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ABSTRACT 
 
This research created a database of financial and non-financial information 
extracted from DataStream, annual reports and accounts, company websites 
and other reputable sources to investigate the incidence of conglomeration 
amongst the largest, by market capitalisation, companies, both 
industrial/manufacturing and service, that comprised the London Stock 
Exchange FTSE100 index at the end of 1993, 1998 and 2003.  
 
Categorising companies according to the 4-category Rumelt-based scheme 
used in previous UK research by Channon (1973, 1978) and Whittington & 
Mayer (2000), this research has found support for the contention, based on 
anecdotal evidence, that conglomeration amongst the FTSE100 has declined, 
especially between 1998 and 2003. Rather than confirming the evolutionary 
flow of companies through the Model of Corporate Development from single 
business to conglomerate strategies, the research shows more companies to 
have retreated to greater focus than advanced to wider diversification. 
Furthermore, the breadth of activities pursued by conglomerates fell through 
the research period and there was also an increase in diversified companies 
with a core activity generating more than 50% of their turnover.        
 
Whilst acknowledging that several conglomerates were created by strong 
business personalities including Lords Hanson and White at Hanson and Sir 
Owen Green at BTR, no strong relationships were found between corporate 
governance and diversification. The enhancement of corporate governance 
Best Practice resulted in improvements across all companies.     
 
Finally, this research suggests performance is not a primary driver of the trend 
towards focus but that financial/market and regulatory, especially competition 
authority, factors led to changes in diversification through a mixture of 
divestment, demerger, capital reduction/downsizing, acquisitions and 
internationalisation. The Model of Corporate Development has become multi-
directional with movements influenced by generic, industry specific and 
company specific factors. There is also an inherent trade-off across 
diversification categories in the potential level of risk, growth, scale and scope 
benefits.     
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1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
This research was undertaken in response to the growing body of anecdotal 
evidence suggesting conglomeration had declined amongst the largest UK 
companies calling into question its continued validity as a corporate strategy. 
The project also sought to bring research into diversification into the 21st 
century adding to extant UK research that ended in 1993 for 
industrial/manufacturing companies and 1974 for service companies.         
 
In a slight departure from prior research which selected the largest UK 
companies by turnover or its equivalent, the population used in this research 
are companies, both industrial/manufacturing and services, quoted on the 
London Stock Exchange and comprising the FTSE100 index; the companies 
with the highest market capitalisations. By extracting relevant financial and 
non-financial information from DataStream, the Financial Times, company 
annual reports and accounts, company websites and other reputable and 
reliable sources a database was created for companies that were constituents 
of the FTSE100 at the end of 1993, 1998 and 2003. The database comprises 
summary profit & loss, balance sheet and ratio information for every year 
available on DataStream and all other information - segmental reports, board 
composition and investor data (share prices, P/E ratios, yields, market 
capitalisations) – for 1993, 1998 and 2003. The segmental data held was 
used to categorise each company according to its degree of diversification in 
1993, 1998 and 2003. The database was mined to produce tables 
summarising diversification, movements between diversification categories, 
breadth of activities, FT classification, corporate governance and performance 
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in 1993, 1998 and 2003. A set of tables was produced for the full FTSE100 
and another for the 54 companies that were constituents of the FTSE100 at 
the end of 1993, 1998 and 2003; the FTSE100 Survivors. In addition, each of 
the tables was split between industrial/manufacturing and service companies.              
 
The results of the research show that conglomeration declined and focus 
increased through the research period amongst the FTSE100 and FTSE100 
Survivors and both the industrial/manufacturing and service sectors. In 
addition, notwithstanding the unobservable effects of company changes to 
their reporting divisions, the breadth of conglomerates‟ activities narrowed 
through the period 1993 to 2003. The greater focus may explain the increase 
in institutional shareholdings in conglomerates through the research period.     
 
Although the research did not originally intend to consider performance in 
detail, in looking for the drivers of the move to greater focus links between 
performance and diversification were investigated; no clear consistent 
significant relationship was found. Similarly, there were no major differences 
between the corporate governance standards of different categories of 
company, although there was a general improvement in line with enhanced 
Best Practice. There was no link between conglomeration and FT 
classification. 
 
The need to identify the drivers of strategic change led to the compilation of 
histories for those companies identified as conglomerates in 1993, 1998 or 
2003. The histories suggest adoption, maintenance and abandonment of 
   3 
conglomeration is driven by a variety of financial/market and regulatory, 
especially competition authority, factors and that the Model of Corporate 
Development needs revision to reflect these forces. The new Model shows 
movement to be two-way and dependent on generic, industry specific and 
company specific drivers.   
 
Overall, this project has brought UK research into diversification into the 21st 
century. Through the creation of a new database, which contains significantly 
more information than has been used in this research and is capable of 
extension/updating, this research has found clear support for the anecdotal 
contention that conglomeration amongst the UK‟s largest, by market 
capitalisation, listed companies has declined substantially. Furthermore, the 
unpopularity of conglomerates is representative of a broader move towards 
greater focus. This research also identified non-performance factors - generic, 
industry specific and company specific - that influence movements, both 
forwards and backwards, through the Model of Corporate Development and 
an inherent trade-off across diversification categories in the potential level of 
risk, growth, scale and scope benefits.                  
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2. INTRODUCTION TO CONGLOMERATION 
This chapter provides an overview of the background that gave rise to this 
research into the incidence and significance of conglomeration amongst the 
largest, by market capitalisation, UK listed companies; constituents of the 
FTSE100 index. By definition, companies covered by this research are major 
contributors to the UK economy and their success or failure has significant 
implications for the nation‟s prosperity. Anecdotal evidence suggests that 
since 1993 fewer of these companies have chosen to either adopt or maintain 
conglomerate strategies although this has yet to be proven by research.           
 
2.1  Overview 
After World War II, encouraged by a number of positive - environmental, 
regulatory and management - factors, the US and the UK saw substantial 
growth in unrelated diversification (conglomeration) in place of focus. 
Companies were following the generally accepted evolutionary path from 
focus to diversification in the Model of Corporate Development (See chart 1). 
Research shows that, largely in response to negative changes in 
financial/market and regulatory factors, US conglomeration stalled in the late 
1970s before reversing through to the end of the millennium. In the UK, while 
similar research suggests growth through to the early 1990s, there is only 
anecdotal evidence that the maturity and decline phases of the conglomerate 
life cycle were experienced thereafter.      
 
In the US, by 1969 the single business industrial/manufacturing companies 
that predominated had become a minority with related and conglomerate 
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companies increasingly pre-eminent accounting for 45% and 19% 
respectively of the Fortune 500 (Rumelt, 1974). The 1980s saw the tide turn 
and by 1990 US companies were retreating from conglomeration seeking a 
return to focus - „sticking to the knitting‟ (Peters & Waterman, 1982, p292-305) 
- that continued through to the new millennium (Franko, 2004). Research by 
Williams, Paez & Sanders (1988) found that, between 1975 and 1984, there 
had been a reduction in the number of businesses managed by US 
conglomerates and that the relatedness between those businesses had 
increased; a clear move to greater focus.      
 
In the UK, limited research shows similar but more restrained post-war growth 
in conglomerate strategies among industrial/manufacturing companies. By 
1970, 6% of the largest 100 companies were conglomerates; a threefold 
increase from 1950 (Channon, 1973). The most recent UK research 
(Whittington & Mayer, 2000) suggests that through the 1980s and early 
1990s, rather than decline as in the US, conglomeration had continued to 
grow reaching 11% by 1983 and 24% by 1993. Anecdotal evidence, including 
the observed retrenchment of conglomerates such as BAT Industries, 
Hanson, BTR and Williams, suggests that since 1993 there has been a 
reappraisal of UK conglomeration as a valid corporate strategy and, as a 
decade earlier in the US, a move toward greater focus. Research has yet to 
prove this to be the case.  
 
This research aims to extend UK research into conglomeration beyond 1993 
to discover what has happened to conglomeration as a corporate strategy and 
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to companies that retained, adopted or abandoned the strategy through to 
2003. Furthermore, recognising that services account for more than half of the 
UK‟s economic activity, this research considers not only 
industrial/manufacturing companies but also service companies which have 
been neglected in research since Channon‟s (1978) work.        
 
This research addresses these issues through the creation and analysis of a 
new and unique database of quantitative and qualitative data on the 100 UK 
companies with the highest market capitalisations; constituents of the London 
Stock Exchange FTSE100 index in 1993, 1998 and 2003.    
 
2.2 Corporate Evolution 
The key model illustrating the evolutionary route taken by companies is shown 
in Chart 1 below and, while accepting that a company may stop at any stage 
or regress, it suggests that unrelated diversification (conglomeration) is the 
final destination. Although the Model does not identify drivers behind a 
company‟s evolution it does show a flow from simplicity – single business - 
through to complexity – conglomeration – with dominant business and related 
diversification as intermediate stages. Many researchers in this field have 
based their expectations regarding corporate evolution on this model. 
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Chart 1: Model of Corporate Development 
 
The original 3-stage model (Scott, 1973) showed single business companies 
developing into dominant business companies before diversifying into related 
businesses. The fourth stage, an option for related diversifiers, unrelated 
diversification (conglomeration) was added by Mintzberg (1979). While this 
extension may be considered logical, it has certainly proved controversial 
given researchers‟ differing and conflicting views as to the sustainability of 
conglomeration as a corporate strategy. Critics of Mintzberg‟s fourth stage cite 
Chandler‟s (1962) belief that conglomeration is unsustainable with companies 
retreating back to related diversification, a view reinforced by Hall & St. John 
(1993) while supporters of Mintzberg champion the views of Channon (1973, 
p238) who couldn‟t countenance a reverse flow in the Model believing that 
“once adopted, the strategy of diversification tended to become 
institutionalised”. This debate highlights a major point regarding the Model 
which, unlike ecological and biological evolution which is based on a premise 
of continual development and improvement, suggests that companies are 
faced with a choice at each stage in their corporate evolution; they can 
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advance to a „higher‟ stage, they can remain where they are or they can 
retreat back to a „lower‟ stage.   
 
Application of the Model to understand how companies have evolved over 
time requires each stage to be clearly defined and, to enable related and 
unrelated diversifiers (conglomerates) to be distinguished, a robust rationale 
to determine relatedness between a company‟s activities; when does a 
related diversifier become a conglomerate? While activity turnovers can 
provide a basis for category definitions, assessing the relatedness between 
activities is more problematic. Furthermore, it is essential to recognise the 
inherent subjectivity in any assessment of relatedness.  
 
While acknowledging alternative approaches to the assessment of 
relatedness, e.g. Prahalad & Hamel‟s (1990) „portfolio of competences‟, there 
appears to be broad agreement between several leading researchers in this 
field as to the most practical approach. Rumelt (1974), Channon (1973, 1978) 
and Whittington & Mayer (2000) consider relatedness between activities to be 
a product or service based concept centred on the question; are there key 
similarities between the products and/or services provided? Given the lack of 
sufficiently detailed publicly available information it is not possible to base 
assessments on commonality of processes and/or capabilities.    
 
In categorising FTSE100 companies, this research has also adopted the 
product/service-based approach and looked for similarities between services 
and/or products in assessing relatedness.   
   9 
2.3 Development and Growth of Conglomeration 
As discussed below, conglomeration was initially a US phenomenon driven by 
several factors that may be considered to have created the ideal conditions 
for companies to grow through diversification.  
 
The 1960s and 1970s saw a peak in mergers and acquisitions activity in the 
US as companies sought ways to grow through the re-investment of surplus 
cash flows generated by their increasingly profitable activities in the post 
World War II growth years. There was a marked reluctance by managers to 
return surplus cash to shareholders and investors encouraged companies to 
retain and invest those funds welcoming conglomeration. Investors had 
become convinced that conglomerates offered growth, increased profitability 
and, as a result, higher dividends and/or capital appreciation. The strong 
investor support for conglomerates is illustrated by Matsusaka (1993) who 
used data from the 1960s and 1970s to show that share prices of US 
companies making unrelated acquisitions appreciated while those of related 
acquirers depreciated. By 1969, 45% of the 500 largest US 
industrial/manufacturing companies were diversified and 19% were 
conglomerates (Rumelt, 1974).    
 
The theoretical justification for growth through diversification is outlined by 
Penrose (1959, p113) who believed that companies with narrow product 
offerings – the single business and dominant business companies of the 
Model for Corporate Development – were constrained in their profit potential 
by market growth limitations and, because of their dependence on a limited 
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range of products/services, were vulnerable to changes in demand and 
competition. Furthermore, she believed that while aggressive competitive 
strategies, e.g. pricing, maintenance of restrictive trade practices and control 
of monopolistic markets, could prolong the success of non-diversified 
companies they did not represent viable long term strategies as competition 
authorities would act to restore the competitive balance in the industries 
and/or markets affected. Antitrust policy and regulatory regimes are seen by 
many as having a strong bearing on diversification. Shleifer & Vishny (1994, 
p405) comment that “…it is hard to believe that diversification would have 
taken the enormous proportions that it did without the prevailing antitrust 
policy”. 
 
In addition to the search for growth and the enthusiastic support of investors, 
there were other drivers behind US conglomeration including the pursuit of 
earnings stability/low risk, the balance in the principal (shareholder)/agency 
(manager) relationship where the balance of power had shifted away from 
owners/shareholders to managers, stock market inefficiencies, tax incentives, 
changes in capital markets increasing the supply/availability of funds, 
increased globalisation and the leveraging of management skills with 
managers believing their skills were effectively generic and could successfully 
be applied to acquisitions regardless of business activity. In his Hubris Theory, 
Roll (1986) attributes much acquisition activity to managements‟ desire for 
power and the greater financial rewards associated with larger companies and 
notes that managers will „take advantage‟ of owner (shareholder) apathy.  
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The post-war growth in the adoption of conglomeration cannot, therefore, be 
adequately explained by a single event but rather by a confluence of 
favourable environmental, regulatory and management circumstances and 
attitudes (managerial, investor and debt holder) that effectively made 
conglomeration appear to be a very attractive strategic option 
 
UK conglomerate growth in the post-war years, albeit slower than in the US, 
was driven by similar factors to those prevailing in the US.  
Table 1: UK Manufacturing Company Diversification, 1950-1993 
 
 19501 19601 19701 19832 19932 
Category No. % No. % No. % No. % No. % 
Single  31 34 18 19 6 6 5 6 3 5 
Dominant 38 41 35 36 34 34 12 16 7 10 
Related  21 23 39 41 54 54 50 67 41 61 
Unrelated  2 2 4 4 6 6 8 11 16 24 
Totals 92 100 96 100 100 100 75 100 67 100 
 
Source: 
1
Channon (1973, p67) 100 largest UK manufacturing companies as in 1969-70, 
2
Whittington & Mayer (2000, p139) UK based companies among largest 100 manufacturers 
as in 1983 and as in 1993. 
 
Channon (1973), in research into diversification undertaken as part of a 
Harvard sponsored programme (Scott, 1973), found there had been a move 
toward diversification, especially related diversification. Between 1950 and 
1970 related diversification increased from 23% to 54% while conglomeration 
increased far more slowly from 2% to 6% which was significantly below the 
19% in the US in 1969. This suggests that, as in the US, UK investors saw 
diversified companies as the 'future' although they appeared reluctant to move 
into unrelated activities. Research under the Harvard programme by Pavan 
(1976) in Italy and Dyas & Thanheiser (1976) in France and Germany also 
suggests growth in UK conglomerates was similar to that in Italy but lagged 
behind France and especially Germany where levels were similar to the US. 
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There was also an increase in conglomeration amongst the largest service 
companies although the most recent UK research is that undertaken by 
Channon (1978).  
Table 2: UK Service Company Diversification, 1950-1974 
 
All Figs % Channon 
Category 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1974 
Single 36 31 23 17 16 16 
Dominant 41 42 46 45 26 16 
Related 17 19 20 26 45 49 
Conglomerate 6 8 11 12 13 19 
Totals 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Companies 69 74 81 91 100 99 
 
Source: Channon (1978, p31) 100 largest UK service companies as in 1973-74.   
 
Channon (1973, p194) suggested the delay, compared to the US, in the UK‟s 
adoption of conglomeration could, in some sectors, have been a result of high 
levels of family ownership or control that “might well have retarded 
diversification”. This „corporate conservatism‟ was overcome as institutional 
shareholdings increased with a consequent divorce of ownership and control 
leading to more professional, rather than family, management. At the same 
time competition, necessarily restricted in the post war years (Scott, 1973), 
began to gather momentum and to drive companies towards diversification, 
typically by acquisition, to achieve growth and stability. Channon (1973, p194) 
summarised the effects of new commercial environment saying that ”The 
onset of competition produced declining financial returns, a worsening stock 
market position, and increased vulnerability. Thus, these companies tried to 
break out from their traditional markets by acquisition”. 
 
It was not until the 1980s, a period that saw the creation through acquisitions 
of several iconic conglomerates including BTR and Hanson, the latter 
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becoming a household name through corporate advertisements on prime-time 
commercial television, that UK conglomeration began to catch up with the US. 
Through to the early 1990s UK investors were staunch supporters of 
conglomerates frequently subscribing for rights and bond issues to provide 
them with new funds for increasingly large acquisitions.  
 
Research by Whittington & Mayer (2000) brought the UK data up to 1993 and 
showed conglomeration amongst the largest industrial companies had 
continued to increase reaching 11% by 1983 and 24% by 1993. This may 
have been the high water mark for UK conglomeration.  
 
2.4 Re-appraisal and Decline of Conglomeration 
In the US, the post-war period saw the creation of many conglomerate groups 
including ITT, GE, Westinghouse, Allied-Signal and Tenneco. These 
conglomerates experienced substantial growth through the 1970s and early 
1980s becoming highly profitable companies, many with global operations, 
creating wealth for their supportive shareholders. However, in the mid-1980s 
several of the favourable conditions that had encouraged conglomerates 
turned neutral and some even became unfavourable. In regulation, the active 
US antitrust polices of the 1960s and 1970s that, by effectively limiting core 
activity growth, contributed to the adoption of conglomeration were replaced 
by the Reagan administration‟s relatively benign laissez-faire policy (Shleifer & 
Vishny, 1991) that allowed greater horizontal acquisitions activity. In addition, 
considerable increases in the volume and intensity of global competition 
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added pressure to focus on core activities to achieve the economies of scale 
that would support price-based competitiveness.   
 
Investor sentiment had also shifted adversely; conglomeration was no longer 
seen as the „best‟ corporate strategy and the inherent complexity of 
conglomerates was seen as a barrier to broker/investor analysis. At a time 
when mastery of a core activity was increasingly regarded as a major 
attribute, conglomerates were criticised as being archetypical „jacks of all 
trades but masters of none‟ with management perceived as being incapable 
of effectively managing disparate activities. Invoking a juggling analogy, the 
more balls a company had in the air the greater the chance that one or more 
would be fumbled or, at worst, dropped! In a stark reversal of the position 
found in the 1960s and 1970s, Morck, Shleifer & Vishny (1990) showed 
related acquisitions yielding stock appreciation and conglomerate acquisitions 
stock depreciation. Institutional investors were also becoming increasingly 
willing, either individually or through associations such as the California Public 
Employees‟ Retirement System (CalPERS) to „flex their muscles‟ and exert 
influence over companies in which they had substantial and growing 
shareholdings and they were less willing to support rights and bond issues 
made to fund conglomerate acquisitions.   
 
The 1980s also saw more critical appraisal of the financial performance of 
conglomerates. Ravenscraft & Scherer (1987) provided evidence that 
conglomerates had failed to produce the financial benefits expected. Evidence 
was also produced questioning the success of conglomerate acquisitions 
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activity; Porter (1987), Ravenscraft & Scherer (1987) and Kaplan & Weisbach 
(1992) showed that acquirers were divesting up to 50% of their acquisitions, 
especially of unrelated businesses, having failed to obtain the benefits they 
had expected. Managers also recognised that many acquisitions made in 
pursuit of conglomeration had actually failed to produce the expected benefits 
and needed to be divested (Jensen, 1991). There was also increasing 
concern that conglomerates were cross-subsidising unattractive and/or 
underperforming activities, some of which may have been acquired in 
diversifying acquisitions, and that managements were failing to ensure their 
portfolio of diverse businesses supported the common goals and objectives of 
the company.  
 
Overall, the disadvantages of conglomeration were increasingly perceived as 
outweighing the advantages. Shleifer & Vishny (1994) succinctly summarise 
this reversal in US opinion of conglomerates. Convinced that conglomeration 
was a fundamentally flawed concept they damningly said that “in our opinion, 
both theory and evidence strongly favour the view that unrelated 
diversification was a mistake from the start” (p409) and “the fact that the 
market thought that conglomerates were a good idea does not mean that they 
were” (p417). Moreover, they saw the 30 year US conglomeration 
phenomenon as “a round trip for corporate America” (p403), and the 1980s as 
bringing “American corporations back to greater specialisation” (p403).  
 
Research by Franko (2004) supports the claims of Shleifer & Vishny (1994) 
that US companies were retreating from conglomeration. Defining a focused 
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company as one with 95% of turnover in one industry, Franko (2004) showed 
that among the largest 12 companies in a broad range of major industries the 
move to focus between 1980 and 2000 was greatest in the US compared to 
Europe and Japan.  
 
In the UK, it was the mid-1990s rather than the mid-1980s that saw many 
hitherto highly successful UK conglomerates change their corporate strategies 
to seek greater focus often achieving change by turning from serial acquisition 
to serial divestment. Several shrank rapidly to a fraction of their peak size and 
some experienced severe financial problems. BTR, for example, declined 
from a position of pre-eminence amongst the top 10 FTSE100 companies in 
the early 1990s to acquisition by Siebe, another FTSE100 company, in 1999 
with the combined group, Invensys, being ejected from the index in 2003. 
Similarly, beginning with the disposal of most of its US business as US 
Industries in 1995, Hanson split itself up by demerging its tobacco (Imperial 
Tobacco), energy (Energy Group) and chemicals (Millennium Chemicals) 
businesses becoming a focused building materials group which, after being 
„exiled‟ for a brief period after the break-up, returned to the FTSE100 until its 
acquisition in 2007 by Heidelberg Cement of Germany.   
 
The experience of the US and UK suggests the corporate strategy of 
conglomeration has a life cycle - development, growth, maturity and decline - 
similar to the generally accepted product life cycle and that the UK has 
followed the US into the decline phase. There are, however, suggestions that 
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this may not be the case and that conglomerates have been unfairly 
maligned. 
  
Whittington (1999) makes a strong case for the „evergreen conglomerate‟ 
suggesting that while some conglomerates may die, e.g. Hanson and BTR, 
others are born to replace them, e.g. Virgin Group. However, Whittington 
(1999) does sound a note of caution recognising the need for conglomerates 
to ensure their diversification is financially sound, doesn‟t create excessive 
(unmanageable) complexity, is commensurate with the talent and ability of its 
managers and that the option to break-up is always recognised as a 
possibility. Conglomerates need to „manage their life span‟ and, where 
necessary commit „corporate euthanasia‟. There is some support for the 
contention that conglomerates have „sell-by dates‟ (Said, 1999).   
 
This view has some support, in a research report into diversified, slightly 
diversified and focused companies in the US, Europe and Asia, the Boston 
Consulting Group (2006) concluded that conglomerates do have a future and 
that their poor status with analysts and investors, especially in Europe where 
they found evidence of a conglomerate discount in valuation, is largely 
unfounded. BCG (2006) found that while, on average over the period 1996-
2005, the relative total shareholder return (RTSR) of focused companies at 
2.19% exceeded that of diversified companies at 1.34%, the average 
performance of focused companies was distorted by a few outstanding 
performers. The research suggested that conglomerates may have actually 
outperformed the majority of focused companies.  
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The lack of UK research into conglomeration since 1993 (Whittington & 
Mayer, 2000) means there is only anecdotal evidence that UK conglomeration 
declined in the mid-1990s and that conglomerates have since unbundled the 
portfolios of unconnected or loosely connected business activities they had 
accumulated over the preceding 10-20 years.    
 
2.5 Factors Influencing Conglomeration 
This research has identified a variety of factors that may influence 
conglomeration. Several of these factors - including risk and stability, 
leveraging management, the role of competition authorities, declining 
industries and growth opportunities, agency (manager/shareholder balance of 
power, management attitudes and science and opportunism/asset-stripping) - 
are discussed in section 3.3.2.2 of chapter 3 – Literature Review. In addition, 
the company histories that comprise chapter 7 – Analysing the Historical 
Record – seek to identify the impact of international rather than product or 
service diversification, the flexibility of companies to change their portfolio of 
business activities and/or their core activity and the changing attitudes of 
investors towards companies pursuing conglomeration. The impact of these 
factors cannot be measured although their existence and potential influence 
at generic, industry or company specific levels has been reflected in 
enhancements to the Model of Corporate Development.       
 
There are also a number of other factors including government policy and the 
reduction of labour and bankruptcy risks which were identified during the 
research but which were felt not to have had a significant impact. Government 
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policy including group tax reliefs, capital allowances (depreciation charges for 
taxation), regional development grants and technology and/or employment-
based incentives may affect corporate investment decisions. However, while 
government policies may provide assistance for companies to invest in their 
existing activities it is unlikely that they provide an incentive to diversify. This 
is especially true since group loss relief restrictions were introduced in the 
1970s/1980s limiting the transferability of tax losses between dissimilar 
businesses. While the relationship between risk and diversification is 
considered in the literature review and subsequent analyses, the specific 
issues of labour risk and bankruptcy risk are not explored in depth. 
Notwithstanding the high levels of UK labour unrest in the 1970s, industrial 
relations difficulties tend to be short term and are unlikely to drive 
conglomeration while the avoidance of bankruptcy may encourage a company 
to change its focus or add related activities rather than to pursue new 
unrelated activities.     
 
The research also considered factors – internal capital markets, complexity, 
accounting rule changes and managerial incentives - that, while potentially 
influential, could not be investigated. We know that internal capital markets 
should, if efficient, ensure returns are maximised by allocating limited capital 
to projects offering the highest returns which has implications for diversifying 
investments. Unfortunately, without details of allocation decisions made by 
companies it is not possible to assess whether or how far the „efficient internal 
capital market‟ hypothesis applies, or the extent to which the allocation 
process plays a role in the pursuit, maintenance or abandonment of 
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conglomeration. Complexity is also an issue for diverse companies which, by 
definition, present greater management challenges than more focused 
businesses. Those companies diversifying by acquisition will also face a 
range of integration problems, including those relating to IT/IS. These 
problems have been mitigated by developments in management science, 
including increasingly sophisticated tools, models and frameworks, and 
greater professionalism. Acknowledging the potential influence of the 
complexity/diversity relationship, the lack of relevant data precludes its 
investigation. The effects of changes in accountancy regulations, notably in 
the recognition of goodwill and the creation and subsequent use of provisions 
relating to acquisitions, have also been identified as impacting diversification 
decisions although the database does not contain sufficiently detailed 
information to assess the effect. Finally, while the attitudes of managers to 
growth, especially in the context of the agency problems created by the 
divorce of ownership and control, were considered the research did not 
specifically investigate whether the granting of stock options and the setting of 
targets governing their exercise influenced diversification decisions. The 
database does include the names of chairmen, CEOs and directors – both 
executive and non-executive - but not their remuneration or incentive 
packages although this data could be added.    
 
The research also investigated whether UK companies had moved towards 
less „pure‟ conglomeration by adopting Asian diversification models where 
networks of companies – Keiretsu in Japan and Chaebol in Korea - may be 
considered quasi-conglomerates.  While UK companies have recognised the 
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benefits of establishing closer long-term relationships backwards to their 
suppliers and forwards to their customers, they have stopped well short of 
formalising those relationships through significant cross-shareholdings or the 
establishment of substantial joint ventures. The cross-shareholdings of 
Guinness and French luxury goods company LVMH (Louis Vuitton Moet 
Hennessey) was an example of the formalisation of corporate co-operation 
although it was reversed following Guinness‟ acquisition of Grand 
Metropolitan in 1997 to create Diageo. The database, which includes details 
of the major (above 3%) shareholders of each FTSE100 company, reflects the 
insignificance of cross-shareholdings.            
 
Finally, the influence of MBOs and MBIs, which have provided ready buyers 
for the unwanted peripheral activities of conglomerates, is discussed as part 
of the debate on corporate refocusing.      
 
2.6 Research Questions 
A review of literature covering diversification and conglomeration amongst US 
and UK companies since World War II suggests the number of large 
industrial/manufacturing companies pursuing the strategy declined 
significantly as the 20th century drew to a close. However, there are 
substantial gaps in our knowledge of conglomeration, especially regarding its 
apparent decline in popularity amongst the largest UK companies, a 
contention supported only by anecdotal evidence in the UK as the most recent 
academic research only covers the period to 1993. This gives rise to the 
central question addressed by this research: what has happened to 
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conglomerates, not only those carrying out industrial/manufacturing activities 
but also those, previously neglected in research, concentrating on services, 
and the strategy of conglomeration in the UK since 1993?    
  
From this central question flow the questions specifically addressed by this 
research. First, is there support for the anecdotal contention that the incidence 
of conglomeration amongst the UK‟s leading companies has fallen? Second, 
how have companies moved – forward, backward or not at all - through the 
Model of Corporate Development and what implications does that have for the 
Model‟s continued validity as illustrating the accepted evolutionary path for 
companies? Third, has there been a general move towards greater focus 
amongst UK companies and has their breadth of activities narrowed? Fourth, 
is there a link between dominant personalities and weaknesses in corporate 
governance and conglomeration or was it coincidence that some of the UK‟s 
largest conglomerates broke-up after the retirements of the strong 
chairmen/CEOs that had created them? Fifth, if conglomeration has declined, 
what were the drivers, including performance, behind the abandonment of the 
strategy? Is the financial performance of a conglomerate related to the 
breadth of its activities and is there support for the a priori assumption that 
conglomerate performance is worse than that of other categories of 
company? Finally, sixth, do conglomerates have a future, have they a „raison 
d‟être‟ in the 21st century and, if so, what might it be? 
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2.7 Contribution 
Through the creation of a new and unique database of financial and non-
financial information on FTSE100 companies, this thesis adds to a relatively 
sparse, as compared to the US, UK literature and breaks new ground by 
bringing research into UK conglomeration into the 21st century. It goes beyond 
the most recent UK research which covered the period 1983 to 1993 
(Whittington & Mayer, 2000) and adds to a literature that has data going back 
as far as 1950 (Channon, 1973 & 1978).  
 
Rather than use turnover to determine inclusion in the population to be 
investigated, this research uses membership of the London Stock Exchange 
FTSE100 index; the 100 companies with the highest market capitalisations. 
Acknowledging that some FTSE100 companies, notably banks, do not have 
turnovers in the accepted sense, given the size of constituent companies 
there would be few differences with a list of UK companies with the highest 
turnovers. Using the FTSE100 means that comprehensive information is 
widely available on all companies and it is possible to gauge investor attitudes 
towards them. Notwithstanding small differences in populations, the research 
identifies trends over the 53 year period from 1950 to 2003.  
 
Recognising the importance to the UK economy of the service sector, this 
research includes both industrial/manufacturing and service companies unlike 
the overwhelming majority of prior research which, with the exception of 
Channon (1978), excluded services. Conglomeration amongst services is 
therefore researched for the first time since the early 1970s since which time 
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there has been a huge increase in the scale, scope and economic importance 
of UK service businesses.   
 
The research goes further than its predecessors as, using Herfindahl indices 
and distributions of turnover across primary activities or groups of related 
activities, it seeks to identify changes in the breadth of activities in corporate 
portfolios and, through a range of indicators, relationships between 
performance and diversification between 1993 and 2003. Furthermore, 
against a background of significant changes in corporate governance Best 
Practice including the LSE‟s Combined Code on Corporate Governance, the 
research seeks to identify links between corporate governance standards and 
the pursuit of conglomeration. Similarly, recognising the increased pro-activity 
of institutional investors, the research considers whether the existence and/or 
aggregate size of major, typically institutional, shareholdings is different for 
companies in different diversification categories which may signify levels of 
support for conglomeration. Finally, by identifying key drivers behind the 
adoption, retention and abandonment of conglomeration by 22 FTSE100 
companies the research considers how the Model of Corporate Development 
may have changed since conglomeration was added in 1979.      
 
In summarising this research, the future of conglomeration as a valid 
corporate strategy is discussed. The research speculates that if „traditional‟ 
public company conglomerates are becoming an endangered species, their 
place may be taken by private equity companies – „New Conglomerates‟ - that 
effectively trade in companies holding none for the long term.     
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2.8 Thesis Outline 
This thesis is organised as follows: 
 
Chapter 3 – Literature Review – critically examines extant literature to 
provide an understanding of how and why conglomeration grew in the US and 
the UK following World War II and stagnated and declined in the US in the 
1980s. The review identifies gaps in UK research to be filled by this work and 
summarises its contribution to knowledge of conglomeration.      
 
Chapter 4 – Hypotheses – distils questions raised by the literature review 
into a series of hypotheses which are grouped under the following broad 
headings: incidence, breadth of activities, performance and corporate 
governance (leadership, board composition and shareholder influence).  
 
Chapter 5 – Methodology – details the approach taken to test the 
hypotheses. It explains the principles followed in creating a unique database 
of financial and non-financial information on FTSE100 companies and 
discusses the considerable, but not insurmountable, problems inherent in 
research into such a disparate collection of industrial/manufacturing and 
service companies as those that comprise the index. The chapter also 
discusses the selection of appropriate definitions and data sources for use in 
creating a consistent and robust database and of categorisation schemes and 
statistical techniques for its analysis and interrogation given the limitations of 
UK financial data in terms of availability and level of detail, as compared to the 
US. The concerns associated with using accounting data gathered over a 10 
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year period which has seen regulatory change are discussed as is the 
subjectivity inherent in assessments of the relatedness between company 
activities when assigning diversification categories.     
 
Chapter 6 – Analysing the Accounting Record – shows quantitative and 
definitive output from interrogation of the database designed to provide 
answers to the questions encapsulated in the hypotheses. The chapter 
includes a number of tables and charts together with statistical analysis and 
explanatory narrative. Wherever possible/practical, specific companies are 
used to illustrate points/issues raised by the analyses with company histories 
included in chapter 7.  
 
Chapter 7 – Analysing the Historical Record – is qualitative and discursive 
and uses short company histories to illustrate and examine the evolutionary 
path followed since 1993 by conglomerates and the external drivers behind 
changes, if any, in their diversification strategies.  
 
Chapter 8 – Conclusions – pulls together key points from the analyses to 
answer the questions addressed by this research. Changes/trends in 
conglomeration since 1950 are discussed as are the drivers behind decisions 
to adopt, maintain or abandon conglomeration. The implications for the Model 
of Corporate Development are also discussed as is the outlook for 
conglomerates in the 21st century and the new corporate forms it may take.      
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3. LITERATURE REVIEW  
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter will outline, discuss and critically assess relevant published 
literature to identify gaps in our knowledge of UK conglomeration and also of 
the drivers behind corporate strategy decisions to adopt, maintain or abandon 
conglomeration. The discussion will start with the Model of Corporate 
Development and go on to look at how and why companies adopted 
conglomerate corporate strategies in the US and the UK over the second half 
of the 20th century. The review will consider the drivers - environmental, 
regulatory and management - behind the adoption of conglomerate strategies 
and how substantial changes in the business world in the late 20th century 
may have eroded many of those drivers making conglomerates an 
increasingly rare phenomenon.  
 
The review will undoubtedly have a US bias as there is considerable disparity 
in the volume of research work undertaken and published in the US, where 
the topic has received significant attention, and the UK and Europe where it 
remains relatively under-researched although there are several key 
papers/books that allow trends through the second half of the 20th century to 
be identified. Research into conglomerates in Asia is also comparatively rare 
although that may be due to difficulties rooted in economic underdevelopment 
and the private status of most companies in that region.  
 
The primary UK research is that of Channon (1973) covering the largest UK 
manufacturing/industrial companies, by turnover, through the period 1950 to 
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1970 and Whittington & Mayer (2000) covering a similar group of companies 
through the 10 years from 1983 to 1993. Together their research covers the 
period 1950 to 1993. This research takes up the story in 1993 and moves it 
forward to 2003 with the aim of bringing our understanding of the 
conglomerate „phenomenon‟ into the 21st century.   
 
Finally, this review will highlight the concentration, with a few notable 
exceptions (Channon, 1978), of extant research on manufacturing /industrial 
companies; service companies have effectively been ignored and little is 
known about their diversification strategies. In his US research into 
diversification and the sources of potential benefits to companies offering 
„search‟ and/or „experience‟ services, Nayyar (1993, p569) recognised the 
importance of the service sector which in the early 1990s, he noted, 
“accounted for 75 percent of employment, 65 percent of gross national 
product, and nearly 90 percent of new jobs” in the US. Similarly, over the last 
quarter of the 20th century services have grown to account for significantly 
more than 50% of UK economic activity as determined by Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP). The size and economic contribution of the service sector is 
reflected in the composition of the FTSE100 index; service companies 
account for over 50%, both in number and value, of the index. To restrict the 
research to only manufacturing companies would be to effectively ignore over 
half of UK economic activity. This neglect of service companies represents a 
significant gap in our knowledge which this research aims to fill. 
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3.2 Model of Corporate Development  
The Model of Corporate Development provides a clear framework into which 
companies may be placed according to their degree of diversification. The 
Model establishes a simple evolutionary path for companies based on 
changes in their degree of diversification with, at one extreme, simple single 
business companies and at the other, complex unrelated diversified 
businesses (conglomerates) with dominant business and related diversified 
companies representing intermediate steps. The Model is consistent with the 
taxonomy of diversification originally designed by Leonard Wrigley in his 1970 
Harvard doctoral thesis (Divisional Autonomy and Diversification) and further 
developed/extended by Richard Rumelt (1974) and used in the overwhelming 
majority of research work into corporate diversification.   
 
The original Model developed by Scott (1973) comprised only three stages 
and showed single business companies growing into dominant business 
companies as new, initially peripheral and usually related, activities are added 
with further development into an unrelated diversified company as those, and 
possibly further new, activities account for an increasing proportion of total 
activity. The original Model did not distinguish between related and unrelated 
(conglomerate) diversification and also showed movements in only one 
direction suggesting reversals were rare.  
 
Mintzberg (1979) added a further stage to the original model - unrelated 
diversification (conglomeration) - believing that related diversifiers would 
   30 
continue to seek profitable growth opportunities wherever they may arise and 
would, as a consequence, move into new unrelated activities.  
 
Chart 1: Model of Corporate Development 
 
While a logical extension, Mintzberg‟s (1979) fourth stage has not been 
universally accepted. Supporters cite Channon‟s (1973, p238) belief that 
diversification was effectively irreversible while opponents, including Hall & St. 
John (1993), reference Chandler (1962) who believed conglomeration to be 
unsustainable with a retreat back to related diversification almost inevitable.  
 
Further, more recent support for Mintzberg has come from Kay (1995a) who 
believes conglomerates are the ultimate company form and rightly considered 
as the fourth and final stage in the Model. However, research has shown the 
dynamism of the conglomerate category with companies entering and leaving 
suggesting that retreat does happen. This research suggests that the Model 
be revised to reflect that dynamism and two-way flow.      
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The prevailing opinion in the 1960s and 1970s was in favour of this 
evolutionary path towards related diversification and is summed up by 
comments attributed by Grant & Thomas (1988, p68) to Caves (1980) who 
said of relevant 1970s Harvard Business School research that there was "a 
consistent trend in corporate development in the USA and Western Europe 
that pointed towards the diversified divisionalised corporation as the highest 
evolutionary form of business enterprise". 
 
While there is general acceptance that the Model reflects the path to be 
followed by a majority of growing companies, it is acknowledged that there are 
exceptions where companies either miss stages, e.g. achieving conglomerate 
status without having become a related diversifier, or deliberately choose not 
to progress beyond a particular stage, e.g. staying as related diversifier. 
Therefore, it is important to note that progression through all stages is not 
automatic or necessary. Furthermore, the Model also operates in reverse 
where companies, through sale, divestment or demerger, retreat towards 
greater focus in their activities.  
  
In the UK, research by both Channon (1973) and Whittington & Mayer (2000) 
considered the stability of companies within each diversification category and 
also movements within categories. Channon (1973) showed relatively few 
companies abandoning conglomeration to return to the related diversification, 
dominant business or single business categories in the period up to 1970. 
Similarly, Whittington & Mayer (2000) showed that in the latest period covered 
by their research (1983 to 1993), the proportion of conglomerates amongst 
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the largest industrial/manufacturing companies increased steadily from 11% to 
24% and very few conglomerates abandoned their strategy.  
  
Despite finding growth in conglomeration and stability amongst 
conglomerates, Whittington & Mayer (2000, p58) expressed their support for 
those believing conglomerates were unsustainable claiming that  
“….essentially the conglomerate is a freak of nature, too unprofitable to 
survive”. Whittington & Mayer (2000, p127/8) summarised their views on the 
longevity of conglomerate strategies by endorsing Dosi et al (1992) saying 
that “The orthodox resource-based view is hard on conglomerates, 
stigmatising them as „hopeful monsters‟. Our own view is more appreciative of 
the short run economic advantages available for corporate relationships, but 
sceptical about the longevity of the top management resources capable of 
exploiting them. In both these views, however, we should expect a reverse 
flow out of the conglomerate category, towards either greater focus or greater 
relatedness. Otherwise, conglomerates are likely to fail altogether”. 
Whittington & Mayer did refer (p128) to comments by Kay (1995a) claiming 
“robustness for the conglomerate” and suggesting that its key advantage of 
reducing risk through diversification created stability and a tendency towards 
„lock-in‟ for the conglomerate corporate strategy but still felt the strategy to be 
unsustainable. This suggests that investors, while welcoming the potential for 
earnings stability offered by conglomerates, still expect them to provide an 
acceptable level of return and will not support them if those stable earnings 
are at too low a level.   
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If Whittington & Mayer‟s (2000) pessimistic view of the future for 
conglomerates is correct, the growth in conglomeration in large UK 
industrial/manufacturing companies experienced through to 1993 should have 
been followed by a period of stagnation before a fall through the final years of 
the 20th century and the beginning of the new millennium. However, 
Whittington & Mayer (2000) make no predictions as to the likely speed of any 
change in the incidence of conglomeration which is likely to be affected by 
environmental, regulatory and managerial factors. This research will show 
how companies have moved through the Model of Corporate Development 
since 1993.        
 
3.3 History of Conglomeration  
3.3.1 Overview 
The growth in conglomeration may be traced back to the 1960s. Before then, 
companies retained focus limiting expansion – organic and/or acquisitive – to 
activities in the same or similar industry segments. Some became related 
diversifiers but very few added unrelated activities to become conglomerates. 
These horizontal (acquisition of businesses in the same industry) or vertical 
(acquisition of supplier or consumer businesses) acquisitions, frequently 
justified in terms of economies of scale/scope, created several large well-
known groups including Ford and General Motors: the core activity of both 
companies remained the design and manufacture of motor vehicles although 
both added 'related' activities including automotive component manufacture. A 
prime UK example is the chemical company ICI (formerly Imperial Chemical 
Industries) which became a related diversifier on its creation in 1927 by the 
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merger of several UK chemical companies each focused on different chemical 
products.  
 
The 1960s saw conglomeration gain acceptance as a valid corporate strategy. 
Smith & Schreiner (1969, p413) summed up the favourable opinion-of-the-day 
of conglomerates commenting that "…one of the more remarkable 
developments within finance during the current [1960s] decade has been the 
rapid emergence of the conglomerate type of firm. Viewed internally, the 
conglomerate phenomenon has proven of great interest to academicians 
studying economies of scale for both human and non-human resources, while 
from an external focus, conglomerates represent a new type of investment 
opportunity".  
 
The preferred route to conglomeration was by acquisition. Mueller (1969) 
quotes US data published in 1967 by the Antitrust Sub-committee of the 
Committee on the Judiciary (Celler-Kefauver Act: Sixteen Years of 
Enforcement) showing a clear trend toward conglomeration. The report 
showed the percentage of large company (assets over $10m) acquisitions 
categorised as conglomerate increased from 51% to 71% between 1950 and 
1966 while horizontal mergers fell from 40% to 14% in the same period. 
Gaughan (1999, p30) notes that the third 20th century US merger wave - 
between 1965 and 1969 - is often called the conglomerate merger period: "the 
FTC reported that 80% of the mergers that took place in the 10-year period 
between 1965 and 1975 were conglomerate mergers" (Statistical Report on 
Mergers and Acquisitions, Federal Trade Commission, Washington D.C., 
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1977). Gaughan (1999) uses ITT as an example of a US company that 
aggressively pursued a conglomerate strategy in the 1960's acquiring "Avis 
Rent-a-Car, Sheraton Hotels, Continental Baking and other far-flung 
enterprises such as restaurant chains, consumer credit agencies, home 
building companies and airport parking firms". By 1969, in the US the single 
business companies that predominated had become a minority with related 
and unrelated (conglomerate) diversified companies increasingly pre-eminent; 
19% of Fortune 500 industrial/manufacturing companies were conglomerates 
(Rumelt, 1974).  
 
In the 1980s the tide turned and US companies began to refocus retreating 
from conglomeration back towards related diversified, dominant and single 
business strategies. Lee & Cooperman (1989, p45) summarise the 
conglomerate „bubble‟ in the US as comprising 3 stages, “1. The 
conglomerate wave, 1955-1968, when new conglomerates, fed by the 
expansion of the 1960s, naively yet feverishly acquired firms in unrelated 
fields, 2. A period of re-evaluation, 1969-1976, during which conglomerates 
began to lose profitability as a result of the recession in the mid-1970s, and 3. 
a third merger wave, 1977-1980s, seeing the emergence of professional 
managers, the entry of more conservative firms, and a corporate 
repositioning/restructuring of many mature conglomerates”. The US 
conglomerates of the 1980s were significantly different from their 1970s 
predecessors. According to Lee & Cooperman (1989, p51) the 1980s 
conglomerate had lower gearing, was less diverse and operated in fewer 
industries than in the 1970s. ITT, the company singled out by Gaughan as 
   36 
early adopter of conglomeration, was one of the first to reverse its strategy 
achieving focus by splitting itself into several independent businesses. 
 
The UK saw similar growth in conglomerate strategies, albeit around 10 years 
later than in the US. By 1970 6% of manufacturing/industrial companies were 
conglomerates compared to only 2% in 1950 (Channon, 1973). Research by 
Utton (2001) showed that while the UK had seen increased levels of 
acquisitions activity between 1945 and 1965, it had been predominantly 
horizontal increasing concentration across manufacturing industry rather than 
creating conglomerates. The UK also lagged behind some of the major 
European economies in its adoption of conglomeration; in 1950 only 2% of 
UK‟s leading non-financial companies were conglomerates compared to 4% in 
France and 7% in Germany and in 1970 the UK‟s 6% compared to 10% in 
France and 18% in Germany (Dyas & Thanheiser, 1976). Only in Italy were 
the 1950 and 1970 levels of conglomeration similar to that amongst UK 
companies.   
 
The most recent research (Whittington & Mayer, 2000) suggests further 
growth in conglomeration through to the early 1990s which contrasts to the 
decline seen in the US. In 1983, 11% of the UK‟s largest manufacturing 
companies, by turnover, were conglomerates (Whittington & Mayer, 2000) but 
by 1993 that figure had risen to 24%. Notwithstanding differences in 
definitions of a conglomerate, according to Whittington & Mayer (2000) growth 
in the UK exceeded that in Germany which increased from 25% to 32% and 
France which increased from 12% to 14%. In 1993, the refocusing strategies 
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prevailing in the US in the 1980s had yet to be adopted by UK conglomerates. 
However, anecdotally, refocusing in the UK has occurred in the mid to late 
1990s following a critical reappraisal of conglomeration with many seeking 
focus through divestment and floatation of peripheral activities. Research has 
yet to prove this to be the case.  
 
3.3.2 Growth 
3.3.2.1 Converts to Conglomeration 
The post World War II period saw unprecedented growth in conglomeration in 
the US where between 1949 and 1969 the percentage of conglomerates 
amongst the largest industrial/manufacturing companies increased from 3% to 
19%. In contrast, only 6% of the same group of UK companies were 
conglomerates in 1970, up from 2% in 1950 (Channon, 1973). However, the 
percentages of companies categorised as being diversified - related and 
conglomerate – remained similar rising from 25% to 60% in the UK and from 
30% to 64% in the US between 1949/50 and 1969/70. This suggests that, 
while UK and US companies had embraced diversification at a similar rate, 
fewer UK companies were willing to take the final step to conglomeration.  
 
The following table draws on the work of several leading researchers to 
present a comparison of the strategies adopted by non-financial companies in 
the US and the major European economies of the UK, France, Germany and 
Italy in 1949/50 and 1969/70.   
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Table 3: Comparisons of Changes in Strategies of Leading Non-financial 
Companies in US and Europe, 1949/50-1969/70 
 
  No. of % by Categoryc Total % 
Country Year Compsa Single Dominant Related Unrelated Diversd 
US 1949 500b 35 35 27 3 30 
 1969 500b 6 29 45 19 64 
UK 1950 92 34 41 23 2 25 
 1970 100 6 34 54 6 60 
France 1950 100 42 21 33 4 37 
 1970 100 16 32 42 10 52 
Germany 1950-55 99 35 26 32 7 39 
 1970 100 22 22 38 18 56 
Italy 1950 84 30 24 43 3 46 
 1970 100 10 33 52 5 57 
 
Notes: 
a Whilst the above table shows similar percentages of diversified - related and 
unrelated - companies in each category, the numbers of companies surveyed 
varies significantly from country to country. The US analysis is based on samples 
drawn from the largest 500 companies while the European data is drawn from a 
maximum of 100 of the largest companies. It is likely that beyond the limited 
European sample companies, the incidence of diversification would be 
significantly lower than that amongst the largest 100 as represented in the table. 
b Rumelt's procedure is based on a sample taken from the largest 500 companies for 
each year (1974, Appendix A).   
c Country percentages may not total 100% due to rounding. 
d Total diversification is the total of the related and unrelated columns. 
 
Sources: US - Rumelt (1974, p51, Table 2.2); UK - Channon (1973, p67, Table 3-2); France – 
Dyas & Thanheiser (1976, p186, Table 12.1 and p191, Table 12.4); Germany – Dyas & 
Thanheiser (1976, p72, Table 6.4); Italy – Pavan (1976, p257, Table 4). 
 
The table appears to show that with increases from 7% to 18% in Germany 
and from 4% to 10% in France, those countries led in the adoption of 
conglomeration in Europe between 1950 and 1970. German adoption rates 
were not far behind those of the US. As similar category definitions have been 
used by researchers in each country, pan-European and European-US 
comparisons are valid. However, the lower number of companies included in 
the European studies may raise questions regarding comparability with US 
research depending on the equivalence between the largest 500 US and 100 
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European companies. Overall, in Europe the post-war trend was away from 
focus and towards diversification as the following chart shows. 
Chart 2: Diversification in Post-War France, Germany and the UK 
 
Sources: Whittington & Mayer (2000, p144). Original sources - UK 1950-70, Channon (1973); 
France 1950-70 & Germany 1950-70, Dyas & Thanheiser (1976); All 1983-1993, Whittington 
& Mayer (2000). 
 
The growth in US conglomeration continued through the 1970s. Research by 
Allen (1984) cited and tabulated by Scherer & Ross (1990, p157) shows 
clearly the continued and steady increase in conglomerate acquisitions, as 
compared to horizontal, vertical, product extension or market extension 
acquisitions, after 1970. The following table shows that between 1972 and 
1979, conglomerate acquisitions accounted for 45.5%, its highest post-war 
level, of the total assets of manufacturing and minerals companies acquired 
with conglomerate transactions being defined as those where there were no 
complementarities between the activities of the acquiring or acquired 
companies. In the immediate post-war period, 1948-55, conglomerates 
accounted for only 10.1% of acquisition asset values compared to horizontal 
39.0% and product extension 36.1% but by 1972-79 horizontal and product 
extension acquisitions had fallen to only 14.9% and 28.2% respectively.    
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Table 4: Distribution of Large Manufacturing and Minerals Company 
Assets Acquired, by Type of Merger, in the US, 1948-1979 
 
 Percentage of Total Assets Acquired 
Type of Merger 1948-55 1956-63 1964-71 1972-79 
Horizontal 39.0 18.7 12.0 14.9 
Vertical 12.7 20.0 6.6 8.3 
Product Extension 36.1 36.9 38.9 28.2 
Market Extension 2.1 6.7 7.7 3.0 
Pure Conglomerate 10.1 17.7 34.8 45.5 
 
Source: Scherer & Ross (1990, p157) 
 
While conglomeration stalled in the US in the 1980s, research suggests it 
continued to grow in the UK through to 1993. This time lag between the US 
and UK peaks in conglomeration may be due to differences in the business 
environment, notably competition legislation and its effective implementation 
and/or management and investor/market attitudes.    
 
As the following table shows, by 1970, according to Channon (1973), 63% of 
the UK‟s largest industrial/manufacturing companies had been diversified but, 
according to Whittington & Mayer (2000) who used the same categorisation 
methodology as Channon (1973), by 1983 that had risen to 77% and by 1993 
to 85%. The increase in the percentage of conglomerates was even more 
pronounced rising from only 6% in 1970 to 11% in 1983 and 24% by 1993. By 
1993, the single business and dominant business categories had fallen to 
their lowest levels, 5% and 10% respectively. In 1993 at 61% the related 
diversified category was also above its 1950 level of 57% but below its 1983 
peak of 67% suggesting more companies had moved through that category 
and become conglomerates rather than remain as related diversifiers. This is 
consistent with the increase in conglomeration.    
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Table 5: Diversification Trends for Domestic Top 100 Industrial Firms in 
the United Kingdom (Classification according to Channon)a 
 
Category 1950b 1960b 1970 1983 1993 
Single 24 18 6 6.7 4.5 
Dominant 50 36 32 16.7 10.4 
Related Diversified 27 48 57 66.7 61.2 
Unrelated Diversified - - 6 10.7 23.9 
 
Note: 
a The figures for 1950, 1960 and 1970 in the above table differ slightly from those in 
similar tables in Channon's (1973) work. The differences are not material and do 
not alter trends. 
b Related Diversified figures include Unrelated Diversified for 1950 and 1960. 
 
Source: Whittington & Mayer (2000, p139) 
 
The US and UK research noted above shows that conglomeration amongst 
UK companies did not reach the levels seen in the US in 1969 - 19% - until 
the early 1990s. The late adoption of conglomeration in the UK may be 
explained by a number of environmental, regulatory and management factors 
that were markedly different to those influencing the US. Caves (1980) 
suggested a number of reasons for the delayed adoption of diversification in 
Europe: 
 Restriction of horizontal mergers (Channon, 1973, p90), 
 Corporate „freedom‟ limited by regulation and bureaucracy,   
 Massive demands of post-war reconstruction which was most needed in 
Europe, 
 Maintenance of old corporate structures; adoption of multi-divisional 
structures was not widespread amongst UK companies until the 1970s, 
 Continuing family ownership structures. 
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UK Conglomeration, 1950-70 (Channon, 1973 & 1978) 
Channon‟s (1973) initial research covered 1950 to 1970 and the UK‟s largest 
manufacturing companies, both public and private, as measured by turnover 
and identified using The Times 500 list for 1969-70. Notwithstanding the 
difficulties inherent in categorising service companies, given the relatively 
small size of the service sector, excluding nationalised utilities, in the mid 20th 
century the concentration of research into the industrial/manufacturing sector 
was not surprising. 
Table 6: Classifications of UK Manufacturing Companies by Strategy in 
1950, 1960 & 1970 
 
 1950 1960 1970 
Category No. % No. % No. % 
Single Product 31 34 18 19 6 6 
Dominant Product 38 41 35 36 34 34 
Related Product 21 23 39 41 54 54 
Unrelated Product 2 2 4 4 6 6 
Totals 92 100 96 100 100 100 
 
Source: Channon (1973, p67) 100 largest UK manufacturing companies as in 1969-70. 
 
In addition to analysing the distribution of company strategies in 1970, 
Channon (1973) also analysed the same companies‟ strategies 10 and 20 
years earlier, i.e. in 1950 and 1960. Using the Model of Corporate 
Development Channon tracked movements between categories over the 
period 1950 to 1970 as the chart on the following page shows: 
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Chart 3 - Number and Direction of UK Corporate Strategy Changes, 
1950-70 
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Source: Channon (1973, p78) 
 
The chart shows, only 3 companies took the final step to conglomeration. 
Although 20 companies had moved from the single to dominant business 
categories and 26 from the dominant business to related diversified 
categories only 1 company had taken the final step and become a 
conglomerate. A second company had made the „double jump‟ moving from 
the dominant business to conglomerate category and another company had 
made the „triple jump‟ from single business company to conglomerate. As only 
2 companies had made double or triple jumps it appears that between 1950 
and 1970 progress through the Model was evolutionary rather than 
revolutionary. Channon (1973) did note movements against the 'normal' flow, 
i.e. back toward greater focus, between 1950 and 1970, but they were very 
few, only 3, in number. 
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The chart shows the overwhelming number of movements between categories 
to be consistent with the logical strategic development of companies as per 
the Model of Corporate Development: initial growth in a single business, 
expansion into one or more minor, usually related, businesses with the core 
activity remaining dominant followed by development into an unrelated 
business as the non-dominant business activity becomes larger. While 
Channon does not list the companies categorised as conglomerates in 1950 
and 1960, he does those in 1970; Rank Organisation, Reckitt & Colman, 
Sears Holdings, Slater Walker Securities, Standard Telephones & Cables and 
Thomas Tilling.  
 
A review of the subsequent development of Channon‟s 6 1970 conglomerates 
raises questions over the strategy‟s durability. Slater Walker Securities, 
Thomas Tilling, Sears Holdings and Standard Telephones & Cables have all 
lost their independence. Slater Walker, an industrial conglomerate in 1970, 
became an investment bank and was rescued in 1975 from near collapse 
during the UK‟s secondary banking crises receiving a government loan of 
£70m. The company changed its name to Britannia Arrow then to Invesco 
and, following a merger with AIM, to Amvescap, under which name it re-
entered the FTSE100 remaining a constituent until transferring its listing to the 
US in 2007. Thomas Tilling was acquired by BTR in 1984 and Sears Holdings, 
the retail group built up by Sir Charles Clore, was acquired for £549m in 1999 
by JIL Ltd, an investment vehicle owned by retail entrepreneur Philip Green 
and financially supported by the reclusive Barclay brothers. Sears was 
subsequently profitably split up the major disposals being the sale of the 
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Freemans mail order business to Otto Versand of Germany, the sale of high 
street fashion retailers Wallis, Warehouse, Miss Selfridge, Richards and Outfit 
to Arcadia (owned by Sir Philip Green‟s family) and the sale of the 
childrenswear retailer Adams to its management. Standard Telephones & 
Cables was acquired in 1991 by Nortel Corporation a wholly owned subsidiary 
of Canada‟s Northern Telecom. Of the 2 surviving companies, Rank remains a 
conglomerate albeit one that has reduced in both size and scope and fallen 
out of the FTSE100 and Reckitt & Colman, which acquired A. Benckiser of the 
Netherlands in 1999 to become Reckitt Benckiser, is a dominant business 
company and an FTSE100 constituent.    
 
Channon (1978) also researched diversification amongst the largest UK 
service companies as measured by turnover and identified using The Times 
1000 list for 1973-74, and found that conglomeration had increased at a much 
faster rate than amongst industrial/manufacturing companies although the 
incidence of related diversification was lower. In 1950 only 6% of service 
companies were conglomerates and by 1974 that had risen to 19% while the 
percentage of related diversifiers had increased from 17% to 49%. The 
incidence of both single business and dominant business companies fell over 
the same period from 36% to 16% and from 41% to 16% respectively.   
 
UK Conglomeration, 1970-93 (Whittington & Mayer, 2000) 
Channon‟s (1973) research into industrial/manufacturing companies was 
effectively brought up to date by Whittington & Mayer (2000) who covered the 
period from 1983 to 1993 and used the Times 1000 lists to identify the largest 
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UK based manufacturing companies in those years. To maintain longitudinal 
consistency and comparability and identify trends back to 1950, they retained 
Channon's (1973) categorisation scheme, which in turn was based on Rumelt 
(1974), although, to reduce subjectivity in assessing/categorising companies, 
where Channon had worked alone they used 2 independent researchers and 
called on an expert in the field to arbitrate where there was disagreement. The 
expert was only needed to arbitrate in 7% of cases, the 93% level of 
agreement suggesting categorisation to be fairly straightforward and 
unambiguous. Again following Channon (1973), Whittington & Mayer (2000) 
used the Model of Corporate Development to track movements between 
categories over 2 time periods, 1970-1983 and 1983-1993. However, unlike 
Channon (1973) who retained the same population of companies and tracked 
them through from 1950 to 1970, Whittington & Mayer (2000) allowed for 
changes in the population, i.e. entries and exits from the population of the 
largest, by turnover, UK industrial/manufacturing companies.        
 
Whittington & Mayer (2000) found the 1970s and early 1980s to have been a 
period of stability for related diversifiers with 26 companies, 52% of the 50 
companies in the category in 1970, remaining in that category between 1970 
and 1983. Given the dire economic performance of the UK through this 
period, which included a prolonged and deep recession, low corporate growth 
would have contributed to that stability. Despite this stability, the category also 
saw the most entries and exits (a net 9 external exits balanced by a net 9 
internal entries) with the largest internal movement, 9 companies, coming 
from the dominant business category. However, as was the case between 
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1950 and 1970, related diversifiers were markedly reluctant to take the final 
step to conglomeration with none of them doing so between 1970 and 1983. 
The net increase of 2 in the conglomerate category was due to entries and 
exits from the population rather than changes of strategy by companies within 
the population in 1970; the net internal movement was 0.     
Chart 4 - Number and Direction of UK Corporate Strategy Changes, 
1970-83 
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Note: Figures in parentheses are the number of companies remaining in the category 
in 1970 and 1983.  
 
Source: Whittington & Mayer (2000, p140) 
 
The following table summarises the movements noted in the above chart; 
internal changes are those between categories and external changes are 
entries and exits from the population of the largest, by turnover, UK 
manufacturing companies. 
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Table 7: Strategy Changes of Largest UK Industrial Companies 1970-83 
 
Categories 
Strategies (Channon Basis) Analysis of Chg 
1970 1983 Change External Int. 
No. % No. % No. % In Out Net 
Single 5 6 5 6 0 0 1 (3) 2 
Dominant 25 29 12 16 (13) (13) 3 (5) (11) 
Related 50 58 50 67 0 9 9 (18) 9 
Unrelated 6 7 8 11 2 4 5 (3) 0 
Totals 86 100 75 100 (11) 0 18 (29) 0 
 
Source: Extracted from Whittington & Mayer (2000) 
 
As with the earlier research by Channon (1973), the internal movements are 
almost all evolutionary, i.e. one category only. However, one company – BAT 
Industries – was found to have made the „triple jump‟ to conglomeration from 
the single business category. BAT Industries‟ move reflected its acquisition of 
paper manufacturers Wiggins-Teape and Appleton and the retailer Argos in 
an attempt to become less reliant on the declining tobacco industry. 
Furthermore, British Insulated Callenders Cables (BICC) made the „double 
jump‟ from dominant business company to conglomerate as it diversified away 
from engineering expanding its construction activities with the acquisition of 
Balfour Beatty. The net forward movement through the Model was 5 (11 
advanced to greater diversification and 6 retreated to greater focus).   
     
As with the periods 1950 to 1970 analysed by Channon (1973) and 1970 to 
1983 analysed by Whittington & Mayer (2000) the changes between 1983 and 
1993 shown in the following chart are again predominantly evolutionary with 
only 3 companies – Blue Circle Industries, Metal Box/Caradon and Trafalgar 
House making the „double jump‟ from dominant product company to 
conglomeration. 
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Chart 5 - Number and Direction of UK Corporate Strategy Changes, 
1983-93 
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Note: Figures in parentheses are the number of companies remaining in the category 
in 1983 and 1993.  
 
Source: Whittington & Mayer (2000, p141) 
 
Table 8: Strategy Changes of Largest UK Industrial Companies, 1983-93 
 
Categories 
Strategies (Channon Basis) Analysis of Chg 
1983 1993 Change External Int. 
No. % No. % No. % In Out Net 
Single 5 6 3 5 (2) (1) 1 (3) 0 
Dominant 12 16 7 10 (5) (6) 2 (2) (5) 
Related 50 67 41 61 (9) (6) 9 (20) 2 
Unrelated 8 11 16 24 8 13 6 (1) 3 
Totals 75 100 67 100 (8) 0 18 (26) 0 
 
Source: Extracted from Whittington & Mayer (2000) 
 
As with 1970-1983, the change in the number of conglomerates between 
1983 and 1993 was more to do with the effects of entries to and exits from the 
population – a net gain of 5 – than changes in strategy amongst the 
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companies that were in the population in 1983, a net gain of 3. Overall, the 
net movement was again towards greater diversification with 9 companies 
advancing and 4 retreating through the Model. This finding suggests that, at 
least amongst the largest industrial/manufacturing companies, few companies 
were trying to refocus.  
 
To eliminate the effects of entries and exits from the population, Whittington & 
Mayer (2000) looked at the strategies of those companies that had survived 
between from 1970 to 1993 and found that very few remained in the same 
category as the following table shows: 
Table 9: Strategic Stability of Domestic Top 100 Survivors, 1970-93a  
 
 Period Single Dominant Related Unrelated 
Numbers in 1970  5 26 50 6 
% same category 
1970-83 20.0 34.6 60.0 16.7 
1983-93 20.0 33.3 52.0 62.5 
1970-93 0.0 15.4 30.0 0.0 
 
Note 
a Survival is holding the same strategy, while remaining in the top 100 populations, at 
the beginning and end-points in the shorter periods, and beginning, mid- and end-
points over the whole 23 years. 
 
Source: Whittington & Mayer (2000, p147). 
 
Of the 4 categories, related appears to be the most stable; of the 50 
companies in the category in 1970, 60% remained in the category in 1983 and 
30% in 1993. The single business and unrelated (conglomerate) categories 
were the least stable; only 16.7% of the 6 companies identified as 
conglomerates in 1970 were still conglomerates in 1983 and none remained 
in the category by 1993 and the comparative figures for the 5 single business 
companies were 20% and none. However, conglomerate survival did improve 
between 1983 and 1993 with 62.5% of 1983 conglomerates still in the 
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category in 1993 while there was no change in single business survival rates 
which remained at 20%. Dominant business company survival rates fell 
midway between those of single business companies and conglomerates and 
related diversifiers with 34.6% of the 26 companies in the category in 1970 
surviving to 1983 and 15.4% to 1993 with a similar survival rate for the period 
from 1983 to 1993.         
 
The continuing popularity of conglomerates through to 1993 may be illustrated 
by looking at some of their key statistics.    
Table 10: Turnovers, Profits Before Interest and Tax, Returns on Sales 
and Market Capitalisations of Whittington & Mayer Unrelated Diversified 
Companies As At 1983 and 1993 
 
All Figs £m except Ros % 
Company 
1983 1993 
Turn- 
over 
 
PBIT 
 
ROS 
Mkt  
Cap 
Turn- 
Over 
 
PBIT 
 
ROS 
Mkt 
Cap 
AMEC 524 20 3.8 113 2,338 0 0 352 
BAT Industries 9,091 808 8.9 1,545 13,817 1,354 9.8 9,275 
BBA Group     1,252 75 6.0 425 
BICC 1,491 124 8.3 580     
Blue Circle     1,114 185 16.6 1,355 
BTR 638 113 17.7 755 6,742 1,107 16.4 7,762 
Charter     450 89 19.8 512 
Hanson 856 83 9.7 372 7,691 2,060 26.8 10,889 
Harrison & Crosfield     1,825 92 5.0 839 
Metal Box / Caradon     679 130 19.1 1,406 
Pearson 702 83 11.8 278 1,600 233 14.6 1,900 
Rank Organisation 618 135 21.8 287     
Redland 390 55 14.1 351     
Siebe     1,481 220 14.9 871 
TI Group     900 120 13.3 837 
Tomkins     1,039 131 12.6 1,101 
Trafalgar House     3,202 170 5.3 1,592 
Unigate     1,894 109 5.8 698 
Williams Holdings     1,002 183 18.3 1,687 
Totals 14,310 1,421 9.9 4,281 47,026 6,258 13.3 41,501 
Average 1,789 178 9.9 535 2,939 391 13.3 2,594 
         
Survivors (5)         
Totals 11,811 1,107 9.4 3,063 32,188 4,754 14.8 30,178 
Average 2,362 221 9.4 613 6,438 951 14.8 6,036 
         
Survivors Ave v Total +32% +24% (0.5) 15% +119 +143 +1.5 +133% 
 
Sources: Companies - Whittington & Mayer (2000), Financial Data - Times 1000 Reports 
(1983 & 1992-93). 
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The above table has been constructed to compare the size and profitability of 
the largest industrial/manufacturing companies categorised as conglomerates 
by Whittington & Mayer (2000) in 1983 and 1993. In 1983 there were 8 
conglomerates (11%) in the UK‟s largest, by turnover, 75 manufacturing 
companies, the average conglomerate having turnover of £1,789m, Profit 
Before Interest and Tax (PBIT) of £178m, Return on Sales (ROS) of 9.9% and 
a market capitalisation of £535m. By 1993 the number of conglomerates in 
the largest, by turnover, 67 manufacturing companies had doubled to 16 
(24%) and their average size was substantially greater with turnover of 
£2,939m (+64%), PBIT of £391m (+120%), RoS 13.3% (+3.4%) and market 
capitalisation £2,594m (+385%). However, 3 of the companies identified as 
conglomerates in 1983 were no longer in that category in 1993; BICC and 
Redland had retreated back to be related diversifiers while Rank Organisation 
was no longer large enough to be included in the Whittington & Mayer study.  
 
As for the 5 conglomerates common to both years – AMEC, BAT Industries, 
BTR, Hanson and Pearson – they were, on average, larger in turnover, PBIT 
and market capitalisation terms than those that did not survive. The changes 
between 1983 and 1993 in the average financial characteristics of survivors 
are even more impressive with turnover increasing 173% to £6,438m, PBIT 
growing 330% to £951m, RoS improving 5.4% to 14.8% and market 
capitalisation rising 885% to £6,036m. However, several of the 1993 
conglomerates have since experienced difficulties or have changed strategy 
and would not, either for size or strategic category reasons, be included in a 
list of the largest conglomerates in 2003. Therefore, anecdotally, it may be 
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that 1993 was a high water mark for the UK conglomerate and that a retreat to 
less complex and diverse strategies, as advocated by Peters & Waterman 
(1982) and seen in the US in the 1980s, began in the mid-1990s. This is one 
of the key questions addressed by this research. 
 
3.3.2.2 Drivers 
Except for recessions (defined as 2 or more quarters of negative economic 
growth) in the late 1970s/early 1980s and the early 1990s, the post-World 
War II period saw steady economic growth in the US and the major 
economies of Western Europe. However, economic growth and use of the 
financial resources that prosperity and profitability generates does not explain 
increases in either diversification or conglomeration. There were several 
factors that together created the conditions in which conglomeration was 
favoured and encouraged. The key drivers behind the adoption of 
conglomerate strategies in the 1960s, 1970s, 1980s and early 1990s illustrate 
the many factors that influence strategic decisions. 
 
Attitudes to Risk and Earnings Stability 
Investors, especially institutional/professional, are generally risk-adverse 
preferring companies that, by offering stability, are low risk. Companies try to 
lower their overall level of risk by "hedging against shifts in demand" Scherer 
(1980, p70) which involves creating earnings stability by building a portfolio of, 
ideally, countercyclical businesses, i.e. when one business is performing 
poorly another performs well and vice versa. Diversification and 'risk and 
return' are therefore closely linked.  
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The principles behind the creation of lower risk investment portfolios by 
companies through efficient diversification were first propounded by Markowitz 
(1952). Theoretically, by constructing a portfolio containing investments with 
perfectly negative correlation coefficients, cyclicality will be minimised and 
stability maximised. Greater earnings stability may result in lower borrowing 
costs as investors view the company as offering a stable and safer investment 
opportunity. The availability of low cost finance may provide additional funds 
for expansion, possibly further increasing diversification, and provide a cost 
advantage over competitors. Companies with diversified portfolios may also 
'cross subsidise' activities with strong businesses helping investment in new 
potentially high growth activities or providing support to underperforming 
businesses, e.g. those facing difficult trading environments, reducing the need 
for more expensive external financing. While achieving stability through 
portfolio management is a theoretically sound aim, the existence, complexity 
and inter-connectivity of business cycles makes it impossible in practice to 
identify and establish a portfolio of countercyclical businesses. 
 
There is mixed evidence as to whether conglomerates achieve greater 
stability in their financial performance. Amit & Livnat (1988) considered the 
effects of business cycles on conglomerates finding that they had lower 
exposure which translated into greater performance stability than was the 
case in more focused companies. Lewellen (1971) also found that the greater 
stability of conglomerate earnings meant that they were perceived a lower risk 
by providers of finance allowing them to borrow higher sums and at low 
interest rates relative to more focused companies. However, investing in 
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conglomerates may not be the only way for investors to reduce their risk. 
Smith & Weston (1977) produced research that not only found conglomerate 
risk-adjusted performance was no better than other categories of company 
but also pointed out that they provided less diversification for investors than 
mutual funds and similar investment vehicles.   
 
Leveraging Management 
Some business leaders believe management skills are generic and 
transferable. Lord Hanson at Hanson and Sir Owen Green at BTR were 
strong advocates of the transferability of core management skills and 
competencies. They believed their teams possessed the skills necessary to 
successfully turnaround and manage the vast range of businesses their 
companies acquired in industries as diverse as, at BTR in the late 1980s, 
ladies hosiery and heavy engineering and, at Hanson, tobacco and building 
products. Hanson, by describing itself as an „industrial holding company‟ in its 
1993 annual report and accounts suggested there was no common thread 
linking its activities other than ownership and management.  
 
The acquisition-led success of Hanson and BTR suggests that replacing 
management teams of acquired companies with those from the acquirer will 
yield positive results. This view is supported by Porter (1987) who considered 
the management challenges arising from diversification/conglomeration, 
primarily achieved through acquisition, and found that, in addition to lower 
financing costs, shareholder value was created by the acquirer‟s professional 
management, especially expertise in areas such as taxation, business 
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planning and review disciplines to target areas of weakness for remedial 
action. BTR's renowned annual profit planning process and comprehensive 
monthly reporting package are prime examples of effective controls. 
 
However, this view is not universally accepted. Matsusaka (1993) found 
evidence that undermines the leveraging of management skills; markets do 
not always view post-acquisition replacement of incumbent management 
positively. He found that during the 1960s markets viewed the post-acquisition 
retention of incumbent management positively and their replacement 
negatively. 
 
It must also be remembered that, no matter how talented, knowledgeable, 
experienced and skilled a management team is, luck and the ability to 
persuade investors to provide finance also play a frequently significant part in 
success or failure. This view of management success or failure is exemplified 
by Sloan (1963, p429) who commented that "It is not to say why one 
management is successful and another is not. The causes of success or 
failure are deep and complex, and chance plays a part". 
 
Given the inherent complexity of conglomerates, their need for an effective 
and appropriate management structure to facilitate leveraging management 
skills is apparent and the importance of structure has been well researched 
since Chandler‟s (1962) pronouncement that „structure should follow strategy‟. 
Williamson & Bhargava (1986) illustrated the choice of structures including 
Unitary (U-form), Holding Company (H-form), Multidivisional (M-form), 
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Transitional Multidivisional (M'-form), Corrupted Multidivisional (M-form) and 
Mixed (X-form). Research has highlighted the widespread adoption of the 
multidivisional, M-Form, structure by conglomerates. The primary advantage 
of multidivisional structures is that they attempt to group similar businesses 
together in often largely autonomous divisions, e.g. automotive, chemical, 
retail, etc. with each being overseen by a management team with appropriate 
skills and knowledge.  
 
Williamson (1970, 1975) also provided support for the idea that management 
could bring greater efficiency to a range of companies operating under its 
control and for the effectiveness of M-Form structures. His economic rationale 
for the multi-business firm is based on Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) 
theory and takes the view that managers could allocate capital and resources 
more efficiently than the market and, by doing so, can create shareholder 
value. Williamson (1975) felt that some of this was also due to the rise of the 
M-Form structure which allowed managers to extend and exploit efficient 
multi-divisional structures by adding new businesses; the limitation of the old 
functional structures had been removed. In many ways „the M-Form begat the 
monster of the conglomerate‟ (Shleifer & Vishny, 1991). 
 
Similarly, Kay (1997) and Angwin (2000) highlight divisionalisation as 
providing a means of minimising a potential disadvantage of conglomerates; 
that of cross-contamination. Kay (1997, p60) sees divisionalisation as 
minimising the risk of a poor performing activity infecting/contaminating others 
while Angwin (2000) sees it as allowing problem activities, depending on their 
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need for strategic direction from the corporate centre or resource transfer from 
other activities, to be isolated or kept at „arms length‟ until they are fit to play a 
full roll in the business.  
 
According to Whittington & Mayer (2000), 7 of the 8 companies identified as 
conglomerates in 1983 had divisional structures; the corresponding figures for 
1993 were 15 of 16. The non-divisional companies – Rank Organisation in 
1983 and Metal Box/Caradon in 1993 – had both adopted holding company 
structures. Given the overwhelming majority of conglomerates adopt the 
multidivisional model, it is not a variable that warranted further investigation in 
this research project. Moreover, without access to the education, skills or 
career histories of directors of FTSE100 companies, this research project 
could not consider whether these characteristics influence conglomeration 
although possible weaknesses in corporate governance that may allow 
chairmen and/or chief executives to overly influence strategic direction were 
investigated.     
 
Role of Competition Authorities 
Some businesses, typically in monopolistic or oligopolistic markets, are 
effectively forced to diversify as their size and dominant position would, 
should they attempt further focused growth, invite the attention of competition 
authorities who may limit such growth to ensure a reasonable level of 
competition is maintained.  
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The US was the first country to enact legislation relating to monopolies or, as 
they are known in the US, trusts; the Sherman Act 1890. Further legislation 
followed including the Clayton Antitrust Act 1914, the Celler-Kefauver Act 
1950 and the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act 1976 which together effectively outlawed 
monopolies and required proposed acquisitions to be reviewed by the 
government before consummation.   
 
In 1965 the UK became the first European country to enact acquisitions 
control legislation when, through the Monopolies & Mergers Act, it created the 
Monopolies & Mergers Commission (MMC) giving it a mandate to review all 
proposed transactions to see if they were against the public interest a broad 
indication of which was a market share of a least 33% (later 25%). Political 
expediency effectively sidelined the MMC until the early 1970s with the 
Industrial Reorganisation Corporation (IRC) established with a remit to create 
world beating UK companies, e.g. the merger of British Motor Holdings and 
Leyland to create British Leyland and the merger of English Electric with GEC 
were two deals brokers by the IRC. The Fair Trading Act 1973 re-established 
the role of the MMC.   
 
Following the Competition Act 1988, the Competition Commission (CC) 
replaced the MMC and the Enterprise Act 2002 changed its role to one 
focused on competition issues giving it additional powers to make companies 
take remedial action to improve competition where problems had been 
identified. The CC continues to investigate not only proposed mergers and 
industries where competition issues have been identified, e.g. banking, 
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supermarkets, brewing, but, following privatisation of utilities, also problems in 
regulated industries where disputes have arisen between the regulator and 
the regulated.     
 
In Europe, Germany introduced legislation in 1973 to prevent acquisitions that 
would create or strengthen market dominance and in 1977 France established 
a Commission on Competition to review domestic acquisitions where the 
resulting market share would exceed 40%. In more recent years the European 
Commission added another pan-European level of competition regulation with 
the establishment of its Competition Commission which is mandated to review 
acquisitions with combined turnover of €5 billion.       
 
Given the existence of these authorities, companies contemplating further 
focused growth must be mindful of the potential for competition authority 
investigation and the remedies they may impose to restore competition. This 
problem was illustrated by the intervention of the CC in the battle for control of 
UK supermarket company Safeway (Competition Commission, 2003). In 
2003, the leading UK supermarket chains - Tesco, Sainsbury, Asda and 
Morrison – were each told by the CC that, should they bid for, and 
subsequently win, control of Safeway, which had effectively been put up for 
sale, they would have to dispose of a number of stores in areas where they 
were deemed to have too great a market share thereby reducing customer 
choice. Morrison 'won' what effectively became a 'one-horse race' as the 
costs, in terms of required store disposals, placed on the other potential 
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supermarket bidders were too onerous. Even Morrison had to commit to 
selling 53 stores post-acquisition.     
 
There is clearly a political dimension to this issue as the work of the 
competition authorities is influenced by the government of the day and its 
policies. In the US, the Reagan administration in the 1980s took a more 
lenient view of competition issues than its predecessors: 1977-81 Carter, 
1969-77 Nixon/Ford and 1961-69 Kennedy/Johnson. Recently in the UK 
political expediency has necessitated the setting aside of competition rules to 
allow Lloyds TSB to acquire HBOS with the former effectively saving the latter 
in a deal, effectively brokered by the government, that created a „superbank‟ – 
Lloyds Banking Group - with substantial market shares in mortgages, savings 
and current accounts that, in normal circumstances, would have been 
deemed against the public interest, competition reducing and stopped.  
 
Clearly, competition regimes do impact conglomeration and this research 
notes instances where reference to competition authorities and/or their rulings 
have clearly influenced strategic decisions. The conglomerate histories 
included in chapter 7 refer to CC investigations that influenced diversification 
strategy, e.g. the impact of an investigation into competition in the UK brewing 
industry (Competition Commission, 1989) impacted on several subsequent 
proposed transactions by UK based brewers, including Bass/Intercontinental 
Hotels, Guinness/Diageo and Whitbread, which were referred to the CC who 
continued to act in line with its 1989 report that effectively limited UK market 
shares. In its deliberations, the CC appears to err on the side of the public 
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almost to the point of assuming companies under review are guilty of 
restricting competition until proved innocent although it would be unfair to 
suggest the CC is intransigent when considering company submissions.        
 
Declining Industries & Growth Opportunities 
Some companies cannot see a path to growth in their existing activities and 
therefore look to add/migrate to new activities. In 1970 British American 
Tobacco was almost exclusively a tobacco business; an industry perceived as 
having little future given the undoubted health issues associated with smoking 
and the growing intensity of „no smoking‟ lobbies. In the late 1970s and early 
1980s the company, which was renamed BAT Industries, adopted a 
conglomerate strategy to reduce its reliance on its „declining‟ tobacco 
business by acquiring paper manufacturers Wiggins-Teape and Appleton, 
retailer Argos and insurers Eagle Star and Allied Dunbar in the UK and 
Farmers in the US along with a number of other smaller unrelated activities.     
 
However, BAT Industries did not continue with its conglomerate strategy but, 
in the 1990s reversed its strategy and through a series of demergers and 
trade sales divested its 'non-core' businesses to, once again, become a single 
business tobacco company. Reverting to its original name, British American 
Tobacco sought to achieve growth through international expansion acquiring 
tobacco companies across the world to increase volumes and, through 
greater economies of scale, profits. British American Tobacco replaced 
conglomeration with internationalisation. After several years outside the 
FTSE100 the focused British American Tobacco regained its membership of 
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the index in 2003 where, surprisingly given the well-known health dangers of 
smoking that would suggest the industry to be in decline, it was not the only 
tobacco company. The index also included Imperial Tobacco which was 
demerged from Hanson in 1996 and Gallaher which was demerged from 
American Brands in 1997. Gallaher has recently (2007) been acquired by 
Japan Tobacco who appear to be pursing a similar global growth strategy to 
British American Tobacco.  
 
Agency - Manager/Shareholder Balance of Power 
Sundaramurthy (1996, p378) describes agency theory as “viewing the 
corporation as a nexus of contracts” with managers acting as agents for the 
shareholders who are the principals. As in any agency/principal relationship 
problems occur when there is ambiguity and uncertainty allowing room for the 
objectives of interested parties to become misaligned.  
 
Although shareholders are the owners of a company they are seldom involved 
in its day-to-day operations instead they receive minimal, albeit statutorily 
required, information infrequently, typically semi-annually. In the post-war 
years as capital markets developed more companies, many previously family 
owned or controlled, obtained stock exchange listings. Their shareholders 
became more diverse with a consequent reduction in their power under the 
„divide and rule‟ principle. The divorcing of ownership and control, together 
with shareholder apathy at the few opportunities they had to exercise power, 
principally general meetings, meant managers held the stronger position in 
the relationship and were able to pursue their own objectives which may not 
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always have coincided with those of shareholders and other stakeholders. 
Galbraith (1971) saw this shift in power towards managers as the creation of 
an effectively autonomous management „technostructure‟. This presented 
managers with an opportunity to run their companies in a way that maximised 
their own satisfaction; the „hubris‟ theory (Roll, 1986).  
 
In order to pursue their growth ambitions, some managers proved reluctant to 
distribute surplus cash to shareholders either through increased dividends or 
capital distributions, e.g. share buy-backs, preferring, especially where 
corporate governance was also weak, to retain surplus cash to fund 
diversifying acquisitions (Mueller, 1969). In addition to pursuing 
diversification/conglomeration, managers could also allocate retained 
resources sub-optimally. Scharfstein & Stein (2000) suggest that there may be 
„socialism‟ in the allocation of resources resulting in poor performing divisions 
effectively being subsidised by those performing well. In effect, a CEO may 
allow sub-optimal allocations to be „fair‟ or to „keep everybody happy‟ rather 
than to maximise profit. This could result in diversification and/or 
conglomeration strategies being pursued despite yielding poor financial 
results.  
 
Another management objective is their own continued employment and, 
through diversification, managers believe they can effectively hedge their 
employment risk (Amihud & Lev, 1981). However, Miller (2004) found that 
there was a risk that managers would over-diversify in their desire to reduce 
their employment risk and Shleifer & Vishny (1991) suggest the agency 
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problem was exacerbated by shareholders‟ failure to fully understand 
conglomeration, its inherent complexity, advantages, disadvantages and 
consequences for their investments. Sundaramurthy (1996) suggests that, 
without strong corporate governance, managements become „entrenched‟ 
and can gain some immunity from the Market for Corporate Control that could 
force a change to the strategies they pursue. While particularly true of some 
US companies where managers can, sometimes without the need for 
shareholder approval, introduce anti-takeover measures this also has some 
resonance in the UK where, until recently, corporate governance has been 
seen as weak. Corporate governance weakness in the US, including the lack 
of non-executive directors and the prevalence of dual (joint chair/CEO) rather 
than unitary (separate chair and CEO) leadership, are seen as contributing to 
the problem of „entrenched management‟ (Sundaramurthy, 1996).  
 
Johnson, Hoskisson & Hitt (1993) undertook research into the influence of 
directors on restructuring finding that the relationship is complex and may be 
affected by shareholding profiles (significant director share ownership/options 
reduces their propensity to act in their own self-interest and promotes greater 
alignment of manager/owner objectives) as well as the balance of power 
between executive and non-executive directors and between the board and 
senior managers. Their study used the entropy index to assess diversification 
and questionnaires to obtain information on the internal power dynamics of 
companies researched. The inherent complexity of the 
diversification/ownership relationship is illustrated by the conflicting findings of 
research by Goranova, Alessandri, Brandes & Dharwadhar (2007) who found 
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that while levels of managerial ownership did not influence subsequent 
diversification, managerial ownership was negatively related to corporate 
diversification.  
 
The increased separation of ownership and control and weaknesses in 
corporate governance may have contributed to the significant influence of 
dominant personalities at several high profile FTSE100 companies, notably 
Lords Hanson and White at Hanson, Sir Owen Green at BTR and Greg 
Hutchins at Tomkins. Since the mid-1990s some degree of balance has been 
restored by the introduction of corporate governance Codes of Practice 
requiring greater transparency regarding directors‟ remuneration and 
contracts (including incentive schemes), the separation of the key positions of 
chairman and chief executive officer (or equivalent) and a board comprising a 
majority of non-executive directors following the Cadbury committee report.  
 
This research has not used questionnaires/interviews to supplement publicly 
available information and therefore cannot identify changes in internal power 
relationships – formal and/or informal – and their effects. However, by 
considering the tenure of chairmen and chief executive officers (or 
equivalents) this research does seek to identify similarities/differences in 
corporate governance across and between diversification categories.  
 
Management Attitudes/Sciences 
The 20th century saw an explosion of management theories to help managers 
make better, essentially profit maximising, decisions. Included in these 
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theories were several suggesting benefits could be derived from portfolio 
management. Ghemawat (2002) in his review of the development of the 
science of management highlighted several „popular‟ models including 
Porter's Five Forces, Value Chain, Boston Consulting Group's Growth-Share 
Matrix (Boston Box) and Ansoff's (1965) Product/Mission Matrix. Each of 
these and many other models, such as Portfolio Planning (Haspeslagh, 1982) 
aim to help mangers to develop and/or refine their corporate strategy and, 
taking a „firm as portfolio‟ approach, to decide on the optimal mix of business 
activities.  
 
Almost by definition, the „firm as portfolio‟ approach necessitates 
consideration of diversification. With this link in mind, several researchers 
have developed matrices to guide managers in making decisions regarding 
the strategic direction of their company. Salter & Weinhold (1979), who 
developed their own matrix based on industry attractiveness and business 
position to assess whether a company should diversify, also considered 
diversification by looking at three other well-known models: 
 
 Strategy Model - Companies should diversify where there is potential for 
skills/know-how/technology transfer between the businesses. This model 
relies on the concept that companies are a collection of resources and 
competences that can be used to create and maintain competitive 
advantage: the resource-based view. By acquiring new activities that 
would benefit from their resources and competences, a company could 
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grow. Success is dependent on correctly understanding which 
resources/competences are valuable and in which activities.   
 
 Product/Market-Portfolio Model (form of BCG market share/growth 
matrix) - Companies should diversify to either build a presence in key 
areas of the matrix, i.e. "Question Marks" or "Cash Cows", where they can 
dominate markets or use excess cash to develop opportunities: "A 
company with a balanced portfolio of cash cows feeding question marks 
and stars is in a position both to reap the current benefit of its high market 
share and advantageous cost position and to develop sources of future 
cash flow" (Salter & Weinhold, 1979, p75). 
 
 Risk-Return Model (developed from CAPM theory) - Companies 'can' 
use diversification to reduce unsystematic risk, i.e. the risk inherent in 
investing in particular industries. However, investors can diversify for 
themselves with similar results: "…various studies have shown that as few 
as 8 to 10 unrelated investments are sufficient to eliminate over 80% of a 
portfolio's unsystematic risk" (Salter & Weinhold, 1979, p128).  
 
While each of the approaches recommended by Salter & Weinhold (1979) has 
its merits, it may also be argued that each is too simplistic reducing the 
inherent complexities and inter-relationships of corporate decision-making, 
especially in large conglomerates, to 2 x 2 matrices. In some ways the 
increase in the number of management theories encouraged managers to 
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explore diversification and to believe they could effectively manage it whereas 
before they would have continued to pursue focus.   
 
Others  
There are several other enablers or drivers that supported the adoption of 
conglomeration strategies.   
 
 Leveraging Company Attributes 
Companies seek to maximise returns from investments in their business, 
e.g. distribution networks, research & development facilities, sales forces, 
etc., especially if those investments are perceived to be sources of 
sustainable competitive advantage. Work by Lemelin (1982) considered 
patterns in diversification and found that there are links between 
diversification and the desire to exploit existing investments. This is 
especially true "with respect to channels of marketing and distribution" 
(p647). Clearly, leveraging company attributes works better for related 
diversifiers where there are product/service complementarities as well as 
the need to share corporate competences.      
 
Further support for the leveraging of company attributes comes from 
Penrose (1959) who, in her resource-based view, believed that companies 
holding surplus resources would always look for ways to profitably utilise 
those resources, a view later supported by Teece (1982). Whittington & 
Mayer (2000, p56) built on this saying, “….it is the existence of surplus 
resources that stimulates diversification, and it is the nature of these 
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existing resources that determine the direction in which this diversification 
goes”. However, there is no guarantee that diversification represents the 
most effective or profitable use of surplus resources obvious alternatives 
being to increase distributions to shareholders, e.g. higher dividends or 
return of capital, and/or reduction/elimination of debt.    
       
 Opportunism 
Some companies constantly trawl the market looking for underperforming 
companies that they can acquire cheaply and to which they can add value. 
While private equity companies are now seen as leading exponents of this 
strategy, BTR and Hanson were skilled exponents in the 1980s acquiring 
underperforming companies including Thomas Tilling, Dunlop Holdings 
and London Brick.  
 
 Asset stripping or asset mining 
There is an obvious link between opportunism and asset stripping which is 
perceived by many as an insidious business practice. In brief, asset 
stripping is the acquisition and subsequent break-up and piecemeal 
disposal of a company with the expectation that the proceeds of disposal 
will exceed the costs of acquisition. The success of any asset stripping 
exercise is dependent on the value of a company‟s component parts being 
worth more than the whole; the company has negative synergies and is 
„worth more dead than alive‟. The acquisition and break-up of undervalued 
companies for profit is exemplified by Hanson's acquisition of Imperial in 
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1987; the subsequent disposals reduced the net cost of the highly 
profitable tobacco business to a fraction of its true value.   
 
 Available financing 
The development and growth of increasingly complex debt instruments, 
the greater sophistication of financial markets and the substantial rise in 
pension funds, has made more funds available for growth.  
 
Comment & Jarrell (1995, p84) refuted the claim that conglomerates could 
borrow more at lower cost when they looked at leverage across 
diversification categories finding that there were few significant differences 
meaning, ”….either that diversification does not increase debt capacity or 
that managers in diversified firms do not choose to exploit their greater 
debt capacity”. Notwithstanding the availability of finance, the 
sophistication of markets has increased the acceptability of higher „paper‟ 
elements in takeover bids. 
 
 Critical Mass 
The concept of 'critical mass' (Salter & Weinhold, 1979, p43) is more of an 
issue in dominant and related diversified businesses where greater control 
over an activity, e.g. through vertical and horizontal diversification, may 
result in increased control over that business activity/market segment 
compared to competitors. A company that has 'critical mass' in an industry 
or market may be able to influence, rather than be influenced by, that 
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industry or market, i.e. become the leader rather than a follower. Acquiring 
critical mass changes the balance of power within an industry.    
 
Summary 
Overall, this section has identified a number of drivers behind conglomeration 
some of which have had a greater effect than others. The drivers may be split 
into generic - those that effect the strategic decisions of all companies – 
industry specific – those that effect companies operating in a particular 
industry – and company specific – those that influence the strategic decisions 
of some, but not all, companies as shown in the following table: 
Table 11: Drivers of Conglomeration 
 
Driver Generic 
Industry 
Specific 
Company 
Specific 
Risk & Earnings Stability X   
Leveraging Management   X 
Competition Regulation   X 
Declining Industries  X  
Growth Opportunities  X  
Agency – Power Balance X   
Management Attitudes/Science X   
 
Some drivers may have influenced the entire population, e.g. the development 
of management skills and the search for lower risk, while others may have 
effected only a few companies, e.g. a declining industry would affect only 
companies with interests in those industries. It is certain that, in determining 
diversification strategy, management is influenced by more than one driver.    
 
This research recognises that the complexity of the business environment and 
the inherent uniqueness of companies effectively makes it is impossible to 
fully explain which drivers were behind which companies‟ decisions to 
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diversify and, conversely, which changes in drivers were behind companies‟ 
decisions to refocus. However, in chapter 7 there are a number of 
conglomerate company histories that try to shed light on why FTSE100 
companies adopted, maintained or abandoned conglomeration between 1993 
and 2003.      
 
3.3.2.3 Role of Acquisitions 
Acquisitions have played an important role in the growth of conglomeration 
through the 20th century both in the US and the UK. Once a decision to 
diversify has been taken, a company must chose how to achieve that 
strategy; organically or by acquisition.  
  
In the US and UK, acquisitions activity was volatile through the 20th century 
with 4 clearly identifiable peaks, each larger - both in volume and constant 
value terms - than its predecessor. The first three peaks have each been 
attributed to a different phenomenon (Lev, 1982, and Salter & Weinhold, 
1979, p10-11):  
 
 1895-1900 : Consolidation 
 1920s : Utility consolidation, manufacturing vertical integration  
 1960s : Diversification* 
* Diversification includes both related and unrelated. 
 
The 1960s diversification driven peak in activity coincides with growth in 
diversification – related and unrelated – identified in the US and, to a lesser 
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extent, Europe. The 1960s peak has since been surpassed by another at the 
end of the 1990s, which saw global activity reach £2.5 trillion in 2000, 
(Acquisitions Monthly, January 2002). 
 
This most recent peak has been attributed to acquirers‟ growth aspirations 
and rising opportunism especially amongst the increasingly active private 
equity houses including Blackstone, Apax, Texas Pacific, BC Partners, 
Cinven, Permira and KKR, that may have effectively become the „New 
Conglomerates‟. In the UK, by 2003 private equity firms were the largest 
private-sector employers with 2.9m employees (Durran, 2003). However, as 
private equity becomes increasingly „popular‟ and, as the acquisitive 
conglomerates of the 1980s found in the 1990s, the pool of underperforming 
and undervalued targets dries up, their position as the „New Conglomerates‟ 
may become uncertain (Riley, 2007). Furthermore, as much of the success of 
private equity stems from financial engineering, especially the use of debt, 
continued success is heavily dependent on low interest rates and the 
availability of funds (Jackson, 1998).      
 
When considered in value terms, acquisitions activity in the late 20th century 
was undertaken by a relatively small number of highly acquisitive companies, 
several of which were conglomerates. Between 1983 and late 1987, Scoullar 
(1987) noted that only 8 companies accounted for over 50%, by value, of UK 
acquisitions. These companies were: Guinness, Hanson, BAT Industries, 
BTR, Vantona Viyella, Habitat, Burton and P&O. The deals undertaken by the 
3 Whittington & Mayer (2000) conglomerates included on the list include 
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BTR's 1983 acquisition of Thomas Tilling for £850m, BAT Industries‟ 1983 
acquisition of Eagle Star for £1,060m and Hanson's 1986 acquisition of 
Imperial for £2,564m. The largest non-conglomerate transaction was 
Guinness' 1986 acquisition of Distillers for £2,531m. The dominance of the 
conglomerate acquirers continued through into the early 1990s with Hanson's 
acquisition of ConsGold in 1989 for £3,300m and BTR's 1990 acquisition of 
Hawker Siddeley for £1,600m. However, in contrast to the 1980s and early 
1990s transactions that were predominantly acquisitions by 
industrial/manufacturing conglomerates, transactions towards the end of the 
millennium were dominated by service companies including, in financial 
services, Royal Bank of Scotland's acquisition of National Westminster Bank 
for £21.6bn and, in telecommunications, Vodafone's £100bn acquisition of 
Germany's Mannesmann. 
 
Companies that decided to advance through the Model of Corporate 
Development were faced with a decision as to how to achieve their aims - 
organically or by acquisition. Many large companies saw acquisition as being 
the most cost effective option (Lamont & Anderson, 1985) and therefore it 
became the primary means of diversifying (Hitt, Hoskisson & Ireland, 1990). 
The advantages of acquisition over organic growth include: 
 
 Speed - Acquiring a ready-made business with an existing product range, 
experienced management and distribution network is far quicker than 
starting from scratch. 
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 Cost - Acquisition, despite acquisition premiums, is almost always cheaper 
than organic growth which often entails high capital costs for new 
equipment and a period of losses while the new business builds and the 
necessary skills, knowledge and experience are developed. 
 
 Intangibles - Where success is heavily dependent on possession and 
exploitation of intangible assets, e.g. patents, trade marks, copyrights and 
distribution networks, acquisition may be the only way to acquire the 
necessary assets. 
 
 Entry barriers - High entry barriers, typically cost or intangible asset-
based, may also preclude new 'organic' entrants. However, the protection 
offered by high entry barriers may push up the cost of acquiring an 
incumbent 'protected' business. 
 
Having chosen the acquisition route to conglomeration, companies were then 
faced with deciding which targets to pursue. In choosing targets that would 
increase the diversity of their activities, companies needed to assess potential 
acquisitions against three key criteria, Porter‟s (1987) "Essential Tests".: 
 
 The attractiveness test 
The new industry or industries must be or have the potential to be 
structurally attractive, i.e. a positive evaluation using Porter's "5 Forces" 
model. Is the industry capable of producing 'acceptable' returns? 
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 The cost-of-entry test 
Is the cost of acquisition lower than the present value (discounted at the 
acquirer's cost of capital) of future earnings streams, i.e. will it make a 
positive contribution? 
 
 The better-off test 
Will the acquirer AND target both benefit from the proposed link, i.e. are 
there any transferable competitive advantages, e.g. synergy benefits 
including shared facilities/resources/know-how? 
 
In order for an acquisition to enhance shareholder value all three of the 
Essential Tests have to be met. However, UK conglomerates that grew in the 
1970s and 1980s made acquisitions that MAY not have met all of Porter's 
tests. Again taking BTR and Hanson as examples, their acquisitions 
frequently passed the first two tests but not always the third. Both companies 
targeted established businesses that were performing poorly, e.g. Thomas 
Tilling, Dunlop, London Brick, and consequently were undervalued and could, 
despite control premiums, be acquired for prices significantly below their 'true' 
restructured and reinvigorated values. Therefore, they passed the 
attractiveness and cost of entry tests. However, whether the better-off test 
was always passed is debatable. This failure would not have become 
apparent until after the acquisitions had been completed, i.e. once post-
acquisition performance had been realised, and could not have influenced 
shareholders when they were asked to support and, if necessary, vote on the 
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proposed acquisitions. Shareholders had therefore to take their boards‟ 
recommendations at face value.    
 
According to Goold & Campbell (1987) both BTR and Hanson were 'Financial 
Control' companies who, by closely monitoring financial performance against 
agreed targets, acted, in effect, as portfolio managers, i.e. they bought and 
sold companies although, as noted later, not as ruthlessly as they could have. 
This management style is consistent with their approach to acquisitions 
typically passing tests 1 and 2 and failing 3, i.e. the actions of short-term 
investors seeking to obtain 'one-off' gains from turnarounds. In 1987, Goold & 
Campbell held BTR and Hanson (together with Tarmac, GEC and Ferranti) as 
being very successful financial control style companies. But this success has 
proved to be unsustainable; all five financial control companies have incurred 
serious problems and none survived into the new millennium without 
substantial change. In updates to their original paper (Goold, Campbell & 
Luchs, 1993a, 1993b) argued that, to enjoy continued success, companies 
had to ensure they matched their management style to the needs of their 
portfolio of businesses. The implication of their review was that unsuccessful 
companies, not only the financial control companies, had failed to do so. 
 
By definition, as the activities of a company become increasingly diverse 
connections between activities become, at best, tenuous and, at worst, non-
existent, e.g. BTR‟s ownership of heavy engineering and hosiery businesses. 
Having acquired 'problem' companies, both BTR and Hanson were (or 
became) very adept at changing management teams, closing loss-making 
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activities and, especially in Hanson's case, divesting unwanted businesses. 
This resulted in rapid turnarounds in financial performance. The next stage, 
increasing profits beyond the acquired company's turnaround potential, was 
dependent on the acquisition meeting the third test, i.e. both acquirer and 
target gaining from the transaction. There is little evidence that either BTR or 
Hanson was able to develop businesses acquired beyond achieving a 
turnaround. If the third test were failed, then the potential for the acquisition to 
continue to grow would be severely limited. In these circumstances, it could 
be argued that the acquirer should sell the acquired company immediately its 
turnaround is realised (assuming there are buyers). Porter (1987) suggests 
that if revitalised acquisitions are retained, as was often the case at BTR, then 
without further acquisitions (turnarounds) future company profits would 
stagnate which is effectively what happened at BTR in the mid-1990s. This 
evidence suggests that conglomerates possessed turnaround skills but not 
the capability to further grow and develop businesses once turnaround had 
been achieved.    
 
The achievement of consistent profitable performance has important 
implications for growth by acquisition. Strong financial performance usually 
translates into a high share price which, in turn, provides the opportunity to 
make market value enhancing acquisitions using shares as payment. The 
exploitation of a high price/earnings ratio is commonly referred to as the „P/E 
Puzzle‟. In simple terms, the P/E puzzle is where a highly rated group, e.g. 
BTR or Hanson at their peak, acquires a poorly rated underperforming 
company, probably with a disappointing profit record, or activities in 
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'unfashionable' businesses. Post-acquisition, investors assume the acquirer 
will be able to improve profitability at its new subsidiary and optimistically 
apply the acquirer's high P/E ratio to the new enlarged company's profit 
projections to calculate the new equity value for the combined company. As a 
result, the acquiring company's market capitalisation will increase by more 
than the value of the acquisition as the future stream of earnings from the 
acquired company are now given a higher P/E multiple by the investment 
community. The fault with this approach lies in the fact that the underlying and 
potential profitability of the acquired company, may, in reality, be significantly 
below that implied by the revaluation and be restricted by fundamental 
limitations in the industry/business in which it operates. However, given the 
level of aggregation in company financial statements, as long as a company 
continues to make substantial acquisitions any underperformance of previous 
acquisitions or of the underlying business is effectively shielded if key 
indicators – growth and profits – show overall continuous increases. The 
market value of conglomerates such as BTR and Hanson, whose acquisition 
activities reduced the transparency of their published accounts, benefitted 
from this phenomenon.  
 
Conn (1973) analysed US data for acquiring and acquired firms through the 
period 1954 to 1969, and showed that while the acquisition of relatively 
profitable firms did not enhance an acquirer's profitability the transference of a 
high P/E to an acquired company‟s activities did enhance value and was a 
valid driver of acquisitions giving credence to the „P/E Puzzle‟ phenomenon. 
Conversely, Matsusaka (1993) suggested that the „P/E Puzzle‟ is not that 
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important a factor as investors see „bootstrapping‟ for the game that it is. That 
may be true of „professional‟ institutional investors but less so of individual 
private investors.   
     
Data included in the Annual Reports of the Director General of Fair Trading, 
show the popularity of diversifying acquisitions through to the end of the 
1980s. The following table shows that through the 1970s and 1980s between 
a quarter and a third of all proposed acquisitions were diversifying 
transactions and that in the 1990s, when conditions were less favourable, 
activity in this category fell dramatically, accounting for less than a tenth of 
proposed acquisitions.  
Table 12: Percentage of Proposed Mergers Classified by Type of 
Integration 
 
Year Horizontal Vertical Diversifying 
1970-74 73 5 23 
1975 71 5 24 
1976 70 8 22 
1977 64 11 25 
1978 53 13 34 
1979 51 7 42 
1980 65 4 31 
1981 62 6 32 
1982 65 5 30 
1983 71 4 25 
1984 63 4 33 
1985 58 4 38 
1986 69 2 29 
1987 67 3 30 
1988 58 1 41 
1989 60 2 37 
1990 75 5 20 
1991 88 5 7 
1992 93 1 6 
1993 90 3 7 
1994 88 5 7 
1995 91 1 8 
1996 93 2 5 
 
Source: Office of Fair Trading, Annual Reports of the Director General of Fair Trading 
 
1970s 
1980s 
1990s 
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This data, albeit comprised of proposed rather than consummated 
transactions and without any distinction between related diversification and 
conglomeration, strongly supports the contention that in the UK diversification 
activity was strong up to 1990. Beyond 1990 horizontal transactions show a 
significant increase suggesting that companies were eschewing diversification 
in favour of focus. Unfortunately, the series was discontinued in 1997.   
 
Similar data on US acquisitions appears to show the same profile with peaks 
in both broadly and narrowly defined diversifying transactions in 1975 followed 
by substantial reductions in 1976, 1977 and 1978.   
Table 13: Large Diversifying Acquisitions by Industrial Companies: 
Percentage of Total Assets Acquireda 
 
 
Year 
FTC Narrow 
Definitionc 
FTC Broad 
Definitionb 
1952-1955d 3.6 52.0 
1956-1959d 14.0 N/A 
1961-1970d 30.4 78.5 
1971 45.3 79.2 
1972 16.8 59.2 
1973 36.7 65.3 
1974 38.0 68.2 
1975 68.3 94.6 
1976 54.8 83.6 
1977e 44.6 77.7 
1978f 46.7 76.0 
 
Notes: 
a Large acquisitions are those involving acquired assets exceeding $10million. 
b All acquisitions extending operations beyond present product or geographic 
markets. 
c Acquisitions where the two companies are functionally unrelated in marketing or 
production. 
d Average for the period. 
e 1977 figures are subject to revision. 
f 1978 figures are preliminary. 
 
Sources: Salter & Weinhold (1979, p15). Original sources - Bureau of Economics, FTC, 
Statistical Report on Mergers and Acquisitions, July, 1974, October 1975, November 1977 
and December 1978; and Jesse W. Markham, Conglomerate Enterprise and Public Policy, 
Division of Research, Harvard Business School, 1973. 
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The above table shows unrelated acquisitions (FTC Narrow Definition column) 
comprised a 1952-55 average of only 3.6% of all transactions involving assets 
of at least $10m. By 1971 the figure was 45.3% and, after the recession years 
of 1972-74, peaked at 68.3% in 1975 before falling back to 46.7% by 1978. 
 
The UK and US profiles appear to support the contention that the life cycle of 
conglomeration amongst UK companies lags behind that experienced in the 
US by around 10-15 years. Conglomerate acquisitions peaked in the late 
1970s in the US and in the UK proposed diversifying acquisitions, including 
related and conglomerate transactions, peaked in late 1980s. The wave of 
conglomerate acquisitions appears to have begun in the US and then moved 
to the UK. Similarly, the decline in conglomerate acquisitions activity began 
earlier in the US than the UK.  
 
The database constructed for this research does not include details of each 
company‟s acquisitions but does note acquisitions involving companies within 
the FTSE100, e.g. Guinness‟ acquisition of Grand Metropolitan to form 
Diageo, Siebe‟s acquisition of BTR to form Invensys. This information, 
together with the relevant company histories in chapter 7, provides insights 
not only into the reasons for exits but also into movements between 
diversification categories within the UK‟s leading stock exchange index.    
 
3.3.3 Re-Appraisal and Decline 
A key element that contributed to the growth and decline of conglomerates 
was their financial performance – real or perceived. In the growth phase, 
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conglomerates were seen as offering low risk and earnings stability while in 
the decline phase they were seen as being economically inefficient. Finding 
research that supports these performance perceptions is difficult as extant 
research is contradictory and, given that a range of categorisation schemes is 
used and that there are always industry effects involved, confusing.  
 
Some of the criticism of conglomerate performance may not have been 
rational but driven by the inability of analysts to fully understand these 
complex companies. With conglomeration had come increased corporate 
complexity and, as a consequence, greater opacity in financial performance. 
When compared to „pure play‟ focused companies, conglomerates were 
judged to have performed poorly. In addition, conglomerates were 
increasingly seen as being inefficient in their allocation of capital with cross-
subsidisation of underperformers by strong businesses reducing overall 
returns although research by Hubbard & Palia (1999) suggests the internal 
capital markets of diversifying acquirers were more efficient than those of the 
external markets that were effectively constrained by their lack of information. 
Conglomerates had fallen out of favour with the investment community who, 
by the 1990s, were increasingly of the view that conglomerates should put 
into practice the advice of Whittington & Mayer (2000, p217) that "Corporates 
need to know when to be practitioners of corporate euthanasia". 
 
3.3.3.1 Performance 
This section considers the performance of conglomerates compared to other 
categories of company. In analysing conglomerate performance their use of 
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acquisitions as a means of growth comes to the fore and, given the poor post-
deal performance of many acquisitions, has a major bearing. Acquisitions may 
provide a quick route to conglomeration and to turnover growth but their effect 
on profitability is less clear.         
 
One of the major advantages claimed for conglomerates is their superior level 
of profitable growth compared to other categories of company. However, a 
review of the, predominantly US, literature does not provide clear evidence 
that conglomerates consistently outperformed other categories. Dess, Gupta, 
Hennart & Hill (1995) reviewed the findings of 32 papers, all except that by 
Grant, Jammine & Thomas (1988) into US, principally Fortune 500 or 1000, 
companies with the majority using Rumelt's strategy-based categorisation 
scheme in preference to SIC/Entropy. The studies revealed no clear picture 
regarding the relationship between diversity and performance with a broad 
range of positive, negative and neutral outcomes being observed. However, 
Dess, Gupta, Hennart & Hill (1995, p30) are quick to point out that, as with 
Rumelt's (1974) original work, many of the subsequent studies failed to 
control for industry effects. 
 
Some of the earliest research into diversification was that by Weston & 
Mansinghka (1971) who compared conglomerates and non-conglomerates. 
Unsurprisingly, given their predilection to diversify by acquisition, 
conglomerates were found to grow more rapidly than comparative focussed 
companies. However, they also found that although the earnings/net worth of 
conglomerates was higher than for non-conglomerates the difference was not 
   86 
statistically significant. By the end of their study, i.e. 1968, there were "no 
significant differences in earnings performance" (p925) where earnings were 
linked to total assets or net worth plus long term debt. It is important to note 
that there was a wide variation in performance across the conglomerate 
category with some companies performing significantly better than others 
inferring an industry effect and/or that the ability of management has a very 
direct influence on financial performance. 
 
Rumelt (1974) used his 4-category categorisation scheme to research the 
performance of US conglomerates and found marked variations in average 
performance across diversification categories between 1949 and 1969 as the 
following table shows:  
Table 14: Annualized Performance of Listed NYSE Companies, 1949-
1969 
 
All Figures % 
Diversification 
Sales 
Growth 
Earnings 
Growth 
EPS 
Growth 
 
ROC 
 
ROE 
Single-business  7.17 4.81 3.92 10.81 13.20 
Dominant-business  8.03 7.95 5.99 9.64 11.64 
Related-business  9.14 9.39 7.64 11.49 13.55 
Unrelated-business 14.24 13.86 7.92 9.49 11.92 
Average all comps 9.01 8.72 6.57 10.52 12.64 
 
Source: Rumelt (1974, p91) 
 
Conglomerates did produce superior growth rates achieving the highest sales 
growth, 14.24% compared to the overall average of 9.01% but also the lowest 
return on investment, 9.49% compared to 11.49% for related diversifiers and 
10.52% overall. Of the other categories, single-business and related business 
companies produced better than overall returns implying that companies 
focusing on core activities rather than pursuing conglomeration produce better 
results.  
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Salter & Weinhold (1979, p24) note that, in response to criticisms regarding 
failure to control for industry, Rumelt refined his analysis adjusting for industry 
effects by comparing each company's performance to a weighted average 
'synthetic' profit calculated for each company according to the proportions of 
its total investment in various business segments. Rumelt also sub-divided 
some of his original categories with related being split into constrained and 
linked and unrelated split into multi-business and unrelated.  
 
The following table compares the performance, in terms of return on capital, of 
each of Rumelt's extended categories against weighted 'average' expected 
performance. The notes explain the new categories.  
Table 15: Performance Differences Among Rumelt's Strategic 
Categories (Weighted for Industry Affiliation), 1962-1971 
  
All figures % 
Category 
Actual 
ROC 
Expected 
ROCa 
 
Residual 
Single Business 11.45 9.94 1.51* 
Dominant - Constrainedb 12.09 11.01 1.08 
Related - Constrainedb 12.28 11.67 0.61 
Related Linkedb 10.53 10.83 (0.30) 
Multibusinessc 8.30 10.13 (1.83)* 
Unrelated Portfolioc 8.80 10.46 (1.66)* 
Average for all companies 11.00 10.89 0.11 
 
Notes: 
a Average return on capital over the period for all the companies in each strategic 
category if they were average performers in the industries in which they 
participated. 
b Rumelt's "constrained" categories closely correspond to related-complementary 
diversification while his "linked" categories closely correspond to related-
supplementary diversification.  
c Rumelt expanded his original unrelated category into a multibusiness segment, or 
companies with 2-4 relatively balanced though unrelated businesses, and an 
unrelated portfolio segment, or companies with numerous unrelated businesses. 
 
* Significant at the 5% level. 
 
Sources: Salter & Weinhold (1979, p24). Original source - Richard Rumelt, “Diversity and 
Profitability”, University of California at Los Angeles Working Paper MGL-51, 1977. 
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Using average return on capital, the best performers are single business 
companies which produced returns 1.51% higher than the average with the 
worst being the multi-business and unrelated portfolio business categories, 
i.e. conglomerates, whose returns were 1.83% and 1.66% lower than the 
average respectively. These results support those of Rumelt‟s (1974) earlier 
work. 
 
Rumelt (1982) continued to research into the profitability of the increasingly 
common conglomeration strategies of US companies finding further support 
for his earlier results that "corporate profitability differed significantly across 
groups of firms following different 'strategies' of diversification" and that "the 
lowest levels were those of vertically integrated businesses and firms 
following strategies of diversification into unrelated businesses" (p359). 
 
Holzmann, Copeland & Hayya (1975) also compared the financial 
performance of US conglomerates and non-conglomerates starting with the 
premise that: "the growth of conglomerate corporations is often justified on the 
grounds that conglomerate mergers are likely to lead to superior risk-return 
performance, the customary rationale underlying portfolio diversification" 
(p74). They categorised 349 companies using definitions developed by 
Forbes (1965) and Weston & Mansinghka (1971) as either conglomerate or 
non-conglomerate and used four performance measures; two asset-based 
(operating income/total gross assets and operating income/book value of 
equity) and two equity-based (net income after tax/stockholders' equity and 
net income available for common equity) to assess the performance of both 
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groups. They did not try to link conglomerate performance to share price 
performance. Data covering the period 1951-1970 was analysed and, for 
asset-based measures, conglomerates produced lower but less variable 
returns. However, for equity-based measures the picture was less clear; non-
conglomerates achieved higher mean returns but they also experienced 
greater mean variances suggesting greater volatility.  
 
Holzmann, Copeland & Hayya (1975) noted that their findings were consistent 
with earlier research by Reid (1968) who asserted that conglomerates were 
size rather than profit maximisers and by Weston & Mansinghka (1971) who 
showed that conglomerates diversified defensively to reduce risk and increase 
stability of returns. In summary, Holzmann, Copeland & Hayya (1975, p76) 
said that ”….on the basis of our findings it is possible to speculate that 
conglomerate managers were more concerned with overall firm performance 
and growth than with returns to equity holders". Holzmann, Copeland & Hayya 
(1975) also referenced consistent findings from research by Berle & Means 
(1968), Mason (1959), Penrose (1959), Marris (1964), Galbraith (1971) and 
Herendeen (1974). 
 
Research by Mason & Goudzwaard (1976) found that, compared to randomly 
selected portfolios, conglomerates did not produce superior returns. They 
questioned why conglomerates need to exist if individual investors can 
achieve the same or better results. Another paper along the same lines is that 
of Melicher & Rush (1973) who compared the financial performance (ratio 
based) of 45 conglomerates against 45 non-conglomerates with the 
   90 
constituents of both groups having been in the same basic industry in 1960. 
The financial performance of both groups was found to be similar: "the irony of 
our findings is that the conglomerates were shown to be no better or worse off 
than those firms that remained in the basic industries that the conglomerates 
abandoned" (p388). 
 
Salter & Weinhold (1979) produced data showing that, on average, 
conglomerates perform worse than the market in general as represented by 
the average of companies comprising the All Industry Composite. Their results 
are summarised in the following table: 
Table 16: Business Week Survey of Business Profitsa 
 
 Conglomeratesb  All Industry Composite 
 
 
 
Year 
Average 
Return 
On  
Equity 
Average 
Price- 
Earnings 
Ratioc 
Average 
Return 
On 
Equity 
Average 
Price- 
Earnings 
Ratioc 
1973 11.3 6 14.0 11 
1974 11.8 5 14.0 9 
1975 11.3 8 11.8 12 
1976 13.2 8 14.0 10 
1977 12.9 7 14.1 9 
1978 13.5 6 15.1 8 
 
Notes: 
a Based on Business Week's Quarterly Survey of Business Profits. 
b The composition of Business Week's conglomerate category is Teledyne, 
Northwest Industries, Textron, Avco, Studebaker-Worthington, Southdown, Martin 
Marietta, Signal, Colt Industries, Whittaker, Bliss & Laughlin Industries, Tenneco, 
Chromalloy American, Gulf + Western Industries, Fuqua Industries, Kidde (Walter), 
City Investing, IU International, U.S. Industries, IC Industries, Litton Industries, LTV. 
c Based on price-earnings ratio in effect on evaluation date.   
 
Source: Salter & Weinhold (1979, p27) 
 
In each year both the average return on equity and the average price earnings 
ratio of conglomerates was substantially below that of the all industry 
composite. Salter & Weinhold (1979) also quote statistics of relative economic 
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performance between 1965 and 1978 showing the S&P index of 10 
conglomerates underperformed the S&P 400 index of industrial companies 
and the S&P index of major companies by a substantial margin. As with 
Rumelt's (1974) early work, Salter & Weinhold (1979) did not control for 
industry effects. Furthermore, their conglomerate population, the Business 
Week Conglomerates, comprised a small group of only 32 companies limiting 
the robustness of their research.  
 
According to Bettis & Hall (1982) industry effects can have a significant 
bearing on conglomerate performance. Acknowledging that diversification can 
be into either related or unrelated activities, they noted conglomerates should 
have an advantage saying, “….unrelated diversification strategies would seem 
to have an advantage because they permit a wider choice of industries in 
which to participate" (p255). Notwithstanding the need for diverse companies 
to match business strategies to their activities if overall performance is to be 
optimised ("high performing diversified firms may be those firms that are able 
to develop and pursue appropriate strategies in their constituent businesses" 
(p256)) Bettis & Hall (1982) note that the success of conglomerate strategies 
remains heavily dependent on the business activities into which the company 
diversifies. Their research showed the best performers were those with 
businesses in pharmaceuticals, a high growth/high profit industry. A key 
finding from Bettis & Hall (1982, p262) is that "…the researchers are led to 
conjecture that selection of industry or industries in which to participate may 
be more important than a related or unrelated diversification strategy....further 
research is needed to separate fully the effects of industry participation from 
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the effects of diversification strategy and to determine whether the two interact 
in some manner". In effect, corporate investors are faced with the same 
industry choices as private investors; both can see the relative industry 
performance and can make choices based on that information. The inference 
is that the success of a conglomerate is heavily dependent on the portfolio 
choices made by management.  
 
Looking at the performance issue from a value perspective, there is a 
substantial body of evidence supporting the view that diversified firms are 
consistently valued less than 'pure play' firms. Lang & Stulz (1994) researched 
the Tobin's q ratios for US firms through the 1980s finding that "Tobin's q and 
firm diversification are negatively related throughout the 1980s. This negative 
relation holds for different diversification measures and when we control for 
other known determinants of q [for example, R & D]. Further, diversified firms 
have lower q's than comparable portfolios of pure play firms" (p1248). This 
finding was consistent with that of Servaes (1996) into performance in the 
1960s and 1970s.  
 
Berger & Ofek (1995) also considered the effect on a firm's value of its 
diversification activities. They found that during the period 1986-1991, when 
compared to focused companies, diversified companies lost 13-15% of their 
value. Berger & Ofek (1995) recognised the potential benefits of 
diversification, notably the acquisition of imperfectly correlated (counter-
cyclical) profit generators, better management and resource allocation. 
However, they also believed that loss-making companies lose more when part 
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of a conglomerate than they would as independent companies as they will be 
cross-subsidised by other profitable operations reducing pressures to 
improve.   
 
The very limited UK literature on conglomerate performance should be 
considered in light of the foregoing US research. Grant & Jammine (1988) 
conclude that, overall, UK research, limited though it is, has failed to “shed 
appreciable light on the relationship between diversification strategy and 
performance” (p335). Their opinion is supported by the conflicting findings of 
Grinyer, Yasai-Ardekani & Al-Bazzaz (1980) who found in favour of dominant 
business firms, Hill (1983) who found volatility but little difference in mean 
profitability and Luffman & Reed (1982) who found conglomerates performed 
better than related diversifiers. However, Grant & Jammine (1988) do note 
that research in this area has not been consistent with differences in 
profitability measures having a major influence.  
 
Finally, it should be remembered that much of the extant literature relates  to 
the 1960s and 1970s, a period when conglomeration and conglomerates were 
enjoying growth rather than contraction. Haynes, Thompson & Wright (2002, 
p173) covered a more recent period – 1985 to 1993 – and reported a 
„positive, significant and substantial‟ relationship between divestment and 
performance suggesting the refocusing activities undertaken by 
conglomerates improved their financial performance. However, research by 
Montgomery & Wilson (1986) into the subsequent divestment of large 
acquisitions made by US public companies between 1967 and 1969, the 
   94 
height of the diversification boom, found no significant difference between the 
number of related and unrelated business divested.     
 
Reliability of Financial Data 
When assessing performance it is important to recognise that the reliability of 
financial performance data has, over recent years, increasingly been called 
into question. The lack of transparency of financial information adds to a 
general mistrust of conglomerates. In the UK, Smith (1996) wrote a best seller 
in which he claimed to be "stripping the camouflage from company accounts" 
to highlight how performance may be manipulated. Whilst Smith (1996) did 
not confine his analyses and criticism to conglomerates, they were well 
represented in his book which drew attention to a number of the 'creative' 
accounting practices that were in widespread use and looked at how many 
leading public companies adopted them strongly inferring that, in doing so, 
they were manipulating their accounts and to some degree misleading 
investors as to their financial performance. Biographies of some leading 
businessmen, e.g. Lord Hanson at Hanson (Brummer & Cowe, 1994), have, 
by questioning the financial performance of the companies they ran, provided 
support to Smith (1996).  
 
The practices highlighted by Smith (1996) were, at the time, all legal and 
within the range of accounting treatments acceptable under accounting 
standards. However, several have since been restricted or eliminated by 
new/revised standards issued by the Accounting Standards Board (ASB) and 
its successors the Accounting Standards Committee (ASC) and the Financial 
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Reporting Council (FRC). While the ASB, ACS and FRC have closed some 
loopholes, many still remain. Interestingly Smith (1996, p162) notes that US 
generally accepted accounting practices are more prescriptive than their UK 
equivalents reducing, but not entirely eliminating, scope for interpretation and 
therefore, manipulation. Where companies have dual US and UK reporting 
requirements, e.g. those with a US stock market listing, Smith (1996) 
advocates using accounts prepared under US rather than UK GAAP when 
undertaking analyses.        
 
The book was first published in 1992 and in the second edition Smith (1996) 
defends his record noting that several of the companies he originally criticised 
for questionable accounting practices had, by 1996, experienced difficulties. 
The following table lists the criticised companies and their subsequent 
problems and note in parentheses the number (out of 12) of dubious practices 
adopted by each company:           
 
Table 17: Companies Using the Most Dubious Accounting Practices 
 
Company Problems 
Tiphook (4) In talks with banks, debts soar 
Queens Moat (6) Financial reconstruction underway 
Trafalgar House (8) Auditors, chairman and chief executive depart; 
huge losses, two rights issues 
Albert Fisher (7) Losses, chairman departs 
British Aerospace (7) Record losses, rights issue 
Ratners (7) Founder departs, huge losses 
Lonrho (6) Huge changes in way group is run 
GrandMet (9) Shares underperform 
Bass (6) Shares underperform 
Ladbroke (8) Chairman steps down 
 
Source: Smith (1996, p7) 
 
While it is easy to suggest cause and effect between dubious accounting 
practice and subsequent problems, it must be remembered that many other 
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factors may have been influential, e.g. Ratners‟ problems were primarily due 
to extremely ill-advised comments by its CEO Gerald Ratner who, in a high-
profile speech, described some of its products as 'total crap'! 
    
A company singled out by Smith (1996) is the conglomerate BTR. Smith 
(1996) points to the 'misuse' - aggressive but not illegal - of provisions during 
the company's acquisition of Hawker Siddeley in 1990. According to Smith 
(1996), BTR acquired Hawker Siddeley, which had net assets of £748 million, 
for £1,513 million and then created provisions, primarily to adjust book asset 
values to fair values, of £445 million (£285 million in 1991 and £160 million in 
1992). These 'fair value' adjustments - made under the rules of SSAP22 
(revised) - represented 59.5% of the net asset value and 29.4% of the 
purchase consideration. Smith's (1996) point is that the judicious reversal of 
these provisions, and others relating to other acquisitions and activities, 
without the matching costs being incurred, helped BTR maintain its historically 
high margins in subsequent years 'confusing' markets into believing that it was 
continuing to trade very profitably when, in reality, it was not. BTR released 
provisions totalling £305m in 1992 (28.1% of the reported profit of £1,085 
million) and £81 million in the first half of 1993 (13.5% of the reported profit of 
£602 million). With its provisions largely exhausted by mid-1993, BTR's true 
underlying profitability became apparent. After stagnating in 1994 and 1995, 
profits fell sharply in 1996 as did the share price and City confidence in the 
company. The second half of the 1990s saw a series of disposals as the 
company attempted, unsuccessfully, to restore its profitability through 
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focussing its operations and to raise cash to repay the substantial debts 
incurred in its acquisitive years.  
 
BTR‟s experience suggests that the underlying profitability of other 
conglomerates may have been declining long before they undertook strategic 
reviews that led to the adoption of divestment strategies and re-focussing.  
 
3.3.3.2 Inhibitors 
A previous section discussed the conditions – environmental, regulatory and 
management – that effectively facilitated and encouraged conglomeration. 
The following section discusses the erosion of those drivers and the effect on 
conglomerates. However, while each of the drivers of de-conglomeration has 
been considered individually, none of the extant literature appears to have 
drawn them together to provide an explanation of their combined influence on 
corporate strategy formulation and strategic change.     
 
Failure to Reduce Risk 
The issue of risk reduction is central to conglomeration. The quest for stability 
and low risk is a major aim of companies pursuing conglomeration with 
managements seeking to offer investors stability by creating low risk portfolios 
of business activities.  
 
Levy & Sarnat (1970, p795) acknowledged prior research had identified a 
"conglomerate effect" where "economic activities are unrelated" and where in 
the "purely conglomerate type" profits remain static "but only stabilized by 
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bringing together centres with zero or negative correlations". The theory is 
logical although in practice flawed by the difficulty of identifying businesses 
with the required cyclicality. Bettis and Hall (1982, p257) make the point that 
diversification would be expected to produce negative correlations as the 
investments would be, by definition, unrelated, and would reduce variations in 
performance. However, they are dismissive of the ability of conglomerates to 
stabilise earnings in practice: "Risk reduction (as defined herein) is not a valid 
rationale for selecting unrelated diversification instead of related 
diversification. This result is supported further by the recent work of Salter & 
Weinhold (1979), who propose that two of the common misconceptions about 
diversification are that a related strategy is always safer than an unrelated 
strategy and that adding countercyclical businesses to a company's portfolio 
leads to a stabilised earning stream" (p262). Their view is summarised in the 
comment that unrelated firms "do not have superior risk pooling 
characteristics [to other types of firm]" (p263). 
 
The risk reduction benefit of conglomeration is further undermined by the 
increased realisation by investors, especially professional and institutional, 
that they can create their own portfolios and can be equally as successful as 
their corporate counterparts in reducing unsystematic risk (Salter & Weinhold, 
1979). While they would continue to face the same systematic risk – the level 
of risk inherent in the economy - as companies, investors can easily construct 
a portfolio of investments containing the same mix of business activities as a 
conglomerate could acquire and could probably do it more cheaply given that 
they would not have to pay acquisition premia. However, this is not as true for 
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international diversification which requires foreign investment which is less 
straightforward for individuals. As Dess, Gupta, Hennart & Hill (1995, p360) 
noted: "An assumption of the risk return model for international diversification 
must therefore be that individuals are more limited in their ability to diversify 
than the firm. The second best solution is for individual investors to buy 
shares in firms which diversify for them".  
 
While the risk of investor and corporate portfolios may be similar, it 'may' still 
be the case that conglomerates can produce superior returns from their 
portfolio of businesses than investors could from the same individually held 
portfolio. Investors, especially individuals, are, despite recent increases in 
investor 'power', effectively passive, i.e. they have little or no influence on the 
day-to-day running or strategy of 'their' companies, whereas by bringing its 
superior management skills to bear, an acquirer may be able to increase the 
profitability of a business. Furthermore, as noted by Berg (1965, p83), 
conglomerates may be better placed to undertake high-risk high-return 
projects: their financial resources are greater and they would not be “putting 
all their eggs in one basket”. BCG (2006, p13) support this view using a 
gambling analogy to highlight the risks to focused companies as compared to 
conglomerates: “this is the dilemma of focussing: putting all your chips on one 
number has the potential to generate higher rewards than spreading your 
bets, as conglomerates do, but the potential losses are also greater if your 
number doesn‟t come up”.       
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Risk-reduction through portfolio management is a sound theoretical basis for 
conglomeration. However, the practicalities and costs relative to investor 
portfolio selection, diminishes its success and attraction. However, especially 
for individual rather than institutional investors, conglomeration continues to 
offer the only practical way to risk-reduction (Williams, 2002).  
  
Changes in Regulation 
The introduction and use of competition legislation and regulatory processes 
to monitor and effectively limit market shares by precluding same industry 
acquisitions encouraged diversification and conglomeration through the 1970s 
and 1980s. In the US, Shleifer & Vishny (1991) lay a portion of the blame for 
what they refer to as the conglomerate „mistake‟ at the US government‟s door 
believing that “….aggressive governmental policy, in the case of antitrust 
policy, can have large unintended effects” (p59).  
 
Relaxation in the application of competition regulations in the late 1980s 
reduced the need for growth through diversification. Scoullar (1987) cites 
government reluctance to refer proposed transactions that would result in 
increased market shares in particular industries, i.e. non-diversifying 
transactions, to competition authorities as helping drive acquisition activity. In 
addition, in some industries globalisation and international expansion 
increased competition and reduced market shares meaning that fewer 
potential acquisitions would require competition authority clearance.   
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Fewer Opportunities 
The UK and the US stock markets are amongst the most developed and 
efficient in the world. Brealey & Myers (1991) attribute the definition of three 
levels of stock market efficiency to Harry Roberts (1967): weak where prices 
reflect information from past prices, semi-strong where prices reflect past 
prices and other publicly available information and strong where prices reflect 
all information not only that publicly available. On this scale, the UK and the 
US stock markets are seen as being semi-strong with prices reflecting all 
known information suggesting prices are generally fair but with some 
opportunities to make gains.  
 
In addition to the efficiency of the stock market, the depth and breadth of 
financial analysis, especially by institutional investors, has increased 
significantly in line with global information technology developments. With 
most quoted and all FTSE100 companies covered by at least one leading 
broker and analysed by several institutional investors there is a greatly 
increased likelihood that a 'bargain' will be spotted by several potential 
acquirers who, should they decide to try to acquire the company, will compete 
for control and bid up the price reducing the scope to add-value post-
acquisition. Porter (1987) argues that the potential 'value-added' by acquirers 
has been reduced making the concept of portfolio management redundant. In 
the UK the decisions of some of the largest UK conglomerates to break 
themselves up is, in effect, a tacit admission of their failure to add-value 
across the range of unrelated business activities in their portfolios. 
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Therefore, stock market efficiency and greater information/analysis result in 
increased acquisition costs making acquisitions, the preferred route to 
increased diversification, less favourable.   
 
Reduced Management Effectiveness 
As companies grow and encompass a greater range of unrelated activities, 
top management inevitably becomes increasingly generic, i.e. specialists with 
the necessary skills and attributes are employed to manage specific business 
activities while generalists manage corporately. Where this does not happen, 
management skill shortages may result in the specific needs of individual 
businesses being unsatisfied leading to sub-optimal performance at both 
business and corporate levels. Kay (1995) suggests that many of the large 
demergers of the early 1990s – including Courtauld‟s demerger of its textiles 
operations, Racal‟s demerger of its Vodafone mobile communications 
activities, BAT Industries‟ demergers of retailer Argos and paper manufacturer 
Wiggins Teape Appleton and ICI‟s demerger of its pharmaceuticals business 
as Zeneca – were driven by the inability of management to effectively manage 
unrelated activities.  
 
The claim that „diversity cannot be managed‟ was explored by Leontiades 
(1989, p77) who included it in his „Six Deadly Management Myths‟ suggesting 
that appropriate choice of management structure could overcome problems of 
complexity inherent in conglomerates. He also noted that focused (single 
business) companies were also liable to management failures, e.g. 
companies misguidedly remaining focused on declining industries.     
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The issue of management effectiveness and diversification is more complex 
than that of management effectiveness and size. Penrose (1959) discussed 
the problems associated with growth and noted the ongoing debate as to 
whether a company can become 'too big' as regards its ability to adjust 
effectively and efficiently to both the short and long-term conditions it faces. 
Essentially, Penrose (1959) saw these problems as being management 
control issues; can management continue to operate effectively as the firm 
grows? Penrose (1959), took the optimistic view that companies would evolve 
as they grew and change their organisation and management structure 
appropriately. However, Penrose (1959) must be considered in light of the 
type of companies that existed in 1959; predominantly single and dominant 
business companies with few diversified companies and no real multi-
business conglomerates.  
 
Marris (1998, p67) referred to Penrose (1959) and her belief that 
diversification was a natural (and essential) part of growth: "It is Edith Penrose 
again who appears as the leading contemporary writer to emphasize the role 
of continuous diversification in the normal process of growth. She points out 
that by this means many firms have continued to grow over very long periods, 
such as fifty or even seventy five years, although there is, apparently, 
evidence of a tendency for the rate of growth themselves to decline over time. 
The planning of diversification is 'par excellence' a typical function of high 
management. Characteristically, it has been found, these decisions are taken 
at higher levels within the management hierarchy than are, for example, 
pricing decisions. We may therefore define a distinct variable to be known as 
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'the rate of diversification', intended to summarize the implication of the series 
of individual decisions that lead up to the marketing of new products". 
 
Undoubtedly, the development and, amongst diversified companies, 
widespread adoption of divisional management structures has contributed to 
the ability of companies to continue to diversify beyond the limitations of 
traditional structures.  
 
Re-Assertion of Shareholder Power 
The Market for Corporate Control (Jensen, 1986) has had great impact on the 
principal (shareholder)/agent (management) relationship. The increased risk 
of takeover - and its negative implications for the management team of an 
acquired company - faced by underperforming companies has led managers 
to rethink their strategies and to re-align their objectives with those of the 
shareholders who could decide to accept an offer made to acquire their 
company. This change has been exacerbated by an increased willingness, 
especially among institutional shareholders who often have informal contact 
with executives, to act to bring errant management into line. Faced with the 
possibility of losing their jobs, managers‟ instinct for self-preservation cannot 
be underestimated! 
 
In addition, the development of corporate governance guidelines following the 
Cadbury, Greenbury and Hampel committees in the 1990s has reduced the 
potential for management to become „entrenched‟ to the point where they 
effectively become protected from the invisible hand of the Market for 
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Corporate Control. This remains more of an issue in the US where many anti-
takeover provisions may be introduced by directors without recourse to 
shareholders.        
 
Retirement of Dominant Personalities 
The influence of some business leaders, e.g. Lords Hanson and White at 
Hanson and Owen Green at BTR, must not be under-estimated. By no means 
perfect, these business leaders were undoubtedly entrepreneurial, opportunist 
and a major driving force behind the largely successful conglomeration 
strategies pursued by their companies. The retirement of long-serving 
dominant personalities is frequently followed by changes in corporate culture 
as the company tries to adjust to a different style of leadership. Whittington & 
Mayer (2000, p17) describe the continuity of top management resource as 
being the "Achilles heel of conglomerates". Most have had to grapple with 
succession issues, some have been successful, e.g. Hanson‟s break-up after 
the retirement of Lord Hanson, while others have not, e.g. BTR struggled after 
the retirement of Sir Owen Green and several other long-serving directors 
credited with creating the company.  
 
Similarly, there are instances in the US where a change in CEO proved the 
turning point for conglomerates. Leontiades (1980, p162) noted that several 
US conglomerates “….like American Standard,  Boise Cascade, and 
Whittaker which had pursued an aggressive acquisition program in the 1960s 
under one chief executive” changed strategic direction and entered a period 
“….of deconglomerating in the 1970s under a new chief executive”.          
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Development of New Corporate Forms 
The late 1980s saw the development of new types of corporate transaction 
which increased the threat of takeover faced by underperforming companies, 
especially conglomerates, which could be broken up by their new owners 
(Morck, Shleifer & Vishny, 1990). Shleifer & Vishny (1991, p53) point to the 
rapid growth through the 1980s of these “radical new forms of control 
changes” that provided a route back towards focus and specialisation. These 
new forms of control included leveraged buy-outs where the acquisition 
vehicle is overwhelmingly financed by debt and is usually privately owned, 
and break-up takeovers where the aim of the acquirer is to break the acquired 
business up into its component parts and sell them to focused buyers 
exploiting situations where „the sum of the parts exceeds that of the whole‟. 
These innovations in corporate forms, which were made possible principally 
by developments in debt markets, sit alongside more traditional approaches 
including management buy-outs and management buy-ins.    
 
The new corporate forms were helped not only by the availability of finance 
but also by the appetite amongst focused firms for the unwanted businesses 
being sold post-acquisition. This demand was enhanced by the less restrictive 
antitrust environment prevailing in the 1980s especially in the US. Kaplan 
(1990) cited in Shleifer & Vishny (1991) showed that broadly 50% of assets 
acquired in leveraged buy-out transactions were sold off to buyers in the 
same industry within 3 years of the original transaction achieving greater 
focus for both the selling and buying companies.         
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Shareholder Sentiment 
Whilst acknowledging the importance of market fundamentals in valuation, 
especially of quoted public limited companies, and the absence of 
randomness in their share prices, it must be remembered that valuations are a 
function not only of economics/financials and future expectations but also of 
market sentiment. The first two of these variables may be estimated with a 
degree of certainty and analysts will usually agree, broadly at least, on their 
direction, positive or negative. The third, market sentiment, is more difficult to 
assess objectively. Market fundamentals tell only half the story of a company‟s 
valuation.      
 
Investors - professional and amateur alike - like to have clarity; to be able to 
see and understand how a company has performed. Conglomerates are an 
anathema to many investors: their complex management, accounting and tax 
structures do not help foster understanding of underlying performance. A clear 
and deliverable strategy is what investors want to see; a difficult task for a 
company with diverse business activities.  
 
The lack of clarity is exacerbated by an increasing short-termism. The 
principal providers of finance - banks through loans and institutions through 
share and rights issues - have or have been perceived to have become 
increasingly short-term and conservative in their outlook (Miles, 1993; 
Demirag, 1995; Grinyer, Russell & Collison, 1998; Marston & Craven, 1998). 
They seek to maximise their short-run profitability to attract investment 
themselves from individuals who are able to compare their performance 
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through investment league tables compiled by publications such as 
Acquisitions Monthly and Investor‟s Chronicle. Short-termism amongst the 
investment community, in turn, drives companies to favour short-term rather 
than long-term capital investment opportunities to improve profits. 
Understandably major investors want to see strong stable performance and 
dividend growth. However, they want this immediately not in the uncertain 
future and will quickly re-direct their funds away from companies they feel are 
underperforming and towards those offering immediate superior returns. 
Furthermore, the cumulative effect of numerous studies showing very high 
rates of failure for acquisitions, has made the providers of finance consider 
proposed transactions more critically. 
 
The adverse investor sentiment towards conglomerates in the 1990s 
manifested itself in share prices; conglomerates were effectively „on trial‟ in 
the late 1990s (Economist, 1997). Just as shareholders had encouraged and 
supported conglomeration in the 1960s and 1970s, they also encouraged and 
supported the return to focus. Where the shares of diversifying and 
conglomerate acquirers traded at premiums in the 1960s and 1970s it was the 
shares of focused acquirers that enjoyed similar premiums in the 1990s. 
There is a strong body of literature including Wernerfelt & Montgomery (1988), 
Lang & Stulz (1994), Berger & Ofek (1995), Servaes (1996), Bodnar, Tang & 
Weintrop (2003), Denis, Denis & Yost (2002) and Lins & Servaes (1999) 
which considered the existence and size of what has come to be known as 
the conglomerate discount.    
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3.3.3.3 Aftermath of Acquisitions 
Failure of Acquisitions 
 The failure of conglomerates to perform could also be explained by the fact 
that many were created by acquisitions and that, in common with all 
acquisitions, few were successful. Mueller (1969) hypothesised that 
conglomerate merger activity was "irrational" believing that the absence of 
relatedness between the businesses involved would limit scope for synergy 
gains and that, therefore, conglomerate acquisitions were driven by the 
acquirer's desire to maximise growth rather than increase profits. Mueller 
acknowledged that an acquiring company's managers "expected to be able to 
achieve managerial economies" but believed that in reality these economies 
are very seldom realised. His view is supported by Roll (1986) whose Hubris 
theory states that bidders get carried away and pay too much for acquisitions 
which, burdened by a high purchase price, fail to achieve their projected 
returns. Furthermore, research by Kaplan & Weisbach (1992) into divestments 
found that the likelihood of acquisition failure was greatest for conglomerates 
as "diversifying acquisitions are four times more likely to be divested than 
related acquisitions" (p107). This is consistent with Porter‟s (1987) research 
into the acquisition and diversification activity of 33 of the largest US 
corporations, including several conglomerates, between 1950 and 1986 which 
found that: "…most of them had divested many more acquisitions than they 
had kept” (p43) with 53% of acquisitions that brought the acquiring companies 
into new industries later divested. Porter's research is consistent with that of 
Ravenscraft & Scherer (1987) who found a divestment rate of 33% relating to 
acquisitions made in the 1960s and 1970s by US companies.    
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Whitley (1994, p169) offers support to Mueller (1969) noting that diversified 
companies are often characterised by the independent and 'isolated' nature of 
their operations which typically run on a stand alone basis limiting scope for 
synergies. He goes on to say that this does not concern some conglomerates 
and (p171) draws attention to the propensity of conglomerates to minimise 
integration and interdependence of their diverse businesses to allow them to 
more easily manage on a 'portfolio' basis, i.e. acquiring and divesting 
businesses to maintain financial performance and meet the increasingly short-
term demands of providers of finance.  
 
Shelton (1988) also finds conglomerate acquisitions to be less successful 
than those involving related activities. Analysing 218 mergers by randomly 
selected acquirers between 1962 and 1983 and assessing their success using 
a 'strategic fit system', she found acquisitions "that permit expansion into new 
markets (related-supplementary) or within the same business (identical) 
create the most value" (p284).  
 
Finally, according to Amburgey & Dacin (1994, p1447), “the unrelated 
diversification inherent in a conglomerate merger is likely to produce greater 
problems with assimilation than the related diversification involved in product 
extension mergers”. In their research into structural change they found the 
impact on structure of conglomerate acquisitions with their inherent complexity 
to be 3 times greater than that of acquisitions of related activities.  
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Through the growth years, conglomeration was achieved primarily through 
acquisitions. Similarly, in the decline years the reversal of conglomeration was 
achieved through divestments including trade sales, floatations, management 
buy-outs/buy-ins and leveraged buy-outs. The return to greater focus was the 
result of several factors including:  
 
 Concentration on a 'core' activity; focussing management and 
resources to maximum effect. 
 Business trends; identifying growing problems within specific 
businesses leading to their divestment. 
 Failure to achieve 'critical mass' in specific markets and/or industries. 
 Poor performance, e.g. profitability, share price.  
 Pressure from investors, especially institutional for leading quoted 
companies. 
 Capital rationing; investment opportunities exceeding available funds 
leading to divestment to restore balance. 
 Pressure from debt financiers whose reluctance to increase facilities 
means not all activities can be supported leading to divestments.  
 
Research by Kaplan & Weisbach (1992) into divestments by US companies 
found a variety of reasons were cited by divesters as the following table 
shows:  
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Table 18: Reasons for Divestitures 
 
 
Reason 
No. of 
Divestitures 
Change of focus or corporate strategy 43  
Unit unprofitable or mistake 22  
Sale to finance acquisition or leveraged restructuring 29  
Antitrust 2  
Need cash 3  
To defend against takeover 1  
Good price 3  
Divestitures with Reasons 103  
 
Source: Kaplan & Weisbach (1992, p114) 
 
In reviewing Kaplan & Weisbach‟s (1992) findings it must be remembered that 
pride may unduly influence the reason for divestment given by company: 
nobody likes to admit they made a mistake! Therefore, at 22 (21%) the 
number of divestitures following mistakes may be understated. The most 
frequently cited reason with 43 (42%) instances was the desire to change 
focus or corporate strategy which is consistent with acquisitions/divestments 
being used to create and destroy conglomerates. 
 
Weston (1989) provides some support for this contention finding many 
divestments to be of earlier acquisitions and that rather than categorise an 
acquisition as a mistake there is a tendency to claim circumstances had 
changed. „Mistake driven divestment‟ was considered by Allen, Lummer, 
McConnell & Reed (1995) as part of research into the reasons why many 
spin-offs generate gains for shareholders. In their paper, Allen, Lummer, 
McConnell & Reed (1995) researched spin-offs that were originally 
acquisitions for the selling company to see if the original acquisition was, 
measured by return, over-priced and reduced shareholder value, i.e. was a 
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mistake. They found evidence supporting the contention that "wealth gains 
from corporate spin-offs result from the correction of a prior mistake" (p465). 
 
Sudarsanam (1995) discusses the increase in divestment activity amongst UK 
companies in the late 1980s/early 1990s using data from Acquisitions 
Monthly. By extending the data series through to its discontinuation in 1998 it 
can be seen that divestments peaked in 1989 and 1998 at 665 and 798 
transactions respectively with the intervening years averaging around 500. 
Similarly, acquisitions peaked in 1988 and 1998 at 1,633 and 1,480 
transactions respectively having fallen to only 684 in 1992. However, by 1998 
acquisitions were only 91% of their 1988 peak having, at their lowest point, 
been only 42% whereas divestments were 120% of their 1989 peak, their low 
point having been 66% of their 1989 peak. The increase, albeit gradual until 
1998s large rise, provides some support for the contention that from 1991 
onward more companies were divesting activities than in earlier periods.  
Table 19: Acquisitions and Divestments in the UK, 1987-98 
 
Year 
Acquisitions Divestments Total 
No. £m No. £m No. £m 
1987 1,469 20,488 468 7,210 1,937 27,698 
1988 1,633 24,369 608 13,254 2,241 37,623 
1989 1,363 35,318 665 10,206 2,028 45,524 
1990 912 17,457 612 10,221 1,524 27,678 
1991 747 12,180 442 6,001 1,189 18,181 
1992 684 14,428 468 5,319 1,152 19,747 
1993 745 8,720 503 8,640 1,248 17,360 
1994 1,017 17,842 538 7,430 1,555 25,272 
1995 1,124 54,336 570 13,412 1,694 67,748 
1996 1,175 43,098 545 13,234 1,720 56,332 
1997 1,240 51,215 561 12,862 1,801 64,077 
1998 1,480 71,914 798 18,193 2,278 90,107 
 
Note: Acquisitions include both private and public company targets. 
 
Source: Acquisitions Monthly Annuals 
 
   114 
The following table, compiled using data from the Office of National Statistics, 
shows acquisition and disposal activity of UK companies between 1983 and 
2003. The data provides support for the trends through to 1998 that were 
apparent in the Acquisitions Monthly data and also shows that non-UK 
acquisitions and disposals activity has increased adding weight to the 
increasing international dimension to UK business.  
Table 20: UK and Non-UK Acquisitions and Disposals by UK Companies, 
1983-2003 
 
UK Total UK Total
Year No. No. % No. No. No. % No. UK Non-UK
1983 447 142
1984 568 170
1985 474 134
1986 842 221
1987 1,528 431 22.0 1,959 340 118 25.8 458 4.5 3.7
1988 1,499 648 30.2 2,147 376 112 23.0 488 4.0 5.8
1989 1,337 681 33.7 2,018 441 134 23.3 575 3.0 5.1
1990 779 586 42.9 1,365 342 134 28.2 476 2.3 4.4
1991 506 550 52.1 1,056 214 157 42.3 371 2.4 3.5
1992 432 679 61.1 1,111 200 219 52.3 419 2.2 3.1
1993 526 521 49.8 1,047 189 221 53.9 410 2.8 2.4
1994 674 422 38.5 1,096 209 149 41.6 358 3.2 2.8
1995 505 365 42.0 870 206 117 36.2 323 2.5 3.1
1996 584 442 43.1 1,026 248 178 41.8 426 2.4 2.5
1997 506 464 47.8 970 122 176 59.1 298 4.1 2.6
1998 635 569 47.3 1,204 150 218 59.2 368 4.2 2.6
1999 493 590 54.5 1,083 93 198 68.0 291 5.3 3.0
2000 587 557 48.7 1,144 121 168 58.1 289 4.9 3.3
2001 492 371 43.0 863 173 139 44.6 312 2.8 2.7
2002 430 262 37.9 692 107 128 54.5 235 4.0 2.0
2003 558 243 30.3 801 166 136 45.0 302 3.4 1.8
RatioAcquisitions
Non-UK Non-UK
Disposals
Acq'n-Disposals
 
 
Source: Office of National Statistics, Various Tables. 
 
Unfortunately, the ONS data is not broken down according to the acquirer‟s 
size, type – public or private – or diversification category and therefore the 
trends identified may only be considered in the broadest sense. The 
percentage of acquisitions of non-UK companies increased from an average 
of around 30% at the end of the 1980s to almost 50% through the 1990s. This 
suggests that UK companies were expanding geographically through the 
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1990s which may have been a response to regulatory limitations on UK 
growth. However, the table also shows that the percentage of non-UK 
disposals increased through the 1990s suggesting high rates of failure for 
cross-border acquisitions. The relative success of UK acquisitions is also 
implied in the ratio of acquisitions to disposals which, with a few exceptions, is 
consistently higher for UK than non-UK activity.  
 
Search for Focus and Stability 
Bergh & Lawless (1998) considered the effects of environmental uncertainty 
on portfolio restructuring and movements towards diversification or focus and 
found that, in addition to seeking performance improvements, some portfolio 
restructuring in the 1980s may have been driven by changes in the level of 
environmental uncertainty. They showed that diversification was related 
negatively to restructuring measures (companies were divesting) although the 
reverse was true for less diversified companies. This suggests managers of 
highly diversified companies cope less well with environmental uncertainty 
and seek focus and simplification while less diversified companies see 
uncertainty as offering opportunities. This finding has implications for optimal 
levels of diversification and possibly for control systems employed within 
companies.  
 
At the optimal level of diversification, management would maximise efficiency 
as well as the transfer and exploitation of core competences with a positive 
effect on competitive advantage (Prahalad & Hamel, 1990, p81). Research by 
Hoskisson & Johnson (1992) into the effects of corporate restructuring on 
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diversification found that there was a link with restructuring being associated 
with a decrease in diversity, as measured by the entropy index, as companies 
moved toward greater focus.  
 
The change in the median level of diversification among Fortune 500 firms 
between 1980 and 1990 in the following table illustrates the shift away from 
conglomerate strategies. Unrelated diversification, as measured by the 
entropy index (max value 1), fell marginally from 0.63 to 0.59 between 1980 
and 1985 before falling substantially to 0.35 by 1990 providing strong 
evidence of a move toward focus among the largest public companies in the 
US.    
Table 21: Median Level of Diversification among Fortune 500 Firms in  
1980, 1985 & 1990 
 
 1980 1985 1990 
Total Diversification (4-digit SIC Segment) 1.00 0.90 0.67 
Unrelated Diversification (2-digit SIC Segment) 0.63 0.59 0.35 
No. of Firms 468 453 448 
 
Note: Level of total diversification is calculated using the entropy measure. 
 
Source: Davis, Diekmann & Tinsley (1994, p561) 
 
The trend away from conglomeration in the US is also evident in the fate of 
Rumelt‟s (1974) conglomerates. According to Davis, Diekmann & Tinsley 
(1994, p562), “…of the 10 firms for which data were available in 1980, three 
(Bangor Punto, Colt Industries and Lear Siegler) were bought out, and one 
(Brunswick) fended off a hostile takeover bid. Of the 7 firms still operating 
independently in 1990 (Brunswick, FMC, General Host, W.R. Grace, LTV, 
Litton Industries and Whittaker) all but one (FMC) were less diversified”. 
Furthermore, research by Franko (2004) shows the rise of the focused 
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company to be greatest in the US between 1980 and 1990 with another 
increase between 1990 and 2000. As regards conglomerates, Franko (2004) 
showed that the percentage of conglomerates among the same group of large 
companies (177 companies in 15 industries in 1980 and 201 companies in 17 
industries in 1990 and 2000) remained broadly constant between 1980 (34%) 
and 1990 (37%) but fell to only 5% by 2000.  
Chart 6: The Rise of Focused Firms, 1980-2000 
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Source: Franko (2004) 
 
Across a wider spectrum of US companies, the trend away from 
conglomeration is less clear. Starting with a 1984 sample of 2,356 US 
companies and tracking changes amongst survivors, i.e. not adding new 
entrants, Denis, Denis & Yost (2002) showed a movement towards focus 
amongst US firms over the period 1984 to 1997 but the changes they 
identified in the incidence of related diversified and conglomerate companies 
(26.3% to 25.6%), the average number of segments reported (3.176 to 2.759) 
and the increase in the average turnover-based Herfindahl index (0.486 to 
0.543) were not significant. However, when the sample of companies includes 
new entrants, the trend toward focus is more pronounced with the changes 
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statistically significant. Denis, Denis & Yost (2002) also found that the 
increase in focus had a positive effect on the level of diversification discount 
reflected in market values of companies which fell from an average of 25% in 
1984-1988 to 19% in 1989-1993 and to only 17% in 1994-1997 suggesting 
the markets welcomed the reduction in diversification and conglomeration. 
 
Comment & Jarrell (1995, p67-68) summarised the prevailing opinion of 
conglomerates in the later part of the 1980s saying that, “Conventional 
wisdom holds that economics of scope have been reversed in the 1980s. 
Managers are now advised to eschew diversification and to shrink the far 
flung enterprise that resulted from past diversification strategies”. 
Furthermore, Comment & Jarrell (1995, p68) provide support for their 
contention by showing that “55.7% of exchange-listed firms had a single 
business segment in 1988 compared to 38.1% in 1979” and that “a change of 
0.1 in the absolute value of a revenue-based Herfindahl index of focus is 
associated with a stock return of about 4%”.   
 
The most recent research is that undertaken by the Boston Consulting Group 
(2006) into the effects of focus on conglomerates. A major finding of this 
research, which centred on the US, Asia and Europe (although no UK 
conglomerates were included) was that; “only in Europe are conglomerates 
under pressure to focus. Interestingly, their fundamental performance is also 
significantly weaker than that of their peers in the United States and Asia, 
indicating that the core issue is not their degree of diversification but how they 
manage their business diversity” (p11). The BCG report continues to say that 
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although Relative Total Shareholder Return (RTSR) of diversified companies 
at 1.34% is lower than that of focussed companies at 2.19% it exceeds the 
0.97% achieved by „slightly diversified‟ companies suggesting there is no 
„halfway house‟ for focusing. BCG also note there were large variations in 
performance across the diversified companies supporting their contention that 
an efficiently run conglomerate performs as well as a focused company. 
Acknowledging a trend towards focus, BCG (2006) failed to be convinced of 
the benefits of divestment and refocusing finding that such strategies were 
often ill-conceived, poorly executed and diminished shareholder value; “There 
is no evidence that diversified companies would necessarily produce higher 
returns if they focused on a smaller number of businesses. In some cases, 
notably break-ups, there is a strong probability that focussing will destroy 
shareholder value (p7)”. 
 
Divestment & Performance 
Recognising that many companies had embarked on the reversal of their 
conglomerate strategies, Markides (1993, 1995) raised the possibility of 
companies having an optimal diversification level, i.e. an optimal degree of 
conglomeration. Markides (1993, 1995) contends that returns will increase as 
diversification is pursued but the law of diminishing returns will apply and once 
the optimal point of diversification is exceeded returns will begin to fall and at 
an increasing rate with each additional degree of diversification. However, 
Markides (1995, p173) acknowledges that each firm will have a unique 
optimal point and that its calculation is effectively impossible given the large 
number of variables involved, “identifying a firm‟s exact optimal diversification 
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level is an impossible task – the optimal diversification limit for a firm is really 
a theoretical concept, much like the utility concept in economics, and it cannot 
be measured precisely”. Markides (1993, 1995) suggests that by refocusing, 
companies that had „over-diversified‟ will increase management efficiency and 
performance. 
 
Markides (1993, 1995) approach is consistent with that of Montgomery & 
Wernerfelt (1988, p631) who saw companies: “….as having a queue of 
potential diversification opportunities. We argue that a firm, in electing to 
diversify, will begin with the most profitable opportunities and move toward the 
least profitable ones. Our expectation is that this process will end when 
marginal rents become subnormal”‟. Harper & Viguerie (2002) take a similar 
view suggesting that moderate diversification provides the „best of both 
worlds‟ where a company is able to grow through diversification and avoid 
over-reliance on one industry but does not spread itself and its management 
team too thinly.  
 
Similarly, in UK research Grant & Thomas (1988) have shown that there is a 
relationship between diversification and profitability that is quadratic, i.e. an 
inverted “U” shape that implies that beyond a certain level of diversification 
the costs of managing the inevitably complex organisation exceed the benefits 
of diversity and returns decrease. The „Holy Grail‟ of companies is dynamic 
portfolio management that achieves and, through acquisition and divestment, 
maintains the optimum degree of diversification for their company in a 
constantly changing business environment. Harper & Viguerie (2002, p35) 
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believe that managers should “continually and proactively monitor and match 
their current and emerging internal capabilities with external discontinuities – 
changes in technology, regulation, and consumer behaviour – that may create 
opportunities in related industries or require management skills they already 
have”.  
 
Sudarsanam (1995) believes that the desire of many divesters to get 'back to 
the core‟ is "a rebound from the poor performance of conglomeration which 
happened on a large scale in the 1960s and 1970s" (p245). The evidence 
suggests that when companies break-up, the post-split value of the new 
companies is greater than that of the original single company. Sudarsanam 
suggests that one of the reasons for this is the increase in information 
available to the stock market; the stock market "places a premium on 
corporate transparency" (p248) and diversified companies could have 
"suffered a conglomerate discount" (p248) because of the lack of 
transparency. More fundamentally, Jensen (1982) questioned the rationale 
behind the takeover wave that led to the diversification of US companies. 
 
Markets understand focused firms better than complex conglomerate groups 
and the knowledge imbalance is reflected in a conglomerate discount. 
Graham, Lemmon & Wolf (2002) take a different view of the diversification 
discount showing that a fall in value following a diversifying transaction may 
not be the result of an increase in diversification but the acquirer‟s assumption 
of the discounted value of the company acquired. Graham, Lemmon & Wolf 
(2002) do acknowledge a key weakness of their research; that diversified 
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companies have a tendency to be serial acquirers and, possibly, diversifiers 
and therefore „clean‟ periods without either acquisitions or divestments are 
rare making analysis difficult. 
 
There is a growing body of evidence suggesting that by breaking up, 
companies gain greater analyst coverage which leads to increased value for 
the newly spun-off company and the former parent. Gilson, Healy, Noe & 
Palepu (2001) considered "103 focus-enhancing spin-offs, equity carve-outs, 
and targeted stock offerings between 1990 and 1995" and found a "30-50% 
increase in analyst forecast accuracy for parent and subsidiary firms" (p565). 
The same authors also report that companies show an increase in financial 
performance after break-ups: "The post-break-up firms have combined 
median sales and net income that are higher than the pre-break-up 
conglomerate. Moreover, the median accounting return on equity (ROE) for 
the pre-break-up firm in fiscal year -1 is 10%. After the break-up, median 
ROEs are 12-13% for the parent firms and 10-12% for the subsidiaries. A 
similar pattern is observed for accounting return on assets (ROA), indicating 
that the ROE improvements are not due to a change in leverage for the parent 
and/or subsidiary firms after the break-up" (p571-572). 
 
But what about the financial performance of groups that reduced in size? 
Shleifer & Vishny (1991) found a major driver of portfolio restructuring in the 
1980s was a desire to refocus to improve control, efficiency and, as a 
consequence, performance. Furthermore, Morck, Shleifer & Vishny (1990, 
p47) found evidence that, “….in the 1980s the stock market punishes 
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unrelated diversification” and “….the source of gains in the 1980s is the 
reversal of the unrelated diversification of the 1960s and 1970s”.  
 
Kose & Ofek (1995) researched post-divestment performance and found 
improvements following divestments that increased focus. There are several 
potential explanations for this including the elimination of negative synergies, 
i.e. the parent suffers financially by owning the business to be divested, and 
better post-divestment allocation of management/financial resources. 
Comment & Jarrell (1995) also produced similar findings; "greater corporate 
focus is consistent with shareholder wealth maximization". In their paper they 
found there was a failure of "diversified firms to exploit financial economies of 
scale" and that they were "less likely to be subject to hostile takeover" (p67).  
 
Miller (1977) hypothesised that spin-offs increased shareholder wealth 
because there was a difference in valuation between existing shareholders 
and potential investors. This “Divergence of Opinion” hypothesis was tested 
by Kudla & McInish (1988) who researched a data set of 39 parent and spin-
off cases and finding there was: "a significant increase in the post- versus pre-
spin-off dollar value of trading, which is consistent with the hypothesis that 
divergence of opinion concerning the value of the parent and spun-off firms is 
a determinant of excess returns from spin-offs, confirming the results of 
previous researchers" (p28). 
 
Bhide (1990) also considered the reversal of conglomerate acquisitions in the 
US. His paper argued that the key drivers for conglomerate diversification 
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were common ownership and internal capital markets and suggested that: 
"…over time the disadvantages have come to outweigh the advantages; and 
thus the reported shareholder gains from "bust-ups" are not simply "paper" 
gains, as critics of takeovers claim, but are likely to reflect real changes in 
operating efficiency" (p70). For example, in theory internal capital markets 
allow first mover advantage, avoid investment in marginal projects, allow 
problems to be solved without undue external pressure, allow managerial 
assistance and better cash management. However, Bhide (1990) believed 
there are significant disadvantages including slow reaction times, high 
corporate overheads, political decision-making and mis-aligned incentives 
including stock option schemes. Bhide (1990) also believed conglomerates 
were living on borrowed time with increasingly sophisticated deregulated 
capital markets applying greater pressure for improved performance and 
enhanced disclosure requirements increasing the transparency of company 
reporting and limiting  scope for manipulation of reported results. Furthermore, 
investor power grew in the 1980s as the percentage of shares owned by 
institutions increased and investors became increasingly vocal and critical of 
those management teams they perceived to be failing to protect their (the 
owners‟) interests. Bhide (1990) concludes his paper by saying, 
unsurprisingly, that although not all conglomerates are poor performers, many 
really have outlived their usefulness and that while some divestments may 
have been 'overpriced', the process of break-up usually adds to overall value. 
 
The relationship between the degree of corporate focus and the incidence of 
spin-offs also produces interesting results. Daley, Mehrotra & Sivakumar 
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(1997) studied 85 spin-offs between 1975 and 1991 looking at corporate focus 
issues by considering parent and spun off company SIC codes. They found "a 
significant improvement in operating performance for cross-industry spinoffs, 
and none for own-industry deals" (p257). Their summary finding was that 
spin-offs only create value when they result in an increase in corporate focus 
which, they theorised, removes unrelated businesses allowing managers to 
concentrate their efforts on core businesses. They saw complexity as 
reducing management efficiency and, as a result, performance. 
   
As part of the control environment, managers need to assess and re-assess 
their strategy with the aim of profit maximisation. Faced with a dynamic 
business environment and conscious of the existence of the market for 
corporate control, managers should always be looking to ensure they cannot 
divest businesses and, as a result, add to shareholder wealth. According to 
Linn & Rozeff (1982, p594): "a value enhancing corporate policy, therefore, 
calls for continual review of the assets of the firm, assessing both the internal 
effects of a unit's continued presence and the external market for these 
assets". An important driver in retention/divestment decisions is synergies, 
which can have a positive or negative value. Positive synergies occur where 
the post-acquisition value of a company is higher than the sum of the values 
of its constituents, i.e. they work better together than separately. Negative 
synergies occur where the reverse is true, i.e. the company is inefficient and 
would have a greater value if separated into two or more independent 
companies. Linn & Rozeff (1982) suggest managers should consider selling 
only if a price above the internal value and future cash flows can be achieved, 
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i.e. if the business is worth more to another business. In cases where 
profitability is poor with little likelihood of improvement, piecemeal liquidation 
should also be considered. Research by Hite & Owers (1983) has suggested 
that some companies are effectively worth more "dead than alive". 
 
Hite & Owers (1983) considered various explanations for spin-offs concluding 
that those undertaken to "facilitate mergers or to separate diverse operating 
units" (p409) produced positive abnormal returns with the latter achieving the 
highest. Schipper & Smith (1982) concluded that there was "a statistically 
significant positive average share price reaction” (p463) for a sample of 93 
voluntary spin-off announcements on the American and New York Stock 
Exchanges between 1963 and 1981 with gains coming primarily from 
reductions in complexity. Jain (1985) shows that following voluntary sell-off 
announcements, both sellers‟ and buyers‟ share prices react favourably, the 
greatest excess returns being enjoyed by the sellers‟ shareholders, a 
statistically significant 0.70% compared to the buyers‟ statistically significant 
0.34%. Jain (1985) also noted that very few divestments were achieved 
through an auction process; in most instances there was only a single buyer. 
In the absence of an auction, is the price always right?          
 
The questionable financial performance of conglomerates put pressure on 
their managements to re-assess their corporate strategies and focus their 
activities. Research by Levy & Sarnat (1970), Rumelt (1974) and Mason and 
Goudzwaard (1976) showed the financial failings of the conglomerate model 
while further research by Porter (1987) and Ravenscraft and Scherer (1987) 
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showed the high failure rate of unrelated acquisitions adding to the suggestion 
that conglomerates were failing. However, Porter (1987) and Ravenscraft & 
Scherer (1987) suggest that some of the break-up gains reflect the desire of 
other company managers to add to their „empires‟ at prices that may not be 
profit maximising providing gains to the divesting company. The hubris of 
acquiring managers works in favour of the divesting company. Although no 
supporting evidence has been found, there is the possibility that a diversity 
reducing divestment by a conglomerate could lead to the acquiring company 
itself becoming a conglomerate.     
 
There has been some recent research into the area of divestment strategy. 
The London office of Deloitte and Touche (2002) produced a report based on 
a survey they undertook on global demergers. They reviewed 1,653 
demergers (spin-off and split-off) completed/declared unconditional between 
January 1990 and December 1999. They narrowed their sample to deals with 
a value above $2 billion (118 transactions). Overall D&T found that pre-
announcement there is a 2-10% drop in share price with "lack of 
understanding of demergers, the loss of scale and scale benefits and the fear 
that assets are being sold cheap" (p3) being the major causes. They also 
noted that investors worry about how the divestment proceeds will be 
invested. However, within 1 year of demerger parents' share prices increase 
between 12.5% (median) to 52% (upper quartile) and divested business share 
prices rise more than 46% (upper quartile) but there are two distinct sub-
groups; successful and others. Break-ups and spin-offs have been 
researched by several others - Schipper & Smith (1983), Kudla & McInish 
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(1988), Krishnaswami & Subramaniam (1999) – who have found that 
information asymmetry and voluntary actions increase shareholder returns 
from the transactions. 
 
Research into the post-divestment performance of divesting companies shows 
performance and value improvements where the transaction has increased 
focus thereby providing an economic rationale for divestment. However, the 
source of those gains is uncertain although greater transparency and 
increased management and corporate efficiency are recurring themes of the 
literature.    
 
Portfolio Management 
Some conglomerates take a very 'enlightened' view of their portfolio of 
businesses, constantly reviewing the rationale supporting each activity‟s 
retention whereas others seem reluctant to „let go‟ of any. Goold & Luchs 
(1993, p22) succinctly summarised the approach management should take in 
deciding on diversification, “…diversity can only be worthwhile if corporate 
management adds value in some way and the test of a corporate strategy 
must be that the businesses in the portfolio are worth more under the 
management of the company in question than they would be under any other 
ownership”.  
 
Rajan, Servaes & Zingales (2000) considered the efficiency of resource 
allocation amongst diversified US companies between 1980 and 1993; can 
divestment improve resource allocation? They found that as 
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complexity/diversity increased the efficiency of resource allocations 
deteriorated; as divestment increased requests for resources rose and the 
efficiency of the allocation process fell. Divestment simplified the process and 
improved the allocation of resources and performance. Overall, this suggests 
managers need to review their portfolios with a degree of ruthlessness which 
may often be lacking. 
 
In many ways, BTR and Hanson were different in their attitudes towards 
managing their portfolios. BTR very rarely divested unwanted parts of 
acquisitions preferring to try and make them work despite their adding to 
group complexity. As a consequence, BTR ended up with businesses as 
diverse as heavy engineering and women's hosiery. The alternative approach 
was typified by Hanson which was well known for selling off businesses within 
an acquisition that did not fit its strategy. Lublin (1989), in an article discussing 
Hanson's 1989 acquisition of Consolidated Gold Fields, noted that between 
1973 and April 1989 "Hanson's US arm spent more than $3.6 billion on 
acquisitions and recouped nearly $2.7 billion, according to analysis by London 
brokers Hoare Govett". He further noted that "Hanson paid $930 million for 
SCM, Smith Corona's parent; so far, it has reaped more than $1.5 billion from 
SCM asset sales".    
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Porter (1987) saw Hanson as exemplifying a 'restructuring' company; an 
acquirer that looks for businesses with unrealised potential and, post-
acquisition: 
 Frequently changes management, 
 Changes strategy, 
 Adds new technology, 
 Builds critical mass, 
 Divests unneeded/unconnected parts. 
The restructured unit is sold off as soon as recovery is evidenced by financial 
performance. Porter believes BTR could also be placed in this category but 
the evidence seems to suggest otherwise; BTR held on to units long after 
their recovery plans had been completed and their successful turnaround 
reflected in profitability. As Porter (1987, p52-53) says, "companies find it very 
hard to dispose of business units once they are restructured and performing 
well. Human nature fights economic reality". Companies that fail to dispose of 
businesses after turnaround effectively become portfolio managers, a strategy 
found to be flawed.  
 
However, turnarounds are not always successful and failure is often followed 
by divestment. In 1988 British Aerospace, an aviation and technology 
company, bought Rover Group, a volume car manufacturer, from the British 
Government. Notwithstanding the Conservative government‟s desire to 
dispose of Rover which had been in public ownership since the mid-1970s, 
the acquisition was intended to give BAe a more diversified portfolio of 
businesses and an opportunity to use its management skills to turn a 
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company long seen as in terminal decline into a successful business. 
Unfortunately, the problems at Rover proved insurmountable for a 
management team skilled in „high-tech‟ aerospace and defence businesses 
but with little/no experience of running high volume, low technology 
manufacturing operations. BAe divested Rover in 1994 to BMW of Germany, 
a focussed automotive group looking to broaden its product range to include 
lower priced vehicles and 4x4s. In 2001, BMW, despite devoting substantial 
financial and management resources to Rover, also admitted defeat and 
divested the business selling it to a consortium including former directors for 
only £10. Ultimately, Rover went into receivership in 2005.  
 
Conglomerate ‘Life Cycle’ 
The following chart illustrates the life cycle of the strategy of conglomeration in 
the UK. The comparable chart for the US would shift towards the left, each 
phase approximately 10-15 years ahead of the UK. Other countries‟ charts 
would be closer to that of the UK.      
Chart 7: Life Cycle of Conglomerate Corporate Strategy 
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The chart, based broadly on extant on UK research, ascribes approximate 
periods for each of the generic phases; development through the 1960s, 
growth through the 1970s, maturity in the 1980s and decline in the 1990s. The 
chart outlines the life cycle of the strategy itself rather than of companies 
adopting it. Looking at strategic change at specific companies may reveal 
significant differences in the length of time conglomeration is pursued; some 
conglomerates, like Williams Holdings, may be short-lived „shooting stars‟ 
while others, notably Bass/Intercontinental Hotels, Tomkins and Unilever, 
prove to be long-term adherents of the strategy.    
 
The frequency of strategic change may prove to be considerable if the 
continual membership of the FTSE100 index since its introduction in 1984 is a 
good indicator of the extent of corporate change. As the following table 
shows, only 23 of the original 100 members survived the first 20 years of the 
index with major household names including Midland Bank, Dunlop Holdings 
and Distillers disappearing through acquisition. 
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Table 22: FTSE100 Survivors, 1984-2004 
 
Barclays 
BOC Group1 
Boots Group2 
BP  
Cadbury Schweppes 
Aviva (Commercial Union Assurance) 
GUS3 
Imperial Chemical Industries4 
Hilton Group5 
Land Securities Group 
Legal & General Group 
Lloyds TSB 
Marks & Spencer Group 
Pearson 
Prudential 
Reckitt Benckiser (Reckitt & Colman) 
Reed Elsevier (Reed International) 
Rio Tinto (Rio Tinto-Zinc Corporation) 
Royal Bank of Scotland 
J Sainsbury 
Shell 
Tesco 
Unilever 
 
Notes 
1 BOC Group acquired by Linde AG of Germany in 2005 
2 Boots merged with AllianceUnichem in 2006 forming AllianceBoots which was taken 
private in 2007 by a consortium funded by KKR. 
3 In 2006 the group was split into Experian, a credit ratings agency, and Home Retail 
Group which comprised the Argos catalogue and Homebase DIY retail activities. 
Both post-split companies were in the FTSE100.  
4 Imperial Chemical Industries acquired by Akzo Nobel of Netherlands in 2007.   
5 Hilton Group (renamed Ladbroke) fell from index following the disposal of its hotel 
businesses in 2006.  
 
Source: Klinger, Bolger & Waller (2004) 
 
The rise in the adoption of conglomerate strategies through to the 1980s may 
be explained by several external and internal factors which created a 
favourable environment. Similarly, the decline in conglomeration may be 
explained by the reversal of several of those previously favourable factors 
creating an environment that was hostile to the conglomerate causing many to 
reverse their diversification and seek greater focus. It is difficult to explain why 
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the environment changed; there were no specific economic or political events 
or „shocks‟ rather markets and investors developed and became more 
demanding while company managements failed to adequately control the 
complex organisations they had created.  
 
While UK conglomeration entered the decline phase in the 1990s, US 
realisation that conglomeration was failing occurred earlier as noted by Peters 
& Waterman (1982, p294-296) who summarised US research into 
conglomerates: "…virtually every academic study had concluded that 
unchannelled diversification is a losing proposition…..it seems worthwhile to 
illustrate rather exhaustively the almost total absence of any rigorous support 
for very diversified business combinations". 
 
The core theory that conglomeration leads to reduced risk, greater earnings 
stability, improved growth and the leveraging of core competences remains 
valid but its practical application has been called into question. Despite the 
widespread introduction of M-Form structures managements have proved ill-
equipped to effectively control the conglomerate groups they created largely 
by acquisition. This suggests that conglomeration, in the form it took in the 
20th century, is a strategy that has „had its day‟ and is unlikely to return to 
prominence or enjoy success in the future. 
 
However, there may be a further evolutionary step beyond the traditional 
conglomerate that may further extend the Model of Corporate Development. 
Some writers have tried to link the evolutionary theories of Charles Darwin to 
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economic and business development and the broad Darwinian concept of the 
'survival of the fittest' may be applicable, albeit simplistically, to different 
corporate strategies and conglomeration in particular. However, one important 
difference remains: Darwinian evolution in nature is determined by the 
environment while in business it is not only the environment but also the 
collective decisions of management that shapes companies. This needs to be 
considered in light of the changes in corporate governance seen over the last 
10-15 years in the UK which has resulted in greater control over executives 
being exercised by non-executive directors and by more active shareholders. 
Clearly, companies continue to be shaped by their directors but the new 
corporate governance regimes restrict their largesse and ability to pursue 
conglomerate strategies. These issues are explored by looking for links 
between board composition and strategy.  
 
3.3.4 Corporate Governance 
The impact of corporate governance on conglomeration cannot be ignored. 
Whittington & Mayer (2000, p60) commented that “the life-cycle of a 
conglomerate is effectively defined by the life-span of its original top 
management team” suggesting a conglomerate was unlikely to outlive the 
management team that created it. Similarly, Johnson (1996) considered the 
period 1983-1996 finding that changes in corporate governance preceded 
refocusing activities.  
 
The experiences of Hanson and BTR in the 1990s seem to bear this out as at 
both conglomerates changes in strategy coincided with a change in chairman 
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and/or chief executive; at BTR, Sir Owen Green retired as chairman in 1994 
while at Hanson, Lord Hanson‟s retirement followed Lord White‟s death. This 
raises the question of just how powerful and influential individuals are in the 
pursuit and maintenance of conglomeration?      
 
3.3.4.1 Executive & Board Composition 
Since the 1990s there have been significant improvements in corporate 
governance at UK companies. These changes were largely in response to a 
series of high-profile corporate failures, including those of the Maxwell Group, 
BCCI and Polly Peck, and to a growing unease regarding the lack of 
accountability at some public companies and the size of directors‟ 
remuneration, especially bonuses and severance payments. In the US, 
enhancements to corporate governance and changes in incentive schemes 
that improve executive accountability are viewed as contributing to the trend 
to greater corporate focus. Citing US research by Hadlock & Lumer (1997), 
Whittington & Mayer (2000, p65) note that, “[in the US] managerial selfishness 
and foolishness have come under control with changes in terms of corporate 
governance and managerial initiatives”.     
 
The changes included requirements to increase, ideally to a majority, the 
number of non-executive directors, splitting the roles of chairman and chief 
executive officer or equivalent (a dual rather than a unitary approach), 
stopping the promotion of CEO to chairman, establishing various non-
executive dominated committees to appoint directors, set remuneration and 
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deal with audit issues and, latterly, introducing independent non-executive 
directors.  
 
These improved checks and balances were encapsulated in a Combined 
Code on Corporate Governance issued by the London Stock Exchange in 
June 1998. The guidelines relating to the composition of boards of directors 
and the positions/status of chairmen and chief executives were established by 
a committee which sat under the chairmanship of Lord Cadbury and reported 
in 1992. Subsequent committees under Lord Greenbury and Sir Richard 
Hampel, reported in 1995 on remuneration and in 1997 on internal controls 
respectively. This research has found instances of companies setting aside 
some guidelines. High profile examples include supermarket Morrison which, 
until very recently, did not have any non-executive directors, bank Barclays 
which allowed its retiring CEO, Matt Barrett, to become chairman and, in 
2008, retailer Marks & Spencer (ironically once chaired by Lord Greenbury 
while also holding the position of chief executive) which, on the retirement of 
its chairman, made CEO Stuart Rose chairman and CEO against the wishes 
of several of its institutional shareholders. 
 
Given the undoubted influence of chairmen and/or chief executive officers and 
the suggestion that their tenure may be linked to the continued pursuit of 
certain strategies, notably conglomeration, research into their length of tenure 
may highlight differences between categories of company. Similarly, research 
into changes in executive/non-executive board membership may be related to 
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strategy and to the level of influence wielded by the chairman and/or chief 
executive.     
       
There is a limit to the depth of research into these issues that is possible 
without access to internal sources of information, e.g. board minutes, 
management operating procedures, structure charts and responsibilities, etc. 
Similarly, without access to personnel records, education and employment 
histories it is not possible to assess competence. Furthermore, even where 
internal information is made available, there is no way of fully understanding 
the true power relationships within a company without direct access to the 
individuals involved.     
 
3.3.4.2 Shareholder Influence 
The level of management shareholding may also have been an influence on 
strategy. Goranova, Alessandri, Brandes & Dharwadhar (2007) say 
managers/directors have historically looked to ensure the stability of their 
career/employment. Their research suggests there is a negative relationship 
between changes in management ownership, i.e. shareholdings, and 
diversification with executives seeking to lower risk when they have a 
substantial investment in the company‟s shares and more of their own money 
invested. This contrasts with the general view of managers that through 
diversification the company can spread risk which increases company and 
employment stability (Amihud & Lev, 1981; Hoskisson & Hitt, 1994). This 
research notes but does not look at this issue.   
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What influence do external shareholders have on management? Kor & 
Mahoney (2005) note research from Sundaramurthy (1996) showing that 
significant institutional shareholdings do have the potential to influence the 
strategic direction of a company and the decisions made by management. In 
cases where there is little/no concentration of shareholdings managers will 
have greater discretion to adopt diversification strategies that will, they hope, 
ensure stability and their continued employment (Amihud & Lev, 1981). 
Where management is not restricted by shareholder influence there is a risk of 
over-diversification and, as a result, poorer performance. Similarly, McConnell 
& Servaes (1990) found that existence of influential shareholders may have 
an overall positive effect on financial performance as management will feel as 
though their actions are under greater scrutiny and therefore need to be 
focused on the generation of shareholder returns. 
  
Nickell (1995, p21) makes a clear distinction between the governance 
regimes in operation in the leading economies of the UK and US and Japan 
and Germany suggesting major shareholders to be of greatest influence in 
Germany and Japan. The UK and US equity markets are categorised by 
Nickell (1995) as being Type I with shareholders, institutional and individual, 
making essentially short-term returns-driven investments in companies but 
having no direct involvement in day-to-day operations/decision-making relying 
on non-executive directors to moderate managers‟ actions and with 
acquisitions activity relatively common. Conversely, Japan and Germany are 
seen as Type II equity markets with shareholders having long-term 
commitments (often nominating directors) to the companies in which they hold 
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substantial investments making acquisitions difficult. In the Type I markets of 
the UK and US the market for corporate control with its implicit threat of 
takeover exerts pressure on management while in the Type II markets of 
Germany and Japan it is long-term major shareholders that influence 
company management. Other countries may be aligned with these two 
extremes; Korea, for example, displays Type II characteristics while, say, 
Canada follows the Type I model.  
 
The relationship between management, i.e. executive directors, and major 
shareholders is difficult to assess with any degree of objectivity. Clearly, 
management have a route to the market in general through their retained 
broker and internally or externally managed public relations activities. 
However, with major institutions they may hold direct meetings and make 
presentations to garner support, where they feel it is necessary, for key 
decisions which would need their support, e.g. those necessitating rights 
issues. In some cases, where price sensitive information is shared with the 
institutions, they would become „insiders‟ and have to accept some trading 
restrictions in return for briefings.         
 
Given these practices, it would seem that the existence of major shareholders 
will have some impact on the decision-making process and possibly on 
corporate strategy. But are major shareholders more prevalent in 
conglomerates? 
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3.4 Summary 
This literature review clearly shows a dearth, compared to the US, of research 
into UK conglomerates. In addition, there is an even greater bias, in both the 
US and UK literature, towards industrial/manufacturing companies, which until 
the last quarter of the 20th century represented, in GDP terms, the largest 
share of economic activity. There is only one major piece of research, that 
undertaken by Channon (1978), into UK service companies which now 
account for over half of economic activity. Clearly, there is a need for further 
research into UK conglomerates and for that research to include service 
companies.  
 
Extant research uses several different schemes to categorise companies 
according to their diversification with the most popular being the strategy-
based approach of Wrigley/Rumelt. The research shows a confused picture of 
the relationship between diversity and performance; some positive, some 
negative and others suggesting there may be an optimal level of 
diversification, i.e. a point beyond which the law of diminishing returns applies.  
 
Review of the environmental, regulatory and management factors effecting 
the adoption, maintenance and abandonment of conglomeration suggests that 
several of the factors that facilitated the growth phase – to the end of the 
1970s in the US and to the early 1990s in the UK – changed and precipitated 
abandonment in the 1980s in the US and 1990s in the UK. The factors include 
issues relating to risk reduction, acquisitions activity and its success, the 
balance of power within the relationship between shareholders as principals 
   142 
and management as their agents, corporate governance and the attitude and 
strength of shareholders. In the case of acquisitions, a major route to 
diversification, the success of such transactions has increasingly been called 
into question reducing the appetite for transactions without a clear rationale, 
i.e. those of unrelated activities.  
 
As regards the shareholder/management relationship, the steady increase in 
the proportion of institutional shareholdings together with their greater 
willingness to exercise the power that their investments give them coupled 
with changes in corporate governance guidelines have changed the dynamics 
within boardrooms and effectively limited the power and increased the 
accountability of chairmen, CEOs and executive directors. Power has shifted 
away from directors and towards shareholders.  
 
Finally, investors no longer see conglomeration as offering the only route to 
greater earnings stability and/or risk reduction as they have come to realise 
that they can create their own portfolios and reduce unsystematic risk as 
efficiently, and possibly more cheaply, as conglomerates.  
 
The growth in the incidence of conglomeration and the comparative scarcity of 
single business companies served to re-enforce the path of companies 
through the Model of Corporate Development from focus to diversity, from 
constraint to growth and from high to low risk. What has yet to be seen is 
whether that flow has reversed and, if it has, why.             
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The key issues and gaps in knowledge identified are: 
 Conglomeration increased in the UK to 1993 amongst 
industrial/manufacturing companies but while anecdotal evidence 
suggests a subsequent decline, there is no published formal research to 
support that contention. 
 
 Regardless of the continued popularity of conglomeration, there is no 
research showing how stable membership of the conglomerate „club‟ has 
been since 1993 nor the dynamics and causes (merger, acquisition, 
divestment, reduction in value) of entries or exits. 
 
 While the evolutionary route implicit in the Model of Corporate 
Development has held up well through to 1993 with relatively few reversals 
of strategy, the period since may have seen a greater shift back towards 
focus.   
 
 Since the 1970s no research has been undertaken into the corporate 
strategies adopted by UK service companies. 
 
 Research shows no clear relationship between diversification and financial 
performance. However, there is a body of evidence supporting the claims 
of financial economists for the existence of a „conglomerate discount‟ in 
the valuation of conglomerate companies by the markets. If 
conglomeration has declined what part, if any, did performance play and 
what were the other drivers of decisions to change strategy? 
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 Institutional shareholdings, especially in FTSE100 companies, have 
increased but no research exists to show if there are differences in 
holdings, and therefore potential influence, across diversification 
categories. 
 
 Corporate governance guidelines have changed substantially since the 
early 1990s but no research exists showing how board profiles – 
percentage non-executives, incidence of dual and unitary leadership 
(chairman/CEO), tenure of chairman and CEO – differ across 
diversification categories or longitudinally. 
 
This research attempts to shed light on each of these issues by framing and 
testing one or more hypotheses covering each issue. The hypotheses are 
outlined in the next chapter. The first three points noted above relate to the 
validity of conglomeration as a corporate strategy and whether it continues to 
be a realistic strategic option. Analyses of the distribution of companies across 
diversification categories will show the relative popularity of conglomeration 
and other diversification strategies between 1993 and 2003 while 
conglomerate company histories (see chapter 7) will shed light on the 
reasons, probably strategic rather than financial given the expected absence 
of a clear link between diversification strategy and performance, for the 
adoption, maintenance and abandonment of conglomeration. As regards the 
effect of corporate governance on diversification strategy, the exertion of 
undue power by executive directors, especially chairmen and chief 
executives, should have diminished in light of revisions to corporate 
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governance Best Practice but is that the case and is weaker corporate 
governance a contributory factor in the pursuit of conglomeration?            
 
Clearly there are a number of issues highlighted in this literature review that 
will not be addressed in this research. Some of these issues cannot 
realistically be addressed owing to a lack of reliable and valid 
information/data, e.g. internal management control issues, divisional 
profitability, while others have been deemed to be outside of the scope of this 
project, e.g. managerial shareholdings. However, the flexibility, especially 
regards capacity to add further data, of the database created for this project 
will provide a starting point for further research into FTSE100 companies.  
 
Review of the extant literature has established the context for this research 
into UK conglomeration. However, while much of the literature deals with the 
incidence of conglomeration and the drivers behind its growth it provides few 
insights into the factors that combined to influence strategy formulation or 
decisions that led to the adoption, maintenance or abandonment of 
conglomeration since 1993. In order to address these issues, each of the 
companies that was a conglomerate at all or any of the period ends – 1993, 
1998 and 2003 – was investigated to identify the key drivers that had 
influenced their diversification strategy. The resulting conglomerate company 
histories form the core of chapter 7 – Analysing the Historical Record – which 
seeks to develop a New Model of Corporate Development.          
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4. HYPOTHESES 
4.1 Aims of this Research 
Recognising the vast majority of research into diversification and 
conglomeration is US centric, this research concentrates wholly on UK 
companies. Furthermore, as no UK research has been undertaken into UK 
service companies since Channon (1978), both industrial/manufacturing 
companies and service companies are included with analyses also carried out 
on the total population and sector sub-groups. The population is constituents 
of the LSE FTSE100 Index which comprises the largest 100, by market 
capitalisation, listed companies.  
 
The research builds on extant research into the largest, by turnover, UK 
industrial/manufacturing companies including that of Channon (1973), 
Luffman & Reed (1982), Grant & Thomas (1988), Grant & Jammine (1988) 
and Whittington & Mayer (2000) and into the largest, by turnover, UK service 
companies by Channon (1978). The research covers the period from 1993, 
which was the end of the most recent extant research (Whittington & Mayer, 
2000) to 2003.   
 
This research seeks to answer each of the key questions concerning 
conglomeration in the UK that were raised at the end of the previous chapter.  
 
4.2 Hypotheses 
The database created as part of this research was designed to capture data 
to address the following hypotheses. The hypotheses, which were tested 
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against FTSE100 and the FTSE100 Survivors populations and service and 
industrial/manufacturing company sub-sets, for 1993, 1998 and 2003, were 
grouped under 4 main headings: 
 
A. Incidence 
Anecdotally, in the 1990s UK companies followed their US counterparts 
in abandoning conglomeration in favour of greater focus in their 
activities; the Model of Corporate Development appears to have been 
thrown into reverse.  
 
The following hypotheses address this claim by considering the 
incidence of conglomeration among FTSE100 companies through the 
research period. 
 
A.1 The incidence of conglomeration amongst FTSE100 companies 
declined between 1993 and 2003. 
 
A.2 The incidence of conglomeration amongst FTSE100 
industrial/manufacturing companies declined between 1993 and 
2003. 
 
A.3 The incidence of conglomeration amongst FTSE100 service 
companies declined between 1993 and 2003. 
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The changes identified by testing these hypotheses gave rise to 
supplementary questions regarding the drivers behind decisions to 
change diversification strategy. These drivers are explored in chapter 7 
using conglomerate company histories.    
 
B. Breadth of Activities    
In addition to an anecdotal decline in conglomeration amongst the UK‟s 
largest listed companies, has there been a broader shift towards 
greater focus as recommended by Peters & Waterman (1982)? The 
following hypotheses consider the overall breadth of activities pursued 
by FTSE100 companies through the research period.  
 
B.1 The breadth of activities pursued by FTSE100 companies 
narrowed between 1993 and 2003. 
 
B.2 The breadth of activities pursued by FTSE100 
industrial/manufacturing companies narrowed between 1993 and 
2003.    
 
B.3 The breadth of activities pursued by FTSE100 service companies 
narrowed between 1993 and 2003. 
 
C. Performance 
Literature strongly suggests conglomerates suffer size and complexity-
related management and control problems but provides no consensus 
   149 
as to the effect of diversification on performance. The following 
hypotheses consider performance of conglomerates through the 
research period. 
 
C.1 FTSE100 conglomerates underperformed through the research 
period compared to other categories of company – single 
business, dominant business and related diversified.  
 
C.2 FTSE100 industrial/manufacturing conglomerates underperformed 
through the research period compared to other categories of 
industrial/manufacturing company – single business, dominant 
business and related diversified. 
 
C.3 FTSE100 service conglomerates underperformed through the 
research period compared to other categories of service company 
– single business, dominant business and related diversified. 
 
C.4 FTSE100 conglomerate performance is negatively related to the 
breadth of activities. 
 
C.5 FTSE100 conglomerates with a core activity generating more than 
50% of turnover outperform conglomerates without a core activity. 
 
It was expected that declining performance would be a key driver of 
any reduction in the incidence of conglomeration. However, as that was 
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not shown to be the case the existence of other drivers was 
investigated through the histories of those companies that were 
conglomerates during the research period.   
 
D. Governance 
Corporate governance Best Practice changed significantly through the 
research period with the express aim of increasing the accountability of 
executive directors by re-balancing boards in favour of non-executive 
directors, splitting the roles of chairman and chief executive officer (or 
equivalent) and making chairmen non-executive. Evidence from 
conglomerate company histories (see chapter 7) suggests that some 
companies may have pursued and maintained a conglomerate strategy 
because of the influence of dominant personalities such as Lord 
Hanson at Hanson and Sir Owen Green at BTR.  
 
The following hypotheses consider differences between key facets of 
corporate governance at conglomerates over time and as compared to 
other categories of company. In each case the null hypothesis is that 
there is no difference between conglomerates over time or between 
conglomerates and companies pursuing other diversification strategies. 
Notwithstanding other influences, these hypotheses seek to identify 
possible links between strategy and governance especially the 
influence of chairmen/chief executive officers.   
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D.1 There was no change in the executive/non-executive split in the 
composition of FTSE100 conglomerate boards through the 
research period. 
 
D.2 The executive/non-executive split in the composition of 
conglomerate boards is the same as that of other categories of 
FTSE100 company.    
 
D.3 There was no change in the average tenure of chairman of 
FTSE100 conglomerate boards through the research period. 
 
D.4 The average tenure of chairmen of conglomerate boards is the 
same as for other categories of FTSE100 company. 
 
D.5 There was no change in the percentage of FTSE100 conglomerate 
company chairmen that are non-executive directors. 
 
D.6 The percentage of conglomerate company non-executive chairmen 
is the same as for other categories of FTSE100 company.    
 
D.7 There was no change in the proportion of FTSE100 conglomerates 
with dual chairmen/chief executive officers through the research 
period. 
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D.8 The average proportion of conglomerates with dual chairmen/chief 
executive officers is the same as for other categories of FTSE100 
company.   
 
D.9 There was no change in the average tenure of chief executive 
officers of FTSE100 conglomerates through the research period.   
 
D.10 The average tenure of chief executive officers of conglomerates is 
the same as for other categories of FTSE100 company. 
 
D.11 There was no change in the average aggregate shareholdings of 
investors with notifiable interests in the share capital of 
conglomerates through the research period. 
 
D.12 The average aggregate shareholding of investors with notifiable 
interests in the share capital of conglomerates is the same as for 
other categories of FTSE100 companies.  
 
D.13 There were no major differences between the corporate 
governance of industrial/manufacturing and service companies. 
 
4.3 Conjectures 
The preceding hypotheses are formulated to answer the key questions 
relating to the incidence and significance of conglomeration amongst 
FTSE100 companies. The hypotheses also consider whether performance is 
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linked to degree of diversification. However, performance, while the „raison 
d‟être‟ for all commercial organisations, is not the only factor driving 
diversification decisions.  
 
The Model of Corporate Development offers a relatively simplistic view of the 
evolutionary path followed by companies seeing them move from focus 
through increasing levels of diversification to conglomeration. The Model does 
not put these movements into context or suggest which factors or groups of 
factors influence diversification decisions through the strategy formulation 
process.  
 
Influences on corporate strategy decisions will include a number of generic, 
industry specific and company specific factors. Several of these factors were 
discussed in the literature review but their influence on strategy formulation 
and strategic change has not previously been considered. In determining 
diversification strategy, management needs to balance the scale benefits of 
focus against the lower risk of diversification and the potentially growth limiting 
regulatory influences on focused companies against unconstrained growth 
through diversification.  
 
From the literature review it is expected that diversification decisions will be 
determined by financial/market pressures, regulatory issues and the 
competence of management. The effects of these drivers on conglomeration 
cannot be turned into hypotheses but can be the subject of additional 
research into the companies identified as conglomerates. 
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Therefore, in addition to quantitative analyses based on accounting records 
(Chapter 6) to address each of the hypotheses outlined in the previous 
section, qualitative reviews of the FTSE100 conglomerates identified in this 
research were undertaken (Chapter 7) to shed light on the drivers behind their 
strategic decisions to adopt, maintain or abandon conglomeration. Chapters 6 
and 7 together comprise the results of this research. Notwithstanding the 
inevitable degree of subjectivity in the interpretation of each conglomerate‟s 
key events, the exercise facilitates discussion of the strategic responses of 
companies to drivers and the outcomes of those responses in terms of size 
and scope.   
 
4.4 Contribution 
This research makes valuable contributions to knowledge on several levels. 
 
First, the database itself represents a new and unique source of data on 
FTSE100 companies. The database brings together financial information 
downloaded from DataStream (summary profit & loss accounts, balance 
sheets and cash flows and ratios), extracts from company annual reports and 
accounts (segmental revenues, profits and assets, board composition and 
major shareholders), Financial Times market data (capitalisation, 
minimum/maximum share prices, 31st December share prices, yields and P/E 
ratios) and miscellaneous company information (major acquisitions, 
demergers, listing transfers, dual listing agreements) from many other sources 
including FT Intelligence, the Economist and company websites. The 
database is in the form of an Excel workbook with separate worksheets for 
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each company and has capacity to accommodate considerably more 
additional information to facilitate further research into FTSE100 companies. 
The methodology (Chapter 5 and Appendices C & D) explains how the 
database was compiled.     
 
Second, the literature review (Chapter 3) critically appraises what is known 
about conglomerates, conglomeration and its causes highlighting the dearth 
of UK literature that, with one notable exception, concentrates on 
industrial/manufacturing companies and ends in 1993 (Whittington & Mayer, 
2000).   
 
Third, by analysing the accounting record (Chapter 6) the research uses 
quantitative data to track the incidence of conglomeration amongst FTSE100 
companies between 1993 and 2003 and movements between 
Channon/Whittington & Mayer diversification categories. The analysis also 
identifies changes in the breadth of activities, performance and corporate 
governance across diversification categories and over time. For the first time 
since Channon (1978) the research includes service companies. Given that 
the service sector now plays the leading role in the UK representing over 50% 
of the country‟s economic activity and that service companies comprise a 
majority, in both number and capitalisation, of the FTSE100 it is appropriate 
that they be included.  
 
Fourth, by analysing the historical record (Chapter 7) the research uses 
qualitative data to identify the factors that have led FTSE100 companies to 
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adopt, maintain and abandon conglomeration between 1993 and 2003. The 
influence of these factors on the strategy formulation process are discussed 
as are their inclusion in a revised Model of Corporate Development which also 
reflects the two-way flow – forward to diversification and backward to focus - 
of companies.    
  
Finally, this research provides data and analyses that will help inform the 
debate on the future of conglomeration amongst the largest, and arguably 
most economically important, UK companies.    
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5. METHODOLOGY 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter details the methodology followed to explore the validity of the 
hypotheses detailed in chapter 4 of this thesis.  
 
First section 5.2 outlines the diversification measures available/adopted, 
section 5.3 explains how a unique database of information on FTSE100 
companies was created, section 5.4 discusses the issues/problems that were 
encountered and their resolution and finally section 5.5 outlines the overall 
design of the study and section 5.6 summarises the chapter.  
 
The methodology recognises the limitations and inherent subjectivity in 
gathering and analysing financial and non-financial data on a diverse 
population but attempts to minimise the effects of both.    
 
5.2 Diversification Measures 
5.2.1 Definitions 
Before considering the categorisation schemes available for use in research 
into diversification, it is important to clarify the key terms used in this area of 
research. 
 
Frequently - not only in everyday speech but also in some academic papers -  
the terms „diversification‟ and „conglomeration‟ are used interchangeably to 
refer to companies with several different business activities which may or may 
not be related. The use of the word „diversification‟ has become confused 
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(Reed & Luffman, 1986). However, there are marked differences between the 
terms and between diversified and conglomerate companies and, to avoid 
ambiguity and misunderstanding, it is essential that each is defined 
accurately.   
  
Gribbin (1976) produced broad definitions of diversified and conglomerate 
companies that highlight the key difference between them; relatedness 
between activities. According to Gribbin (1976, p19-21) a diversified company 
is one that “….instead of operating in one market the firm operates in a 
number, and each separate market is different in important ways, implying 
significant changes in products, production and marketing, with vertical 
integration being excluded”. Similarly, he defines conglomeration as “joining 
together disparate products or activities which have virtually no common 
characteristics”, making a conglomerate a company that “…is composed of a 
series of parts which are not horizontally or vertically related”.  
 
The difference between related and unrelated diversified companies lies in the 
relatedness of activities; both have multiple activities but those of a 
conglomerate are unrelated while those of a diversified company are related. 
This suggests that conglomerates are, in effect, a sub-division of diversified 
companies comprising firms with unrelated activities, i.e. diversified 
companies that have broadened their portfolios to include unrelated activities. 
Establishing a definition for diversified – related and conglomerate – 
companies leaves all other companies effectively defined as non-diversified, 
i.e. focused, companies.  
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This split between diversified (related/unrelated) and focused is too simplistic 
and fails to take account of those companies, of which there are many, that 
have a substantial core business activity but are also active in a number of far 
smaller activities. These companies are not focused in the sense of having a 
single activity nor are they diversified as their portfolio is dominated by one 
predominant activity. Recognising that the „focused‟ category could, at one 
extreme, comprise companies with a single activity and at the other 
companies with one dominant and several minor activities, there is a strong 
argument that the non-diversified or focused category be split into single 
business and dominant business categories.  
 
These definitions have therefore produced 4 categories of company; single 
business, dominant business, related diversified business and conglomerate. 
This taxonomy was originally established by Wrigley and further 
developed/enhanced by Rumelt (1974) who used it in their ground-breaking 
research into the diversification strategies of US companies. The taxonomy 
links to the Model of Corporate Development discussed in previous sections 
and has consistently been the most commonly used by researchers in this 
area (Dess, Gupta, Hennart & Hill, 1995) although, in some cases, with minor 
modifications.   
 
Establishing robust definitions is only part of the process of determining a 
categorisation scheme. Another key element is a scheme‟s practicality, i.e. 
can it be consistently applied to real companies rather than theoretical 
constructs. Given that the categories identified above use the relatedness 
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between activities as a factor determining diversification category it is 
necessary to determine what constitutes relatedness and how related 
activities can be identified.    
 
Assessing relatedness between a company‟s activities is, by virtue of the fact 
that the company will, for commercial reasons, only make publicly available a 
limited amount of relevant information, a subjective exercise. In UK research, 
this problem is further exacerbated by the absence of Standard Industrial 
Classification (SIC) code data which would provide a formal, structured means 
of assessing relatedness, e.g. at 2, 3 or 4 digit code level. Sections 5.2.2 and 
5.2.3 outline a number of categorisation schemes that use SIC code data. 
Prahalad & Hamel‟s (1990) non-SIC code approach, which is based on how a 
company‟s „portfolio of competences‟ is used across its activities, is unfeasible 
because of the lack of sufficiently detailed information. The approach followed 
by the leading researchers in this field – Rumelt (1974), Channon (1973, 
1978) and Whittington & Mayer (2000) - relies on the identification of 
similarities between a company‟s services and/or products to determine 
whether or not they are related. Where there are little or no differences, say, 
motor vehicles and financial services, the activities are unrelated, but where 
there are clear similarities, say, motor vehicles and automotive components, 
the activities are related. 
 
5.2.2 Categorisation  
As this research attempts to isolate and analyse categories of UK companies 
according to their degree of diversification, it is essential that, whilst 
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endeavouring to minimise complexity, definitions are sufficiently detailed and 
unambiguous to ensure robustness and credibility and that the chance of mis-
categorisation of companies is minimised.  
 
There are two possible approaches to the categorisation of companies: 
positive and negative. The positive approach requires a clear definition of 
categories to cover the complete spectrum of diversification, i.e. including the 
category to be researched. The alternative, negative, approach is to design a 
scheme that defines categories of company other than that which is to be 
researched and those companies that do not fit any of the pre-determined 
categories will be those to be researched. The negative approach has been 
discounted as, to draw meaningful conclusions from this research, it is 
essential that the category to which any conclusions apply is clearly and 
positively identified which necessitates defining all categories.  
 
Having adopted a positive approach to categorisation, there is a further choice 
as to which measures should be used to determine categorisation; 
continuous/index or discrete category based. The former comprise indices 
which effectively convert the distribution and relatedness of turnover, 
operating profit or net asset data into an index with a value between 0 and 1 
where 0 denotes a company that has an infinite number of unrelated activities 
and 1 a single business company. Alternatively, discrete categorisation 
schemes consider the distribution of turnover across activities and the inter-
relationships between those activities to decide into which of several pre-
determined ranges, and their associated categories, a company fits. 
   162 
Continuous measures are good when comparing degrees of diversification but 
are not descriptive; an index number does not convey any qualitative 
information. Discrete measures are good for grouping similar companies 
according to their degree of diversification. Index-based schemes are 
considered more objective as they typically use SIC coded turnover-by-activity 
data in calculating diversification indices. However, the availability of SIC 
coded data is a problem in countries other than the US. 
 
Sambharya (2000) categorised the available schemes as being either 
business count or strategic with the former comprising continuous measures 
including Berry-Herfindahl, Entropy and Broad and Narrow Spectrum Diversity 
(BSD & MNSD) (Varadarajan & Ramanujam, 1987) and the latter primarily the 
discrete Wrigley/Rumelt scheme. In terms of their robustness, business count 
approaches which rely on SIC code data are seen as more objective than the 
largely subjective strategic approaches that rely on observation and non-
standardised published data, e.g. segmental reports included in annual 
reports and accounts (Ramanujam & Varadarajan, 1989). This subjectivity 
reflects issues in the assessment process which generally considers inter-
dependence between reported activities in terms of processes, products and 
technology although clearly from an „outsiders‟ perspective. However, the 
simplicity of SIC code count approaches, while an advantage, is also a 
drawback in that is makes no allowance for the difference in the breadth of 
SIC codes and assumes that each is equally dissimilar. 
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It is important to note the limitation of diversification indices, e.g. their obvious 
reliance on the availability and reliability of segmental data and the possibility 
that they may provide conflicting assessments of degree of diversification 
and/or direction/quantum of change over time. The latter point is illustrated by 
Robins & Wiersema (2003) who question the validity of two of the most widely 
used continuous measures of related diversification; the related component of 
the entropy index and the concentric index which, they show, do not always 
produce consistent categorisations. Finally, in common with other measures, 
the entropy index fails to take account of a company‟s „strategic intent‟, e.g. 
what a company intends to do. The entropy indices reflect the diversity of a 
company at a point in time but do not shed any light on the strategic direction 
of the company or on any strategic issues faced. 
 
5.2.3 Types of Scheme 
The following section reviews several of the categorisation schemes used in 
research into diversification with the aim of establishing which are appropriate 
for use in this research project. Advantages and disadvantages of each 
scheme are considered as are practicalities in light of the data quality and 
level of detail available. 
 
5.2.3.1 Business Count (Continuous) Index Schemes 
Entropy 
The continuous entropy diversification index is calculated using SIC-code 
segmental turnover data. The index of a company‟s total diversification (DT) 
has a minimum value of 0, which equates to a single business company, and 
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increases with diversification. DT can be broken into two subsidiary indices to 
show related diversification (DR) and unrelated diversification (DU).  
 
The measure was first developed by Jacquemin & Berry (1979) and applied to 
diversification by Palepu (1985) and is calculated using turnover data at 2 and 
4-digit SIC-code levels as follows:  
 
Total Diversification (DT) 
DT = ∑ Pi ln(1/Pi) 
Where, Pi is the share of the segment i and ln(1/Pi) is the weight given 
to each segment.  
 
Related Diversification (DR) 
DR = ∑ DRj P
j  
and  
DRj = ∑ Pji ln(1/P
j
i) 
Where DRj is the related diversification derived from the operation in 
several segments within an industry group j and Pj
i is defined as the 
share of segment i (4-digit SIC code) of group j (2-digit SIC code) in the 
total turnover of the group.   
 
Unrelated Diversification (DU) 
DU = ∑ Pj ln(1/Pj) 
Which is the weighted average of all the group shares. 
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As noted by Palepu (1985, p244) the measure‟s strength lies in its reflection 
of three key components of product diversification: the number of product 
segments in which a company operates, the distribution of a company‟s total 
turnover across its product segments and the degree of relatedness between 
product segments. 
 
The major advantages of the entropy measure lie in its relative simplicity and 
objectivity as it uses turnover data that conforms to a standardised scheme - 
SIC-code - which means it can be used for inter-company comparisons. 
Hoskisson, Hitt, Johnson & Moesel (1993) investigated the validity of the 
entropy measure seeking to prove it to be preferable/superior to alternative 
measures and found, in common with others, that strategy based measures 
such as Rumelt‟s were inherently more subjective.      
 
Entropy does have its critics and faults. Hall & St. John (1993) believe it has a 
tendency to favour single and dominant business categories at the expense of 
the related and conglomerate categories as related businesses are only 
considered within 2-digit SIC codes and unrelated categories across 2-digit 
SIC codes. A further problem is that the determination of cut-off points to 
define diversification categories is arbitrary, what ranges of DT indices equate 
to each of the diversification categories.  
 
The integrity of entropy indices is dependent on the accuracy of the SIC-code 
data used in its calculation. In the US, since its introduction in 1976 Statement 
of Financial Accounts Standard 14 (SFAS14) has required public companies 
   166 
to publish and include in their annual 10-K filings segmental information, 
including SIC codes, for each activity with more than 10% of consolidated 
turnover, profits or assets with each segment, where relevant, sub-divided into 
a maximum of 4 principal products/services. In order to ensure segmental 
reports closely match business reality the disclosure provisions of SFAS14 
were enhanced by SFAS131 (introduced in 1997) which require segments 
reported to be consistent with those used by management. Researchers are 
further helped by Standard & Poor who maintain a database – COMPUSTAT 
– which they do make available to some researchers and which includes 
segmental data, complete with SIC codes, on US companies. No such 
database exists in the UK.  
 
The UK requirements introduced by the Companies Act 1965 and SSAP25 
(1990) are similar but less detailed than those in the US with the two major 
differences being; SIC codes are not required and management can 
omit/consolidate segmental data where publication, in their opinion, would be 
commercially detrimental, e.g. show margins to competitors. While the latter 
may result in some reported segments comprising an odd mix of activities or 
being changed from one accounting period to another, the former effectively 
precludes the use of SIC-code based diversification measures in research. 
Therefore, research into US companies may be seen as more robust as it 
frequently uses the COMPUSTAT database allowing measures of diversity 
that use SIC codes, e.g. entropy, to be calculated. 
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Notwithstanding the other problems noted above, the UK does not have an 
equivalent of the US S&P COMPUSTAT database to provide the required 
SIC-code data. Furthermore, the lack of detail in UK company segmental 
reports appearing in many annual reports means SIC codes cannot, with any 
degree of accuracy, be assigned to the segments reported. The use of 
entropy in UK research is therefore effectively precluded. 
 
Broad & Narrow Spectrum 
As with entropy, calculation of broad and narrow spectrum indices relies on 
the availability of SIC-code turnover data. The calculations are very simple 
being based only on the number of segments at either a 2 or 4-digit SIC-code 
level, in which a company operates. The indices are calculated as follows: 
     
Broad Spectrum Diversity  
BSD = No. of 2-digit SIC codes 
Narrow Spectrum Diversity 
NSD = No. of 4-digit SIC Codes 
 
In an attempt to make some, albeit very crude, assessment of relatedness 
between activities, a mean narrow spectrum diversity index may be 
calculated. In effect the MNSD shows how many, on average, 4-digit SIC-
code activities are within each 2-digit SIC-code activity.    
 
Mean Narrow Spectrum Diversity 
MNSD = NSD / BSD  
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The advantages and disadvantages of the index are similar to those for 
entropy but in addition the index does not take account of the relative sizes of 
the segments in which the company operates and therefore provides only the 
most high-level assessment of diversity.  
 
Herfindahl 
This continuous index, which can be calculated using revenue, operating 
profit or asset data, considers the breadth or degree of concentration or focus 
across a company's activities (Comment & Jarrell, 1995). The index was 
considered by Jacquemin & Berry (1979) to be a valid alternative to entropy. 
 
The index is most commonly used by economists to assess the degree of 
concentration in markets while others have used it to provide a simple but 
reliable measure of other types of concentration, e.g. cultural diversity. This 
has led to its widespread use by the UK‟s Competition Commission and its 
foreign equivalents, as a primary means of assessing the market power that 
exists in industries subject to structural review, e.g. UK Brewing Industry, or 
that may result from the combination of two or more companies whose 
proposed merger has been referred for review. Other users include the 
government, academics and research organisations such as the National 
Institute for Economic and Social Research.      
 
The index is the sum of each reported activity‟s squared proportion of the 
company‟s total activity, operating profit or assets with the extreme values of 0 
representing an infinitely diverse company and 1 a single business company. 
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As with entropy-based measures of diversification, Herfindahl indices are best 
calculated using consistent level SIC-code data, e.g. at the 2, 3 or 4-digit 
level. However, the index‟s simplicity renders it amenable to being calculated 
using reported segmental data. Clearly, this makes the index less robust but, 
notwithstanding changes made to divisions and the breadth of activities within 
them, the index does provide a useful indication of the direction of change in 
diversity. The formula is:  
  N  
H = ∑ (Pi/∑Pi)
2 
  i=1  
 
Where Pi is the turnover of segment i. 
 
The major advantages of the Herfindahl index lie in its simplicity, relative ease 
of calculation and inclusiveness; all reported activities are included in the 
calculation, none are excluded. While, notwithstanding the availability of 
segmental data, the index is simple and easy to calculate, it fails to take any 
account of any relatedness between the separately reported business 
activities, i.e. all reported activities are effectively deemed to be unrelated. 
Furthermore, in common with all continuous index measures, use of the index 
to categorise companies, e.g. as high, medium or low diversifiers, would 
require the subjective conversion of index ranges into categories which, were 
it practical, would not produce a scheme that distinguish related and unrelated 
diversifiers as relatedness between reported activities is ignored.  
 
Therefore, Herfindahl is not valid as a primary means of categorising 
companies according to their degree of diversification if, as in this research, 
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conglomerates need to be separately identified. However, as a means of 
providing a simple overall measure of the breadth of activities for use in 
assessing whether diversity has increased or decreased over time and to 
compare overall levels diversity between companies whose diversification 
category has been determined using another more suitable scheme, e.g. 
Rumelt, it does have merit. Therefore, the Herfindahl index has been 
calculated for each FTSE100 company as at 1993, 1998 and 2003.     
 
5.2.3.2 Strategy Schemes 
Rumelt 
The categorisation scheme most widely used in diversification research is that 
initially devised by Wrigley and further developed/enhanced by Rumelt (1974). 
The strategy-based scheme provides a practical, albeit inherently more 
subjective, and logical approach to determining a company‟s level of 
diversification; single business, dominant business, related diversified and 
unrelated diversified or conglomerate.  
 
Recognising the almost universal acceptance of turnover as the only valid 
measure of activity, Rumelt (1974) equated value ranges of two turnover-
based ratios - specialisation and related – to 4 separate diversification 
categories as per the following table: 
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Table 23: Rumelt’s 4-Category Categorisation Scheme 
 
 Description Ratios 
SB Single Business Rs ≥ 0.95 
DB Dominant Business 0.95 > Rs ≥ 0.70 
RB Related Business Rs < 0.70; Rr ≥ 0.70 
UB Unrelated Business Rr < 0.70 
 
Where; 
Rs (specialisation ratio) – the proportion of total turnover accounted for by the largest 
single business unit, 
Rr (related ratio) – the proportion of total turnover attributable to the company‟s 
largest group of somehow related business activities. 
 
Source: Adapted from Rumelt (1974) 
 
In addition to developing the „basic‟ 4-category scheme, Rumelt (1974) also 
created sub-divisions to reflect different degrees of relatedness in the 
dominant and related categories and the passive or acquisitive nature of 
companies in the unrelated diversified category. Although this expanded 
scheme comprising 9 categories used an additional ratio - Vr (vertical ratio) - 
to determine the degree of vertical integration amongst dominant companies, 
the additional categories were heavily dependent on subjective judgements. 
Rumelt (1977) continued to develop the expanded scheme and by 1982 had 
reduced it to 7 categories - dominant sub-divided into dominant vertical, 
dominant constrained and dominant linked and related sub-divided into 
related constrained and related linked – with categorisation determined more 
objectively by using a further ratio – Rc (related core).  
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Table 24: Rumelt’s 7-Category Categorisation Scheme 
 
 Description Ratios 
SB Single Business Rs ≥ 0.95 
DV Dominant Vertical Rv ≥ 0.70 
DC Dominant Constrained 0.95 > Rs ≥ 0.70; Rc > (Rr+Rs)/2 
DLU Dominant Linked-Unrelated 0.95 > Rs ≥ 0.70; Rc < (Rr+Rs)/2 
RC Related Constrained Rs < 0.70; Rr ≥ 0.70; Rc > (Rr+Rs)/2 
RL Related Linked Rs < 0.70; Rr ≥ 0.70; Rc < (Rr+Rs)/2 
UB Unrelated Business Rr < 0.70 
 
Where; 
Rs (specialisation ratio) – the proportion of turnover accounted for by the largest 
single business unit, 
Rc (related core ratio) – the proportion of turnover attributable to its largest group of 
businesses which share or draw on the same common core skill, 
Rr (related ratio) – the proportion of a company's turnover attributable to its largest 
group of somehow related businesses, 
Rv (vertical ratio) – the proportion of turnover attributable to the company‟s largest 
group of products, joint-products and by-products.      
 
Source: Adapted from Rumelt (1982, p360) 
 
The sub-division of the related category was dependent on linkages in terms 
of vertical integration (measured by Rv - the vertical ratio) and use of common 
skills (measured by Rc - the related core ratio) between dominant and other 
activities while sub-division of the related category was dependent on the 
interdependence of the related activities. While the expanded 7-category 
scheme is more detailed and „richer‟ than the original 4-category scheme, it is 
inherently more subjective as it requires additional assessments of product 
relatedness according to the degree of vertical integration across business 
activities and the processes/skills used in those activities.  
 
Notwithstanding the significantly increased level of subjectivity, the additional 
data requirements of the 7-category scheme make its adoption in this 
research difficult; it requires information/assessments regarding core skills to 
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calculate the related core ratio (Rc) and identification/assessments of by-
products and their internal uses to calculate the vertical ratio (Rv).  
 
The basic 4-category Rumelt scheme has been used by the overwhelming 
majority of researchers in this field (Dess, Gupta, Hennart & Hill, 1995). It 
uses turnover or its equivalent and through the calculation of 2 simple ratios 
and an assessment of product and/or service relatedness provides a sound 
basis for a categorisation that is consistent with those used in the Model of 
Corporate Development. 
 
Hill & Pickering 
Hill & Pickering‟s (1986) strategy-based scheme is one of the simplest; it has 
only 3 categories – low, medium and high diversification – which are 
determined according to the distribution of turnover between core and non-
core activities. The categories are defined as follows:  
 Low diversification - non-core turnover less than 5% of  total turnover, 
 Medium diversification - non-core turnover between 5% and 25% of total 
turnover, 
 High diversification - non-core turnover greater than 25%.  
 
A major strength claimed for the scheme is its simplicity. However, that 
simplicity is also a weakness in that it effectively ignores diversification 
beyond that identified between core and non-core activities. Therefore, the 
scheme does not reflect the underlying breadth of a company‟s activities nor 
does it make any distinction between related and conglomerate companies. 
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An extreme example of the scheme‟s weaknesses would be a company that, 
by reporting two activities each accounting for 50% of turnover, would be 
classified as highly diversified which would not be a fair reflection of its limited 
spread of activities. Furthermore, the low thresholds determining low and 
medium diversification result in a very large number of companies being 
categorised as highly diversified, i.e. conglomerates. A revision to the Hill & 
Pickering (1986) scheme that mitigates this problem is to apply the thresholds 
to turnover distributions across related groups rather than individual activities. 
A conglomerate would then be a company with more than one unrelated 
activity with the smallest – the non-core activity - generating at least 25% of its 
turnover.       
 
This research has used the modified Hill & Pickering (1986) scheme as an 
alternative, primarily to support the categorisation of conglomerate or highly 
diversified companies.     
 
Channon  
In the 1970s Channon (1973 & 1978) produced the first research into UK 
diversification. His initial research (Channon, 1973) concentrated on the 
largest, by turnover, industrial/manufacturing companies and was part of a 
Harvard Business School project, administered by Scott (1973) that also 
included similar research in France and Germany by Dyas & Thanheiser 
(1976) and in Italy by Pavan (1976). Recognising the increasing importance of 
the service sector in the UK economy, in 1978 Channon undertook further 
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research concentrating on the largest, by turnover or its equivalent, UK 
service companies.  
 
The categorisation scheme adopted by Channon (1973) was effectively the 
Rumelt (1974) 4-category scheme although the category descriptions were 
modified to better explain each category and the underlying concepts of 
relatedness. Channon‟s (1973) definitions are: 
 Single product - At least 95% of turnover in a single product area.  
 Dominant product - Single dominant product with at least 70% of total 
turnover with other products, which may or may not be related to the 
dominant product or other minor products, comprising 30% of total 
turnover. 
 Related product - Multiple related products/markets, no single product line 
with 70% or more of total turnover and related products/markets account 
for 70% of more of total turnover. 
 Unrelated product - Multiple unrelated products/markets, no single product 
line with more than 70% of total turnover and related products/markets 
account for less than 70% of total turnover. 
 
The cut-off points used by Channon (1973) are effectively those established 
by Rumelt (1974) and research into the appropriateness of the category 
values of the specialisation ratio has found them to be robust (Reed & Sharp, 
1987). They also seem reasonable, e.g. setting the cut-off for a single product 
company at 95% recognises that very few companies have one single product 
that accounts for 100% of turnover. The cut-offs used by Channon (1973) in 
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his UK research were also used in other European studies under the Harvard 
programme; Dyas & Thanheiser (1976) in Germany and France and Pavan 
(1976) in Italy. The consistency of the categorisation schemes used across 
the Harvard programme ensure that, in addition to the identification of trends, 
valid country comparisons may be made.  
 
In adopting this scheme, Channon (1973) retained the simplicity of the Rumelt 
(1974) scheme and its link to the categories in the Model of Corporate 
Development, ensured that relatedness between activities was taken into 
consideration in determining a company‟s degree of diversification and 
distinguished between diversified and conglomerate companies. However, as 
with Rumelt (1974), it must be recognised that categorisations under the 
scheme are, inherently, subjective as they require assessments of the 
relatedness between activities. While not universally adopted in UK research, 
the Channon (1973) scheme was also used by Whittington & Mayer (2000) 
which meant that there are strong methodological links between the key 
pieces of extant UK conglomerate research. 
 
Whittington & Mayer 
Whittington & Mayer (2000), whose research is the most recent covering the 
10-year period between 1983 and 1993, adopted Channon‟s (1973) 
categorisation. Their pragmatic approach not only recognised the scheme‟s 
heritage, robustness and widespread use and acceptance but also ensured 
consistency with prior UK research dating back to 1950 allowing meaningful 
trend analysis to be undertaken. In addition, Whittington & Mayer (2000) also 
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categorised UK companies according to Rumelt‟s (1982) expanded 7-
category scheme an exercise which, apart from being inherently very 
subjective, would have necessitated more resources, both time and 
information, than were available for this research. 
 
5.2.3.3 Importance of Core Activity 
One area to be researched is the incidence of related diversifiers and 
conglomerates that have a significant business activity within their portfolio. 
Clearly, such an activity could provide a „safety net‟ of stable performance 
allowing greater diversification risks to be taken. The 'traditional' Channon 
(1973), Dyas & Thanheiser (1976) and Whittington & Mayer (2000) 
categorisation scheme effectively ignores the size of the largest single 
business activity once it falls below 70% of total turnover in its definitions of 
related diversifiers and conglomerates. Clearly, these categories are very 
broad and would include a wide range of companies with at one extreme two 
business companies where one activity accounts for 69.9% of turnover and, at 
the other, companies with several businesses none of which accounts for a 
significant proportion of total turnover. However, the existence of a substantial 
business activity in related or conglomerate companies could be a major 
determinant of corporate behaviour, performance and survival.  
 
Furthermore, the underlying core business of a related diversifier or 
conglomerate may change and the impact on the company needs to be 
understood. A prime example is GEC/Marconi, categorised as a related 
diversifier in 1983 and 1993 by Whittington & Mayer (2000), when its 
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dominant core activity was electrical engineering. By 2003, GEC (then 
renamed Marconi) was still a related diversifier but its dominant core activity 
had changed to telecommunications following a strategic review and a series 
of high value acquisitions and divestments. However, the company had fallen 
out of the UK's top 100 companies by market capitalisation having narrowly 
avoided bankruptcy with debts exceeding £5 billion incurred funding 
expensive acquisitions of telecommunications businesses as it changed its 
core activity. Clearly, in this case the existence of a significant business 
activity and, more importantly, the attempt to change it, had a major and 
disastrous effect on the company.   
 
Recognising the need to identify companies with a core activity, the following 
amended typology is proposed: 
 Single Business - At least 95% of total turnover in a single product area 
 Dominant Business - At least 70% of total turnover in a single product area 
 Related - Multiple related products/markets, no single product line with 
70% or more of total turnover and related products/markets account for 
70% of more of total turnover: 
 Related – Core* 
 Conglomerate - Multiple unrelated products/markets, no single product line 
with more than 70% of total turnover and related products/markets account 
for less than 70% of total turnover:  
 Conglomerate – Core* 
* A core activity is one that accounts for more than 50% of total turnover. 
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5.2.3.4 Assessment of Relatedness 
All the categorisation schemes noted earlier are similar in that they are based 
on segmental data. This is true of Rumelt's schemes and the variations of 
those schemes used by UK researchers Channon (1973) and Whittington & 
Mayer (2000). In each case company categorisation is determined by the 
distribution of turnover across business activities and an assessment of 
relatedness between those activities. Successful implementation of the 
chosen typology is dependent on the quality and accuracy of segmental data 
and the assessment of the relatedness between segments reported. Given 
the wide diversity of business activities across FTSE100 constituents and the 
degree of „licence‟ given to directors as to how they should divide and report 
on their business, there are inevitably issues with segmental reporting and 
these are dealt with later in this chapter 
 
While it is relatively easy to identify those companies that operate in a single 
business, e.g. the supermarket groups Tesco, Morrison and Sainsbury, or 
whose operations are overwhelmingly dominated by one principal activity, e.g.   
Legal & General (life assurance and general insurance), Associated British 
Foods (food processing and clothing retail), BAA (airports and property) it is 
more difficult to identify diversified companies and then to split those 
companies into related and unrelated (conglomerate) diversifiers. Given a key 
element of any categorisation scheme is assessment of the relatedness of 
activities, in the absence of a standard measurement of relatedness, there is 
always a risk of mis-categorisation due to the inherent subjectivity of 
assessments. This is especially true in the UK where, unlike the US, 
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companies are not required to report segmental data by SIC code. By 
gathering as much relevant data as possible/practical, subjectivity may be 
limited but it cannot be eliminated. 
 
There are several approaches to determining relatedness but, as with the 
example that follows, many are precluded as they require information that is 
not publicly available. Prahalad & Hamel (1990) suggested a competence 
based view that views companies holding a „portfolio of competencies‟ with 
the application of those competences determining relatedness. A company 
could be described as a conglomerate on a product level and as a related 
diversifier on a competence level. Prahalad & Hamel (1990) suggest Canon, 
NEC and Xerox to be competence based related diversified companies rather 
than conglomerates. This „resource-based‟ view is supported by Whittington & 
Mayer (2000, p56), “it is the existence of surplus resources that stimulates 
diversification”. They go on to say that the potential breadth of resources is 
wide and includes management skills, specialised production facilities, trade 
secrets, etc. Unfortunately, without direct access to companies, it is 
impossible to undertake robust competence audits and to assess 
competence-based relatedness. 
 
In assessing relatedness this research draws on comments made by 
Whittington & Mayer (2000, p247) who noted that “vertical integration [is] 
explicitly considered as a related strategy” and “….no single core skill was 
required for a company to be classified as related. Rather, a domino pattern 
with different skills along the chain linking the different activities was 
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considered sufficient”. From these two comments an approach to determining 
the relatedness of each reported business segment was established. To be 
related activities (reported segments) should: 
 
1. Use similar skills, e.g. technologies, equipment, as evidenced by the use 
of similar Value Chains,  
Or         
2. Be vertically integrated, i.e. provide inputs to or take outputs from each 
other. 
 
Therefore by looking at processes, products and technology the degree of 
relatedness between a company‟s activities could be assessed. Similarities 
between customers or distribution channels are not considered sufficient to 
deem activities related as most business sell either to the public, commerce or 
the governments and distribution, often outsourced, represents a small part of 
the value chain. This research takes a holistic approach and considers the 
overall activity of each reported division after amalgamating geographically 
separate divisions comprising the same activities. The approach adopted in 
this research will give a view of relatedness between a company‟s activities 
but it must be remembered that it is not the only view.  
 
Finally, using segmental reports will almost certainly understate the degree of 
diversification in a company as each division is typically a collection of 
business activities rather than a single activity. 
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5.2.4 Summary 
This section has reviewed the most common business count (continuous) 
index-based schemes that use SIC-code information and strategy-based 
categorisation schemes which use less formal/structured turnover data with a 
view to identifying the scheme or schemes that are best suited to this 
research project. The review considered each scheme in terms of simplicity, 
richness, subjectivity and practicality. 
 
The choice of scheme does have an effect on research into diversification as 
Hall & St. John (1993) found. They considered the relative strengths and 
weaknesses of different measures of diversity, including examples of both 
types, and concluded that scheme choice had an impact on research results, 
in their case the relationship between diversification and performance. While 
recognising the inherent benefits of categorisation based on SIC-code data, 
Hall & St. John (1993, p165) noted that such schemes‟ validity was 
“….completely dependent upon the validity of SIC codes in representing 
strategic diversity" which was exacerbated by inconsistencies in the width of 
SIC-code groupings and subjectivity in the true relatedness SIC-codes, e.g. 
can all 4-digit codes within a 2-digit code be considered to be related.  Hall & 
St. John (1993) suggested that the results of research would be influenced by 
the diversification measure adopted and that SIC codes were not the panacea 
to categorisation difficulties. 
 
The limitations of UK segmental reporting effectively preclude the use of SIC-
code index schemes such as the entropy diversification index. Compared to 
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the US, few UK researchers have opted to the use index-based categorisation 
schemes primarily owing to the limitations of UK company segmental reports. 
However, the Herfindahl index does provide a simple, easily calculated 
indicator of the overall breadth of company activities although without a 
distinction between related diversified and conglomerate companies. Of the 
strategy-based schemes the most appropriate, not only on grounds of 
richness and robustness but also for continuity with extant UK research by 
Channon (1973, 1978) and Whittington & Mayer (2000), appears to be the 
Channon (1973) scheme which has its roots in the Rumelt (1974) 
categorisation scheme that has been so widely used over the last 30 years. 
 
Having reviewed each of the commonly used categorisation schemes this 
research uses two primary complementary measures to determine 
diversification amongst FTSE100 companies; the Channon (1973)/Whittington 
& Mayer (2000) strategy-based scheme modified to incorporate additional 
sub-categories to the related diversification and conglomerate categories 
where a core activity accounts for more than 50% of total turnover and the 
continuous Herfindahl index. Hill & Pickering, modified to use turnovers of 
related groups rather than individual divisions, was also used as a secondary 
means of categorisation.  
   
The choice of schemes to be used in this research was made in light of 
Ramanujam & Varadarjan‟s (1989) recommendation that a mix of 
continuous/business count and strategy measures of diversification was the 
most appropriate and inclusive methodological approach. Similarly, Palepu 
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(1985, p239) also advocated the use of both types of scheme using entropy 
and Rumelt schemes he claimed that the approach “….combines the 
strengths of the index approach, namely simplicity, objectivity and replicability, 
with the essential richness of Rumelt‟s methodology”. 
 
5.3 Database 
5.3.1  Population – FTSE100 
Previous UK research including that by Channon (1973) and Whittington & 
Mayer (2000) concentrated exclusively on the largest, by turnover, UK 
industrial/manufacturing companies. This population included private as well 
as public companies but excluded financial, utility, government owned and 
service companies, defined as those companies for which services account 
for more than 50% of total turnover.  
 
Whittington & Mayer (2000) used the annually published Times 1000 to 
compile their lists of UK manufacturing companies. The Times 1000 listed, in 
descending order of turnover, the UK's largest companies, including both 
public and private companies, providing additional financial information for the 
last two completed and reported financial years including turnover, operating 
profit and capital employed and non-financial information such as number of 
employees, sector and the names of the chairman and managing 
director/CEO. Unfortunately, the Times 1000 was discontinued in 1998 being 
replaced by the Euro 500 published by the Financial Times. The new 
publication is limited to public companies quoted on main European stock 
exchanges and lists companies in descending order of market capitalisation 
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rather than turnover. However, within the report there is a subsidiary table 
listing the UK's top 500 quoted companies by market capitalisation. Given the 
discontinuance of the previously used publication, it is therefore not possible 
to establish the same turnover-based public and private company population 
for study as those used in extant research.  
 
For this research, the population is defined as constituents of the Financial 
Times Stock Exchange 100 Index (FTSE100) as at the close of business on 
the last trading day of each relevant calendar year, i.e. 1993, 1998 and 2003. 
The FTSE100 or „Footsie‟ is the primary LSE index and comprises the 100 
companies with a full stock exchange listing that are assessed by the review 
panel as having consistently had the largest market capitalisations at the end 
of each quarter. Despite comprising only 100 companies, the FTSE100 
accounts for substantially more than 50% of the total market capitalisation of 
the LSE reflecting its importance and that of its constituents.  
 
Using the FTSE100 companies as the research population creates 
discontinuity with previous UK research which used turnover to determine 
which companies were included, excluded service companies and included 
private companies. Given that relatively few private companies were of 
sufficient size to warrant inclusion in either Channon‟s (1973 & 1978) or 
Whittington & Mayer‟s (2000) research, their exclusion from this research is 
not seen as a problem in identifying trends since 1950. Furthermore, the 
inclusion of both service and non-service companies reflects the mix of the UK 
economy of the late 20th century and the importance and contribution of 
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service companies. By undertaking some separate analyses of 
industrial/manufacturing companies and service companies it will be possible 
to look for any trends in the across both sectors since 1950. 
 
The FTSE100 does include companies with substantial non-UK activities, e.g. 
SABMiller and Old Mutual - but excludes companies whose primary stock 
exchange listing is not London, e.g. Ford (Dow Jones, US), Toyota (Nikkei, 
Japan). Also included are Dual Listing Companies (DLCs) which are 
effectively companies that have merged but which have retained a separate 
listing on their „home‟ exchanges. While there are only a few of these 
companies in the FTSE100, they are substantial. DLCs in the FTSE100 are 
Shell (Anglo-Dutch oil company), Carnival (Anglo-US cruise line operator), 
BHP Billiton and RTZ (both Anglo-Australian mining companies) and Unilever 
(Anglo-Dutch FMCG company).    
 
Finally, in addition to entries and exits resulting from mergers and 
acquisitions, floatations and transfers of listings to/from other exchanges, 
FTSE100 membership changes to reflect increases and decreases in market 
values. Therefore, the membership at the end of 1993, 1998 and 2003 is very 
different. To create a stable population for analysis, a sub-group of those 
companies that were members of the index at the end of 1993, 1998 and 
2003 was created. This sub-group – FTSE100 Survivors - comprises  54 
companies rather than the 23 that were identified as FTSE100 „ever presents‟ 
by the Financial Times (Dickson, 2004) as it includes companies that may 
have not been constituents of the index at times other than year ends.          
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5.3.2 Sector Definitions 
By identifying FTSE100 companies as either service or 
industrial/manufacturing companies it will be possible to identify the 
characteristics of each sector as well as of the whole population and to make 
comparisons with relevant prior research.  
 
The sector categorisation of a company is made by assessing each of a 
company‟s reported divisions as either being a service or 
industrial/manufacturing activity. The divisional assessments drive the overall 
categorisation of the company; where the aggregate turnover of service 
divisions exceeds that of industrial/manufacturing divisions the company will 
be categorised as a service company otherwise it will be an 
industrial/manufacturing company. There will be no attempt to split each 
division‟s turnover between service and industrial/manufacturing activity; a 
judgement is made as to which represents the majority of each division‟s 
turnover. Channon (1973, p6) took a very similar view saying that a 
manufacturing company is, “….one where at least 50 percent of sales was 
contributed by manufacturing or processing operations”. Channon (1973, p6) 
goes on to point out that this definition differs from that adopted by Fortune 
“which includes mining alone and without processing as a manufacturing 
function”. Whittington & Mayer (2000, p245) noted that, to identify 
industrial/manufacturing companies they followed Harvard “…..in excluding 
utilities and construction firms, as well as firms for which trade and services 
accounted for more than 50% of turnover” to eliminate service companies. 
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There is therefore consistency across research in the approaches to 
identifying service companies.  
 
In making assessments, services are deemed to be activities that do not 
involve changes in the state of a product or the creation of a new product, e.g. 
utilities (electricity, gas, telephones, water), banks and other financial services 
companies fit the definition of service companies. Factoring, e.g. retailing to 
trade and/or the general public goods purchased in wholesale markets, are 
also deemed service activities. Examples include general retailers including 
GUS and Marks & Spencer as well as food retailers such as Sainsbury and 
Tesco. Similarly, Wolseley, the building and plumbing supplies company, is 
also a service company. 
 
As with any definition, there are some „grey‟ areas, e.g. catering companies 
that provide meals (food processors are manufacturers) and mining 
companies that extract ores/minerals (miners are manufacturers). FT 
classifications do guide categorisation although some companies do try to 
„stretch‟ definitions to achieve a classification that is perceived more 
favourably by the investment community.      
 
Appendix E lists constituents of the FTSE100 as at 31st December 1993, 1998 
and 2003 and notes the service companies and which of those are financial 
services companies.  
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5.3.3 Incomplete Data 
DataStream downloads were not available for several of the FTSE100 
companies and, as a result, they have been excluded from analyses requiring 
financial data, i.e. performance analyses. Tables summarising financial data 
note the number of companies for which a complete set of data was available. 
Segmental data was available from annual reports and accounts for all 
companies in the database meaning no companies were excluded from the 
non-performance analyses.  
 
Data for both of the companies in the FT classification „Investment 
Companies‟ – 3i Group (DataStream Number 960338) and Foreign & Colonial 
(DS 901543) – were not available (access denied by DataStream) and they 
have been excluded. Review of their annual reports and accounts shows 
them both to be focused single business companies.  
 
Data for Granada (DS 931524), Eastern Electricity (DS 928847), Securicor 
(871674) and TSB (DS 870429) were also unavailable from DataStream. 
Eastern Electricity was acquired in 1996 by Hanson and TSB was acquired in 
1995 by Lloyds Bank and therefore they played little part in the FTSE100 over 
the research period. Both were focussed single business companies; Eastern 
in electricity generation and TSB in banking. Although in the FTSE100 in 
1998, Securicor, a related diversifier, was not a member in either 1993 or 
2003.   
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The position of Granada is more complicated. The company was a 
conglomerate in 1993 and 1998 with interests in media and catering/hotels 
and acquired Forte Hotels, then also a FTSE100 company, in 1996. Granada 
merged with Compass Group in 2000 to form Granada Compass before 
demerging the combined catering business as „new‟ Compass in 2001 leaving 
Granada a media-based business. Further divestments saw Granada become 
a single business company by 2003. Granada was eventually acquired by 
Carlton Communications in 2004 to form ITV.  
 
Finally, although still an FTSE100 company at the end of 1998, BTR did not 
publish an annual report and accounts for that year as by the time of 
publication it had been acquired by Siebe forming Invensys. Therefore, the 
segmental data for BTR used in the database for 1998 is that of the 12 
months ended 31st December 1997.     
 
5.3.4 Required Information/Data Inputs 
All the data used in this research is secondary, i.e. drawn from publicly 
available sources. As a consequence, there is always a risk of bias in the way 
information gathered has been reported or interpreted as interrogation of the 
original data is not possible. However, the principal sources, especially 
DataStream, are all well known, respected, reputable and reliable.  
 
A fundamental element of this research is the accurate and subjective 
categorisation of FTSE100 companies according to their degree of 
diversification in 1993, 1998 and 2003. This was undertaken using data in 
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segmental reports in annual reports and accounts for the most recently 
completed financial year of each company, i.e. 1993‟s reviews would use data 
from annual reports and accounts for financial years ending up to and 
including 31st December 1993. Where, in a few cases - Cadbury Schweppes, 
Reckitt & Colman (now Reckitt Benckiser) and United Biscuits - financial years 
ended in the first few days of the following January, the year end was 
assumed to be the preceding 31st December.  
 
In view of the complexity of many FTSE100 companies and the wide variety of 
factors that could influence their diversification strategies, it was necessary to 
gather a substantial volume of financial and non-financial data on each 
company. The financial data may be divided into two sections: data required 
to categorise companies according to degree of diversification and assess the 
breadth of activities and data required to assess profitability/performance. The 
former need is met primarily through collection and analysis of turnover and 
net assets data provided in segmental reports and notes to annual reports 
and accounts. The latter is addressed by gathering additional financial data, 
e.g. summary profit & loss accounts, balance sheets and ratios from 
DataStream and non-financial information in the reports of chairmen and/or 
chief executive officers included in annual reports and accounts. The non-
financial data may also be divided into two sections; data required to assess 
adherence to corporate governance Best Practice and data required to 
provide background/explanations for strategy changes. The former need is 
met through extracting data from annual reports and accounts and also by 
interrogating the FAME database of UK company information which includes 
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details of directors. The latter requirement is satisfied from a variety of 
sources including company websites, company directories and various 
databases including FT Intelligence and the Economist.       
 
The annual reports and accounts of companies that provided segmental 
turnover data were all prepared under statute - Companies Acts - and 
complied with generally accepted accounting practice (GAAP) in the form of  
Statements of Standard Accounting Practice (SSAP) and Financial Reporting 
Standards (FRS). UK GAAP is considered to be amongst the best in the world 
although they do allow some, albeit increasingly limited, leeway in certain 
areas, e.g. goodwill, deferred taxation. Furthermore, in view of the sizes of the 
companies and their public limited liability status, all accounts have been 
audited and their receipt of unqualified audit reports/opinions provides comfort 
as to their compliance with relevant legislation and GAAP. For each set of 
annual accounts from which data has been extracted, the database records 
the name of the auditor and whether their report was unqualified.    
 
One area researched was links between changes in corporate diversification 
strategy and performance. In view of the significant differences between some 
of the FTSE100 constituent companies, notably those involved in financial 
services, in their financial reporting, especially banks and insurance 
companies which report according to different statutory requirements, this 
research has not undertaken comprehensive performance reviews but has 
instead followed the approach adopted by Hoskisson, Hitt, Johnson & Moesel 
(1993) who looked at the relationships between diversification and a limited 
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number of accounting and stock market performance indicators. They found a 
negative relationship between diversification and the backward looking, i.e. 
historic, accounting performance indicators and a neutral relationship with 
forward looking, i.e. prospect based, market performance indicators.  
 
To avoid the complexities inherent in detailed company financial analysis, this 
research restricted performance analysis to 5 key indicators:  
 Market Capitalisation 
 Share Price Volatility 
 Market Value to Book Value (Excluding Intangibles) 
 Return on Capital Employed 
 Gearing 
For all indicators simple category and population averages were calculated as 
weighting averages by market value would have created a bias in favour of 
the largest companies. Weighted averages would not have shown the 
performance of a „typical‟ company in each category.   
 
In addition to the above, this study also considered a number of other 
performance indicators including operating margin, price/earnings ratios and 
operating cash flows, but, calculating Pearson‟s Correlation Coefficients, 
failed to find any consistent significant relationships with diversity as 
measured by the Herfindahl index. A limited factor analysis was also 
undertaken using SPSS to look for correlations between performance and 
diversification but nothing significant was found.    
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The core summary profit & loss, balance sheet, cash flow and financial ratio 
data was downloaded from DataStream (Thomson Financial) and segmental 
data were extracted from segmental reports in copies of annual reports and 
accounts downloaded from Thomson Financial. All other details, e.g. market 
capitalisation, listing classification, etc., were taken from the first Financial 
Times published after the year end that contained market capitalisation 
information. Depending on which days of the week were bank holidays, the 
FT figures may have included the first day‟s trading of the new-year; the effect 
was not material.  
 
Appendix A shows the definitions relating to the performance measures used 
and appendix B shows an example (Associated British Foods) database 
spreadsheet including the DataStream download sheet illustrating the 
information collected for each FTSE100 company included in the research 
project. 
 
5.3.5 Research Period 
The period covered by this research - 1993 to 2003 - follows directly on from 
research into industrial/manufacturing companies undertaken by Whittington 
& Mayer (2000) covering 1983 to 1993 which, in turn, built on earlier work by 
Channon (1973 & 1978) covering 1950 to 1970. Research into services 
(Channon, 1978) stopped in 1974. Despite minor differences in the 
populations studied, it has been possible to use the prior research to build a 
picture, albeit with caveats regarding its general application, of the life cycle of 
UK conglomeration from 1950 to 2003.  
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Notwithstanding the longer-term trend analysis, the 10 years covered by this 
research saw substantial change amongst FTSE100 conglomerates as 
evidenced by the changes in corporate strategy at several high profile 
conglomerates including BTR, Hanson and Williams. Review of companies 
that were conglomerates at some time during the research period provided 
insights into the drivers behind their adoption, maintenance or abandonment 
of conglomeration.  
 
The period under review was one of steady economic growth in the UK; there 
were no excessive increases or decreases in gross domestic product (GDP) 
suggesting a stable economic environment.  
 
5.3.6 Sources 
The principal sources of information are similar to those used by Channon 
(1973 & 1978) and Whittington & Mayer (2000): 
 
 Published company annual reports & accounts downloaded from company 
websites (largely post-2000) and the Thomson Financial database.  
 DataStream financial information: 
o Profit & loss summary 
o Balance sheet summary 
o Cash flow summary 
o Key ratios  
 Times 1000/FT Euro 500 reports 
 Financial Times 
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 The Economist 
 Press reports/releases extracted from databases, e.g. ProQuest, and/or 
company websites 
 Dun & Bradstreet and similar company directories 
 FAME database of company information 
 FT Intelligence (FT articles) 
 Times Online 
 
The extensive use of DataStream ensures a high degree of consistency in the 
financial information in the research database. In creating its database of 
financial information, DataStream interprets annual reports and accounts of all 
companies in the same way adjusting profit and loss, balance sheet and cash 
flow figures according to consistent principles, e.g. the identification and 
treatment of extraordinary/exceptional items, especially reorganisation costs, 
and other income which varies significantly across companies and can lead to 
substantial differences in operating profits. DataStream is widely recognised 
as being a detailed and robust source of company financial information and is 
used extensively in both commercial and academic environments.     
 
While all FTSE100 companies published their 1993 accounts in sterling some, 
notably RTZ, BP, Standard Chartered and BHP Billiton, reported in US Dollars 
in 1998 and/or 2003. DataStream automatically translates accounting data 
into sterling and the same average exchange rates have been used to 
translate the segmental data extracted from annual reports and accounts 
denominated in a foreign currency to ensure data reconcile. Similarly, some 
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companies have reported accounting periods longer or shorter than 12 
months typically to achieve a change in accounting date (year end), e.g. 
Scottish & Newcastle reported an 8 month period to achieve a 31st December 
year end, or preceding a merger to achieve a co-terminus year end with a 
new partner, e.g. Carlton Communications reported a 15 month period to 31st 
December 2003 before acquiring Granada to form ITV in early 2004. 
DataStream financial information is automatically „annualised‟ with figures pro 
rated and segmental data extracted from annual reports has been adjusted in 
the same way to maintain consistency.  
      
Segmental analyses of turnover have been extracted from annual reports and 
accounts as that information is not captured by DataStream. To ensure 
downloaded DataStream information relates to the same year as the 
segmental data and that the underlying annual reports and accounts are the 
same, the segmental analyses and DataStream turnover figures have been 
reconciled. Wherever possible, segmental operating profits have been 
reconciled to the corresponding DataStream figure. 
     
5.4 Issues 
5.4.1 Subjectivity 
Clearly, given the complexity of FTSE100 companies, the global business 
environment in which they operate and confidentiality, it is impossible for 
every aspect of this research to be totally objective; a degree of subjectivity is 
inevitable given the researcher‟s position as an „an outsider‟. This section 
recognises these problem areas and acknowledges their potential effects. 
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The difficulties of achieving objectivity is exemplified by the findings of 
Sambharya (2000) who found only 50% agreement between Rumelt scheme 
categorisations made the managers of the companies assessed and external 
researchers. This finding is similar to the 48.75% agreement found by Nayyar 
(1992), who also noted that external assessments were skewed towards 
related and away from unrelated diversification, but substantially better than 
the 29.5% agreement achieved by another researcher cited by Sambharya 
(2000). These variations may be due to errors by researchers who 
understandably have less information than managers but may also be due to 
managers‟ misunderstanding the categories. These findings illustrate clearly 
the problem of achieving objectivity.    
 
Sambharya‟s (2000) contention that entropy provides the most robust and 
objective measure of diversification provides little comfort as the absence of 
SIC-code segmental data precludes the index‟s calculation for UK companies. 
An alternative would be to review and assign a single SIC-code to each 
division reported by companies in their segmental reports. However, it would 
be very difficult and extremely subjective to do this at the 2-digit let alone the 
4-digit level in order to use the entropy measure of diversification. There 
would be a grave danger of replacing one subjective judgement with an even 
more subjective approach. 
  
There will always be some degree of subjectivity in financial data. The 
problem is even greater when comparing profitability and profitability-based 
ratios across segments as the, frequently highly subjective, allocations of 
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central overheads to segments can distort profits. Furthermore, allocations 
may change across accounting periods without comment/explanation 
necessarily being made in notes to the accounts and could even be stopped 
with the corporate centre becoming a loss-making segment itself. This 
research does not make use of segmental profit data although it is held within 
the database. Segmental cash generation information would not suffer the 
same drawbacks as segmental profitability but, unfortunately, few companies 
report those figures.  
 
5.4.2 Data Availability (Confidentiality) 
 The confidential nature of some company information limits its availability. 
The same is true of reports issued by the Competition Commission (CC) 
either into specific proposed transactions or the structure and dynamics of 
particular industries, e.g. The supply of banking services by clearing banks to 
small and medium-sized enterprises (CC Ref: CM5319), Supermarkets: A 
report on the supply of groceries from multiple stores in the United Kingdom 
(CC Ref. CM4842). CC reports are judiciously edited to remove information 
that is commercially sensitive or interesting from a researchers‟ point of view! 
Grunberg (1981, p23) noted that there are "….few Western Governments that 
conduct special censuses or survey and multinational companies do not 
publish data on divestments, even if they collect such data. Such information 
is classified as confidential”. 
 
Therefore, it must always be remembered that this research is dependent on 
the quality and range of publicly available information. Unlike Whittington & 
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Mayer (2000), no interviews have been held with senior executives of the 
companies researched. Although, given the propensity of directors and senior 
managers to „spin‟ information to show them/their company in the best 
possible light and their understandable reluctance to disclose commercially 
sensitive information, it is doubtful whether interviews would make a valid 
contribution to research in this area. An alternative may be to identify retired 
directors who may be more willing and/or able to discuss past events.  
 
Effectively, this research reflects analysis of the „image‟ a company portrays of 
itself through its approach to publication of data required by statute, regulation 
and the LSE listing agreement.   
 
5.4.3 Changes to Segmentation 
Disclosure in annual reports and accounts of mandatory segmental 
information provides turnover and equivalent data which may be used to 
categorise companies. However, there are several potential problems/pitfalls 
associated with segmental turnover data.  
 
Compared to the US, segmental reporting in the UK is less developed. In the 
US, where Wrigley and Rumelt produced leading research in the 1970s and 
1980s, Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (SFAS14 and later 
SFAS131) and also the FTC have required companies to produce segmental 
reports, including SIC codes, which have to be included in annual 10-K 
submissions. In addition, Standard & Poor have created and maintained a 
database – COMPUSTAT – which includes the submitted segmental data. 
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Unfortunately, this is not the case in the UK where segmental reporting, first 
introduced by the Companies Act 1967 and developed through several 
reporting standards starting with SSAP23 – Segmental Reporting, is less 
prescriptive. The only reporting of SIC codes by UK companies is in the 
Annual Returns they submit to Companies House; they are required to note 
the SIC codes of their activities but they do not have to provide financial data, 
e.g. turnover, operating profit, net assets, for each code.  
 
Therefore, UK study in this area is inherently more difficult; research is heavily 
reliant on the availability of good quality segmental data and accurate 
assessment of relatedness between activities. The potential problems/pitfalls 
associated with segmental data are: 
 Notwithstanding portfolio changes, companies amend reported segments 
and/or the composition of those segments over time, e.g. to reflect a new 
management structure, 
 
 Legislation allows directors to decide which of their business activities are 
„sufficiently different‟ to require separate identification in the segmental 
reports,  
 
 There is no consistency across companies in the breadth of activities 
included within the divisions they report, i.e. one company may report each 
of its activities separately while another might amalgamate activities that it 
believes are related in some way,      
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 Statutes provide an 'escape clause' which effectively allows directors to 
amalgamate activities and, ultimately, not to provide any segmental data, 
where they believe that to do so would be commercially prejudicial to their 
company's interests, e.g. Cable & Wireless provide limited turnover 
analyses but no corresponding operating profit information. Where 
directors have relied upon this exemption in preparing segmental 
analyses, they are required make a disclosure to that effect, 
 
 There are inconsistencies across companies and over time of turnover 
attributable to joint ventures and associated/related companies and the 
policies/accounting treatments followed by those companies, 
 
 There are inconsistencies in the inclusion/exclusion of discontinued 
activities/businesses in the segmental reports. Where sufficient data is 
found, segmental data has been adjusted to exclude the discontinued 
activity/business, thereby providing a more accurate picture of the 
activities of the company at the reporting date,    
 
 There are inconsistencies in the reporting of intra-group turnover. Some 
companies disclose total and external turnover figures for each of their 
segments while others merely show external turnover figures which, in 
total, agree to the headline profit and loss figure,    
 
 Companies have reported geographic divisions that comprise the same 
activities, e.g. Wolseley reports its UK and US building product distribution 
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business separately although the activities are essentially the same. (NB 
Where it is clear this has occurred, the geographic divisions are 
amalgamated into a product-based division. Appendix D provides details 
of the principles followed in rationalising reported divisions),  
 
 Companies, especially mining and building materials companies, report 
separate divisions for each of the ores and/or minerals mined/excavated. 
Given that all of the activities are essentially the same; these divisions are 
amalgamated into an activity-based division. 
 
The research database reflects segmental turnover net of intra-group trading 
where the information is available otherwise gross figures have been used. 
Similarly, segmental data net of joint venture and associated/related company 
activity has been used reflecting the investment nature of such non-controlled 
activity, as compared to subsidiary company activities, and its comparative 
rarity amongst FTSE100 companies.   
 
A further point is that directors may decide to change the segments they 
report reducing the validity of longitudinal data. Graham, Lemmon & Wolf 
(2002) consider the effects of such changes and found that segment changes 
that were not the result of changes in the business or its activities did not have 
any effect on market value or perceptions of the company or its activities. In 
their paper they do cite an unpublished paper by Piotroski (1999) arguing that 
segment reporting changes can actually have a positive effect on value.  
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5.4.4 Triangulation 
Triangulating or cross-referencing data, especially non-financial data, has 
been undertaken wherever practical/possible having regard to the risk of bias 
in reporting, to ensure integrity of data and to minimise errors in 
categorisations and analyses. However, the inevitability of a degree of 
subjectivity in the process is recognised, e.g. distinguishing between related 
diversifiers and conglomerates is especially subjective as opinions as to the 
concept of relatedness will vary.  
 
5.4.5 Risk of Mis-categorisation 
Whittington & Mayer (2000) note that, unlike Channon (1973) and Dyas & 
Thanheiser (1976), their categorisation process used two researchers 
independently categorising companies with any disagreements being 
arbitrated by a third party. However, they note that before arbitration there 
was a 93.4% correlation between categorisations suggesting that, using an 
appropriately detailed scheme and reliable data, a single researcher would 
make a negligible number of mis-categorisations. This high rate of agreement 
is similar to that reported by Hoskisson, Hitt, Johnson & Moesel (1993) who 
achieved a level of agreement of 92.8% (180 out of 194 companies). The rate 
of agreement between this research and that of Whittington & Mayer (2000) in 
the categorisation of the industrial/manufacturing companies common to both 
studies‟ 1993 analyses is more than 90%. Therefore, this issue is not 
regarded as significant.   
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5.4.6 Joint Ventures & Associated/Related Companies 
A further issue relates to the categorisation of those companies that have 
significant joint venture and/or associated/related company activities. The 
reporting requirements these activities have increased over the 10 years 
covered by this research although there remained a wide range of acceptable 
approaches. Very few FTSE100 companies carry out a significant proportion 
of their activities through joint venture or associated/related companies the 
major exception being Reed Elsevier, the Anglo-Dutch publishing company 
owned jointly (not quite equally) by UK and Dutch companies who account for 
their investment as a joint venture. The database includes the UK‟s proportion 
of Reed Elsevier‟s turnover. 
 
Joint venture and associated/related company activities are excluded, where 
possible, from the turnover data used to assess diversification category. In 
effect, joint ventures and associated/related company activities are deemed 
investments yielding income rather than integral parts/activities of the 
company.   
 
5.4.7 Privatisations 
The possibility that privatisations distorted changes amongst the population 
has been considered. In the 1980s and early 1990s, the conservative 
government pursued a policy of returning to the private sector as many state 
owned industries as possible including British Telecommunications, British 
Gas, British Steel, British Coal (formerly the National Coal Board) and various 
national and regional water and electricity distribution and generation 
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companies. Because of their size, on privatisation many of these single 
business companies immediately became constituents of the FTSE100 
although many, especially water and electricity companies, quickly lost their 
independence being acquired by other UK and, in some cases, foreign 
companies; a trend that has continued through into the new millennium, e.g. 
Thames Water acquired by RWE of Germany in 2000, BAA acquired in 2006 
by the Spanish company Ferrovial and Scottish Power acquired by Iberdrola 
of Spain in 2006. Throughout the research period - 1993 to 2003 - there were 
few changes amongst utilities and, as they are all classified as service 
companies, they will not distort comparisons with prior research into 
industrial/manufacturing companies.        
 
5.4.8 Turnover Surrogates 
A further problem occurs when categorising those companies that, because of 
the nature of their business, do not report turnover figures that accurately 
reflect the spread of their activities; a surrogate for turnover must be used in 
determining diversification category. Channon (1978, p15) acknowledged the 
difficulties inherent in categorising these companies, typically financial 
services businesses, and suggested loans/advances, premium income and 
assets as alternatives to turnover. This research uses the following surrogates 
for turnover; premium income for insurance companies and assets for banks.      
 
5.4.9 Accounting Regulation 
Since 1960 there have been many changes in UK accounting requirements 
that have affected reported financial information. In addition to three major 
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consolidating Companies Acts in 1965, 1979 and 1985, there has also been a 
whole raft of GAAP. Statements of Standard Accounting Practice (SSAP) 
were introduced in 1970 by the Accounting Standards Board (ASB) which was 
itself superseded in 1990 by the Financial Reporting Council (FRC) which 
introduced Financial Reporting Standards (FRS) some covering new areas, 
other revising and replacing previously issued SSAPs. The most recent 
change, which will have implications for all FTSE listed companies, is the 
adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) with effect 
from 1st January 2007. These legal and regulatory developments have 
resulted in significant changes in the content and presentation of financial 
statements, e.g. treatment of extraordinary/exceptional items, amortisation of 
goodwill, calculation of earnings per share, resulting in a loss in the 
comparability of reported results over time. However, the changes between 
1993 and 2003 are, with the exception of the treatment of 
extraordinary/exceptional items and goodwill, not seen as having had a 
significant effect on reported results.  
 
As regards extraordinary/exceptional items and goodwill there have been 
significant changes since 1993. SSAP6 – Extraordinary Items and Prior Year 
Adjustments was superseded by FRS3 – Reporting Financial Performance 
which became effective in 1993 and effectively eliminated extraordinary items 
and tightened the definition and reporting of exceptional items in an attempt to 
bring greater standardisation across companies. However, the FRS3 
definitions allowed directors considerable leeway in deciding what are 
exceptional items requiring separate disclosure and resulted in an increase 
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rather than a decrease in the incidence and variation in treatment of 
exceptional costs across companies, e.g. some companies treat 
reorganisation costs as exceptional while others see them as a normal 
business expense. The use of DataStream financial information reduces the 
variations across companies as adjustments are made to ensure consistent 
treatment of exceptional items.    
 
In broad terms, almost without exception prior to January 1998, as allowed 
under SSAP22: Accounting for Goodwill, companies adopted a policy of 
writing off goodwill arising on acquisitions against reserves meaning that it did 
not appear as an intangible asset nor were subsequent years‟ profits reduced 
by amortisation charges. With the introduction of FRS10: Goodwill and 
Intangible Assets in 1998 this approach was effectively disallowed with 
companies required to capitalise and amortise goodwill arising on all 
acquisitions although, by undertaking annual reviews of its value, companies 
could avoid amortisation charges if there had been no impairment. 
DataStream deducts intangible assets from capital employed, although it does 
not adjust profits to eliminate goodwill amortisation, in its calculation of return 
on capital employed and from book values in calculating market value/book 
value ratios and therefore the effects of goodwill should be minimised. 
 
DataStream reviews all mergers and treats them as acquisitions by one or 
other of the parties where the underlying substance of the transaction is an 
acquisition. This research has used DataStream‟s interpretations of 
transactions.                
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5.4.10 Generic Problems 
Dess, Gupta, Hennart & Hill (1995, p370-4) raise a number of important 
generic methodological limitations/weaknesses regarding research into 
diversification each of which has been addressed:  
 
 General limitations of cross-sectional work 
There is always the potential for confusion in distinguishing cause and 
effect and in controlling for 'unobservable factors' that may affect company 
performance, e.g. managerial competence. This problem has been 
minimised, but not eliminated, by undertaking reviews of all conglomerate 
companies and noting major extraneous factors that may have contributed 
to changes in corporate strategy/performance.   
 
 Differences in organisational culture 
Management‟s approach to running a company will have a direct and 
substantial influence on its performance and behaviour and changes in 
that management will have an effect. Rather than ignore such influences, 
this research identifies the chairman and CEO (or equivalent) at each firm 
in 1993, 1998 and 2003 to see if changes in leadership coincide with 
changes in strategy.    
 
 Concentration on corporate level performance 
Detail is inevitably lost in the aggregation of performance. This research 
does not attempt to look at performance at activity level but rather at the 
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corporate level. The basic unit of this research is whole companies and it 
is at that level that data has been gathered.   
 
Dess, Gupta, Hennart & Hill (1995) suggest that in each of the above cases, 
some form of semi-structured interview or survey may help to reduce negative 
effects on research. As noted earlier, it was decided that this approach would 
not be followed. By using only published data the research will be looking at 
companies in the same way as their investors; the total activity of each 
business will be split across activities according to the directors‟ views as 
reported in segmental analyses. 
 
5.5 Design of the Study 
This research centres on the creation of a unique database of information 
created from three key sources of data on each company; DataStream has 
provided summarised profit & loss accounts and balance sheets and financial 
ratios, the annual reports and accounts of each company has provided 
segmental information and corporate governance, primarily director details, 
information and the Financial Times and Sunday Times have provided lists of 
the FTSE100 as at each calendar year end together with data, adjusted for 
rights issues, share splits, etc. made during the year, including share prices, 
price/earnings ratios and yields. The database covers constituents of the LSE 
FTSE100 index as at 31st December 1993, 1998 and 2003.  
 
Each of the 160 companies in the database, which is held in an Excel 
spreadsheet, has its own standard format worksheet, populated with its data. 
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The data is used to calculate additional statistics including multiple 
(Channon/Whittington & Mayer, Hill & Pickering, Focus/Multiple, Core/Non-
core) diversification category assessments. A summary worksheet draws 
together key data from each company worksheet and is used as the basis for 
various tables showing the incidence of conglomeration, the breadth of 
company activities, movements between diversification categories, 
performance and various corporate governance characteristics.  
 
As there have been many changes in the composition of the FTSE100 over 
the 10 year research period, two sets of tables have been complied; one set 
shows data from the whole FTSE100 population as at 31st December 1993, 
1998 and 2003 while the other shows data from the 54 companies that were 
FTSE100 constituents at each of the three period ends. Furthermore, each 
set of tables has been sub-divided into service and industrial/manufacturing 
companies recognising that the majority of extant research excluded service 
companies and therefore would be comparable only to 
industrial/manufacturing companies.    
 
Recognising that the quantitative data lacks richness, a brief history of each of 
the FTSE100 conglomerate companies identified in the research has been 
compiled using a variety of sources from company websites to the FT 
Intelligence database. These histories provide valuable insight into the drivers 
- environmental, regulatory and/or management - that were behind decisions 
to adopt, abandon or maintain a conglomerate strategy.  
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Statistical analyses using Chi-squared to test for differences between 
category movements in different time periods and Pearson‟s correlation 
coefficients to test for performance-diversity relationships were undertaken.  
 
5.6 Summary 
In summary, the key stages of the methodology detailed in this section of the 
thesis are: 
 
A. Identify the population; constituents of the FTSE100 index as at 31st 
December 1993, 1998 and 2003. Appendix E shows the lists with key 
details of each company, e.g. market capitalisation.  
 
B. Gather financial and non-financial data on each of the companies 
identified in A above to create a unique database. Data for each company 
is drawn from annual reports and accounts downloaded from Thomson 
Financial database for 1993, 1998 and 2003 or until the company ceased 
to fulfil the criteria qualifying it for inclusion, from journal and business 
press databases, e.g. FT Intelligence, and DataStream.  
 
C. Categorise the companies researched according to their degree of 
diversification using the same basic typology as followed by previous 
researchers but including sub-categories within the diversified and 
conglomerate categories to reflect the existence or absence of a core 
activity.  
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D. Analyse the financial performance of the companies and identify changes 
in corporate strategy and the drivers behind such changes and any 
relationship between performance and company diversification strategy.  
 
E. Identify service companies that have become manufacturing companies or 
vice versa and companies that have changed their core activity and the 
drivers behind the changes.  
   
F. Draw conclusions from the analyses undertaken as to the validity of the 
hypotheses. 
 
This research makes contributions through the creation of a unique database 
of information on FTSE100 companies and its analysis to identify changes in 
conglomeration between 1993 and 2003 and the drivers of these changes.  
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6. ANALYSING THE ACCOUNTING RECORD 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents analyses of the database created using information 
extracted from DataStream, company annual reports and accounts and the 
financial press, principally the Financial Times. The database contains 
information on 160 companies that were members of the London Stock 
Exchange FTSE100 Index at the end (31st December) of any or all of the 
calendar years 1993, 1998 or 2003.  
 
The data is analysed to identify trends in conglomeration between 1993, 1998 
and 2003 amongst the FTSE100 as a whole at the end of each of those years 
(section 6.2) and amongst the 54 companies that were constituents of the 
FTSE100 at the end of 1993, 1998 and 2003 (section 6.3); the FTSE100 
Survivors. While analysis of the FTSE100 identifies trends amongst the 100 
most valuable UK listed companies regardless of changes in that population, 
the FTSE100 Survivors analysis identifies trends amongst a constant 
population and facilitates further investigative work into the drivers of change.      
 
In addition to the incidence of conglomeration, the chapter also considers 
movements between diversification categories, diversification across FT 
classifications, the breadth of conglomerate activities, the performance of 
conglomerates and their corporate governance both over time and against 
other diversification categories. Each of these issues is reported in a separate 
sub-section of section 6.2 for the FTSE100 and 6.3 for the FTSE100 
Survivors. The causes – loss of market value, delisting, acquisition – of 46 of 
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the constituents of the FTSE100 in 1993 leaving the index by the end of 2003 
are provided illustrating the dynamism of the index. Finally, each of the 
hypotheses detailed in chapter 4 are tested against the information in the 
preceding analyses. 
 
The data analyses of the FTSE100 and FTSE100 Survivor populations are 
also sub-divided into industrial/manufacturing companies and service 
companies in order that sector differences may be identified. However, it 
should be noted that there may be a tendency, compared to 
industrial/manufacturing companies, for service company categorisations to 
be biased toward focus. This is particularly true of banks whose segmental 
reports, which vary greatly in their level of detail and grouping of activities, 
have been standardised according to broad financial services businesses - 
personal & corporate banking, insurance, capital markets/investment banking 
and other - according to principles outlined in Appendix D. While this process 
improves comparability across bank segmental reports, it may show them to 
be less diverse than would be the case under a different set of activity 
definitions.        
 
Throughout this chapter tables are used to summarise key data extracted 
from the database, e.g. FTSE100 By Diversification Category, and statistical 
analyses - Chi-squared to test for differences between population category 
movements in different time periods and Pearson‟s correlation coefficients to 
test for performance-diversity relationships – were undertaken. The Chi-tests 
found patterns of movements to be different between 1993 and 1998 and 
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1998 and 2003. Pearson‟s correlation coefficients showed no consistent 
significant relationships between diversity and performance although a few 
isolated relationships - specific indicators in specific periods - were identified.    
 
Appendix E comprises lists of the FTSE100 as at 31st December 1993, 1998 
and 2003. The market capitalisation of the FTSE100 has risen significantly 
through the 10 year period covered by this research increasing from £553.3 
billion in 1993 to £1,067.3 billion in 1998 and £1,110.9 billion in 2003 and the 
membership of the index has also changed reflecting the buoyancy and, after 
the brief recession of the early 1990s, uninterrupted economic growth of the 
UK economy and its dynamism. In the five years since 2003 there has been 
little change in the total market capitalisation of the FTSE100 which was 
£1,142 billion at 31st December 2008.   
    
Unlike the preceding 10 year period which saw publicly owned utilities - gas, 
electricity, water and telecommunications - returned to the public sector, the 
research period saw few large privatisations/floatations by the UK government 
(Railtrack, the provider of railway infrastructure, and British Energy, the 
nuclear electricity generator, were floated in 1996). However, there were a 
number of demutualisations including those of insurer Norwich Union (1997) 
and several building societies became banks including Alliance & Leicester 
(1997), Bradford & Bingley (2000), Halifax (1997), Northern Rock (1997) and 
Woolwich (1997). In addition, several companies previously quoted on foreign 
stock exchanges moved their primary listing to London to take advantage of 
the UK‟s status, along with New York and Tokyo, as a pre-eminent financial 
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centre. Companies moving to the LSE included the mining companies Anglo 
American (1999, ex South Africa), Xstrata (2002, ex Switzerland) and Billiton 
(demerged from Gencor of South Africa in 1997), the insurance company Old 
Mutual (demutualised and listed ex South Africa in 1999) and the brewer 
South African Breweries (later SABMiller) (2002, ex South Africa). As a result 
of these new listings several companies fell out of the FTSE100. 
 
A key feature of the FTSE100 over the period 1993 to 2003 was the change in 
the percentage of service companies in the index. In 1993 only 58% of 
FTSE100 companies were classified as service companies where more than 
50% of their turnover or, in the case of banks, assets were categorised in 
segmental reports as relating to service activities. By 1998 this had risen to 
70% but fell back to 63% by 2003. In terms of value, service companies 
represented £310 billion (56%), £662 billion (62%) and £634 billion (57%) of 
the total market capitalisation of the FTSE100 in 1993, 1998 and 2003 
respectively. Some of the increase in FTSE100 service companies would 
have been the result of demutualisations of banks and insurance companies 
where the newly floated companies entered the index immediately. These 
„new‟ listed service companies would have been partially offset by the entry of 
several mining companies. 
 
For the survivors, the percentage of service companies remained broadly 
constant through the research period being 64.8% in 1993 and 1998 and 
63.0% in 2003 as would be expected with a stable population and the 
comparative rarity of companies changing sector. Only BAT/British American 
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Tobacco was in a different sector, industrial/manufacturing, in 2003 having 
been a service company in 1993. In value terms, service companies 
represented £242 billion (63%), £455 billion (59%) and £481 billion (55%) of 
the total market capitalisation of the FTSE100 survivors in 1993, 1998 and 
2003 respectively.   
 
6.2 Constituents of the FTSE100 
6.2.1 Diversification 
The distribution across diversification categories of FTSE100 companies has 
changed considerably over the 10 years covered by this research. Using 
definitions consistent with those of Channon/Whittington & Mayer, the 
following table shows a steady decline in the number (and percentage) of 
conglomerates within the 100 companies that comprised the index at the end 
of 1993, 1998 and 2003. In 1993 there were 16 conglomerates in the index 
but by 1998 that had fallen to 10 and by 2003 to only 7, less than half the 
number 10 years earlier. Similarly, the number of related diversified 
companies had also fallen substantially during the same period from 31 in 
1993 to 27 in 1998 with an even greater fall to 18 by 2003. When 
conglomerates and related diversifiers are considered together – as multiple 
business companies – the decline is from 47 to 37 and to 25. The multiple 
business companies have been replaced not by dominant business 
companies, whose numbers have remained broadly constant through the 
period, but by single business companies which accounted for only 21 of the 
FTSE100 in 1993 but 44 in 2003. 
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Table 25: FTSE100 By Diversification Category 
  
No. % No. % No. %
Channon/W&M
Single 21 21.0 34 34.0 44 44.0
Dominant 32 32.0 29 29.0 31 31.0
Sub-Total Focus 53 53.0 63 63.0 75 75.0
Related 31 31.0 27 27.0 18 18.0
Conglomerate 16 16.0 10 10.0 7 7.0
Sub-Total Multiple 47 47.0 37 37.0 25 25.0
Total 100 100.0 100 100.0 100 100.0
Related - Core 20 20.0 18 18.0 13 13.0
% of Related 64.5 66.7 72.2
Conglomerate - Core 7 7.0 3 3.0 5 5.0
% of Conglomerate 43.8 30.0 71.4
Hill & Pickering
Low 68 68.0 75 75.0 77 77.0
Medium 14 14.0 12 12.0 15 15.0
High 18 18.0 13 13.0 8 8.0
Total 100 100.0 100 100.0 100 100.0
1998 20031993
 
 
The alternative diversification measure of Hill & Pickering supports the 
Channon/W&M results and shows a steady fall from 18 to 8 in the number of 
highly diversified companies and an increase from 68 to 77 in the number of 
companies classified as having low diversification with medium diversification 
remaining broadly constant.              
 
The table also shows the percentage of related and conglomerate companies 
with core activities increased, marginally in the case of related companies but 
significantly for conglomerates, from 64.5% in 1993 to 72.2% in 2003.  
 
The following tables show changes in the categorisation of 
industrial/manufacturing and service companies the later comprising 58% of 
the FTSE100 in 1993, 70% in 1998 and 63% in 2003. 
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Table 26: FTSE100 By Diversification Category – 
Industrial/manufacturing 
 
No % No. % No. %
Channon/W&M
Single 3 7.1 4 13.3 11 29.7
Dominant 7 16.7 7 23.3 14 37.8
Sub-Total Focus 10 23.8 11 36.6 25 67.5
Related 22 52.4 13 43.3 9 24.3
Conglomerate 10 23.8 6 20.0 3 8.1
Sub-Total Multiple 32 76.2 19 63.3 12 32.4
Total 42 100.0 30 100.0 37 100.0
Related - Core 13 31.0 9 30.0 7 18.9
% of Related 59.1 69.2 77.8
Conglomerate - Core 5 11.9 2 6.7 2 5.4
% of Conglomerate 50.0 33.3 66.7
Hill & Pickering
Low 21 50.0 19 63.3 27 73.0
Medium 10 23.8 5 16.7 6 16.2
High 11 26.2 6 20.0 4 10.8
Total 42 100.0 30 100.0 37 100.0
1993 1998 2003
 
 
Table 27: FTSE100 By Diversification Category – Services 
 
No % No. % No. %
Channon/W&M
Single 18 31.0 30 42.9 33 52.4
Dominant 25 43.1 22 31.4 17 27.0
Sub-Total Focus 43 74.1 52 74.3 50 79.4
Related 9 15.5 14 20.0 9 14.3
Conglomerate 6 10.3 4 5.7 4 6.3
Sub-Total Multiple 15 25.8 18 25.7 13 20.6
Total 58 100.0 70 100.0 63 100.0
Related - Core 7 12.1 9 12.9 6 9.5
% of Related 77.8 64.3 66.7
Conglomerate - Core 2 3.4 1 1.4 3 4.8
% of Conglomerate 33.3 25.0 75.0
Hill & Pickering
Low 47 81.0 56 80.0 50 79.4
Medium 4 6.9 7 10.0 9 14.3
High 7 12.1 7 10.0 4 6.3
Total 58 100.0 70 100.0 63 100.0
1993 1998 2003
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The changes appear to be more pronounced amongst the 
industrial/manufacturing companies where the percentage of conglomerates 
has fallen from 23.8% in 1993 to 20.0% in 1998 and 8.1% in 2003 by which 
time only 3 companies fell into that category. The corresponding figures for 
conglomerate service companies were 10.3%, 5.7% and 6.3% with only 4 
companies in the category in 2003.  
 
There was also a sharp reduction in related diversification amongst 
industrial/manufacturing companies which more than halved falling from 
52.4% in 1993 to 24.3% in 2003. Again, this reduction was not matched by 
service companies amongst whom related diversification remained broadly 
constant decreasing from 15.5% in 1993 to 14.3% in 2003 notwithstanding an 
increase to 20.0% in 1998.         
 
Taking the conglomerate and related diversification categories together as 
multiple business companies, the changes amongst industrial/manufacturing 
and service companies are again very different. Multiple business service 
companies accounted for 25.8% and 25.7% of the FTSE100 in 1993 and 
1998 respectively before declining to 20.6% by 2003. By contrast the 
percentage of multiple business industrial/manufacturing companies fell from 
76.2% in 1993 to 63.3% in 1998 before almost halving to 32.4% by 2003. The 
move towards greater focus was more pronounced amongst 
industrial/manufacturing companies.  
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However, changes in the incidence of focused - single and dominant business 
companies - differed between sectors. While both sectors saw significant 
increases in the incidence of single business companies - services from 
31.0% to 42.9% to 52.4% and industrial/manufacturing from 7.1% to 13.3% to 
29.7% - changes in dominant business companies were very different. In the 
industrial/manufacturing sector dominant business companies increased from 
16.7% in 1993 to 23.3% in 1998 and 37.8% in 2003 while the services sector 
saw decreases from 43.1% in 1993 to 31.4% in 1998 and 27.0% in 2003. The 
Hill & Pickering based categorisations support those based on Channon/W&M 
with both sectors seeing reductions in high diversification and increases in low 
diversification with medium diversification reducing amongst 
industrial/manufacturing but increasing for service companies.       
 
As these statistics refer to the FTSE100 some of the changes will be due to 
FTSE100 index exits and entries. However, changes in the index constituents 
reflect not only the LSE population from which they are drawn but also the 
value investors, through the market, place on those listed companies. 
Therefore, the move to greater focus amongst FTSE100 companies is 
indicative of diversification across the LSE and investor support, as evidenced 
by valuations that drive FTSE100 membership, of companies pursuing 
different diversification strategies.  
 
6.2.2 Category Changes 
By looking at movements between categories from 1993 to 2003 and in the 
sub-periods 1993 to 1998 and 1998 to 2003 it is possible to indentify forward 
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and backward movements through the Model of Corporate Development and 
to see how many companies maintained their strategy, i.e. remained in the 
same category. This section analyses the movements between categories 
implicit in tables 25 (all), 26 (industrial/manufacturing) and 27 (services).   
Table 28: FTSE100 Diversification Changes From 1993 To 1998 
 
Single Dominant Related Conglom. Exits Totals
Single 12 2 0 0 7 21
Dominant 4 14 5 1 8 32
Related 1 7 12 1 10 31
Conglom 1 1 2 7 5 16
Entries 16 5 8 1
Totals 34 29 27 10 100
1998
1
9
9
3
 
 
The above table shows that, excluding exits, 45 (64%) companies remained in 
the same diversification category. A majority of companies in each 
diversification category in 1993 remained in the same category in 1998; 12 
(86%) single business, 14 (58%) dominant companies, 12 (57%) related 
diversifiers and 7 (64%) conglomerates. The numbers of companies 
remaining in the same category in 1993 and 1998 are shown in each of the 
shaded cells in the above table as they will be in subsequent tables.  
 
Amongst the 25 (36%) companies that changed category 9 (13%) advanced 
and 16 (23%) retreated in their diversification suggesting a strong trend 
towards greater focus. Most movements occurred amongst related diversifiers 
where 8 (38%) reversed (7 to dominant and 1 to single) and only 1 (5%) 
advanced (1 company became a conglomerate) and conglomerates where 4 
(36%) companies reversed (2 to related and 1 each to dominant and single).   
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The ratios of entries to exits show how the index moved toward greater focus. 
The entries:exits ratios of the conglomerate, related and dominant categories 
at 1:5, 8:10 and 5:8 respectively all show more exits than entries which 
contrasts with the 16:7 ratio in favour of single business company entries.  
 
The following tables show the category movements for the 
industrial/manufacturing and service companies.  
Table 29: FTSE100 Diversification Changes From 1993 To 1998 – 
Industrial/Manufacturing 
 
Single Dominant Related Conglom. Exits Totals
Single 1 0 0 0 2 3
Dominant 0 2 2 0 3 7
Related 1 4 8 1 8 22
Conglom 0 0 2 4 4 10
Entries 1 1 2 1
Totals 3 7 14 6
Notes:
0
30
42
BAT Industries entered the single business category having been a service conglomerate 
in 1993
Scottish & Newcastle exited the related diversifier category becoming a service related 
diversifier in 1998
Net movement (to)/from services not included above 
Table based on each company's sector in 1993 
1998
1
9
9
3
 
 
Table 30: FTSE100 Diversification Changes From 1993 To 1998 – 
Services 
 
Single Dominant Related Conglom. Exits Totals
Single 11 2 0 0 5 18
Dominant 4 12 3 1 5 25
Related 0 3 4 0 2 9
Conglom 1 1 0 3 1 6
Entries 15 4 6 0
Totals 31 22 13 4
Notes:
0
Scottish & Newcastle entered the related diversifier category having been an 
industrial/manufacturing related diversifier in 1998.
BAT Industries exited the conglomerate category becoming a single business 
industrial/manufacturing company in 1998.
Net movement (to)/from industrial/manufacturing not included above 
Table based on each company's sector in 1993 
58
70
1
9
9
3
1998
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The tables show similar levels of stability. Excluding exits, 60% of 
industrial/manufacturing and 67% of services companies remained in the 
same diversification category and in no category did the number of 
movements exceed stable companies. Both sectors saw more companies 
retreat than advance with net movements of 4 (16%) industrial/manufacturing 
companies (3 advances and 7 retreats) and 3 (7%) service companies (6 
advances and 9 retreats). Each sector saw 1 company advance to 
conglomeration both as a result of an acquisition; industrial/manufacturing 
company Guinness acquiring Grand Metropolitan to form Diageo and service 
company North West Water acquiring Norweb to form United Utilities. Both 
sectors saw 2 companies retreat from conglomeration; 
industrial/manufacturing companies Williams and Siebe became related 
diversifiers and service companies BAT Industries/British American Tobacco 
and Ladbroke/Hilton retreated to the single and dominant business categories 
respectively.    
Table 31: FTSE100 Diversification Changes From 1998 To 2003 
 
Single Dominant Related Conglom. Exits Totals
Single 15 5 2 0 12 34
Dominant 4 16 1 0 8 29
Related 2 4 9 2 10 27
Conglom 2 0 2 4 2 10
Entries 21 6 4 1
Totals 44 31 18 7 100
2003
1
9
9
8
 
 
The above table covering the period 1998 to 2003 tells a similar story to that 
of the preceding 5 years; the prevailing trend is towards focus. Ignoring 
entries and exits, 44 (65%) companies remained in the same diversification 
category although, unlike 1993 to 1998 there were significant differences 
between categories. While 15 (68%) single business and 16 (76%) dominant 
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business companies remained in the same category only 9 (53%) related 
diversified companies and 4 (50%) conglomerate companies did not move. 
Therefore, while overall stability remained broadly the same, that amongst 
focused categories was greater than that amongst multiple business 
categories.  
 
The movements reflect a continuing shift towards greater focus with 14 (21%) 
companies retreating and only 10 (15%) advancing in their diversification. 
Again conglomerates and related diversifiers led the way back to greater 
focus with 4 (50%) and 6 (35%) companies respectively reversing their 
diversification. Of the conglomerates 2 - North West Water/United Utilities and 
Pearson - took a step back to related diversification while 2 - Granada and 
Guinness/Diageo - made the „double jump‟ back to the single business 
company category. Only 2 companies - Whitbread and Hays - advanced to 
conglomeration both related diversifiers.           
 
The ratio of entries to exits was also greatest for the conglomerate and related 
diversifier categories where exits exceeded entries; conglomerate 1:2 and 
related diversifier 4:10. This contrasts with ratios of 6:8 and 21:12 for the 
dominant business and single business categories respectively.  
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Table 32: FTSE100 Diversification Changes From 1998 To 2003 – 
Industrial/Manufacturing 
 
Single Dominant Related Conglom. Exits Totals
Single 1 2 0 0 1 4
Dominant 0 6 0 0 1 7
Related 1 3 5 0 4 13
Conglom 1 0 1 3 1 6
Entries 7 3 3 0
Totals 10 14 9 3
Notes:
1
Scottish & Newcastle entered the single business category having been a service related 
diversifier in 1998.
30
2003
36
1
9
9
8
Table based on each company's sector in 1998
Net movement (to)/from services not included above 
 
 
Table 33: FTSE100 Diversification Changes From 1998 To 2003 – 
Services 
 
Single Dominant Related Conglom. Exits Totals
Single 14 3 2 0 11 30
Dominant 4 10 1 0 7 22
Related 1 1 4 2 6 14
Conglom 1 0 1 1 1 4
Entries 14 3 1 1
Totals 34 17 9 4
Notes:
(1)
70
64
2003
Scottish & Newcastle exited related diversifier category becoming a single business service 
company in 2003.
Net movement (to)/from industrial/manufacturing not included above 
Table based on each company's sector in 1998
1
9
9
8
 
 
As between 1993 and 1998, the levels of stability were again similar at 65% 
for industrial/manufacturing and 64% for service companies. With few 
exceptions, the majority of companies in each category did not change their 
diversification strategy. Unlike 1993-1998, there were differences between 
sectors in the net direction of movements. Industrial/manufacturing companies 
continued to focus with 6 (26%) retreating and only 2 (9%) advancing while 
there was a balance in service company movements with the same number of 
companies - 8 (18%) – retreating and advancing. No industrial/manufacturing 
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companies advanced to conglomeration but 2 service companies – Hays and 
Whitbread - advanced to conglomeration both having been related 
diversifiers.     
Table 34: FTSE100 Diversification Changes From 1993 To 2003 
 
Single Dominant Related Conglom. Exits Totals
Single 6 3 1 0 11 21
Dominant 8 10 6 0 8 32
Related 4 7 5 1 14 31
Conglom 2 2 1 3 8 16
Entries 24 9 5 3
Totals 44 31 18 7 100
1
9
9
3
2003
 
 
Considering the complete 10 year research period the trend is clearly towards 
focus as the above table shows. Excluding entries and exits, the net 
movement is in favour of greater focus with 24 (41%) companies retreating 
and only 11 (19%) advancing through the Model of Corporate Development. 
The dynamism of FTSE100 companies is also well illustrated by the fact that 
only 24 (41%) companies remained in the same diversification category in 
2003 as 1993 and only the single business company category had a majority 
of companies, 6 (60%), with a stable diversification strategy.  
 
In addition to the move toward focus amongst those companies in the 
FTSE100 throughout the research period, the ratios of entries to exits also 
suggest focused companies were becoming more commonplace. The 
entry:exit ratio for single and dominant business categories were in favour of 
entries at 24:11 and 9:8 respectively while for related diversified and 
conglomerate categories they were in favour of exits at 5:14 and 3:8.   
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Table 35: FTSE100 Diversification Changes From 1993 To 2003 – 
Industrial/Manufacturing  
 
Single Dominant Related Conglom. Exits Totals
Single 0 1 0 0 2 3
Dominant 1 3 1 0 2 7
Related 4 5 3 0 10 22
Conglom 0 1 1 2 6 10
Entries 5 4 4 1
Totals 10 14 9 3
Notes:
1
42
36
2003
BAT Industries entered the single business category having been a service conglomerate 
in 1993
Net movement (to)/from services not included above 
1
9
9
3
Table based on each company's sector in 1993 
 
 
Table 36: FTSE100 Diversification Changes From 1993 To 2003 – 
Services 
Single Dominant Related Conglom. Exits Totals
Single 6 2 1 0 9 18
Dominant 7 7 5 0 6 25
Related 0 2 2 1 4 9
Conglom 2 1 0 1 2 6
Entries 19 5 1 2
Totals 34 17 9 4
Notes:
(1)
BAT Industries exited the conglomerate category becoming a single business service 
company in 2003.
Net movement (to)/from industrial/manufacturing not included above 
Table based on each company's sector in 1993
2003
58
64
1
9
9
3
 
 
Excluding exits, service companies have shown greater stability; 16 (43%) 
service companies remained in the same diversification category compared to 
only 8 (36%) industrial/manufacturing companies. In the conglomerate 
category 2 industrial/manufacturing companies - Tomkins and Unilever – and 
1 service company – Bass/Intercontinental Hotels – were in the category in 
1993 and 2003.     
 
The prevailing trend amongst companies in both sectors was towards focus 
with the greatest movement in the industrial/manufacturing sector. Amongst 
   230 
industrial/manufacturing companies there was a net movement of 10 (45%) 
towards focus with 12 (54%) retreats and only 2 (9%) advances while 
amongst service companies the net movement was 3 (8%) with 12 (32%) 
retreats and 9 (24%) advances.       
 
The reluctance of companies to take the final step to conglomeration was 
similar in both sectors. While 2 industrial/manufacturing companies – Hanson 
and Pearson - retreated to greater focus, none advanced to conglomeration 
and amongst service companies 3 conglomerates – BAT/British American 
Tobacco, Granada and Ladbroke/Hilton - retreated and only 1 company – 
Whitbread - advanced to conglomeration from related diversification.  
 
The entry:exit ratios are in favour of focus rather than multiple business 
categories in both sectors although industrial/manufacturing ratios are most 
clear cut. Again, this supports the contention that focus supplanted diversity 
amongst the FTSE100.   
 
6.2.3 Diversification By FT Classification 
The following tables break down tables 25 (all), 26 (industrial/manufacturing) 
and 27 (services) to show, by FT classification, the number of FTSE100 
companies in each diversification category. These analyses seek to identify 
links between conglomeration and FT classification; do companies in 
particular classifications have a greater propensity to pursue conglomeration?      
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Table 37: FTSE100 Diversification Category by FT Classification 1993 
 
FT Classification S D R C Tot S D R C Tot S D R C Tot
Banks 2 5 2 9 2 5 2 9
Brewers & Distillers 4 4 1 1 2 5 1 6
Building Materials 2 2 4 1 1 1 2 2 5
Business Services 1 1 2 1 1 2
Chemicals 3 3 3 3
Conglomerates 2 2 2 2
Electricity 3 3 6 3 3 6
Electronics 1 1 1 1
Engineering - Aerospace 2 2 2 2
Engineering - General 2 2 2 2
Food Manufacturing 2 1 1 4 2 1 1 4
Food Retailing 4 4 4 4
Health & Household 2 1 3 6 2 1 3 6
Hotels & Leisure 1 1 1 3 4 2 3 5
Insurance Composite 4 1 5 4 1 5
Insurance Life 2 2 2 2
Media 1 1 2 1 1 2 1 2 1 4
Merchant Banks 2 2 2 2
Metals & Metal Forming 1 1 1 1
Mines 1 1 1 1
Miscellaneous 1 1 1 1
Oil & Gas 1 2 1 4 1 1 1 3 1 5
Other Industrials 2 2 2 2
Packaging, Paper & Print 2 2 2 2
Property 2 2 2 2
Stores 3 1 1 5 3 1 1 5
Telephone Networks 1 1 1 3 1 1 1 3
Textiles 1 1 1 1
Transport 2 1 3 2 1 3
Water 1 3 4 1 3 4
Totals 3 7 22 10 42 18 25 9 6 58 21 32 31 16 100
Services TotalInd/Manu
 
 
The distribution of FTSE100 companies by category and FT classification 
shows conglomerates to come from a broad range of classifications. In 1993 
there was a „conglomerates‟ FT classification but only 2 – Hanson and 
Tomkins - of the 10 conglomerates in the FTSE100 were included in the 
classification. It would appear that even in 1993, before the decline in the 
popularity of conglomerates, there was a marked reluctance for them to allow 
themselves to be classified as such.    
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The table shows basic industries, including utilities and mining companies, to 
be populated by dominant business companies and „specialist‟ activities such 
as financial services to be primarily single and dominant businesses.     
 
Table 38: FTSE100 Diversification Category by FT Classification 1998 
 
FT Classification S D R C Tot S D R C Tot S D R C Tot
Alcoholic Beverages 1 1 2 1 1 2
Banks, Retail 8 3 11 8 3 11
Breweries, Pubs & Rests 1 2 1 4 1 2 1 4
Chemicals 1 1 2 1 1 2
Electricity 2 4 6 2 4 6
Electronic & Elec. Equip. 1 1 1 1
Engineering 2 1 3 6 2 1 3 6
Engineering, Vehicles 1 1 2 1 1 2
Extractive Industries 1 1 2 1 1 2
Food Processors 1 1 1 1
Food Producers 1 1 2 1 1 2
Gas Distribution 2 2 2 2
Health Care 1 1 1 1
Household Goods & Text 1 1 1 1
Insurance 2 2 4 2 2 4
Investment Trusts 1 1 1 1
Leisure & Hotels 1 1 2 1 1 2
Life Assurance 1 2 1 4 1 2 1 4
Media 1 1 1 3 2 3 5 3 4 1 8
Oil, Integrated 1 1 2 1 1 2
Other Financial 2 2 2 2
Pharmaceuticals 1 2 3 1 2 3
Property 2 2 2 2
Retailers, Food 3 1 4 3 1 4
Retailers, General 2 2 4 2 2 4
Support Services 1 1 2 2 4 2 3 5
Telecommunications 4 1 2 7 4 1 2 7
Tobacco 1 1 1 1
Transport 3 1 1 5 3 1 1 5
Utilities 1 1 1 1
Water 1 1 2 1 1 2
Totals 4 7 13 6 30 30 22 14 4 70 34 29 27 10 100
Ind/Manu Services Total
 
 
In addition to showing the number of FTSE100 conglomerates to have fallen 
from 16 in 1993 to 10 in 1998, the above table shows the engineering 
classification to have the most conglomerates with 3 companies pursing the 
strategy compared to only 2 in the classification in 1993. The table also 
illustrates the shift toward greater focus with 13 more single business 
companies than in 1993 although the number of dominant business 
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companies decreased by 3 over the same period. The increase in financial 
services companies, which are predominantly single or dominant business 
companies, explains some of the shift.      
 
Table 39: FTSE100 Diversification Category by FT Classification 2003 
 
FT Classification S D R C Tot S D R C Tot S D R C Tot
Aerospace & Defence 2 1 3 2 1 3
Automobiles & Parts 1 1 1 1
Banks 7 2 1 10 7 2 1 10
Beverages 2 2 4 2 2 4
Chemicals 1 2 3 1 2 3
Construction & Bldg Matls 1 1 1 1 1 1 2
Electricity 1 1 2 1 1 2
Engineering & Machinery 1 1 1 1
Food & Drug Retailers 4 4 4 4
Food Prods & Processors 1 1 1 3 1 1 1 3
General Retailers 3 3 6 3 3 6
Health 1 1 2 1 1 2
Insurance 1 1 1 1
Investment Companies 2 2 2 2
Leisure & Hotels 1 1 2 4 1 1 2 4
Life Assurance 2 1 1 1 5 2 1 1 1 5
Media & Entertainment 1 3 4 4 1 5 4 2 3 9
Mining 1 2 1 4 1 2 1 4
Oil & Gas 1 1 2 1 1 1 2 3
Personal Care & H'hold 1 1 1 1
Pharmaceuticals & Bio. 2 1 3 1 1 3 1 4
Real Estate 2 1 3 2 1 3
Software & Comp Servs 1 1 1 1
Speciality & Other Fin. 1 1 1 3 1 1 1 3
Support Services 1 1 1 1 1 1 4 2 1 1 1 5
Telecommunication Servs 2 1 1 4 2 1 1 4
Tobacco 3 3 3 3
Transport 1 2 3 1 2 3
Utilities (Ex Electricity) 2 2 4 2 2 4
Totals 11 14 9 3 37 33 17 9 4 63 44 31 18 7 100
Ind/Manu Services Total
 
 
The move towards greater focus continued from 1998; there were 10 
additional single business and 2 additional dominant business companies. 
Since 1998 both the related diversifier and conglomerate strategies have 
fewer adherents, down by 9 and 3 respectively. Amongst the conglomerates, 
engineering accounts for only 1 compared with 3 in 1998.         
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6.2.4 Breadth of Activities 
Having shown in tables 25 (all), 26 (industrial/manufacturing) and 27 
(services) a trend towards greater focus in the diversification of FTSE100 
companies – both industrial/manufacturing and service - this section considers 
whether the breadth of activities of companies in each diversification category 
increased, decreased or remained constant through the research period. 
Herfindahl indices and the distribution of turnover across activities/groups of 
related activities and the number of reported activities/groups of related 
activities have been used to determine the spread of each company‟s 
activities.  
Table 40: FTSE100 Average Herfindahl Indices By Diversification 
Category 
 
Category 1993 1998 2003
Single 0.98 0.99 0.99
Dominant 0.73 0.71 0.74
Related 0.42 0.44 0.43
Conglomerate 0.36 0.35 0.44
All 0.63 0.70 0.77  
 
Table 41: FTSE100 Average Percentage Turnover Generated by the 
Largest Reported Activity and Largest Related Group of Reported 
Activities By Diversification Category 
 
1993 1998 2003 1993 1998 2003
Single 98.9 99.4 99.3 99.9 99.9 99.7
Dominant 83.6 82.4 84.4 98.0 95.7 95.4
Related 53.3 54.7 56.1 93.2 95.5 95.4
Conglomerate 46.0 44.5 55.5 52.5 50.8 58.1
All 71.4 76.9 83.8 89.6 92.6 94.7
Category
Largest Activity Largest Related Group
 
 
The increases in the overall Herfindahl index from 0.63 to 0.77 and in the 
percentages of turnover generated by the largest activity and related group of 
activities suggest a narrowing of the activities of FTSE100 companies. 
However, the averages of the single, dominant and related diversified 
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categories remained broadly constant throughout the research period while 
those of the conglomerate category all increased; Herfindahl from 0.36 to 
0.44, largest activity turnover from 46.0% to 55.5% and largest related group 
turnover from 52.5% to 58.1%. These averages suggest that conglomerates 
have narrowed their activities but that companies in other categories have not. 
The increases in overall averages reflect the narrowing of conglomerate 
activities and the migration of companies to more focused categories over the 
research period.    
Table 42: FTSE100 Average Herfindahl Indices By Diversification 
Category – Industrial/Manufacturing  
 
Category 1993 1998 2003
Single 1.00 1.00 1.00
Dominant 0.66 0.69 0.72
Related 0.40 0.44 0.43
Conglomerate 0.37 0.35 0.40
All Non-Service 0.48 0.56 0.71  
 
Table 43: FTSE100 Average Percentage Turnover Generated by the 
Largest Reported Activity and Largest Related Group of Reported 
Activities By Diversification Category – Industrial/Manufacturing 
 
1993 1998 2003 1993 1998 2003
Single 100.0 100.0 99.9 100.0 100.0 100.0
Dominant 77.8 80.8 83.0 99.0 94.9 96.7
Related 51.1 54.7 56.8 92.6 97.9 92.7
Conglomerate 48.8 44.9 52.8 49.2 52.1 56.5
All Non-Service 58.5 64.8 79.2 83.9 88.3 93.5
Category
Largest Activity Largest Related Group
 
 
The trends indentified amongst the industrial/manufacturing companies are 
more pronounced than those of the FTSE100 as a whole with the average 
Herfindahl index increasing from 0.48 to 0.71. While the conglomerate 
Herfindahl did increase it was only from 0.37 to 0.40, a change matched by 
the related diversified category. The largest change was in the dominant 
business category which saw its Herfindahl increase from 0.66 to 0.72. The 
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single business category remained constant at 1.00. Similar changes to those 
in Herfindahl indices were seen in the distributions of turnover across activities 
and, to a lesser extent, groups of related activities. Given the relatively small 
reductions in the breadth of dominant, related diversified and conglomerate 
activities, the comparatively large increases in the overall Herfindahl index 
were driven by the significant shift away from diversification as evidenced by 
the greater number of FTSE100 companies in focused categories in 2003.              
Table 44: FTSE100 Average Herfindahl Indices By Diversification 
Category – Services 
 
Category 1993 1998 2003
Single 0.97 0.99 0.98
Dominant 0.76 0.72 0.75
Related 0.47 0.43 0.44
Conglomerate 0.33 0.35 0.47
All Service 0.73 0.76 0.81  
 
Table 45: FTSE100 Average Percentage Turnover Generated by the 
Largest Reported Activity and Largest Related Group of Reported 
Activities By Diversification Category – Services 
 
1993 1998 2003 1993 1998 2003
Single 98.7 99.3 99.1 99.9 99.9 99.6
Dominant 85.2 83.0 85.5 97.7 95.9 94.4
Related 58.6 54.8 55.3 94.8 93.2 98.1
Conglomerate 41.2 43.9 57.5 57.9 48.9 59.2
All Service 80.7 82.1 86.6 93.8 94.4 95.4
Category
Largest Activity Largest Related Group
 
 
In common with the preceding tables showing data for 
industrial/manufacturing companies, the overall average Herfindahl indices of 
service companies increased from 0.73 in 1993 to 0.81 in 2003. There were 
also increases in the turnover generated by the largest activity and group of 
related of activities. The conglomerate category showed the highest increases 
with its Herfindahl rising from 0.33 to 0.47 and the turnover generated by the 
largest activity increasing from 41.2% to 57.5%. While this was a driver of the 
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increase in overall averages, the movement towards greater focus will again 
have caused much of the change.     
 
In addition to the analyses detailed above, the average number of activities 
and groups of related activities reported by companies was also calculated 
and reviewed. There has been a reduction in the average number of activities 
and groups of related activities reported by most categories of company. 
Conglomerates showed the largest falls from 4.6 activities and 3.4 related 
groups in 1993 to 3.3 activities and 2.4 related groups in 2003. Other falls 
were relatively small. This provides further support for the contention that 
conglomerates have narrowed the breadth of their activities.    
 
The movements identified in this section strongly support the contention that, 
in addition to a shift towards focus in the categorisation of the FTSE100, 
conglomerates, especially in the service sector, have narrowed the breadth of 
their activities.        
 
6.2.5 Performance 
The following tables summarise key average performance indicators of 
companies within each diversification category as per tables 25 (all), 26 
(industrial/manufacturing) and 27 (services). The performance reviews were 
undertaken to see if performance was a clear driver of changes in 
diversification across the FTSE100. This investigation into performance was 
the first stage in a process to gain an understanding of the drivers behind 
changes in diversification.      
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As DataStream financial data was not available for all companies for all 
relevant time periods, the number of companies in each year and category for 
which complete data was available is noted in the final column of each table. 
The maximum number is 100.   
 
In addition to the performance indicators shown in the tables a number of 
others including operating margin, price/earnings ratios and operating cash 
flows were calculated and reviewed to see if any trends could be discerned. 
Tests, using Pearson‟s coefficients, for correlations between breadth of 
activities and a number of performance variables were also undertaken. While 
a few isolated correlations were found, there were no consistent significant 
relationships between performance and diversification. That is not to say no 
such relationships exist but rather that they could not be found using the 
information that was available from DataStream and the Financial Times. 
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Table 46: FTSE100 Average Performance By Diversification Category 
 
12 mnth Bal Sheet Number
Ave Market Share Date Of
Herfindahl Capital'n Volatility MV/Book ROCE Gearing Companies
Index £m (%) Ex Intan. (%) (%) Max 100
1993
Single 0.98 4,279 70.4 2.3 16.3 31.0 18
Dominant 0.74 5,434 56.3 3.1 14.8 32.2 28
Related 0.42 5,473 47.1 9.1 16.6 37.8 31
Conglomerate 0.37 5,582 43.6 3.6 17.8 40.9 14
All 0.62 5,242 54.0 5.1 16.2 35.2 91
1998
Single 0.98 11,747 96.8 37.6 15.3 49.5 20
Dominant 0.71 9,203 74.8 7.4 14.6 36.5 27
Related 0.44 12,900 76.5 16.1 27.0 36.0 20
Conglomerate 0.36 7,421 84.0 7.0 31.7 36.9 5
All 0.69 10,813 82.0 18.2 19.4 40.0 72
2003
Single 0.98 9,281 71.0 5.4 1.8 43.6 30
Dominant 0.74 15,939 76.2 4.5 16.5 40.0 23
Related 0.45 23,096 46.7 3.2 12.0 40.1 12
Conglomerate 0.44 3,088 63.3 33.5 22.3 31.9 5
All 0.77 13,395 68.0 6.7 9.9 41.0 70
Year End 2 Year Averages 
(Unweighted)
 
 
The average performance of FTSE100 conglomerates varies considerably 
through the research period but does not appear to differ markedly from that 
of other categories except in ROCE which is consistently higher for 
conglomerates. However, the standard deviation of the average ROCE also 
increased, especially in the conglomerate category, implying a wider range of 
performance. As the breadth of conglomerate activities narrowed, as reflected 
in a higher Herfindahl index, the average market capitalisation has fallen 
relative to other categories; in 1993 the average market capitalisation of 
conglomerates was, by a narrow margin, the highest but by 2003 it was by far 
the lowest.  
 
Share price volatility, which may be an indicator of corporate stability, has 
risen in most categories. Conglomerates were most stable in 1993 but in 2003 
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only the related category had lower volatility. This is in contrast to the Market 
Value/Book Value Excluding Intangibles ratio which, notwithstanding 
distortions caused by a few extreme values in 1998 and 2003, improved 
across all categories, excluding related diversifiers, although 1998 figures 
were higher than 2003.  
 
In terms of returns on capital employed, there was little difference between 
the performance of conglomerates and other categories in 1993 but by 1998 
the multiple business categories – related diversifiers and conglomerates – 
were achieving returns significantly higher than those of focused categories 
and by 2003, the conglomerate category had by far the highest ROCE. The 
gearing of conglomerates appears similar to that of other categories. 
Comparison of the performance of conglomerates with and without a core 
activity showed neither group to consistently outperform the other.   
 
The following tables show the average performance by diversification 
category of industrial/manufacturing and service companies. In broad terms, 
the performance of both groups mirrors that of the FTSE100 as a whole 
although, in terms of ROCE, service conglomerates consistently underperform 
their industrial/manufacturing counterparts.     
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Table 47: FTSE100 Average Performance By Diversification Category – 
Industrial/Manufacturing 
 
12 mnth Bal Sheet Number
Ave Market Share Date Of
Herfindahl Capital'n Volatility MV/Book ROCE Gearing Companies
Index £m (%) Ex Intan. (%) (%)
1993
Single 1.00 3,954 48.4 3.6 23.5 32.8 2
Dominant 0.64 6,128 54.9 2.4 12.5 30.6 6
Related 0.40 4,495 48.4 11.9 18.2 37.9 22
Conglomerate 0.37 5,315 42.2 4.3 20.2 41.9 10
All 0.46 4,918 47.8 8.2 18.1 37.6 40
1998
Single 1.00 8,302 77.5 553.4 18.4 72.4 1
Dominant 0.70 10,265 68.8 3.3 15.5 31.4 6
Related 0.46 14,343 74.4 16.7 28.0 34.3 9
Conglomerate 0.33 9,321 87.5 10.3 45.1 33.0 3
All 0.54 11,944 74.9 39.7 26.3 35.2 19
2003
Single 1.00 13,825 68.0 19.6 12.9 26.7 6
Dominant 0.69 18,122 71.9 17.3 18.9 38.0 9
Related 0.43 31,651 45.2 14.0 11.6 21.6 4
Conglomerate 0.39 2,892 58.1 13.4 24.6 36.1 2
All 0.70 18,021 64.4 16.9 16.3 31.5 21
Year End 2 Year Averages 
(Unweighted)
 
 
Table 48: FTSE100 Average Performance By Diversification Category – 
Services 
 
12 mnth Bal Sheet Number
Ave Market Share Date Of
Herfindahl Capital'n Volatility MV/Book ROCE Gearing Companies
Index £m (%) Ex Intan. (%) (%)
1993
Single 0.98 4,320 73.1 2.1 15.4 30.8 16
Dominant 0.77 5,245 56.7 3.2 15.5 32.7 22
Related 0.47 7,864 44.1 2.5 12.6 37.5 9
Conglomerate 0.38 6,249 47.3 1.7 11.7 38.4 4
All 0.75 5,496 58.9 2.6 14.6 33.4 51
1998
Single 0.98 11,929 97.8 10.4 15.1 48.3 19
Dominant 0.72 8,900 76.5 8.6 14.4 37.9 21
Related 0.43 11,720 78.1 15.6 26.1 37.4 11
Conglomerate 0.41 4,571 78.7 2.0 11.7 42.9 2
All 0.74 10,408 84.6 10.5 17.0 41.7 53
2003
Single 0.98 8,145 71.7 16.4 (0.9) 47.9 24
Dominant 0.77 14,536 79.0 16.6 14.9 41.3 14
Related 0.47 18,818 47.5 12.8 12.2 49.4 8
Conglomerate 0.48 3,218 66.8 21.3 20.8 29.0 3
All 0.80 11,412 69.5 16.2 7.1 45.1 49
Year End 2 Year Averages 
(Unweighted)
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6.2.6 Corporate Governance 
The tables on the following pages illustrate the key corporate governance 
characteristics of the companies that comprised the FTSE100 in 1993, 1998 
and 2003. The categorisations are as per tables 25 (all), 26 
(industrial/manufacturing) and 27 (services). The tables should be considered 
in the context of the improvements in corporate governance driven by the 
introduction of enhanced Best Practice. The tables show no appreciable 
differences between the corporate governance of industrial/manufacturing and 
service companies.     
 
The average percentage of non-executive directors sitting on boards 
increased through the research period across all companies and sectors while 
the average tenure of both non-executive and executive directors remained 
broadly constant. While only dominant business companies had a majority of 
NEDs in 1993, by 1998 only conglomerates were marginally short of that mark 
and by 2003 all categories had around 60% NEDs.       
 
The average percentage of chairmen that were non-executive directors 
increased significantly through the period with the largest increase seen 
between 1998 and 2003. The tenure of chairmen remained broadly constant 
but their length of service as a director, i.e. including service pre-
chairmanship, reduced suggesting an increased willingness to appoint 
chairmen from outside the company.    
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The tenure and length of service of chief executives remained broadly 
constant through the period and across companies/sectors. However, 
consistent with the move away from executive chairmen and away from 
unitary leadership, the number of companies without a CEO fell through the 
period and across sectors. Overall, the number of companies without a CEO 
fell from 22 to 9 with the largest fall in the conglomerate category. In 2003 
only Unilever out of 7 conglomerates was without a chief executive and that 
was because the company had multiple, product based, managing directors.  
 
The average aggregate percentage of ordinary shares held by major 
shareholders with notifiable interests, i.e. over 3%, increased from 12.6% in 
1993 to 14.5% in 1998 and 19.3% in 2003 with the largest increases being 
seen in companies within the related and conglomerate categories where 
holdings increased from 9.6% to 20.4% and 8.0% to 16.7% respectively 
suggesting institutional investors looked on conglomerates increasingly 
favourably.    
 
The analyses suggest all categories of company have tried to improve their 
corporate governance in line with Best Practice and that there are no clear 
differences between categories. The most striking changes are in the size of 
major shareholdings in conglomerates.  
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Table 49: FTSE100 Corporate Governance by Diversification Category 
 
All Averages Major
NED (%) NED (yrs) ED (yrs) NED % Tenure(yrs) Director(yrs) Tenure(yrs) Director(yrs) Total No CEO S'holds (%)
1993
Single 46.7 8 6 33.3 4 12 4 7 21 9 22.3
Dominant 54.8 6 5 56.3 4 10 3 6 32 4 11.4
Related 49.3 5 5 35.5 4 11 3 7 31 4 9.6
Conglomerate 42.6 6 7 43.8 7 17 4 8 16 5 8.0
All 49.4 6 5 43.0 5 12 3 7 100 22 12.6
1998
Single 58.2 5 6 55.9 5 10 3 7 34 6 19.2
Dominant 56.5 5 5 62.1 5 11 3 6 29 4 15.2
Related 53.9 4 6 59.3 6 11 4 7 27 1 9.1
Conglomerate 46.8 5 7 20.0 5 12 3 5 10 2 10.8
All 55.4 5 6 55.0 5 11 3 6 100 13 14.5
2003
Single 60.5 4 6 72.7 6 10 4 7 44 6 21.2
Dominant 63.8 5 5 83.9 4 8 3 7 31 2 16.5
Related 62.1 5 5 77.8 3 8 4 8 18 0 20.4
Conglomerate 59.7 4 4 85.7 3 6 3 6 7 1 16.7
All 61.7 5 5 78.0 4 9 4 7 100 9 19.3
Board Chair CEO No. of Companies
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   245 
Table 50: FTSE100 Corporate Governance by Diversification Category – Industrial/Manufacturing 
 
All Averages Major
NED (%) NED (yrs) ED (yrs) NED % Tenure(yrs) Director(yrs) Tenure(yrs) Director(yrs) Total No CEO S'holds (%)
1993
Single 39.5 4 4 0.0 3 13 0 2 3 2 26.8
Dominant 51.1 9 6 28.6 5 15 1 4 7 2 16.0
Related 47.4 5 5 22.7 4 12 3 6 22 3 10.3
Conglomerate 44.3 7 7 40.0 7 15 3 5 10 3 9.2
All 46.7 6 6 26.2 5 13 2 6 42 10 12.2
1998
Single 58.1 2 5 0.0 4 11 2 3 4 2 10.2
Dominant 55.3 7 7 28.6 7 15 1 5 7 2 16.2
Related 54.9 4 6 46.2 5 11 4 6 13 1 8.3
Conglomerate 45.7 5 7 16.7 3 12 1 2 6 1 9.5
All 53.6 5 6 30.0 5 12 2 5 30 6 10.6
2003
Single 64.9 5 5 90.9 5 9 4 7 11 0 21.3
Dominant 68.5 5 5 92.9 3 8 2 7 14 0 21.0
Related 61.3 5 5 77.8 3 7 6 9 9 0 30.8
Conglomerate 57.4 4 5 66.7 5 10 3 3 3 1 17.0
All 64.8 5 5 86.5 4 8 4 7 37 1 23.2
Board Chair CEO No. of Companies
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Table 51: FTSE100 Corporate Governance by Diversification Category – Services 
 
All Averages Major
NED (%) NED (yrs) ED (yrs) NED % Tenure(yrs) Director(yrs) Tenure(yrs) Director(yrs) Total No CEO S'holds (%)
1993
Single 47.9 8 6 38.9 5 12 2 4 18 7 21.5
Dominant 55.9 5 4 64.0 4 8 3 5 25 2 10.2
Related 53.8 6 5 66.7 3 9 3 6 9 1 7.7
Conglomerate 39.8 5 7 50.0 7 19 3 5 6 2 6.0
All 51.4 6 5 55.2 4 10 3 5 58 12 12.9
1998
Single 58.2 5 6 63.3 5 10 3 6 30 4 20.4
Dominant 56.9 5 5 72.7 5 9 3 5 22 2 15.0
Related 53.0 5 6 71.4 8 11 4 8 14 0 9.9
Conglomerate 48.3 5 6 25.0 7 12 4 7 4 1 12.7
All 56.2 5 6 65.7 5 10 3 6 70 7 16.2
2003
Single 59.0 4 6 66.7 6 10 3 6 33 6 21.1
Dominant 59.9 5 5 76.5 4 8 3 6 17 2 12.8
Related 62.9 5 5 77.8 3 8 2 7 9 0 10.0
Conglomerate 61.4 3 4 100.0 2 3 3 6 4 0 16.6
All 59.9 5 5 73.0 5 9 3 6 63 8 17.0
No. of CompaniesBoard Chair CEO
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6.2.7 Conglomerates in the FTSE100 Index 
The following table lists those FTSE100 companies that were categorised as 
conglomerates at the end of 1993, 1998 or 2003 and notes changes and their 
causes. Chapter 7 provides brief histories for each of the conglomerates in 
the table and tries to explain the drivers behind their change of diversification 
strategy.  
Table 52: FTSE100 Conglomerates in 1993, 1998 & 2003 
 
1993 1993-1998 1998 1998-2003 2003 
Company Change Company Change Company 
Bass  Bass  Intercont. Hotels 
BAT Industries To Single    
Blue Circle MV Exit    
BTR  BTR Acquired  
Caradon MV Exit    
 From Related Diageo To Single  
Forte Acquired    
Granada  Granada To Single  
Hanson MV Exit    
   From Related Hays 
Ladbroke Grp To Dominant    
 From Dominant United Utilities To Related  
   New Listing Old Mutual 
P&O  P&O To Related  
Pearson  Pearson To Related  
Siebe To Related    
 MV Entry Smiths Inds  Smiths Group 
TI Group MV Exit    
Tomkins  Tomkins  Tomkins 
Unilever  Unilever  Unilever 
   From Related Whitbread 
Williams Hldgs To Related    
16 -6 10 -3 7 
 
Of the 16 conglomerates in the FTSE100 in 1993 only 3 – 
Bass/Intercontinental Hotels, Tomkins and Unilever – were still pursuing the 
strategy at the end of 2003.  
 
Between 1993 and 1998, the conglomerate category fell by a net 6 
companies; 9 leaving and 3 joining. In addition to 1 company – Forte – being 
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acquired, 4 conglomerates were displaced from the FTSE100 because of falls 
in their market capitalisation relative to other companies and 4 others 
retreated to greater focus; 2 to the related diversified, 1 to the dominant 
company and 1 to the single business company categories. Of the 3 
companies that moved into the category; Guinness/Diageo advanced from the 
related diversified category and North West Water/United Utilities from the 
dominant business category following acquisitions and Smiths was a new 
constituent of the FTSE100.   
 
The movement between 1998 and 2003 was less extensive; the category fell 
by a net 3 companies with 3 joining and 6 leaving. In addition to 1 company 
leaving following a merger with another FTSE100 company, 5 companies 
moved to greater focus; 3 to the related and 2 to the single business 
categories. The period also saw 1 new listing and 2 related diversified 
companies broadening their activities to become conglomerates.  
 
These movements suggest an overall trend towards greater focus and this is 
borne out by changes in the breadth of each conglomerates‟ activities as 
measured by the Herfindahl index. The average Herfindahl index of the 
conglomerate category increased between 1993, 1998 and 2003 suggesting a 
narrowing of the breadth of activities. This is underlined by the following table 
which shows the Herfindahl indices of companies categorised as 
conglomerates in 1993, 1998 and 2003. With the exception of Pearson, the 
indices of all companies that were conglomerates in more than one period 
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showed increases between each period suggesting a consistent narrowing of 
conglomerate activities.       
 
Table 53: Herfindahl Indices of FTSE100 Conglomerates in 1993, 1998 & 
2003 
 
 Herfindahl Index 
Company 1993 1998 2003 
Bass 0.21 0.29 0.58 
BAT Industries 0.50   
Blue Circle 0.48   
BTR 0.21 0.52  
Caradon 0.49   
Forte 0.34   
Granada 0.24 0.30  
Guinness/Diageo  0.32  
Hanson 0.21   
Hays   0.45 
Ladbroke/Hilton 0.43   
NWW/United Utilities  0.47  
Old Mutual   0.45 
P&O 0.24 0.35  
Pearson 0.48 0.27  
Siebe/Invensys 0.50   
Smiths Industries  0.34 0.30 
TI Group 0.35   
Tomkins 0.23 0.28 0.48 
Unilever 0.35 0.38 0.41 
Whitbread   0.41 
Williams Hldgs 0.43   
Conglomerate Average 0.36 0.35 0.44 
No. of Conglomerates 16 10 7 
 
When reviewing these indices it should be remembered that they are 
calculated on data that originated in company segmental reports that may 
have been „manipulated‟ by directors to reduce the number of reported 
activities to appease investors desire for greater focus and may not be a true 
reflection of a material change in the portfolio.   
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6.3 FTSE100 Survivors 
Of the 100 companies in the index in 1993 only 54 remained by 2003 and of 
those several had changed their names to reflect portfolio changes, 
rebranding or, most often, following acquisitions some of which accounted for 
exits from the index where two FTSE100 companies were involved.  
 
A prime example of portfolio change driving a name change is BAT Industries 
which reverted British American Tobacco as it divested its non-tobacco 
activities including insurance companies Allied Dunbar and Eagle Star. Argyll 
sought to rebrand itself to better reflect its Safeway supermarket operations 
while the privatised telephone company British Telecom changed its name to 
British Telecommunications and then to BT Group following restructurings.   
  
Acquisitions have resulted in the majority of corporate name changes. When 
Guinness acquired Grand Metropolitan 1997 the enlarged group took the 
name Diageo and the pharmaceutical company Glaxo changed its name to 
GlaxoWellcome after acquiring its peer Wellcome in 1995 and again to 
GlaxoSmithKline in 2001 after merging with SmithKlineBeecham. Lloyds Bank 
added TSB to its name after acquiring that company in 1995, Zeneca became 
AstraZeneca after merging with Swedish company Astra in 1999 and 
Commercial Union became CGU after acquiring General Accident in 1998 and 
to Aviva in 2000 after adding Norwich Union which had been demutualised in 
1997. BP briefly became BP Amoco after acquiring Amoco of the US in 1998 
before reverting back to BP, Rentokil became Rentokil Initial after it acquired 
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Initial Services‟ parent company, BET, in 1996 and Allied Lyons became 
Allied Domeq after it acquired the Spanish drinks company Domeq in 1994.   
   
Table 54 shows the 54 companies that were constituents of the FTSE100 in 
1993, 1998 and 2003 with conglomerates shown in bold type and any name 
changes over the 10 year period noted. Chapter 7 – Analysing the Historical 
Record - discusses each of the FTSE100 Survivors conglomerates and their 
adoption, maintenance or abandonment of conglomeration over the period 
from 1993 to 2003.   
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Table 54: FTSE100 Survivors, 1993-2003 (Name Changes Noted) 
 
1993 1998 2003
Abbey National Abbey National Abbey National
Allied Lyons Allied Domeq Allied Domeq
Argyll Group Safeway Safeway
Associated British Foods Associated British Foods Associated British Foods
BAA BAA BAA
Barclays Bank Barclays Bank Barclays Bank
Bass Bass Intercontinental Hotels
BAT Industries British American Tobacco British American Tobacco
BOC Group BOC Group BOC Group
Boots Boots Boots
BP BP Amoco BP
British Aerospace British Aerospace BAE Systems
British Airways British Airways British Airways
British Gas BG BG
British Telecom British Telecommunications BT Group
Cable & Wireless Cable & Wireless Cable & Wireless
Cadbury Schweppes Cadbury Schweppes Cadbury Schweppes
Commercial Union CGU Aviva
Glaxo Glaxo Wellcome Glaxo SmithKline
Granada Granada Granada
Guinness Diageo Diageo
GUS GUS GUS
HSBC HSBC HSBC
ICI ICI ICI
Kingfisher Kingfisher Kingfisher
Ladbroke Group Ladbroke Group Hilton
Land Securities Land Securities Land Securities
Legal & General Legal & General Legal & General
Lloyds Bank Lloyds TSB Lloyds TSB
Marks & Spencer Marks & Spencer Marks & Spencer
North West Water United Utilities United Utilities
Pearson Pearson Pearson
Prudential Prudential Prudential
Reckitt & Colman Reckitt & Colman Reckitt Benckiser
Reed International Reed International Reed Elsevier
Rentokil Rentokil Initial Rentokil Initial
Reuters Reuters Reuters
Rolls-Royce Rolls-Royce Rolls-Royce
Royal Bank of Scotland Royal Bank of Scotland Royal Bank of Scotland
RTZ Rio Tinto Rio Tinto
Sainsbury Sainsbury Sainsbury
Schroders Schroders Schroders
Scottish & Newcastle Scottish & Newcastle Scottish & Newcastle
Scottish Power Scottish Power Scottish Power
Severn Trent Severn Trent Severn Trent
Shell Transport & Trading Shell Transport & Trading Shell Transport & Trading
Standard Chartered Standard Chartered Standard Chartered
Sun Alliance Royal & Sun Alliance Royal & Sun Alliance
Tesco Tesco Tesco
Tomkins Tomkins Tomkins
Unilever Unilever Unilever
Vodafone Group Vodafone Group Vodafone Group
Whitbread Whitbread Whitbread
Zeneca Group Zeneca Group AstraZeneca  
 
Note: Conglomerates are in bold type           
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6.3.1 Diversification 
Analysis of the diversification categories of the 54 FTSE100 survivors is 
shown in the following table.  
Table 55: FTSE100 Survivors By Diversification Category 
 
No. % No. % No. %
Channon/W&M
Single 10 18.5 14 25.9 17 31.5
Dominant 21 38.9 19 35.2 20 37.0
Sub-Total Focus 31 57.4 33 61.1 37 68.5
Related 16 29.6 14 25.9 13 24.1
Conglomerate 7 13.0 7 13.0 4 7.4
Sub-Total Multiple 23 42.6 21 38.9 17 31.5
Total 54 100.0 54 100.0 54 100.0
Related - Core 12 22.2 11 20.4 9 16.7
% of Related 75.0 78.6 69.2
Conglomerate - Core 4 7.4 2 3.7 4 7.4
% of Conglomerate 57.1 28.6 100.0
Hill & Pickering
Low 38 70.4 35 64.8 38 70.4
Medium 9 16.7 9 16.7 12 22.2
High 7 13.0 10 18.5 4 7.4
Total 54 100.0 54 100.0 54 100.0
20031993 1998
 
 
The table clearly shows that using both Channon/Whittington & Mayer and Hill 
& Pickering categorisations, there has been a retreat back from diversification, 
especially, conglomeration, toward greater focus between 1993 and 2003. 
Using the Channon/W&M measure, the number of conglomerates fell from 7 
(13%) in 1993 to only 4 (7.4%) by 2003 while the corresponding figures for 
single business companies increased from 10 (18.5%) to 17 (31.5%). The 
figures for the middle diversification categories – dominant and related – 
remained broadly constant with 16 (29.6%) related companies in 1993 and 13 
(24.1%) in 2003 and 21 (38.9%) dominant companies in 1993 and 20 (37.0%) 
in 2003. When single and dominant business companies are combined into a 
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focus category and related diversified and conglomerate companies into a 
multiple business category the reduction in the multiple category is from 23 
(42.6%) companies to 17 (31.5%) with a corresponding increase in focused 
companies from 31 (57.4%) to 37 (68.5%). The less detailed Hill & Pickering 
categorisations show broadly the same change with 7 companies (13.0%) 
classed as highly diversified in 1993 but only 4 (7.4%) in 2003.           
 
However, there is some conflict between Channon/W&M and Hill & Pickering 
in 1998. Categorisation according to Channon/W&M shows conglomeration in 
1998 to have remained constant at the same level as 1993 – 7 companies 
and 13% - while Hill & Pickering show an increase from 7 to 10 companies or 
13% to 18.5%.     
 
The table also shows a consistently high percentage of related companies, 
around 70%, to have a core activity that generates more than 50% of 
turnover. This is not surprising given the definition of related diversification, 
i.e. that there are links between activities. The percentage of conglomerate 
companies with a core activity varies greatly. In 1993, 4 (57.1%) 
conglomerates had a core activity but by 1998 the corresponding figure had 
fallen to only 2 (28.6%). However, by 2003 all four conglomerates had core 
activities.  
 
The following tables show how diversification had changed through the 10 
years of the research period for industrial/manufacturing and service 
companies.    
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Table 56: FTSE100 Survivors By Diversification Category – 
Industrial/Manufacturing 
 
No % No. % No. %
Channon/W&M
Single 1 5.3 2 10.5 4 20.0
Dominant 4 21.1 6 31.6 9 45.0
Sub-Total Focus 5 26.4 8 42.1 13 65.0
Related 11 57.9 7 36.8 5 25.0
Conglomerate 3 15.8 4 21.1 2 10.0
Sub-Total Multiple 14 73.7 11 57.9 7 35.0
Total 19 100.0 19 100.0 20 100.0
Related - Core 7 36.8 6 31.6 4 20.0
% of Related 63.6 85.7 80.0
Conglomerate - Core 2 10.5 1 5.3 2 10.0
% of Conglomerate 66.7 25.0 100.0
Hill & Pickering
Low 11 57.9 12 63.2 12 60.0
Medium 5 26.3 3 15.8 6 30.0
High 3 15.8 4 21.1 2 10.0
Total 19 100.0 19 100.0 20 100.0
1993 1998 2003
 
 
Table 57: FTSE100 Survivors By Diversification Category – Services 
 
No % No. % No. %
Channon/W&M
Single 9 25.7 12 34.3 13 38.2
Dominant 17 48.6 13 37.1 11 32.4
Sub-Total Focus 26 74.3 25 71.4 24 70.6
Related 5 14.3 7 20.0 8 23.5
Conglomerate 4 11.4 3 8.6 2 5.9
Sub-Total Multiple 9 25.7 10 28.6 10 29.4
Total 35 100.0 35 100.0 34 100.0
Related - Core 5 14.3 5 14.3 5 14.7
% of Related 100.0 71.4 62.5
Conglomerate - Core 2 5.7 1 2.9 2 5.9
% of Conglomerate 50.0 33.3 100.0
Hill & Pickering
Low 27 77.1 23 65.7 26 76.5
Medium 4 11.4 6 17.1 6 17.6
High 4 11.4 6 17.1 2 5.9
Total 35 100.0 35 100.0 34 100.0
1993 1998 2003
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Both service and industrial/manufacturing sectors show a similar reduction in 
the number and percentage of conglomerate companies between 1993 and 
2003 although there is an increase amongst industrial/manufacturing 
companies in 1998. Interestingly, while the industrial/manufacturing sector 
shows a consistent and substantial reduction in related diversification from 
57.9% in 1993 to 36.8% in 1998 and 25.0% in 2003, the trend amongst 
service companies is in the opposite direction rising from 14.3% to 20% and 
23.5%.  
 
Overall, multiple business companies – conglomerate and related diversified - 
amongst service companies remain broadly constant at between 25.7% and 
29.4% while amongst industrial/manufacturing companies they more than 
halve from 73.7% to only 35.0%. While this suggests the retreat toward focus 
is far greater amongst industrial/manufacturing companies it should be noted 
that the starting points in 1993 were very different, 73.7% compared to 25.7% 
giving the industrial/manufacturing sector more scope for focusing.      
 
Amongst industrial/manufacturing companies the reduction in multiple 
business companies is offset by an increase in focused companies, especially 
single business companies which increased from only 5.3% in 1993 to 10.5% 
in 1998 and 20.0% in 2003. Amongst service companies, while the relative 
stability in multiple business companies is matched by that in focused 
business companies the number of single business companies increased 
from 25.7% to 38.2% while that of dominant business companies decreased 
from 48.6% to 32.4%.          
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These tables provide only „high level‟ information on the categorisations of the 
54 FTSE100 survivors. They do not show how dynamic companies have been 
or how radical their changes in diversification strategy have been.  
 
6.3.2 Category Changes 
By looking at the movements between categories from 1993 to 2003 and in 
the sub-periods 1993 to 1998 and 1998 to 2003 it is possible to identify 
forward and backward movements through the Model of Corporate 
Development and to see how many companies remained in the same 
category. This section analyses the movements between categories implicit in 
tables 55 (all), 56 (industrial/manufacturing) and 57 (services). 
Table 58: FTSE100 Survivors Category Changes From 1993 To 1998 
  
Single Dominant Related Conglom. Totals
Single 9 1 0 0 10
Dominant 4 11 5 1 21
Related 0 6 9 1 16
Conglom. 1 1 0 5 7
Totals 14 19 14 7 54
1998
1
9
9
3
 
 
The first 5 year period shows 34 (63%) companies to have remained in the 
same category with single business showing the highest level of stability, 
90%, and dominant business companies the lowest, 52% with 71% 
conglomerate stability. The numbers of companies remaining in the same 
category in 1993 and 1998 are shown in each of the shaded cells in the above 
table as they will be in subsequent tables.  
 
Considering the changes in terms of movements through the Model of 
Corporate Development, the table shows 8 (15%) companies to have 
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advanced and 12 (22%) to have retreated; a net reversal of 4 (7%) 
companies. The single business category had least movement with only one 
company advancing; Sainsbury became a dominant company with the 
development of its Homebase DIY business. The dominant category showed 
itself to be a stepping stone within the model; although 11 (52%) companies 
remained in the category, 4 (19%) retreated to more focus while 6 (29%) 
advanced to greater diversification, 5 becoming related diversifiers and 1 a 
conglomerate; North West Water became a conglomerate, renamed United 
Utilities, through its acquisition of electricity distribution company Norweb. 
Companies in the related diversified category proved reluctant to take the final 
step to conglomeration with only 1 company doing so; Guinness acquired 
another related diversified FTSE100 company, Grand Metropolitan, to form 
Diageo. In contrast to their reluctance to advance, 6 related companies 
decided related diversification was a step too far and retreated back to the 
dominant category. Finally, the conglomerate category saw 2 reversals with 1 
company retreating 2 steps to the dominant business and another 3 steps to 
the single business categories. As neither company took the single step back 
to related diversification, this suggests their decision to abandon 
conglomeration was unequivocal.        
 
 
 
 
 
        
   259 
Table 59: FTSE100 Survivors Category Changes From 1993 To 1998 - 
Industrial/Manufacturing & Service Sectors  
 
S D R C Tot S D R C Tot
Single 1 0 0 0 1 8 1 0 0 9
Dominant 0 2 2 0 4 4 9 3 1 17
Related 0 4 6 1 11 0 2 3 0 5
Conglom. 0 0 0 3 3 1 1 0 2 4
Totals 1 6 8 4 19 13 13 6 3 35
0
1998
Services
Between 1993 and 1998 BAT Industries exited the service conglomerate 
category becoming an industrial/manufacturing single business company 
and Scottish & Newcastle exited the industrial/manufacturing related 
diversifier category becoming a service related diversifier.
Notes:
Table based on each company's sector in 1993 
1
9
9
3
Ind/Manu
Net movement from services to industrial/manufacturing 
 
 
Comparing industrial/manufacturing and service sector movements shows 
each to have the same level of stability; 12 industrial/manufacturing and 22 
service companies remained in the same diversification category representing 
63% of the 19 industrial/manufacturing and 35 service companies in the 54 
company FTSE100 Survivors population. Both sectors showed a shift towards 
greater focus although the net movements – 1 (3 advances and 4 retreats) 
amongst industrial/manufacturing companies and 3 (5 advances and 8 
retreats) amongst service companies – were not large representing 5% and 
9% of sector populations respectively. Amongst conglomerates, the 
industrial/manufacturing companies showed greatest stability with 3 (100%) 
companies remaining in the category through the period and they were joined 
by Guinness/Diageo which advanced from the related diversification category 
following an acquisition. Of the service conglomerates, 2 (50%) remained in 
the category and 2 (50%) left; 1 each to the single and dominant business 
categories. Only 1 company – North West Water/United Utilities – advanced 
to the conglomerate category having been a dominant business company.         
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Table 60: FTSE100 Survivors Category Changes From 1998 To 2003 
 
Single Dominant Related Conglom. Totals
Single 9 3 2 0 14
Dominant 4 14 1 0 19
Related 2 3 8 1 14
Conglom. 2 0 2 3 7
Totals 17 20 13 4 54
1
9
9
8
2003
 
 
The period between 1998 and 2003 showed almost an identical overall 
movement to that of the preceding 5 years. In terms of movements through 
the Model of Corporate Development, the table shows 7 (13.0%) companies 
advanced, 13 (24.0%) retreated and 34 (63.0%) remained the in the same 
diversification category. Compared to the preceding 5 year period there was 
an acceleration in the number of companies abandoning conglomeration; 
between 1993 and 1998 2 companies entered and 2 left the category but 
between 1998 and 2003 1 entered while 4 left.       
 
In the single, dominant and related categories the number of companies 
remaining in the category – 9 (64%) single, 14 (74%) dominant and 8 (57%) 
related – exceeded the number advancing or retreating. In the conglomerate 
category only 3 (43%) of the 7 companies identified as conglomerates in 1998 
remained in the category in 2003 with 2 retreating to the related category – 
United Utilities divested a substantial proportion of its electricity activities and 
Pearson divested its television activities - and a further 2 to the single 
business category – both Granada and Guinness/Diageo divested their 
food/catering businesses. Of the 5 single business companies that advanced 
between 1998 and 2003, 3 became dominant business companies – 
GlaxoWellcome merged with SmithKline Beecham to form GlaxoSmithKline 
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with both pharmaceutical (drugs) and healthcare businesses, Schroders 
added other non-investment banking activities and Vodafone added fixed line 
telecommunications activities to its global mobile business. Two companies 
made the „double jump‟ to related diversification; HSBC grew its investment 
banking/capital markets activities and Land Securities added property 
services to its core property rental/development business.  
 
As in the previous 5 year period there was a reluctance among dominant 
companies to become related diversifiers with only 1 company – BG (formerly 
British Gas) adding liquefied natural gas and power generation to its core gas 
production and distribution business - making that move while 4 retreated to 
the single business category; Abbey National which reported a refocusing of 
activities on retail banking, Cable & Wireless which refocused on 
telecommunications exiting peripheral activities including cable ships and 
equipment, Sainsbury which sold its Homebase DIY business and Scottish 
Power which divested its water business. Similarly, companies in the related 
category were equally as reluctant to become conglomerates with only one of 
their number making that move - Whitbread which had divested the bulk of its 
traditional brewing and pubs activities in 2000 and 2001 replacing them with 
hotel and restaurant activities - while 5 became more focused with 3 
becoming dominant business companies – Allied Domeq which had divested 
its retailing businesses, Reuters where information activities had grown faster 
than other activities and Rio Tinto where mining and metals had outgrown 
industrial minerals - and 2 single business companies -  Scottish & Newcastle 
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which, by divesting its retail activities, had become a focused brewer, and  
AstraZeneca which had divested its agro and specialist chemicals businesses. 
Table 61: FTSE100 Survivors Category Changes From 1998 To 2003 - 
Industrial/Manufacturing & Service Sectors 
 
S D R C Tot S D R C Tot
Single 1 1 0 0 2 8 2 2 0 12
Dominant 0 6 0 0 6 4 8 1 0 13
Related 1 2 4 0 7 1 1 4 1 7
Conglom. 1 0 1 2 4 1 0 1 1 3
Totals 3 9 5 2 19 14 11 8 2 35
Notes:
1
2003
Ind/Manu Services
Between 1998 and 2003 Scottish & Newcastle exited the services related 
diversifier category becoming an industrial/manufacturing single business 
company.
Table based on each company's sector in 1998
1
9
9
8
Net movement from services to industrial/manufacturing 
 
 
Comparing industrial/manufacturing and service company movements shows 
each group to have similar levels of stability; 13 industrial/manufacturing and 
21 service companies remained in the same diversification category 
representing 68% of the 19 industrial/manufacturing and 60% of the 35 
service companies in the 54 FTSE100 Survivors population. Both sectors 
showed companies to have retreated to greater focus; there was a net 
movement of 4 (1 advance and 5 retreats) amongst industrial/manufacturing 
companies and 2 (6 advances and 8 retreats) amongst service companies. 
Amongst conglomerates, industrial/manufacturing companies were again the 
most stable; 2 (50%) companies remained in the category through the period 
and 2 companies retreated to the related diversified and dominant business 
categories. Of the service conglomerates 1 (33%) remained in the category 
and 2 retreated 1 each to the single business and related diversified 
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categories. The only advance to conglomeration was made by a related 
diversified service company, Whitbread.        
Table 62: FTSE100 Survivors Category Changes From 1993 To 2003 
 
Single Dominant Related Conglom. Totals
Single 6 3 1 0 10
Dominant 6 9 6 0 21
Related 3 7 5 1 16
Conglom. 2 1 1 3 7
Totals 17 20 13 4 54
1
9
9
3
2003
 
 
The above table shows movements over the full 10 year research period. In 
terms of movements through the Model of Corporate Development, 11 (20%) 
companies advanced, 20 (37%) retreated and 23 (43%) remained in the same 
diversification category. The net movement towards focus was 9 (17%). This 
suggests there was a trend toward greater focus among the 54 companies 
that were members of the FTSE100 index in 1993, 1998 and 2003. 
 
The single business company category was the most stable. In 1993 there 
were 10 companies in the category and by 2003 6 (60%) remained with 4 
companies having advanced to greater diversification (3 to the dominant 
business and 1 to the related diversifier categories). Of the 21 dominant 
business companies in 1993 only 9 (43%) remained by 2003 with the 12 exits 
from the category split evenly with 6 companies advancing to related 
diversification and 6 retreating to the single business category. None of the 
single business or dominant business companies had advanced to 
conglomeration by 2003 although 1 of the 16 companies categorised as 
related diversifiers in 1993 had done so. Of the other 15 related diversifiers, 5 
(31%) remained in the category while 10 (63%) retreated, 7 becoming 
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dominant and 3 single business companies. Finally, 3 (43%) of the 1993 
conglomerates remained in that category with 4 having retreated towards 
greater focus, 1 becoming a related diversifier, 1 a dominant business 
company and 2 single business companies.      
 
The net reduction of 3 (43%) conglomerates with only one company – 
Whitbread – advancing to the category through the 10 year period strongly 
supports the contention that, in addition to a broader trend towards focus, 
there was a significant move away from conglomeration. Only 1 (2%) of the 47 
companies that were in the single business, dominant business or related 
diversified  categories in 1993 managed to reach the conglomerate category 
by 2003 while 4 (57%) of the 1993 conglomerates abandoned the category 
over the same period.    
 
When looked at in terms of focussed (single and dominant) and multiple 
(related and conglomerate) categories the trend to remain within the same 
group is even more pronounced; of the 31 companies categorised as 
focussed in 1993 only 7 moved into the multiple business category (all 
related) by 2003 while of the 23 companies in the multiple category in 1993, 
13 retreated back towards greater focus. 24 (77%) of the 1993 focussed 
companies remained in that group in 2003 and 10 (43%) of the multiple 
business companies remained as such in 2003.          
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Table 63: FTSE100 Survivors Category Changes From 1993 To 2003 - 
Industrial/Manufacturing & Service Sectors 
 
S D R C Tot S D R C Tot
Single 0 1 0 0 1 6 2 1 0 9
Dominant 0 3 1 0 4 6 6 5 0 17
Related 3 5 3 0 11 0 2 2 1 5
Conglom. 0 0 1 2 3 2 1 0 1 4
Totals 3 9 5 2 19 14 11 8 2 35
Notes:
1
Between 1993 and 2003 BAT Industries exited the service conglomerate 
category becoming an industrial/manufacturing single business company.
Table based on each company's sector in 1993
Net movement from services to industrial/manufacturing 
1
9
9
3
Ind/Manu
2003
Services
 
 
Over the 10 year period both sectors showed very similar levels of stability 
with 8 (42%) industrial/manufacturing companies and 15 (43%) service 
companies remaining in the same category in 1993 and 2003. While both 
sectors showed a trend toward greater focus, there was a net movement of 7 
(37%) industrial/manufacturing companies compared to only 2 (6%) service 
companies. Amongst conglomerates, 2 (66%) industrial/manufacturing 
companies remained in the category with 1 company – Pearson - retreating to 
related diversification and no companies joining the category. There was more 
movement in the service company conglomerate category with one 1 (25%)  
company remaining in the category, 3 companies retreating to more focus – 2 
becoming single business companies and 1 a dominant business company – 
and 1 related diversified company, Whitbread, advancing to the category.          
 
6.3.3 Diversification By FT Classification 
The following tables break down tables 55 (all), 56 (industrial/manufacturing) 
and 57 (services) to show, by FT classification, the number of FTSE100 
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Survivors in each diversification category. These analyses seek to identify 
links between conglomeration and FT classification; do companies in 
particular classifications have a greater propensity to pursue conglomeration? 
Table 64: FTSE100 Survivors Diversification Category by FT 
Classification 1993   
 
FT Classification S D R C Tot S D R C Tot S D R C Tot
Banks 1 4 1 6 1 4 1 6
Brewers & Distillers 3 3 1 1 2 4 1 5
Business Services 1 1 1 1
Chemicals 2 2 2 2
Conglomerates 1 1 1 1
Electricity 1 1 1 1
Engineering - Aerospace 2 2 2 2
Food Manufacturing 1 1 1 3 1 1 1 3
Food Retailing 3 3 3 3
Health & Household 1 2 3 1 2 3
Hotels & Leisure 2 2 2 2
Insurance Composite 1 1 2 1 1 2
Insurance Life 2 2 2 2
Media 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 3
Merchant Banks 1 1 1 1
Mines 1 1 1 1
Miscellaneous 1 1 1 1
Oil & Gas 2 2 1 1 3 3
Property 1 1 1 1
Stores 2 1 1 4 2 1 1 4
Telephone Networks 1 1 1 3 1 1 1 3
Transport 2 2 2 2
Water 2 2 2 2
Totals 1 4 11 3 19 9 17 5 4 35 10 21 16 7 54
Ind/Manu Services Total
 
 
The above table shows conglomerates to have been in a broad range of FT 
classifications; only hotels and leisure had 2 conglomerates - Granada and 
Ladbroke Group. Companies in the utilities (water and electricity), mining 
(mines and oil & gas) and financial services (banks and insurances) 
classifications were predominantly dominant business companies. Half of the 
10 single business companies were retailers; 3 food retailers (Argyll Group, 
Sainsbury and Tesco) and 2 stores (Boots and Kingfisher). Only one company 
- Tomkins – was actually quoted in the conglomerates classification.       
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Table 65: FTSE100 Survivors Diversification Category by FT 
Classification 1998 
 
FT Classification S D R C Tot S D R C Tot S D R C Tot
Alcoholic Beverages 1 1 2 1 1 2
Banks, Retail 4 2 6 4 2 6
Breweries, Pubs & Rests 2 1 3 2 1 3
Chemicals 1 1 2 1 1 2
Electricity 1 1 1 1
Engineering 2 1 3 2 1 3
Extractive Industries 1 1 1 1
Food Processors 1 1 1 1
Food Producers 1 1 2 1 1 2
Gas Distribution 1 1 1 1
Household Goods & Text 1 1 1 1
Insurance 1 1 2 1 1 2
Leisure & Hotels 1 1 2 1 1 2
Life Assurance 1 1 2 1 1 2
Media 1 1 2 1 1 2 1 3
Oil, Integrated 1 1 2 1 1 2
Other Financial 1 1 1 1
Pharmaceuticals 1 1 2 1 1 2
Property 1 1 1 1
Retailers, Food 2 1 3 2 1 3
Retailers, General 2 2 4 2 2 4
Support Services 1 1 1 1
Telecommunications 1 1 1 3 1 1 1 3
Tobacco 1 1 1 1
Transport 2 2 2 2
Utilities 1 1 1 1
Water 1 1 1 1
Totals 2 6 7 4 19 12 13 7 3 35 14 19 14 7 54
Ind/Manu Services Total
 
 
By 1998 no classification had more than one conglomerate and the separate 
conglomerate classification had been withdrawn. As in 1993, utility and mining 
companies were predominantly dominant business companies but banks had 
reduced their focus with 4 (HSBC, Lloyds TSB, Royal Bank of Scotland and 
Standard Chartered) categorised as single business companies and 2 (Abbey 
National and Barclays) as dominant business companies. As with 1993, 
retailers – food and general – accounted for 4 (Safeway (formerly Argyll), 
Kingfisher, Marks & Spencer and Tesco) of the single business companies.          
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Table 66: FTSE100 Survivors Diversification Category by FT 
Classification 2003 
 
FT Classification S D R C Tot S D R C Tot S D R C Tot
Aerospace & Defence 2 2 2 2
Banks 4 1 1 6 4 1 1 6
Beverages 2 1 3 2 1 3
Chemicals 1 1 2 1 1 2
Electricity 1 1 1 1
Engineering & Machinery 1 1 1 1
Food & Drug Retailers 3 3 3 3
Food Prods & Processors 1 1 1 3 1 1 1 3
General Retailers 2 2 4 2 2 4
Insurance 1 1 1 1
Leisure & Hotels 1 2 3 1 2 3
Life Assurance 1 1 1 3 1 1 1 3
Media & Entertainment 2 2 1 1 2 1 1 2 4
Mining 1 1 1 1
Oil & Gas 1 1 2 1 1 1 2 3
Personal Care & H'hold 1 1 1 1
Pharmaceuticals & Bio. 1 1 2 1 1 2
Real Estate 1 1 1 1
Speciality & Other Fin. 1 1 1 1
Support Services 1 1 1 1
Telecommunication Servs 1 1 1 3 1 1 1 3
Tobacco 1 1 1 1
Transport 2 2 2 2
Utilities (Ex Electricity) 2 2 2 2
Totals 4 9 5 2 20 13 11 8 2 34 17 20 13 4 54
TotalInd/Manu Services
 
 
The classification/categorisation table for 2003 is notable for the reduction in 
the number of conglomerates, down from 7 in 1993 and 1998 to only 4 of 
which 2 – Bass/Intercontinental Hotels and Whitbread – were in the hotels & 
leisure classification. The broad distribution of categories across 
classifications remains comparable with 1998 with banks and retailers – food 
and drug and general – accounting for 9 of the single business companies.  
 
The table shows 2 single business companies - Guinness/Diageo and 
Scottish & Newcastle – in the beverages classification. Both of these 
companies had refocused between 1993 and 2003. Guinness/Diageo had 
been a conglomerate in 1998 after its creation by Guinness‟s acquisition of 
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Grand Metropolitan, both related diversifiers, in 1997 and Scottish & 
Newcastle had been a related diversifier in 1993 and 1998 before divesting its 
public house/retailing activities to become focused on brewing by 2003.        
 
6.3.4 Breadth of Activities 
Having shown in tables 55 (all), 56 (industrial/manufacturing) and 57 
(services) a trend towards greater focus in the diversification of FTSE100 
Survivors companies – both industrial/manufacturing and service - this section 
considers whether the breadth of activities of companies in each 
diversification category increased, decreased or remained constant through 
the research period. Herfindahl indices and the distribution of turnover across 
activities/related activities and the number of activities/related activities have 
been used to determine the spread of each company‟s activities. 
Table 67: FTSE100 Survivors Average Herfindahl Indices By 
Diversification Category 
 
1993 1998 2003
0.98 0.98 0.98
0.73 0.69 0.73
0.46 0.44 0.42
0.35 0.33 0.47
0.65 0.65 0.72
Category
All
Single
Dominant
Related
Conglomerate
 
 
Table 68: FTSE100 Survivors Average Percentage Turnover Generated 
by the Largest Reported Activity and Largest Related Group of Reported 
Activities By Category 
 
Category 1993 1998 2003 1993 1998 2003
Single 99.1 98.9 99.0 99.9 99.7 99.6
Dominant 83.8 80.8 84.0 97.0 93.4 94.7
Related 57.8 56.2 54.2 94.6 94.7 95.8
Conglomerate 45.7 41.7 61.2 53.5 49.6 62.2
All 74.0 74.0 79.8 91.2 89.7 94.1
% Largest Activity % Largest Related Group
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The increase in the overall average Herfindahl index from 0.65 to 0.72 and in 
the percentage of turnover generated by the largest activities and related 
group of activities suggest a narrowing of the activities of FTSE100 Survivors. 
However, the averages of the single, dominant and related categories 
remained broadly constant throughout the research period while of the 
conglomerate category all increased; Herfindahl from 0.35 to 0.47, largest 
activity turnover from 45.7% to 61.2% and largest related group turnover from 
53.5% to 62.2%. These averages suggest that conglomerates have narrowed 
their activities but companies in other categories have not. The increases in 
overall averages reflect the narrowing of conglomerate activities and the 
migration of companies to more focused categories over the research period.      
Table 69: FTSE100 Survivors Average Herfindahl Indices By 
Diversification Category - Industrial/Manufacturing 
 
1993 1998 2003
1.00 1.00 1.00
0.63 0.68 0.74
0.43 0.47 0.42
0.35 0.31 0.45
0.49 0.56 0.68
Category
Single
Dominant
Related
Conglomerate
All  
 
Table 70: FTSE100 Survivors Average Percentage Turnover Generated 
by the Largest Reported Activity and Largest Related Group of Reported 
Activities By Category – Industrial/Manufacturing  
 
Category 1993 1998 2003 1993 1998 2003
Single 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Dominant 76.2 80.3 84.4 98.3 94.1 95.0
Related 53.9 57.4 55.1 93.7 100.0 92.6
Conglomerate 48.6 40.6 60.2 49.4 51.4 60.6
All Non-Service 60.2 65.6 77.8 88.0 87.9 92.0
% Largest Activity % Largest Related Group
 
 
The trends identified amongst the manufacturing/industrial companies are 
similar changes to those of the total FTSE100 Survivors population with the 
exception that the dominant business category has shown changes similar to 
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those of the conglomerate category. Single business companies appear to be 
exactly that with an average Herfindahl index at its maximum value of 1 while 
the related diversified category remains broadly unchanged. The dominant 
company index shows an increase from 0.63 in 1993 to 0.74 by 2003 and the 
conglomerate category an increase from 0.35 to 0.45 suggesting companies 
in both categories have narrowed their activities. Similar changes to those in 
average Herfindahl indices were seen in the distributions of turnover across 
activities and groups of related activities. Given the relatively small reductions 
in the breadth of dominant business and conglomerate companies, the 
comparatively large increase from 0.49 to 0.68 in the overall Herfindahl index 
was also driven by the significant shift away from diversification as evidenced 
by the greater number of FTSE100 Survivors in focused categories in 2003.         
Table 71: FTSE100 Survivors Average Herfindahl Indices By 
Diversification Category – Services 
 
1993 1998 2003
0.98 0.97 1.00
0.76 0.70 0.74
0.53 0.42 0.42
0.34 0.35 0.45
0.74 0.71 0.68
Single
Category
Related
Conglomerate
All
Dominant
 
 
Table 72: FTSE100 Survivors Average Percentage Turnover Generated 
by the Largest Reported Activity and Largest Related Group of Reported 
Activities By Category – Services  
 
Category 1993 1998 2003 1993 1998 2003
Single 99.0 98.7 98.6 99.8 99.7 99.4
Dominant 85.5 81.0 83.6 96.6 93.1 94.5
Related 66.3 55.0 53.7 96.6 89.4 97.8
Conglomerate 43.6 43.2 62.1 56.6 47.2 63.9
All Service 81.5 78.6 81.0 92.9 90.7 95.4
% Largest Activity % Largest Related Group
 
 
The pattern of change amongst service companies differs from those of the 
manufacturing/industrial sector. As with industrial/manufacturing companies, 
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the breadth of conglomerate activities narrowed as evidenced by an increase 
from 0.34 to 0.45 in the average Herfindahl index and from 43.6% to 62.1% in 
turnover generated by the largest activity. However, in contrast to the 
industrial/manufacturing sector, the average Herfindahl of the related 
diversified category decreased suggesting companies in that group had 
increased the breadth of their activities. The single and dominant business 
company category averages remained broadly constant. Overall the average 
Herfindahl index decreased from 0.74 to 0.68 suggesting an increase in the 
breadth of activities. The small number of service conglomerates amongst the 
FTSE100 Survivors compared to related diversifiers and the less pronounced, 
compared to the industrial/manufacturing sector, shift to more focused 
diversification categories, has resulted in the decrease in overall average 
Herfindahl.     
 
Finally, there has been a reduction in the average number of activities and 
groups of related activities reported by most categories of company. 
Conglomerates showed the largest falls from 4.6 activities and 3.3 related 
groups in 1993 to 3.3 activities and 2.5 related groups in 2003. Other falls 
were relatively small. This provides further support for the contention that 
conglomerates have narrowed the breadth of their activities.    
 
The movements identified in this section strongly support the contention that, 
in addition to a shift towards focus in the categorisation of the FTSE100, 
conglomerates have narrowed the breadth of their activities.        
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6.3.5 Performance 
The following table summarises the average performance statistics of 
companies within each diversification category as per tables 55 (all), 56 
(industrial/manufacturing) and 57 (services). The performance reviews were 
undertaken to see if performance was a clear driver of changes in 
diversification across the FTSE100.    
 
As DataStream financial data was not available for all companies for all 
relevant time periods, the number of companies in each year and category for 
which complete data was available is noted in the final column of each table. 
The maximum number is 54.   
 
In addition to the performance indicators shown in the tables a number of 
others including operating margin, price/earnings ratios and operating cash 
flows were calculated and reviewed to see if any trends could be discerned. 
Tests, using Pearson‟s coefficients, for correlations between breadth of 
activities and a number of performance variables were also undertaken. While 
a few isolated correlations were found, there were no consistent significant 
relationships between performance and diversification. That is not to say no 
such relationships exist but rather that they could not be found using the 
information that was available from DataStream and the Financial Times.  
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Table 73: FTSE100 Survivors Average Performance By Diversification 
Category 
 
12 mnth Bal Sheet Number
Ave Market Share Date Of
Herfindahl Capitall'n Volatility MV/Book ROCE Gearing Companies
Index £m (%) Ex Intan. (%) (%) Max 54
1993
Single 0.98 5,815 70.9 2.8 21.3 25.8 8
Dominant 0.73 7,256 56.3 3.6 15.7 36.5 18
Related 0.46 6,454 50.5 12.0 14.0 36.7 16
Conglomerate 0.40 6,921 47.6 2.8 18.8 32.0 5
All 0.65 6,702 55.9 6.2 16.4 34.3 47
1998
Single 0.98 15,597 103.8 55.4 14.6 51.2 13
Dominant 0.69 10,771 79.0 2.9 14.3 35.8 18
Related 0.45 17,882 72.0 15.0 26.1 33.4 11
Conglomerate 0.38 9,962 81.7 7.8 31.9 34.9 3
All 0.69 13,850 84.6 21.4 18.5 39.6 45
2003
Single 0.98 16,538 52.7 17.1 15.1 48.9 14
Dominant 0.74 19,044 66.5 18.9 (32.6) 37.7 17
Related 0.41 23,167 55.5 19.2 22.2 63.7 11
Conglomerate 0.47 5,828 64.4 22.6 32.4 39.5 4
All 0.71 18,118 59.5 18.7 0.7 47.5 46
Year End 2 Year Averages 
(Unweighted)
 
 
As with the performance of the FTSE100, the average performance of the 
FTSE100 Survivors shows a mixed picture and no clear relationship between 
performance and diversification; conglomerates do not appear to have 
performed appreciably better or worse than other categories of company. If 
poor performance were to have been a major driver of the search for focus, 
the above table should show conglomerates to have underperformed other 
diversification categories.  
 
The table shows the average conglomerate to have become more focused 
and smaller according to the average Herfindahl index and average market 
capitalisation. The volatility of conglomerate share prices, similar to other 
categories in 2003, has increased from its low 1993 level but its Market Value/ 
Book Value Excluding Intangibles ratio increased from 2.8 in 1993 to 22.6, 
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marginally above those of other categories. The ROCE of conglomerates 
increased significantly between 1993 and 2003 from 18.8% to 32.4% with the 
category achieving the highest returns in 1998 and 2003. However, the 
standard deviation of the average ROCE also increased implying a wider 
range of performance. The average level of gearing remained broadly static 
for conglomerates as it did for other categories except for related diversifiers. 
Comparison of the performance of conglomerates with and without a core 
activity showed neither group to consistently outperform the other. 
 
The following tables summarise average performance statistics by 
diversification category for industrial/manufacturing and service companies. 
Notwithstanding the low number of companies in some of the diversification 
categories, the relative performance of categories does not suggest that any 
category consistently under or over-performed. As with the 54 FTSE100 
Survivors in total, the industrial/manufacturing and services sub-groups show 
similar movements although the ROCE of industrial/manufacturing 
conglomerates exceeds that of service conglomerates. 
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Table 74: FTSE100 Survivors Average Performance By Diversification 
Category – Industrial/Manufacturing 
 
12 mnth Bal Sheet Number
Ave Market Share Date Of
Herfindahl Capitall'n Volatility MV/Book ROCE Gearing Companies
Index £m (%) Ex Intan. (%) (%)
1993
Single 0.00 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0
Dominant 0.59 10,272 40.7 2.0 9.7 31.9 3
Related 0.43 4,618 54.1 16.4 15.1 38.6 11
Conglomerate 0.35 5,239 47.1 3.0 21.7 27.7 3
All 0.44 5,725 50.5 11.5 15.3 35.5 17
1998
Single 1.00 8,302 77.5 553.4 18.4 72.4 1
Dominant 0.69 11,753 68.3 2.6 15.5 26.5 5
Related 0.51 20,262 62.9 12.5 27.1 31.9 5
Conglomerate 0.33 12,657 98.3 10.5 41.9 27.9 2
All 0.59 14,899 71.5 50.0 24.2 32.3 13
2003
Single 1.00 22,017 49.1 17.8 31.6 39.3 4
Dominant 0.74 18,326 65.9 15.8 (67.3) 38.2 9
Related 0.43 29,146 82.6 27.7 25.2 47.9 4
Conglomerate 0.45 8,617 55.8 17.6 58.6 49.6 2
All 0.70 20,359 64.8 18.9 (13.7) 41.7 19
Year End 2 Year Averages 
(Unweighted)
 
 
Table 75: FTSE100 Survivors Average Performance By Diversification 
Category – Services 
 
12 mnth Bal Sheet Number
Ave Market Share Date Of
Herfindahl Capitall'n Volatility MV/Book ROCE Gearing Companies
Index £m (%) Ex Intan. (%) (%)
1993
Single 0.98 5,815 70.9 2.8 21.3 25.8 8
Dominant 0.76 6,653 59.4 3.9 16.9 37.4 15
Related 0.53 10,494 42.6 2.2 11.5 32.5 5
Conglomerate 0.46 9,445 48.4 2.4 14.5 38.5 2
All 0.76 7,256 58.9 3.2 17.0 33.6 30
1998
Single 0.98 16,205 106.0 13.9 14.3 49.4 12
Dominant 0.70 10,393 83.2 3.0 13.9 39.4 13
Related 0.40 15,899 79.5 17.1 25.4 34.7 6
Conglomerate 0.47 4,573 48.6 2.4 11.9 49.0 1
All 0.74 13,423 90.0 9.7 16.1 42.6 32
2003
Single 0.97 14,346 54.1 16.9 8.5 52.7 10
Dominant 0.73 19,852 67.1 22.4 6.4 37.1 8
Related 0.41 19,750 40.0 14.3 20.5 72.8 7
Conglomerate 0.50 3,039 73.1 27.7 6.1 29.5 2
All 0.72 16,541 55.7 18.6 10.8 51.6 27
Year End 2 Year Averages 
(Unweighted)
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6.3.6 Corporate Governance 
The tables on the following pages illustrate the key corporate governance 
characteristics of the 54 companies comprising the FTSE100 Survivors. The 
categorisations are as per tables 55 (all), 56 (industrial/manufacturing) and 57 
(services). The tables should be considered in the context of the 
improvements in corporate governance driven by the introduction of enhanced 
Best Practice. The tables show no appreciable differences between the 
corporate governance of industrial/manufacturing and service companies.    
 
As with the FTSE100, the average percentage of non-executive directors 
sitting on boards increased through the research period across all categories 
and sectors. In 1993 only dominant business companies had a majority of 
NEDs but by 1998 the single business and related business averages had 
also exceeded 50%. By 2003, all categories had averages that exceeded 
55%. The average tenure and length of service of both non-executive and 
executive directors remained broadly constant through the research period at 
around 5 or 6 years.  
 
The percentage of chairmen that were NEDs increased significantly through 
the period rising from 38.9% in 1993 to 48.1% in 1998 and 79.6% in 2003 with 
all categories showing improvements. The average tenure of chairmen fell 
through the period from 4 years in 1993 to 3 years in 2003 with the largest 
reduction coming in the conglomerate category from 7 years to 3 years. The 
length of chairmen‟s service as directors, including service pre-chairmanship, 
almost halved from 12 years in 1993 and 1998 to only 7 years in 2003 with an 
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even greater fall in the length of conglomerate chairmen‟s service which fell 
from 18 years in 1993 to 11 years in 1998 and only 6 years in 2003. One of 
the drivers of this substantial fall is the retirement of several chairmen with 
extraordinarily long tenures, notably Sir Garfield Weston at Associated British 
Foods who was appointed chairman in 1967.   
 
The tenure of chief executive officers remained unchanged over the research 
period remaining at 3 years and their total service as directors has also 
remained unchanged at 6 years. The number of companies with no chief 
executive fell from 12 (22%) in 1993 to only 3 (6%) by 2003 which is 
consistent with the move away from unitary leadership. Of the 12 companies 
without chief executives in 1993, 3 had multiple, typically, divisional, 
managing directors and 9 had a joint chairman and chief executive and of the 
3 companies without chief executives in 2003 1 had multiple managing 
directors, 1 was a vacancy and only 1 had a joint chairman and chief 
executive.          
 
The average percentage of ordinary shares held by major shareholders with 
notifiable interests, i.e. over 3%, decreased between 1993 and 1998 falling 
from 12.3% to 9.5% before increasing again to 16.8% by 2003. The averages 
for each category are higher in 2003 than they were in 1993 with the largest 
increase in the conglomerate category which increased from 7.7% to 14.3%. 
The increase in major shareholding reflects the increasing dominance of the 
equities market by institutions; analysis of each company‟s major 
shareholders reveals insurance companies such as Prudential, Scottish 
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Widows and Aviva to have substantial investments in the equity capital of 
many companies. The greater increase in institutional investment in 
conglomerates, relative to other categories, suggests they were looking more 
favourably on conglomerates than they had in the past. This could be due to 
the narrowing in the breadth of conglomerate activities or an underlying 
support for the economic rationale behind conglomeration.    
 
In broad terms the corporate governance of conglomerates differs little from 
that of companies in other diversification categories but the levels of 
institutional shareholding have increased significantly. 
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Table 76: FTSE100 Survivors Corporate Governance By Diversification Category 
 
All Averages Major
NED (%) NED (yrs) ED (yrs) NED % Tenure(yrs) Director(yrs) Tenure(yrs) Director(yrs) Total No CEO S'holds (%)
1993
Single 41.0 7 7 20.0 5 16 5 9 10 5 15.2
Dominant 54.8 6 5 52.4 4 8 3 6 21 2 14.2
Related 48.2 5 5 25.0 2 11 2 5 16 3 9.9
Conglomerate 41.6 6 7 57.1 7 18 4 7 7 2 7.7
All 48.6 6 5 38.9 4 12 3 6 54 12 12.3
1998
Single 52.7 5 6 42.9 3 13 3 8 14 2 11.5
Dominant 55.0 5 6 57.9 5 12 3 6 19 3 9.3
Related 55.7 4 6 57.1 4 11 4 8 14 1 8.0
Conglomerate 47.3 5 6 14.3 3 11 1 4 7 2 8.7
All 53.6 5 6 48.1 4 12 3 7 54 8 9.5
2003
Single 60.9 4 5 70.6 3 7 2 4 17 1 21.1
Dominant 64.1 5 4 90.0 3 7 4 7 20 1 16.1
Related 61.1 5 4 76.9 3 8 3 6 13 0 12.9
Conglomerate 60.2 4 5 75.0 3 6 3 7 4 1 14.3
All 62.1 5 5 79.6 3 7 3 6 54 3 16.8
Board Chair CEO No. of Companies
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Table 77: FTSE100 Survivors Corporate Governance By Diversification Category – Industrial/Manufacturing 
 
All Averages Major
NED (%) NED (yrs) ED (yrs) NED % Tenure(yrs) Director(yrs) Tenure(yrs) Director(yrs) Total No CEO S'holds (%)
1993
Single 35.3 2 5 0.0 8 25 0 6 1 0 4.2
Dominant 48.4 11 7 25.0 7 18 1 4 4 1 21.6
Related 45.6 5 4 9.1 2 11 1 4 11 2 10.4
Conglomerate 38.6 8 9 33.3 7 14 4 6 3 1 10.2
All 44.5 6 6 15.8 4 14 2 4 19 4 12.4
1998
Single 57.1 1 6 0.0 1 11 4 6 2 0 3.8
Dominant 52.4 7 7 16.7 7 17 1 3 6 2 16.3
Related 52.8 4 5 28.6 2 12 3 5 7 1 8.6
Conglomerate 43.3 5 7 0.0 3 13 1 2 4 1 11.5
All 51.1 5 6 15.8 4 13 2 4 19 4 11.2
2003
Single 73.2 5 6 75.0 3 10 2 4 4 0 20.9
Dominant 66.9 5 5 88.9 1 5 3 8 9 0 17.8
Related 58.1 5 4 80.0 3 8 4 5 5 0 17.5
Conglomerate 65.3 4 5 50.0 5 10 1 1 2 1 13.1
All 65.8 5 5 80.0 2 7 3 6 20 1 17.9
CEO No. of CompaniesBoard Chair
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   282 
Table 78: FTSE100 Survivors Corporate Governance By Diversification Category - Services 
 
All Averages Major
NED (%) NED (yrs) ED (yrs) NED % Tenure(yrs) Director(yrs) Tenure(yrs) Director(yrs) Total No CEO S'holds (%)
1993
Single 41.6 7 7 22.2 5 15 3 4 9 5 16.4
Dominant 56.3 5 4 58.8 3 6 3 6 17 1 12.5
Related 53.9 6 6 60.0 3 11 3 5 5 1 8.9
Conglomerate 43.9 4 6 75.0 8 20 2 5 4 1 5.8
All 50.8 5 5 51.4 4 11 3 5 35 8 12.2
1998
Single 52.0 6 6 50.0 3 13 2 7 12 2 12.8
Dominant 56.2 5 5 76.9 5 10 3 6 13 1 6.1
Related 58.6 5 6 85.7 6 10 5 9 7 0 7.3
Conglomerate 52.7 4 5 33.3 4 9 1 4 3 1 5.0
All 54.9 5 6 65.7 4 11 3 7 35 4 8.5
2003
Single 57.1 4 5 69.2 2 7 2 4 13 1 21.2
Dominant 61.8 5 4 90.9 4 8 4 6 11 1 14.7
Related 62.9 5 4 75.0 3 8 2 6 8 0 10.1
Conglomerate 55.1 3 5 100.0 2 2 4 11 2 0 15.5
All 59.9 5 4 79.4 3 7 3 5 34 2 16.1
CEO No. of CompaniesBoard Chair
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6.3.7 Conglomerates amongst the FTSE100 Survivors 
As noted in a preceding section, between 1993 and 2003 there were changes 
in composition of the conglomerate category although 3 of the 7 companies 
categorised as conglomerates in 1993 remained in that category in 2003.  
Table 79: FTSE100 Survivors – Conglomerates in 1993, 1998 & 2003  
 
1993 1993-1998 1998 1998-2003 2003 
Company Change Company Change Company 
Bass 
 
Bass 
 Intercontinental 
Hotels
1
 
BAT Industries To Single    
Granada  Granada To Single  
Ladbroke Grp To Dominant    
Pearson  Pearson To Related  
Tomkins  Tomkins  Tomkins 
Unilever  Unilever  Unilever 
 From Dominant United Utilities
2
 To Related  
 From Related Diageo
3
 To Single  
   From Related Whitbread 
7 +0 7 -3 4 
 
Notes: 
1 Bass changed its name to Intercontinental Hotels reflecting its exit from brewing. 
2 North West Water changed its name to United Utilities after acquiring Norweb.  
3 Diageo was formed by Guinness‟ acquisition of Grand Metropolitan in 1997.  
 
By 1998, 2 of the original 7 conglomerates – BAT Industries/British American 
Tobacco and Ladbroke/Hilton – had abandoned conglomeration being 
replaced by North West Water/United Utilities and Guinness/Diageo which, in 
1993, had been dominant and related companies respectively. Between 1998 
and 2003, 2 more of the original 7 left the conglomerate category with 
Pearson becoming a related diversifier and Granada becoming a single 
business company and the 2 companies that had become conglomerates 
between 1993 and 1998, North West Water/United Utilities and 
Guinness/Diageo retreated to related diversification and single business 
company respectively. Whitbread, previously a related diversifier, joined the 
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category. The „stories‟ behind each of the conglomerates‟ adoption, 
maintenance or abandonment of the strategy are considered in chapter 7.  
 
The Herfindahl indices of the 3 companies that retained their conglomerate 
strategies throughout the 10 year period show that the breadth of activities 
narrowed marginally at household products company Unilever but 
substantially at both the brewing and hotels group Bass/Intercontinental 
Hotels and the engineering company Tomkins.     
Table 80: FTSE100 Survivors Constant Conglomerates – Herfindahl 
Indices 
 
Company 1993 1998 2003 
Bass/Intercontinental Hotels 0.21 0.29 0.58 
Tomkins 0.23 0.28 0.48 
Unilever 0.35 0.38 0.41 
 
6.4 Exits from the FTSE100 
The list of FTSE100 survivors includes some of the best known names in UK 
business but a review of the companies that left the index between 1993 and 
2003 reveals a number of famous companies that did not enjoy continuous 
membership of the index. The following table shows what happened to the 46 
companies that were in the FTSE100 in 1993 but had left the index by 2003.  
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Table 81: FTSE100 Exits By 1998 and 2003 
 
FTSE100 Constituents 1993-1998 FTSE100 Constituents 1998-2003 Other
1993 Reason for Exit 1998 Reason for Exit Information
Anglian Water Value Loss/Displaced   
Arjo Wiggins Appleton Value Loss/Displaced  A by Worms (Fr) 2000
ASDA ASDA A by Wal*Mart (US) 1999  
Bank of Scotland Bank of Scotland A by Halifax* 2001  
Blue Circle Value Loss/Displaced  A by Lafarge (Fr) 2001
Bowater Value Loss/Displaced  Re-entry by 2003
British Steel Value Loss/Displaced   
BTR BTR A by Siebe* 1999  
Burmah Castrol Value Loss/Displaced  A by BP* 2000
Caradon Value Loss/Displaced   
Carlton Communications Carlton Communications Value Loss/Displaced  
Coats Viyella Value Loss/Displaced  A by Guinness Peat 2003
Courtaulds A by Akzo Nobel (Neth) 1998   
Eastern Electricity A by Hanson* 1995   
Enterprise Oil Value Loss/Displaced  A by Shell* 2002
Forte A by Granada* 1996   
GEC GEC Liquidated 2003  
General Accident A by Comm. Union* 1998   
Grand Metropolitan A by Guinness* 1997   
Guardian Royal Exchange GRE A by Axa (Fr) 1999  
Hanson Value Loss/Displaced  Re-entry by 2003
Inchcape Value Loss/Displaced   
MEPC Value Loss/Displaced  A by UK/US Consortium 2000
National Power National Power Value Loss/Displaced  
National Westminster Bank Nat West A by Royal Bank of Scot* 2000  
P&O P&O Value Loss/Displaced  
PowerGen PowerGen A by E.On (Ger) 2002  
Rank Organisation Value Loss/Displaced   
Redland A by Lafarge (Fr) 1997   
RMC Group Value Loss/Displaced   
Royal Insurance M by Sun Alliance 1996   
Scottish Hydro Electricity Value Loss/Displaced  Re-entry by 2003
Sears Holdings A by JIL Ltd 1999   
Siebe Siebe Value Loss/Displaced  
Smith & Nephew Value Loss/Displaced  Re-entry by 2003
SmithKline Beecham SmithKline Beecham M with Glaxo* 2001  
Southern Electricity Southern Electric A by Scottish Hydro* 1999  
Thames Water Thames Water A by RWE (Ger) 2000  
Thorn EMI EMI Value Loss/Displaced  
TI Group Value Loss/Displaced  A by Smiths Inds* 2000
TSB A by Lloyds* 1995   
United Biscuits Value Loss/Displaced  A by Finalrealm (US) 2000
Warburg SG A by SBC (Sw) 1994   
Wellcome A by Glaxo* 1995   
Williams Holdings Williams De-Listed 2000  
Wolseley Value Loss/Displaced  Re-entry by 2003
* Denotes merging or acquiring company was a constituent of the FTSE100 at the time of the transaction.
Merging and acquiring companies are UK unless noted.
Notes
All companies displaced through loss of market value remained LSE listed until merged/acquired.
Bowater (Rexam), Hanson, Scottish Hydro, Smith & Nephew and Wolseley re-entered the FTSE100 by 2003.
 
 
As the table shows, in addition to displacement due to loss of market value, 
acquisitions activity was also a major driver of change within the FTSE100. Of 
the 30 companies that left the index between 1993 and 1998 and the 
additional 16 that exited between 1998 and 2003, value loss accounted for 19 
(1998-03: 5) and acquisitions 11 (9) of which 3 (4) were by foreign acquirers, 
6 (5) by fellow FTSE100 companies and 1 (0) by private equity, the acquisition 
   286 
of retailer Sears by JIL Ltd, retail entrepreneur Sir Philip Green‟s investment 
vehicle. The 1999 to 2003 period also saw the de-listing of Williams and the 
liquidation of GEC.  
 
Williams, which, since the 1970s under Sir Nigel Rudd, had grown from a 
small engineering company into an FTSE100 conglomerate by 1993, 
embarked on a break-up to realise shareholder value that saw its businesses 
which included lock-maker Chubb and security company Kidde  either sold or 
floated with the holding company finally de-listed. Williams‟ successful break-
up may be contrasted with GEC‟s decision, championed by its new chief 
executive Lord Simpson after the retirement of its managing director for over 
30 years, Lord Weinstock, to retreat from a related diversification strategy to 
become a focused telecommunications company renamed Marconi and 
achieving the change through a series of disposals and acquisitions. The 
strategic change provided ill-timed given the spike in technology and 
telecommunication company values and GEC‟s famous cash resources were 
turned into a debt of around £5 billion which provided unserviceable leading to 
profit warnings, a debt for equity swap that diluted existing shareholders 
ownership by over 99% and eventually a break-up of the group. 
 
Finally, 5 of the 46 1993 FTSE100 companies excluded from the list of 54 
„ever present‟ companies had actually returned to the index by 31st December 
2003. Each of the 5 companies – Bowater (Rexam), Hanson, Scottish Hydro, 
Smith & Nephew and Wolseley - and had fallen out of the index at the end of 
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1998 on „Value loss/Displacement‟ grounds but had re-entered by the end of 
2003. 
 
6.5 Results  
Analyses of the database of FTSE100 and FTSE100 Survivors populations 
detailed in this chapter have the following implications for 
acceptance/rejection of the hypotheses stated in chapter 4. The hypotheses 
are considered in four sections covering incidence, breadth of activities, 
performance and corporate governance. In each case, acceptance or 
rejection of the hypothesis is assessed.    
 
6.5.1 Incidence 
These hypotheses consider the incidence of conglomeration among FTSE100 
companies through the research period. Based on anecdotal evidence, a 
decline in the incidence of conglomeration amongst FTSE100 companies was 
expected. In order to assess incidence, the FTSE100 and FTSE100 Survivors 
were categorised according to the Rumelt-based scheme of Channon/W&M 
which uses segmental activity data.     
 
A.1 The incidence of conglomeration amongst FTSE100 companies declined 
between 1993 and 2003. 
 
 The analyses have shown a clear and continuing decline from 16% to 7% 
in the incidence of conglomeration amongst FTSE100 companies since 
1993. There was also a wider trend towards focused business strategies 
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– single business and dominant business – and away from multiple 
business strategies – related diversification and conglomeration - through 
the 10 year period. In addition to the move to greater focus, the research 
has also shown increases in multiple business companies, especially 
conglomerates, with a core activity generating more than 50% of turnover. 
 
These trends have been seen not only amongst the 100 companies 
constituting the FTSE100 index in 1993, 1998 and 2003, i.e. a changing 
population, but also in the activities of the 54 FTSE100 Survivors.    
 
A.2 The incidence of conglomeration amongst FTSE100 
industrial/manufacturing companies declined between 1993 and 2003. 
 
 The number of industrial/manufacturing conglomerates in the FTSE100 
fell from 10 (23.8%) in 1993 to 6 (20.0%) in 1998 and to only 3 (8.1%) in 
2003. There was a similarly dramatic fall in the number of related 
diversified industrial/manufacturing companies which fell from 22 (52.4%) 
in 1993 to 13 (43.3%) in 1998 and to only 9 (24.3%) in 2003.  
 
Overall multiple business industrial/manufacturing companies in the 
FTSE100 index fell from 32 (76.2%) in 1993 to 19 (63.3%) in 1998 and 12 
(32.4%) in 2003. In addition to the move to greater focus, analysis has 
shown increases in conglomerate and related companies with a core 
activity generating more than 50% of turnover. 
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 The number of focused business companies remained steady between 
1993 and 1998 increasing by 1 from 10 (23.8%) to 11 (36.6%) but rose 
significantly to 25 (67.5%) by 2003. In both 5 year periods there were 
similar increases in single business and dominant business companies.    
 
These trends have been seen not only amongst the 100 companies 
constituting the FTSE100 index in 1993, 1998 and 2003, i.e. a changing 
population, but also in the activities of the 54 FTSE100 Survivors.  
 
A.3 The incidence of conglomeration amongst FTSE100 service companies 
declined between 1993 and 2003. 
 
 The trends identified are similar to, but not as pronounced as, those 
discussed above which may reflect the low, compared to the 
industrial/manufacturing sector, level of conglomeration in 1993 when 
there were only 6 (10.3%) conglomerate service companies in the 
FTSE100. By 1998 there were only 4 (5.7%) service conglomerates and 
2003 saw the same number. There was an increase from 9 (15.5%) to 14 
(20.0%) in related diversification between 1993 and 1998 followed by a 
fall back to 9 (14.3%) by 2003. Overall, there were 15 (25.8%) multiple 
business companies in 1993 and 13 (20.6%) in 2003. 
 
 The reduction in multiple business companies did not produce an 
increase in both focused company categories. There was a decrease in 
dominant business companies which fell from 25 (43.1%) in 1993 to 17 
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(27.0%) in 2003 meaning the single business category benefitted from the 
move to greater focus seeing increases from 18 (31.0%) in 1993 to 30 
(42.9%) in 1998 and to 33 (52.4%) in 2003. In addition to the move to 
greater focus, the research also showed increases in the numbers of 
conglomerate, but not related, companies that have a core activity, one 
generating more than 50% of turnover. 
 
 These trends have been seen not only amongst the 100 companies 
constituting the FTSE100 index in 1993, 1998 and 2003, i.e. a changing 
population, but also in the activities of the 54 FTSE100 Survivors. 
     
Each of the three hypotheses relating to the decline of conglomeration 
amongst FTSE100 companies has been upheld; the incidence of 
conglomeration declined between 1993 and 2003. The decline was seen in 
the total population and also in the industrial/manufacturing and service 
sectors. More companies retreated back to greater focus than advanced to 
wider diversification. Chi-Tests showed the patterns of change in each period 
to be significantly different.  
    
6.5.2 Breadth of Activities    
These hypotheses consider the breadth of activities pursued by FTSE100 
companies through the research period. Anecdotal evidence suggests that 
companies, even those that remained diversified, had been narrowing the 
scope or breadth of their activities since 1993 and this research has used 
Herfindahl indices and the distribution of turnover across activities and groups 
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of related activities to assess whether this was the case overall and for each 
Channon/W&M diversification category.  
 
B.1 The breadth of activities pursued by FTSE100 companies narrowed 
between 1993 and 2003. 
 
 The average Herfindahl index of the total population of FTSE100 
companies increased from 0.63 to 0.77 suggesting the breadth of 
activities had narrowed. However, there was little change in the single, 
dominant and related category averages; only the conglomerate category 
showed a significant increase from 0.36 to 0.44. Similar movements were 
identified in the percentage of turnover generated by the largest activity 
and group of related activities. 
 
This suggests only the breadth of conglomerate activities had narrowed. 
The increases in overall averages reflect this and the migration of 
companies to more focused categories over the research period.     
          
B.2 The breadth of activities pursued by FTSE100 industrial/manufacturing 
companies narrowed between 1993 and 2003. 
 
 The average Herfindahl index of FTSE100 industrial/manufacturing 
companies increased significantly over the research period rising from 
0.48 in 1993 to 0.56 in 1998 and 0.71 in 2003 suggesting a substantial 
reduction in the breadth of activities. However, only the dominant 
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category showed a material increase in average Herfindahl index. There 
were similar movements in the average percentage of turnover generated 
by the largest activity and group of related activities.  
 
This suggests a narrowing of dominant company activities. The increases 
in overall averages reflect this and the migration of companies to more 
focused categories over the research period. 
 
B.3 The breadth of activities pursued by FTSE100 service companies 
narrowed between 1993 and 2003.    
 
 The average Herfindahl index of FTSE100 service companies increased 
in both of the 5 year periods; from 0.73 in 1993 to 0.76 in 1998 and to 
0.81 in 2003 suggesting the breadth of activities had narrowed. However, 
there was little change in the single, dominant and related category 
averages; only the conglomerate category showed a significant increase 
from 0.33 to 0.47. Similar movements were identified in the percentage of 
turnover generated by the largest activity and group of related activities. 
 
This suggests only the breadth of conglomerate activities had narrowed. 
The increases in overall averages reflect this and the migration of 
companies to more focused categories over the research period. 
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For all three hypotheses, changes in the number of reported activities and 
groups of reported activities supported the findings. For all three hypotheses, 
the FTSE100 Survivors showed similar results.  
 
Each of the three hypotheses relating to the breadth or scope of FTSE100 
company activities between 1993 and 2003 has been upheld but only 
consistently for conglomerate companies. With a few exceptions, the breadth 
of activities of other categories remained broadly unchanged.  This was true 
of the total population and also of the industrial/manufacturing and service 
sectors.          
 
6.5.3 Performance 
Ignoring effects of changes in business portfolios, these hypotheses consider 
the overall performance of conglomerates and other diversification categories 
through the research period. 
 
C.1 FTSE100 conglomerates underperformed through the research period 
compared to other categories of company – single business, dominant 
business and related diversified.  
 
 The evidence is mixed depending on year and indicator with no clear 
picture emerging. In each year average conglomerate performance was 
similar to that of other diversification categories.   
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C.2 FTSE100 industrial/manufacturing conglomerates underperformed 
through the research period compared to other categories of 
industrial/manufacturing company – single business, dominant business 
and related diversified. 
 
 The evidence is mixed depending on year and indicator with no clear 
picture emerging. In each year average industrial/manufacturing company 
conglomerate performance was similar to that of other diversification 
categories. 
 
C.3 FTSE100 service company conglomerates underperformed through the 
research period compared to other categories of service company – 
single business, dominant business and related diversified. 
 
 The evidence is mixed depending on year and indicator with no clear 
picture emerging. In each year average service company conglomerate 
performance was similar to that of other service company diversification 
categories.   
 
C.4 FTSE100 conglomerate performance is negatively related to the breadth 
of activities. 
 
 There is no significant degree of correlation between a conglomerate‟s 
breadth of activities, as measured by its Herfindahl index, and 
performance, as measured by its operating margin.     
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C.5 FTSE100 conglomerates with a core activity generating more than 50% of 
turnover outperform conglomerates without a core activity. 
 
There is no significant degree of correlation between the existence of a 
core activity that generates more than 50% of a conglomerate‟s turnover 
and its performance relative to other conglomerate companies.  
 
Overall the five hypotheses covering performance are inconclusive; there 
appears to be no strong link between performance and diversification 
suggesting that many of those companies that have retreated back from 
conglomeration through the research period were driven by other, non-
performance, strategic issues. Conglomerates did not appear, on average, to 
have underperformed compared to other categories. The absence of a link 
between diversification category and performance is re-enforced by the low 
and statistically insignificant Pearson correlation coefficients between 
diversification, as measured by Herfindahl indices, and a number of 
performance indicators.  
 
In light of the absence of a clear financial driver for the reduction in 
conglomeration, Chapter 7 looks at each of the companies that adopted, 
maintained and/or abandoned conglomeration between 1993 and 2003 to 
identify other strategic drivers behind their decisions.     
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6.5.4 Corporate Governance 
These hypotheses consider differences between key facets of corporate 
governance at conglomerates over time and as compared to other categories 
of company. The expectation was that, notwithstanding changes resulting 
from enhancement to the Code of Best Practice, the characteristics of 
corporate governance in conglomerates would be different to those at more 
focused companies.      
 
D.1 There was no change in the executive/non-executive split in the 
composition of FTSE100 conglomerate boards through the research 
period. 
 
 There have been changes in the percentage of non-executive directors 
sitting on the boards of conglomerates since 1993; the percentage has 
increased as it has across all categories. This finding is inconsistent with 
that expected and suggests that FTSE100 companies have adopted Best 
Practice which recommends that, ideally, boards should have a majority 
of non-executive directors.    
 
D.2 The executive/non-executive split in the composition of conglomerate 
boards is the same as for other categories of FTSE100 company.    
 
 As noted in D1 above, there was a general trend towards a higher 
percentage of non-executive directors on boards at all FTSE100 
companies.     
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D.3 There was no change in the average tenure of chairmen of FTSE100 
conglomerate boards through the research period. 
 
 The average tenure of the chairmen of conglomerate company boards fell 
significantly through the research period as has their period of service as 
a director, i.e. including time as a director prior to their appointment as 
chairman. The average tenure of chairmen of FTSE100 conglomerates 
has fallen by half between 1993 and 2003 while average service has 
fallen by two-thirds in the same period. These falls were largely due to the 
retirements of a few long-serving chairmen.   
 
D.4 The average tenure of chairmen of conglomerate boards is the same as 
for other categories of FTSE100 companies. 
 
 The average tenure of the chairmen of non-conglomerate company 
boards has fallen through the research period as has their period of 
service as a director although the reductions have not been as large as 
those for conglomerate chairmen. By 2003 the tenure of chairmen of 
conglomerates is similar to that of chairmen of other categories of 
company although their period of service is shorter.   
 
D.5 There has been no change in the percentage of conglomerate company 
chairmen that are non-executive directors. 
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 Notwithstanding a reduction in 1998, the percentage of conglomerate 
companies with non-executive chairmen doubled between 1993 and 
2003. This increase suggests conglomerates have adopted the Cadbury 
committee recommendation that chairmen should be non-executive.  
 
D.6 The percentage of conglomerate company non-executive chairmen is the 
same as for other categories of FTSE100 companies.    
 
 The percentage of non-conglomerate companies with non-executive 
chairmen doubled between 1993 and 2003. This increase is similar to that 
at conglomerates and suggests widespread adoption of the Cadbury 
committee recommendation that chairmen should be non-executive.  
 
D.7 There was no change in the proportion of FTSE100 conglomerates with 
dual chairmen/chief executive officers through the research period. 
 
 The proportion of conglomerate companies with no separate chief 
executive officer fell between 1993 (31.3%) and 2003 (14.3%). This 
outcome was expected as the separation of the roles of chairman and 
chief executive officer was an element of the Cadbury committee‟s 
recommendations.   
 
D.8 The proportion of conglomerates with dual chairmen/chief executive 
officers is the same as for other categories of FTSE100 companies.   
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 The number and percentage of non-conglomerate companies with no 
separate chief executive officer fell through the research period although 
less so at single business companies. The reduction in the incidence of 
non conglomerate companies having a chairman/chief executive officer is 
broadly similar to that at conglomerates. 
 
D.9 There was no change in the average tenure of chief executive officers of 
FTSE100 conglomerates through the research period.  
 
 The average tenure and length of service of chief executive officers has 
remained broadly unchanged at conglomerate and non-conglomerate 
companies throughout the research period.  
   
D.10 The average tenure of chief executive officers of conglomerates is the 
same as for other categories of FTSE100 companies. 
 
 The average tenure and length of service of chief executive officers has 
remained broadly unchanged at conglomerate and non-conglomerate 
companies throughout the research period.  
 
D.11 There was no change in the average aggregate shareholdings of 
investors with notifiable interests in the share capital of conglomerates 
through the research period. 
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The average aggregate shareholdings of investors with notifiable 
interests almost doubled for the conglomerate category between 1993 
and 2003. The largest increase happened between 1998 and 2003 and 
for companies in the service sector.  
 
D.12 The average aggregate shareholding of investors with notifiable 
interests in the share capital of conglomerates is the same as for other 
categories of FTSE100 companies.  
 
The average aggregate shareholdings of investors with notifiable 
interests increased for almost all categories between 1993 and 2003 but 
the increase for conglomerates was greater than those of other 
categories.  
 
D.13 There were no major differences between the corporate governance of 
industrial/manufacturing and service companies. 
 
 The analyses showed the same trends to be evident in corporate 
governance across both sectors.   
 
For each of the hypotheses the analyses showed similar results for the 
FTSE100 and FTSE100 Survivors populations. Overall there are few 
differences between the corporate governance characteristics of 
conglomerates and those of other categories of FTSE100 company 
suggesting they are all run along similar lines. All categories of company 
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increased the percentage of non-executives on their boards. The major 
changes concerned chairmen; the percentage having non-executive status 
increased across all categories of company and their period of service 
decreased substantially especially at conglomerates. These universal 
improvements in corporate governance were in line with changes in Best 
Practice. Finally, the significant increase in the average aggregate major 
shareholdings in conglomerates suggests institutional investors may be more 
supportive of conglomerates than had been thought.   
 
6.6 Summary 
Overall, the results have clearly shown that the incidence of conglomeration 
amongst FTSE100 companies has declined between 1993 and 2003 and that 
amongst the 54 companies that were members of the index at the end of 
1993, 1998 and 2003 conglomeration has also declined. In addition, the 
average breadth of corporate activities has narrowed amongst conglomerates 
where the incidence of core activities generating more than 50% of turnover 
has also increased as it did amongst related diversifiers. Together with 
increases in the percentage of turnover generated by the largest activity/group 
of related activities and decreases in the number of reported activities/groups 
of related activities, these findings strongly suggest that, in addition to 
eschewing conglomeration, those companies that retained the strategy 
narrowed the breadth of their activities. In addition, analyses of movements 
between diversification categories show more companies to have retreated 
back through the Model of Corporate Development towards greater focus than 
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advanced to wider diversification. These findings are broadly true for both 
industrial/manufacturing and service companies.  
 
Improvement in corporate governance at conglomerates does not appear to 
be a major driver of their strategic change. While the key elements of 
corporate governance have improved at conglomerates, the same is true of 
companies in other diversification categories which is consistent with the 
contention that enhancements to Best Practice have driven the 
improvements. The contention that the investment community views 
conglomerates unfavourably is undermined by the absolute and relative (to 
other diversification categories) increase in the average aggregate size of 
major shareholdings in conglomerates which increased between 1993 and 
2003. This may suggest that institutional investors still support conglomeration 
or that the 2003 conglomerates are perceived as better than those that 
existed in 1993.        
 
While detailed financial analysis was not an intended part of this research, the 
high level analyses of performance have shown that, in common with extant 
literature, there is no apparent link between post-hoc performance and 
diversification category. This suggests there are other strategic drivers such 
as those identified as inhibitors in the literature review (section 3.3.3.2) behind 
corporate decisions to retreat away from conglomeration towards greater 
focus. Furthermore, this implies that the non-performance drivers force 
companies to act before any negative performance impacts of a conglomerate 
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strategy are realised; it is the expectation of future poor performance (ex-ante) 
rather than past poor performance (post-hoc) that drives strategic change.     
Given there is no clear link between diversification and post-hoc performance, 
other factors must also drive strategic decisions. These drivers may be 
generic, industry specific or company specific. Generic drivers are those that 
affect companies regardless of sector or industry and typically include such 
intangible factors as tastes/fashion, social/environmental, personal/value and 
economic outlook/growth. Clearly, given their nature, the effects of generic 
factors are hard to quantify. Industry specific factors are those that affect 
companies in particular industries and would include technological change, 
market growth and competitive market structure; is the industry dominated by 
a few major global companies? Again, the specific effects of these drivers are 
difficult to quantify especially on multi-business companies. Finally, company 
specific drivers include those that determine the financial/market support the 
company receives, how the company is led/managed and how regulation 
affects its ability to grow and compete in its chosen businesses.   
 
In order to get an understanding of the impact of company specific factors on 
corporate strategy formulation and strategic change, principally movements 
between diversification categories in the Model of Corporate Development, in 
terms of the strategic responses and outcomes, company histories were 
compiled and analysed. Chapter 7 – Analysing the Historical Record – 
considers the circumstances in which 22 FTSE100 companies adopted, 
maintained or abandoned conglomeration at some point between 1993 and 
2003. 
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7. ANALYSING THE HISTORICAL RECORD  
7.1 Introduction 
The results detailed in the preceding chapter provide substantial support for 
the contention that conglomeration has declined in the UK, at least among the 
companies – both industrial/manufacturing and service - that comprise the 
FTSE100 index, and that there has been a broad movement towards greater 
focus. A narrowing of the breadth of conglomerate activities was also 
identified. The chapter also noted the lack of any apparent link between 
performance (post-hoc) and diversification category or between corporate 
governance and diversification suggesting that other issues were behind 
decisions to adopt, maintain or, increasingly through the research period, 
abandon conglomeration. While Chapter 6 did provide a quantitative 
assessment, based largely on accounting data, of diversification amongst 
FTSE100 companies, it did not try to explain why diversification, especially 
conglomeration, had decreased. This chapter takes a qualitative and 
discursive approach to look for explanations of those strategic change 
decisions.   
 
The extant literature covering the US and UK history of conglomeration 
discussed in chapter 3 suggests a number of drivers behind diversification 
decisions. The key external drivers include investor/market pressure and 
regulation especially the prevailing attitude of competition authorities to 
industry structures, as evidenced by the UK CC‟s investigations in industries 
such as brewing, banking and supermarkets, and acquisitions that reduce 
competition. These drivers influence internal strategic decisions regarding 
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corporate diversification which may result in disposals, demergers, the return 
of capital to shareholders and/or acquisitions to either add new or build 
existing activities or expand internationally. In turn, these strategic responses 
shape the future scope of the company which could lead to greater focus or 
further diversification and/or the attainment, re-assertion, maintenance or 
elimination of a core activity.  
 
The following section (7.2) charts the movements between 1993 and 1998, 
1998 and 2003 and 1993 and 2003 of FTSE100 and FTSE100 Survivors 
companies through the Model of Corporate Development. The charts show 
the number of companies moving between each diversification category and, 
for the FTSE100 index, entries and exits. The names of all companies moving 
to/from the conglomerate category are also shown on each chart.  
 
The next section (7.3) provides, for each company categorised as a 
conglomerate at any of the period ends, a brief company history which 
includes references to performance and other information drawn from the 
database, to provide high-level qualitative assessments of the circumstances 
in which diversification decisions were made. Appendix F includes key 
database details for each of the conglomerates and notes the major 
references used in compiling each history. 
 
The third section (7.4) analyses the key elements of each company history 
summarising them into a table (table 82) which supports discussion of links 
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between external drivers, strategic responses/restructuring and their 
outcomes.  
 
7.2 Movements To/From Conglomeration 
FTSE100 
Charts 8, 10 & 12 show that only 7 of the FTSE100 companies categorised as 
conglomerate in 1993 remained in that diversification category in 1998 and of 
those only 3 – Bass/Intercontinental Hotels, Tomkins and Unilever - were still 
conglomerates in 2003. Over the same period the number of conglomerates 
in the FTSE100 more than halved from 16 to 7.  
 
Between 1993 and 2003, 3 conglomerates entered and 8 left the FTSE100 
while 5 conglomerates retreated back to more focus – 1 to related 
diversification and 2 each to the dominant and single business categories – 
and only 1 company, a related diversifier, advanced to greater diversification.  
 
The charts show a flow back to greater focus with more activity in the 5 years 
from 1998 to 2003 than between 1993 and 1998.   
 
FTSE100 Survivors 
Charts 9, 11 & 13 show that only 5 of the 54 FTSE100 Survivors companies 
categorised as conglomerate in 1993 remained in that category in 1998 and of 
those only 3 – Bass/Intercontinental Hotels, Tomkins and Unilever – were still 
conglomerates in 2003. Over the same period the number of conglomerates 
in the FTSE100 Survivors fell from 7 to 4.  
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Between 1993 and 2003 the trend was towards greater focus with 4 
companies retreating to less diversified categories and only 1 company 
becoming a conglomerate. Of the 4 1993 conglomerates that achieved 
greater focus, by 1998 BAT Industries/British American Tobacco had become 
a single business company and Ladbroke/Hilton a dominant business 
company and by 2003 Granada had become a single business company and 
Pearson a related diversifier. The one new conglomerate was Whitbread 
which advanced from related diversification during the 5 years between 1998 
and 2003.    
 
As with the FTSE100, the charts show a flow back to greater focus with more 
activity in the 5 years from 1998 to 2003 than between 1993 and 1998. 
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Chart 8: FTSE100 – Movements To/From The Conglomerate Category From 1993 To 1998
BAT Industries
1 Guinness/
Diageo
Bass
BTR
Granada
P&O
Pearson
Tomkins
Unilever
Siebe
Williams
Ladbroke
Group
1
Exit 5
Forte (A by Granada)
Blue Circle (MV, C)
Caradon (MV, D)
Hanson (MV, D)
TI Group (MV, C)
Entry 1
Smiths Industries (MV, C)
North West Water/
United Utilities
[1] Number of companies remaining in each category at the start and end of the period.
1 Number of companies moving in the direction of the arrow. Conglomerates are named.
Broken red lines denote expected movements through the Model of Corporate Development.
Solid black lines denote the actual movements to/from each diversification category during the period.
Abbreviations: MV – entry/exit due to change in market value, S, D, R, C – category pre/post FTSE100
membership if listed before/after membership, M – merged, A – acquired.
Key
Entry 16
Exit 7
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Chart 9: FTSE100 Survivors – Movements To/From the Conglomerate Category From 1993 To 1998
BAT 
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Bass
Granada
Pearson
Tomkins
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[1] Number of companies remaining in each category at the start and end of the period.
1 Number of companies moving in the direction of the arrow. Conglomerates are named.
Broken red lines denote expected movements through the Model of Corporate Development.
Solid Black lines denote the actual movements to/from each diversification category during the period.
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Chart 10 FTSE100 – Movements To/From the Conglomerate Category From 1998 To 2003
Granada
Diageo
Whitbread 
Hays
Bass/Intercontinental 
Hotels
Smiths Industries
Tomkins
Unilever
United Utilities
Pearson
Exit 2
BTR (M with Siebe)
P&O (MV, R)
Entry 1
Old Mutual (New Listing)
Key
[1] Number of companies remaining in each category at the start and end of the period.
1 Number of companies moving in the direction of the arrow. Cong lomerates are named.
Broken red lines denote expected movements through the Model of Corporate Development.
Solid black lines denote the actual movements to/from each diversification category during the period.
Abbreviations: MV – entry/exit due to change in market value, S, D, R, C – category pre/post FTSE100
membership if listed before/after membership, M – merged, A – acquired.
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Chart 11: FTSE100 Survivors – Movements To/From the Conglomerate Category From 1998 To 2003
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Pearson
Bass/Intercontinental 
Hotels
Tomkins
Unilever
Whitbread
[1] Number of companies remaining in each category at the start and end of the period.
1 Number of companies moving in the direction of the arrow. Conglomerates are named.
Broken red lines denote expected movements through the Model of Corporate Development.
Solid black lines denote the actual movements to/from each diversification category during the period.
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Chart 12: FTSE100 – Movements To/From the Conglomerate Category From 1993 To 2003
BAT Industries/British American Tobacco
Granada
Whitbread
Bass/Intercontinental 
Hotels
Tomkins
Unilever
Pearson
Hanson
Ladbroke Group /
Hilton Group
Exit 8
Blue Circle (MV, A by Lafarge)
BTR (M with Siebe)
Caradon/Novar (MV, D)
Forte (A by Granada)
P&O (MV, R)
Siebe (MV, R)
TI Group (MV, A by Smiths 
Industries)
Williams (De-listed)
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Hays (MV, R)
Old Mutual (New Listing)
Smiths Industries (MV, C)
Key
[1] Number of companies remaining in each category at the start and end of the period.
1 Number of companies moving in the direction of the arrow. Conglomerates are named.
Broken red lines denote expected movements through the Model of Corporate Development.
Solid black lines denote the actual movements to/from each diversification category during the period.
Abbreviations: MV – entry/exit due to change in market value, S, D, R, C – category pre/post FTSE100
membership if listed before/after membership, M – merged, A – acquired.
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Chart 13: FTSE100 Survivors – Movements To/From the Conglomerate Category From 1993 To 2003
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[1] Number of companies remaining in each category at the start and end of the period.
1 Number of companies moving in the direction of the arrow. Conglomerates are named.
Broken red lines denote expected movements through the Model of Corporate Development.
Solid black lines denote the actual movements to/from each diversification category during the period.
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7.3 Company Histories 
The preceding charts show that there were 22 companies that were 
categorised as conglomerate at one or more of the period ends. For each of 
the 22 companies, a brief history has been compiled to look for the strategic 
rationale behind each decision to retain or change diversification strategy and, 
if a change was made, how it was achieved.  
 
The histories are grouped under six headings: 
 
 Stable Conglomerates – those that remained conglomerates in 1993, 
1998 and 2003 – Bass/Intercontinental Hotels, Tomkins and Unilever, 
 
 Conglomerate Reversals – those that retreated from conglomeration to 
become more focused - BAT Industries/British American Tobacco, 
Ladbroke/Hilton, Granada, Hanson, Siebe/Invensys, Williams and 
Pearson, 
     
 Advances to Conglomeration – those that advanced to conglomeration 
from other categories – Hays and Whitbread, 
 
 Temporary Conglomerates – those that were conglomerates only in 
1998 – North West Water/United Utilities and Guinness/Diageo – having 
been more focused in 1993 and 2003. 
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 Conglomerate Exits – those that left the FTSE100 index – BTR, P&O, 
Forte, Blue Circle, Caradon/Novar and TI Group, 
 
 Conglomerate Entries – those that entered the FTSE100 as 
conglomerates – Old Mutual and Smiths Industries. 
 
7.3.1 Stable Conglomerates 
The following 3 companies, all FTSE100 survivors, Bass/intercontinental 
Hotels, Tomkins and Unilever, retained their conglomerate strategies 
throughout the period 1993 to 2003. However, only Unilever retained the 
same core business activity – foods – throughout while Bass/Intercontinental 
Hotels moved away from its traditional base in brewing towards hotels and 
Tomkins divested its largest activity, the Rank Hovis McDougall bakery 
business. All three companies saw their Herfindahl indices rise between 1993 
and 1998 and 2003 indicating greater focus.     
 
7.3.1.1 Bass/Intercontinental Hotels   
Bass enjoyed a position of pre-eminence within the UK brewing industry for 
many years growing through a series of focused acquisitions including  those 
of Mitchells & Butlers in 1961 to form Bass Mitchells & Butlers and of 
Charrington United in 1967 to form Bass Charrington which was later 
renamed Bass. However, by 1970 Bass had a 25% share of the UK beer 
market which effectively precluded it from further non-organic UK expansion 
as any proposed acquisition would have been referred to, and almost certainly 
blocked by, the Monopolies and Mergers Commission. The competition 
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authorities, which in a series of investigations culminating in a report 
(Competition Commission, 1989) that mandated structural changes (the „Beer 
Orders‟) had sought to introduce greater competition in the brewing industry, 
would influence the company‟s strategic decisions through the 1980s and 
1990s.   
 
Faced with regulatory restrictions, the company sought growth through 
international expansion - acquiring brewing businesses in Europe, notably 
Czechoslovakia – and diversification adding betting shops (Corals), bingo 
halls (Gala) and gaming machines to its activities. The largest diversification 
came in 1988 when, through the acquisition of Holiday Inns International, 
Bass added hotels to its portfolio. By 1993 brewing accounted for 27.8% of 
total external turnover with public house operations 24.2%, hotels 13.5% and 
other leisure activities 22.6%. No single activity generated more than 50% of 
total turnover and therefore the company did not have a core activity. ROCE 
was 12.9%.  
 
Despite ongoing regulatory interest in the UK brewing sector, in 1996 Bass 
acquired 50% of the Anglo-Danish brewer Carlsberg-Tetley from Allied 
Domeq. The transaction, which gave Bass 35% of the UK market compared to 
Scottish Courage‟s 31% and Whitbread‟s 14%, was referred to the 
Competition Commission and was blocked. This decision, followed by a failed 
attempt in November 1997 to acquire the William Hill betting business 
(Nomura outbid Bass), meant Bass had to look to its other activities to 
generate growth (Ross, 1997).   
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Bass embarked on a programme to re-balance its portfolio of activities in 
favour of hotels which were widely seen as offering higher growth and better 
margins (Willman, 1998). The period from December 1997 to August 1998 
saw the group dispose of non-core activities, further develop its hotel 
operations and return £800m to its shareholders. Divestments, which included 
Coral betting (sold unconditionally to gaming and hotels group Ladbroke who 
were subsequently forced to divest the business by the Competition 
Commission), Gala bingo (sold to management), BLMS (amusement machine 
servicing sold to private equity), Barcrest (amusement machine manufacture 
sold to International Game Technology), the tenanted public house estate and 
300 managed public houses (sold to Punch Taverns and Enterprise Inns), 
yielded £1,306m while £1,765m was spent acquiring Intercontinental Hotels in 
March 1998. Brewing was again the largest activity generating 35.5% of the 
1998 turnover with other leisure activities contributing 32.3% and hotels 
20.2%. As in 1993, the company did not have a core activity. ROCE had 
improved to 18.9%.   
 
The 5 years to 2003 saw the company, renamed Six Continents, make further 
investments in its hotel operations, which became the primary activity, and 
divest its brewing activities which were sold to Interbrew of Belgium for £2.3bn 
in 2000. Regulatory issues were again involved with the Competition 
Commission allowing the sale only on condition that Interbrew subsequently 
sell its Carling, the UK market leader, Caffrey‟s and Worthington brands. This 
requirement was an improvement on the Commission‟s original order that 
Interbrew sell all UK brewing activities (Jones, 2001).  
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In April 2003, the group demerged its remaining retail operations as Mitchells 
& Butlers and renamed itself Intercontinental Hotels to reflect its primary 
activity. The 2003 accounts show 69.5% of turnover to have come from hotel 
operations with soft drinks generating 27.5%. For the first time in the research 
period, the transformed group had a core activity contributing more than 50% 
of total turnover. In addition to the change in primary activity from brewing to 
hotels, Intercontinental Hotels had a narrower spread of business activities as 
evidenced by its Herfindahl index which had risen from 0.21 in 1993 to 0.29 in 
1998 and 0.58 in 2003. 
 
The group‟s corporate governance also changed through the research period. 
In 1993 and 1998 the group was headed by an executive chairman, Ian 
Prosser, who had been appointed in 1987 and had been a director since 
1978. The roles of chairman and chief executive were combined and 
executive directors comprised 60% of the board in 1993 and 50% in 1998. 
Following the demerger, Ian Prosser retired and Intercontinental Hotels was 
led by David Webster as non-executive chairman with Richard North 
appointed as chief executive officer and the percentage of executive directors 
fell to only 44.4%. The aggregate shareholdings of major shareholders 
increased significantly following the demerger; having been 3.6% in 1993 and 
3.8% in 1998 it rose to 10.6% in 2003.         
   
Bass provides an excellent example of an FTSE100 company that retained its 
conglomerate strategy but narrowed its activities and changed its portfolio of 
businesses out of low growth high competition sectors where further 
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expansion was restricted by competition regulation and into high growth/high 
margin sectors. The P/E ratio of the company‟s shares also reflected the 
improved perception of the company‟s growth prospects. As a company 
primarily involved in brewing it had a P/E of only 14.5 in 1993 and 17.3 in 
1998 but as a hotels and soft drinks group it had a P/E of 43.4 in 2003 
although that was distorted by profit adjustments resulting from the demerger. 
Vindication of the demerger came in the following years which saw ROCE 
increase steadily from a demerger cost affected 4.2% in 2003 to 42.5% in 
2007 which was substantially higher than that achieved in 1993 and 1998. In 
addition, the company finally embraced the corporate governance 
recommendations of the Cadbury committee.   
    
7.3.1.2 Tomkins 
In 1993 Tomkins was one of only a handful of companies, that also included 
Hanson, comprising a conglomerates classification in the FT listings but in 
1985 it had only been a small manufacturer of buckles and fasteners. 
Tomkins‟ change was achieved through a series of acquisitions made under 
the leadership of Greg Hutchins, an ex-Hanson executive, who took a 23% 
stake in the company in 1983 becoming its chief executive in January 1984 
(Batchelor, 2000).     
 
The major acquisitions behind Tomkins‟ impressive growth included those of 
UK tap and valve manufacturer Pegler-Hattersley for £200m in 1985, baker 
Rank Hovis McDougall for £952m in 1992 (outbidding Hutchins‟ former 
employers Hanson), US gun maker Smith & Wesson for $112m in 1987, US 
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lawn mower and bicycle company Murray Ohio Manufacturing and diversified 
US group, Philips Industries.  
 
In 1993 the largest activity generating 32.2% of turnover was bakery followed 
by professional, garden and leisure products including Spear & Jackson tools 
with 25.6% and 3 further divisions each with between 11% and 17%. No 
single activity generated more than 50% of total turnover. The group extolled 
the virtues of its diversity claiming in its 1993 Annual Report (p7) that “From 
being 100% dependent on fastener businesses, we have BROADENED OUR 
BASE such that no one specific product market accounts for over 10% of pre 
tax profits” (emphasis as per original). Furthermore, the broad base, along 
with earnings per share outperformance and progressive dividend growth, 
was one of Tomkins‟ three corporate objectives.   
 
Between 1993 and 1998 the company continued to grow largely through 
acquisitions including those of automotive/engineering companies Gates for 
$1.6bn in 1996 and Stant Corporation for £381m in 1997 and 6 Spillers flour 
mills from Irish food group Kerry for £92m in 1998 (the acquisition, which gave 
Tomkins a 40% share of the flour milling market, was referred to the MMC 
who, in 1999, ordered the sale of 4 of the 6 mills acquired). There were also 
some disposals and rationalisation with the number of reported divisions 
falling from 5 to 4. While the RHM bakery business continued to be the largest 
activity in terms of turnover at 35.6% it was closely followed by Industrial & 
Automotive Engineering with 29.9% and Construction Components with 
23.5%. Despite the clear difference between activities, the company stressed 
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a manufacturing link between its operations and set out its aim “…to be a 
focused international manufacturing company”. Again, no single activity 
generated more than 50% of total turnover. The 5 years saw significant 
improvements in financial performance with ROCE increasing from 18.6% in 
1993 to 39.4% in 1998.      
    
In 1999 Tomkins decided to move towards its new strategic aim of becoming 
more focused by demerging its baking and food activities and selling other 
non-core activities (Marsh, 1999) and returning capital to shareholders 
through buybacks. The company, whose ROCE had fallen to 34.3% in 1999, 
acknowledged that the decision, which would leave it focused on automotive 
and building products, had been made in response to market pressure; “The 
stock market doesn‟t want Tomkins to be a conglomerate any more” (Marsh, 
1999). In addition, the low margins achieved in food businesses coupled with 
competition regulation restrictions on growth, as evidenced by the Spillers 
acquisition referral, meant the RHM business was not sufficiently dynamic for 
Tomkins. The refocusing of Tomkins was seen by many observers as overdue 
and, coming after the demise of other leading conglomerates including BTR 
and Hanson, signalling the end of the widely diversified UK conglomerate 
(Economist, 1999). RHM was sold to UK private equity group, Doughty 
Hanson, for £1,139m in 2000, the UK and US lawn mower business to 
Chinese company Summerson Investment for $221m in 2000 and Smith & 
Wesson to US group Saf-T-Hammer for a mere $15m in 2001 reflecting the 
raft of potentially costly negligence cases pending in US courts. The group 
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used the proceeds to reduce debt and to fund a £700m return of capital to 
shareholders.  
 
By 2003 the group‟s restructuring was complete and chief executive Greg 
Hutchins had left. The „new‟ Tomkins comprised only three divisions; Industrial 
& Automotive Engineering, Construction Components and Air Systems 
Components which generated 64.3%, 21.1% and 14.6% of turnover; industrial 
& automotive engineering had become the company‟s core activity. In the 
following years, the changes continued to bear fruit with ROCE increasing 
from 15.0% in 2003 to 24.6% in 2007.  
 
The group‟s corporate governance changed through the research period with 
a different chairman and chief executive in 1993, 1998 and 2003 and the 
chairmanship held by a non-executive director in 1993, Michael Moore, and 
2003, David Newlands. In 1998 the executive chairman was Greg Hutchins 
who, until his appointment, had been chief executive since 1984 having 
become a director the year before. The „promotion‟ of a chief executive to 
chairman contravenes corporate governance Best Practice. However, 
Tomkins did maintain separation of the roles of chairman and chief executive 
and decreased the percentage of executive directors from 85.7% in 1993 to 
62.5% in 1998 and only 25.0% in 2003. The aggregate shareholdings of major 
shareholders fell steadily through the research period from 16.7% in 1993 to 
12.2% in 2003.         
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Tomkins provides another example of an FTSE100 company that retained its 
conglomerate strategy but changed its portfolio of businesses disposing of its 
primary, but not core, business activity - baking - and building other 
businesses, notably automotive engineering, which eventually became the 
core activity, and construction materials. This change is reflected in its 
Herfindahl index which increased marginally from 0.23 in 1993 to 0.28 in 1998 
but, following divestment of RHM, reached 0.48 by 2003. There were also 
competition regulation influences on Tomkins‟ strategy. The P/E ratio of the 
company‟s shares changed little between 1993 and 2003 falling from 17.2 in 
1993 to 11.8 in 1998 before improving to 13.5 in 2003 reflecting the limited 
growth opportunities in the traditional building and engineering activities that 
had become the primary businesses of Tomkins.  
 
Finally, with the exception of Greg Hutchins‟ move from chief executive to 
chairman in 1995, the company had adopted the major tenets of the Cadbury 
committee recommendations regarding its corporate governance.  
 
7.3.1.3 Unilever 
Unilever, formed in 1930 by the merger of Lever Brothers and Margarine Unie, 
is a dual listed company (DLC) with the operating companies owned by UK 
and Dutch holding companies that are quoted on their national stock 
exchanges. Unilever is one of the world‟s largest consumer products 
companies.  
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The product range produced by Unilever changes constantly in line with the 
tastes and fashions of its consumers and also as technologies evolve. With 
the exception of the sale of the group‟s speciality chemicals activities in 1997 
to ICI for £4.9bn (McCoy, 1997) which reduced the 5 divisions reported in 
1993 to 4 in 1998 and 2003, the divisions reported by the group – foods, 
detergents, personal products (toiletries) and other - have changed little over 
the 10 years of the research period. Following divestment of the speciality 
chemicals business, the group returned £5bn to shareholders by a special 
dividend in 1999. Changes in the portfolio of products and brands which 
comprise each division are a fact of life for „fast moving consumer goods‟ 
companies like Unilever although, given Unilever‟s size, none of its 
acquisitions between 1993 and 2003 could be considered major. In 1999 
Unilever had 1,800 brands in its portfolio and, recognising that not all made 
acceptable contributions, intensified its increasingly aggressive approach to  
disposing of products and brands which were seen as underperforming that 
began in 1998 (Smit & Willman, 1998; Smith, 1999).       
 
In 1993, 1998 and 2003 the foods division was the core activity of the group 
generating over 50% of total turnover; 1993 51.5%, 1998 52.1% and 2003 
56.1%. The second largest division was the group‟s traditional detergents 
activity generating 23.4% of turnover in 1993 with personal products in third 
place with 14.3%. However, in 1998 the detergents business (21.8%) was 
overtaken by personal products (24.7%) with the gap between them widening 
by 2003. The consistency of the company‟s business portfolio and of the 
growth of its food turnover is reflected in a Herfindahl index that remains little 
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changed between 1993 and 2003. The sale of the speciality chemicals 
activities that contributed 8.4% of 1993 turnover was the driver behind the 
increase from 0.35 in 1993 to 0.38 in 1998 and changes in the relative sizes 
of activities is reflected in a further increase to 0.41 by 2003. Unilever has 
maintained a consistently high level of financial performance and, except for 
1995 and 2000, has achieved continuous increases in ROCE which reached 
121.1% in 2003. Similarly, investor confidence in the group has always been 
strong.                   
 
Unilever, primarily as a consequence of its DLC structure, has an 
unconventional corporate governance structure. In 1993, 1998 and 2003 the 
group was headed by an executive chairman supported by divisional heads 
rather than a single chief executive or equivalent. In line with recommended 
practice, Unilever has a majority of non-executive directors.  
 
Unilever provides an example of a dynamic consumer-driven company that 
remained a conglomerate with a core product – foods – throughout the 10 
year research period. However, Unilever did increase its focus disposing of its 
speciality chemicals activities.   
 
7.3.2 Conglomerate Reversals 
The following 4 companies – BAT Industries/British American Tobacco, 
Ladbroke/Hilton, Granada and Pearson – were conglomerates in 1993 but 
had retreated from that strategy by 2003, 1998, 2003 and 1998 respectively. 
In all four cases, the companies took deliberate actions to increase focus; 
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BAT Industries/British American Tobacco and Granada became single 
business companies focused on tobacco and television respectively, 
Ladbroke/Hilton became a dominant business company focused on hotels 
and Pearson became a related diversifier with activities in education and 
media including the Financial Times.   
 
7.3.2.1 BAT Industries/British American Tobacco 
In 1993 BAT Industries was a conglomerate with a core activity of financial 
services. By 1998 it had reversed its strategy becoming a focused tobacco 
business and reverting to its original name of British American Tobacco. It 
remained a single business company through to 2003. The change in focus 
and disposal of financial services activities also meant the company moved 
from the service to industrial/manufacturing sector.   
 
BAT Industries became a conglomerate as a consequence of a deliberate 
diversification strategy which it embarked upon in the 1970s. The decision to 
diversify away from a reliance on tobacco products was taken against a 
background of increasing concerns over the health consequences of tobacco 
use; research into the links between smoking tobacco and lung cancer had 
produced increasingly robust and consistent evidence that smoking tobacco 
was a major cause of the disease. Faced with falling turnover in its 
established markets of the US and Europe, British American Tobacco decided 
to diversify while it could still rely on strong cash flows from its „declining‟ core 
business activity. In a series of large acquisitions the company built up a 
significant presence in financial services buying the insurance companies 
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Allied Dunbar and Eagle Star in the UK and Farmers Group in the US. 
Renaming itself BAT Industries, the company also acquired UK catalogue 
retailer Argos and paper manufacturers Wiggins Teape and Appleton. The 
diversification strategy adopted by BAT Industries  was similar to that pursued 
by another major UK tobacco company, Imperial, which had diversified into 
the food, drink and leisure industries. Imperial‟s acquisitions included food 
producers Golden Wonder (crisps), National Canning (Smedley‟s frozen & 
tinned foods), HP Sauce (condiments), Ross Group (frozen foods), Courage 
(brewing, off-licences and public houses), Pillsbury Farms (US food producer), 
plastics companies Creators Group and Plastic Coatings, packaging company 
Mardon and hotel and restaurant company Howard Johnson.  
 
The diversification strategy was not universally welcomed by investors and in 
1989 a „break-up‟ bid of £13.4bn was made by Hoylake Investments a 
consortium headed by Sir James Goldsmith, Lord Rothschild and Kerry 
Packer. The bid was defeated but, in response, BAT demerged Argos and 
Wiggins Teape Appleton in 1990 (Kay, 1995). Despite the divestments, by 
1993 tobacco accounted for a minority, 46.3%, of the total turnover.       
 
The complexities of effectively managing a group with activities as diverse as 
financial services and tobacco products together with a greater degree of 
stability and resilience in tobacco activities and increased access to the large 
consumer markets of Eastern Europe, especially Russia (Brown-Humes & 
Oran, 1997), led the group to revise its diversification strategy. Rather than 
seeking to replace tobacco with financial services, the group sought to 
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reverse its diversification strategy to once again become a focused, single 
business tobacco products company.  
 
In September 1997 the company divested its insurance businesses by 
merging them through a Dual Listing Agreement with those of the Zurich 
Insurance Company; BAT Industries‟ shareholders received shares in Allied 
Zurich plc the UK listed component of the DLC. Recognising the company‟s 
focus on tobacco, it reverted back to its original name of British American 
Tobacco. The company decided that it could continue to be highly profitable in 
a declining industry by expanding internationally especially into those 
countries, typically less developed countries, where smoking levels remain 
relatively unaffected by health concerns and, as incomes rise, may even 
increase in the short to medium term; globally cigarette sales were rising by 1-
2% annually (Willman, 1998). International expansion, typically through the 
acquisition of local companies, would increase volumes and economies of 
scale leading to greater profits. The continued decline, albeit slow, in the 
historically important UK and US markets would have only a limited effect. 
The first major acquisition, costing £5.3bn, was that of US competitor 
Rothmans International which added 22 new countries including South Africa, 
Malaysia, Nigeria and China to British American Tobacco‟s international 
spread (Economist, 1999).              
 
The change from conglomerate to single business company in 1997 is 
reflected in the increase in the group‟s Herfindahl index which rose from 0.50 
in 1993, when turnover was split equally between financial services and 
   329 
tobacco, to 1.00 in 1998 and 2003, when tobacco was the only activity. 
Interestingly market sentiment appears negative regarding the company‟s 
change from a conglomerate to single business strategy with the P/E ratio 
declining from 16.6 in 1993, when the company was a conglomerate, to 11.0 
in 1998, when it was a single business company, with a marginal recovery to 
13.4 by 2003. The group‟s ROCE best illustrates the positive effect of its 
return to focus. Between 1993 and 1998 ROCE averaged 20% but significant 
increases in the new millennium raised the average to almost 50%. The 
refocusing also attracted institutional investors. After having no significant 
shareholders in 1993 and 1998, an aggregate 35.0% of the company‟s 
ordinary share capital was held by two major shareholders in 2003.       
 
The group‟s corporate governance was broadly in-line with recommended 
practice; there were a majority of non-executive directors in 1998 and 2003 
and the roles of chairman and chief executive were split. However, when non-
executive chairman Patrick Sheehy retired in 1998 when the insurance 
business was demerged, Mark Broughton, was promoted to chairman but 
retained his executive status a situation that remained unchanged in 2003.        
 
BAT Industries/British American Tobacco is a prime example of an FTSE100 
company that, to escape an industry it expected to decline sharply, diversified 
its activities but which, on realising there remained opportunities in the global 
tobacco industry that could profitably be exploited, reversed that strategy. The 
group, in effect, turned full circle starting and ending as a single business 
company with a brief period as a conglomerate in between. At the end of 
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2008, British American Tobacco remained a single business company and a 
constituent of the FTSE100 index.     
    
7.3.2.2 Granada 
Granada Group was a conglomerate without a core activity in 1993 and 1998 
but by 2003 it had taken advantage of favourable regulatory changes to 
become a single business company focused on television.  
 
In 1993 Granada‟s largest activity was its television rental business which 
accounted for 33.3% of total turnover with motorway services, business 
services including catering and workwear, television (broadcast and content 
and including the Granada television franchise) and computer services, 
principally contract maintenance, generating 25.7%, 16.1%, 15.9% and 9.0% 
of total turnover. The company recognised that, with the price of sets falling in 
real terms year-by-year, television/video rental was a dying business and by 
1998 that activity generated only 9.6% of total turnover with motorway 
services, hotels and television the major activities accounting for 40.5%, 
26.1% and 23.7% respectively. The growth in television had come from the 
acquisition of the London Weekend Television and Yorkshire Tyne Tees 
franchises following the partial relaxation of multiple ownership restrictions. 
Much of the growth in the hotels and motorway services activities resulted 
from the acquisition in 1996 of Forte Hotels Group for £3.9bn. This acquisition 
was followed by speculation that Granada would split into 2 focused 
companies; television and hotels and catering (Daneshkhu & Snoddy, 1996). 
Although still a conglomerate in 1998, the scope of the company‟s activities 
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had narrowed, as evidenced by an increase in the Herfindahl index from 0.24 
to 0.30.  
 
Between 1998 and 2003 Granada changed substantially; in a complex series 
of transactions in 2000 and 2001 the company became focused on television 
and media activities. In 2000 it announced a merger with the FTSE100 
business services company Compass Group which would be followed by the 
demerger of a restructured Compass Group which would comprise all of the 
combined company‟s catering and hotels operations leaving Granada a 
focused television and media company (Ascarelli, 2000). While convoluted, 
the merger/demerger did achieve its aim of creating two focused companies 
that had potential to generate significant synergies from two diverse 
companies. By 2003 Granada television accounted for 99.7% of Granada‟s 
turnover and it had a Herfindahl index of 0.99.         
 
Granada‟s corporate governance shows the company to have met the 
requirement for a majority of non-executive directors only in 2003 when it was 
being acquired by Carlton Communications. Gerry Robinson succeeded Alex 
Bernstein as chairman in 1996 but, unlike his predecessor, retained executive 
status as did his successor, Clive Allen, on appointment in 2003. Following 
the announcement of Carlton‟s acquisition of Granada creating ITV, the 
institutional shareholders of both companies pressed for the chairman of the 
new company to be non-executive in accordance with Best Practice (Burt & 
Malkani, 2003b). 
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Early in 2004 Granada was acquired by another FTSE100 company, Carlton 
Communications, to form ITV which effectively consolidated the previously 
regionalised terrestrial commercial television in the UK. The acquisition 
received regulatory approval as it was thought that a consolidated ITV would 
be better placed to compete with the increasing influence of digital and 
satellite broadcasters such as BSkyB and the publicly funded BBC. This 
decision was in complete contrast to the stance of the early 1990s when there 
were 15 UK commercial television companies and multiple ownership was 
limited (Burt & Malkani, 2003a). In 2008, ITV was still a single business 
company but had, because of a loss in market value, fallen out of the 
FTSE100. 
 
Granada provides an example of a conglomerate faced with a declining 
primary activity, television/video rental, but with other activities offering 
potential for growth one of which, commercial television, was subject to 
government regulation that effectively limited growth. The turning point for 
Granada came when the government began to relax controls over how many 
commercial television franchises could be owned by a single company 
offering Granada the opportunity to expand its successful television 
operations beyond the North West of England. Notwithstanding the complex 
merger/demerger mechanism it adopted, Granada effectively divested its non-
media activities and set about acquiring other commercial television 
franchises to become a major force in that industry. Given that ownership 
controls had been removed, acquisition by Carlton Communications to 
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effectively unite UK commercial television stations was the logical final step 
for Granada. 
 
7.3.2.3 Hanson 
Along with BTR, Hanson is probably one of the best known UK conglomerates 
of the 1980s and 1990s as were its two leading lights Lords Hanson and 
White although the latter, controversially given his influence, was never 
appointed a statutory director of the group. Hanson was born out of the shell 
of Lord Hanson‟s family haulage business following the post-war 
nationalisation of the transport industry and, through a series of seemingly 
ever-larger acquisitions, grew to be a major company in the FTSE100 index. 
Such was Hanson‟s size and resources that by the early 1990s few 
companies considered themselves safe from the possibility of a takeover bid. 
In 1991 Hanson bought a stake in ICI giving rise to suggestions that it may bid 
for the company seen by some as underperforming (Economist, 1991). 
Ultimately, Hanson did not make a bid for ICI but the threat of a bid is widely 
regarded as forcing ICI into demerging its pharmaceuticals activities as 
Zeneca in 1993 (Eglin, 1992).    
 
Hanson‟s outstanding growth was achieved largely through the acquisition of 
often of poorly run, underperforming and, as a result, undervalued, 
companies; the „classic‟ 1970s and 1980s route to conglomeration. The 
largest acquisitions included the diversified tobacco company Imperial (1986), 
US conglomerate SCM (1985), mining company Consolidated Goldfields 
(1989), battery company Berec (1981), US coal producer Peabody (1990) and 
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building products companies London Brick (1984) and Kaiser Cement (1986) 
(Skeel, 1991).  
 
Unlike some other conglomerates, Hanson did not keep all of the activities of 
companies it acquired and often sought to reduce the price it paid for the 
activities it wanted to keep by selling those it did not want. Lublin (1989) noted 
that between 1973 and April 1989 „Hanson‟s US arm spent more than $3.6bn 
on acquisitions and recouped nearly $2.7bn according to London brokers 
Hoare Govett‟ with the acquisition of SCM standing out as a particularly good 
deal, „Hanson paid $930m for SCM, Smith Carona‟s parent; so far, it has 
reaped more than $1.5b from SCM asset sales‟. Hanson also divested many 
of Imperial‟s non-core activities including Courage beer, Golden Wonder 
crisps and Ross Young‟s foods reducing the net cost of the highly profitable 
tobacco business significantly. 
   
By 1993, Hanson had a turnover of £9,668m, an operating profit of £923m 
and was the 8th largest company, by market capitalisation, in the FTSE100 
with activities as diverse as coal mining and tobacco reflected in a Herfindahl 
index of only 0.21. The company‟s ROCE was 10.4% and its P/E ratio of 19.9 
suggested investors were confident of future growth.  
 
In mid 1995 Hanson acquired Eastern Electricity for £2.5bn in what proved to 
be the group‟s last significant acquisition. Lord White died in August 1995 and 
Lord Hanson was nearing retirement and the conglomeration strategy they 
had pursued was no longer in favour with investors who increasingly wanted 
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to see companies with focus making acquisitions that would produce growth 
while also yielding synergies (Economist, 1995). In common with other leading 
UK conglomerates, Hanson took the decision to effectively abandon its 
conglomeration strategy to become a dominant business company.  
 
Having, in 1995, sold most US business as US Industries, Hanson demerged 
its non-building materials activities into three new independent companies; 
Imperial Tobacco, Millennium Chemicals and the Energy Group (which 
included Eastern Electricity) with shareholders receiving shares in each of the 
new companies. Imperial Tobacco and the Energy Group were floated on the 
LSE in 1996 and 1997 respectively while Millennium Chemicals was floated 
on the New York exchange in 1996. Today, only Imperial Tobacco remains 
independent; the Energy Group was acquired by Texas Utilities, a US energy 
group, in 1998 and Millennium Chemicals by Lyondell Chemical in 2004. The 
demergers, which were completed shortly before Lord Hanson‟s retirement at 
the end of 1997, left Hanson a dominant business company focused on 
building materials. At the end of 1998 the much smaller Hanson had fallen out 
of the FTSE100 and had a Herfindahl index of 0.75 reflecting its greater focus. 
The P/E of 15.0 reflected lower growth expectation typical of building material 
companies where scope for innovation is limited. 
 
Rationalisation of Hanson continued through to 2003 with the disposal of 
minor activities that had remained after the break-up and the acquisition of 
additional brick manufacturing businesses. By the end of 2003 Hanson, 
restored to the FTSE100, was a dominant business company although, 
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because of the change in relative turnovers of its aggregates and brick 
activities, its Herfindahl index had fallen to 0.60. In 2007 Hanson was 
acquired by Heidelberg Cement of Germany leaving Imperial Tobacco as the 
only surviving independent Hanson business.                                      
 
Hanson typifies an aggressive company that identified and exploited 
opportunities to acquire underperforming businesses and realise value by 
achieving a turnaround and/or through the sale of unwanted assets. As with 
its peers, Hanson found fewer opportunities in the 1990s and decided to act 
on investors‟ desire for greater focus. The influence of Lords Hanson and 
White were major factors in the company‟s growth and it is no coincidence 
that the break-up came within a year of Lord White‟s death and shortly before 
Lord Hanson was due to retire. 
      
7.3.2.4 Ladbroke/Hilton 
Ladbroke Group was a conglomerate in 1993 with a core activity of betting, 
including off-track betting offices and Vernon‟s football pools, which generated 
59.5% of its total turnover. Other activities included Hilton Hotels and Texas 
Homecare, a nationwide DIY chain, which accounted for 20.9% and 16.2% 
respectively of total turnover.  
 
By 1998 the group had sold its retail activities to a competitor, Sainburys, and 
had established an alliance with Hilton Hotels Corporation reuniting the Hilton 
brand in the UK and US (European Report, 1997). The group had also 
aggressively grown its betting and gaming operations, taking advantage of the 
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de-regulation of betting shops in 1995, which became the company‟s core 
activity generating 79.6% of total turnover. The dominance of the betting and 
gaming activity would have been greater had the company been allowed to 
retain the 833 shop Corals business it acquired unconditionally from Bass for 
£383m in 1997. The acquisition was blocked by the MMC, which ordered 
Ladbroke to sell the shops „en block‟ to restore competition in the UK off-
course betting market which was dominated by Ladbroke and William Hill 
(Daneskhu & Wighton, 1998), in a decision that effectively placed a restriction 
on the group‟s ability to grow its UK betting activities. Coral was sold in 1999 
to Morgan Grenfell Private Equity. The greater focus had a positive effect on 
the ROCE which increased from 7.4% in 1993 to 19.0% in 1998.  
 
Ladbroke continued to grow its betting activities internationally and also to 
develop its hotel business. In early 1999 Ladbroke acquired the Stakis hotels 
group for £1.2bn (Brice, John & Kibazo, 1999) increasing the number of hotels 
operated from 54 to 92 and in 2001 it acquired Scandic Hotels which operated 
in Scandinavia and the Baltic States. Following the Stakis acquisition the 
group changed its name to Hilton Group. The group continued to be 
dominated by its betting and gaming activities which, by 2003, generated 
81.4% of total turnover.  Increased competition in its core activity limited profit 
growth and ROCE fell to only 10.3% in 2003.   
 
The group‟s Herfindahl index reflected its transformation from conglomerate to 
dominant business company between 1993 and 1998 increasing from 0.43 to 
0.68 after which it stabilised rising marginally to 0.70 by 2003. Market 
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sentiment appears to have favoured the group‟s change in strategy as its P/E 
ratio increased from 13.9 in 1993 to 15.9 in 1998 and to 18.1 in 2003. In 
addition, there had been no significant shareholders in the group in 1993 and 
1998 but in 2003 there were 4 – Fidelity, Barclays, Scottish Widows and Legal 
& General – with an aggregate holding of 23.1% of the ordinary share capital.     
 
The group‟s corporate governance appears to be in accordance with 
recommended practice with a majority of non-executive directors, separation 
of the roles of chairman and chief executive and chairmen, John Jackson to 
2001 followed by Ian Robinson, who were both non-executive. 
 
The Ladbroke/Hilton Group illustrates a conglomerate that sought to increase 
its focus by disposing of a peripheral business activity in which it believed it 
could not achieve critical mass. At the same time, notwithstanding the 
regulator‟s refusal to sanction the acquisition of Corals, the group took 
advantage of legislative changes that increased the potential of its betting and 
gaming activities. The group had significant market shares and very strong 
brand names/recognition in its two largest activities – Ladbrokes in betting 
and Hilton in hotels – while its Texas Homecare operation was small relative 
to competitors including Homebase, then owned by Sainsbury, B&Q, then 
owned by Kingfisher and Focus, then owned by Smiths.  
 
Interestingly, in February 2006 the group sold its hotel activities to US 
company Hilton Hotels International with which it had had an alliance since 
1997. The group then changed its name back to Ladbroke and was a single 
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business company focused on betting activities (Strauss, 2006). At the end of 
2008 Ladbroke remained a single business company but, as it returned most 
of the proceeds of the sale of its hotel activities to its shareholders, had fallen 
out of the FTSE100. 
 
7.3.2.5 Pearson 
Pearson is best known for its ownership of the Financial Times although that 
was only one of its diverse activities that, in 1993, included the London tourist 
attraction Madam Tussauds and a minority interest in the Lazards merchant 
bank. The group was categorised as a conglomerate in 1993 and 1998 before 
retreating to related diversification by 2003.  
 
In 1993 the core activity of the group was books (primarily information and 
entertainment but also including education) which accounted for 62.0% of 
total turnover with newspapers, principally the Financial Times, generating 
29.1% of total turnover. In addition Madam Tussauds contributed 6.0% of total 
turnover and the Thames commercial television franchise another 2.9%. The 
company also had significant investments in several other television 
companies/franchises including BSkyB and Yorkshire-Tyne Tees and the 
Lazards merchant bank although, being related/associated companies their 
turnovers were not included in that reported. 1993 had seen the start of the 
company‟s refocusing with the demerger of its chinaware, Royal Doulton, and 
US oil services, Camco, businesses.  
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By 1998 Pearson had divested Madam Tussauds, a number of specialist law, 
tax and medical publications and a minority interest in satellite broadcaster 
BSkyB. The disposals were in line with the company‟s strategy of divesting 
peripheral activities and specialist publications that were not market leaders 
(Ford, 1998). Pearson also started to expand its portfolio of FT branded 
products and its education activities which were bolstered by the acquisition of 
Simon & Schuster for £2.9bn in 1998. Following the acquisition the education 
and book activities were separated recognising the size of the enlarged 
education business and that it included a range of products including CDs and 
interactive materials that made it substantially different from the entertainment 
books activity. In 1998 Pearson remained a conglomerate with books still its 
core activity generating 54.4% of turnover (education 31.2% and other 23.2%) 
followed by newspapers, 30.3%. The increase in ROCE from 15.8% in 1993 
to 47.0% in 1998 suggests the portfolio changes were proving successful.  
 
Between 1998 and 2003 the company continued to pursue its focus strategy 
divesting Thames Television and its minority investment in Lazards while 
making acquisitions, principally the $2.5bn purchase of school-testing firm 
National Computer systems Inc in 1999 and the $482m acquisition of UK 
publisher Dorling Kindersley, that added to its education activities (Gruner, 
2001). In 2003 education was the core activity generating 60.5% of total 
turnover with newspapers and books each contributing around 20%. 
Pearson‟s refocusing activities had moved it from conglomeration to related 
diversification. The ROCE fell marginally to 13.8% in 2003.                       
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The group‟s Herfindahl index decreased significantly from 0.48 to 0.27 
between 1993 and 1998 reflecting the more even split of turnover across 
activities but by 2003 it had risen to 0.45 reflecting the increasing size of the 
education businesses which had become the core activity.  
 
The P/E and significant shareholder statistics provide conflicting evidence of 
market sentiment towards Pearson and its future prospects. As a 
conglomerate in 1993 and 1998 the P/E was 33.0 and 30.5 respectively but 
as a related diversifier in 2003 it had fallen to only 17.9. Conversely, the 
percentage of ordinary share capital held by major shareholders increased 
from 8.9% in 1993 to 10.6% in 1998 and to 26.9% in 2003 although that may 
be a reflection of the share‟s yield which also rose over the same period from 
2.5% to 3.8%.      
 
Corporate governance at Pearson improved over the 10 year research period. 
Denis Stevenson succeeded Michael Blakenham as executive chairman in 
1997 and had relinquished his executive status by 2003 while non-executive 
directors were in the majority in 1993 and 2003. The roles of chairman and 
chief executive were kept separate. 
 
Pearson offers an example of a company that had a number of substantial 
activities; several in one broad industry that was undergoing significant 
technological change - Media - and others in a range of some smaller 
specialised businesses, e.g. Madam Tussauds. Through divestments and 
acquisitions the company narrowed the breadth of its activities developing an 
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activity – education - that had been a small part of the books division in 1993 
into its core activity by 2003. However, in 2002 investors, while praising the 
greater focus, were becoming critical of the core activity and its low growth 
prospects (Reed, 2002) suggesting focus is beneficial but only when the core 
activity is an attractive one.  
 
7.3.2.6 Siebe/Invensys 
In 1993 Siebe was a conglomerate with several distinct divisions from controls 
through to safety & life support systems and property development. The 
company had grown, principally by acquisition, under the leadership of Barrie 
Stephens who joined as chief executive in 1964 later becoming chairman as 
well. Siebe‟s largest, and core, activity was controls which generated 67.9% of 
total turnover and overall group ROCE was 18.5%.  
 
By 1998 the company had, through a series of divestments and acquisitions, 
reduced the breadth of its activities and become a related diversified company 
with core competences in controls – temperature and appliance - and 
automation which generated 39.9% and 45.9% of total turnover respectively.  
Controls were seen as offering slow future growth but the acquisition of APV 
for £327m in 1997 was believed to have added new potential markets for 
those products (Lex, 1997). Despite the reduction in the number of activities, 
the change in the relative turnovers of the remaining activities meant its 
Herfindahl index decreased from 0.50 to 0.39 suggesting a wider breadth of 
activities. Between 1993 and 1998 turnover increased from £1,619m to 
£3,670m, operating profits rose from £217m to £576m and ROCE improved to 
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38.3% although the P/E ratio fell from 20.0 to 14.7 suggesting investors‟ future 
expectations had deteriorated. Management were aware of the need to 
reinvigorate the business and were, according to the 1998 annual report and 
accounts, looking to further rationalise the remaining operations to further 
enhance profitability. Shortly after the March year end it further expanded its 
controls activity acquiring automation software company Wonderware for 
£225m (Edgecliffe-Johnson, 1998).  
 
A major change occurred in early 1999 when Siebe acquired troubled 
FTSE100 conglomerate BTR with the combined company taking the name 
Invensys. In the 2 years preceding the acquisition both Siebe and, to an even 
greater extent, BTR had embarked upon rationalisation programmes aimed at 
improving efficiency, productivity and profitability. Rationalisation continued 
after the merger and £1bn was returned to shareholders. Further acquisitions, 
notably that of Dutch software company Baan for £466m in 2000, were made 
to develop the controls activity that was to form the core of Invensys.  
 
Despite reorganisations and restructurings, which included the disposal of 
Baan, financial performance was poor leading to a fall in market capitalisation 
from £9.5bn on formation in 1999 to only £500m in 2003 (Jackson, 2003). At 
the end of 2003 Invensys, no longer an FTSE100 constituent, was still a 
related diversifier and, despite the significant divestment programmes, had a 
Herfindahl index almost unchanged from 1998 at 0.38. The poor performance 
and ongoing funding problems combined to push ROCE to (100.3)% in 2003.        
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Having had an executive chairman who was also chief executive and a 
majority of executive directors, corporate governance improved following the 
retirement of Barrie Stephens in 1998 before the acquisition of BTR in 1999. 
The roles of chairman and chief executive were split, the new chairman, Sir 
Colin Marshall, was a non-executive and the board had a majority of non-
executive directors.   
 
Siebe/Invensys exemplifies a company that successfully retreated from 
conglomeration to related diversification but, faced with lower growth in the 
activity it had chosen as its core – controls – sought growth through 
acquisition but chose to buy a company, BTR, beset with fundamental 
problems typical of the huge conglomerates built up through the 1980s and 
early 1990s. Lord Marshall, chairman of Siebe, acknowledged that these 
problems were underestimated and exacerbated by the acquisition of Baan 
(Marsh, 2003). 
 
7.3.2.7 Williams 
Williams Holdings epitomises the conglomerate life cycle. In 18 years it moved 
through each stage of the Model of Corporate Development before heeding 
the advice of Whittington (1999) and committing „corporate euthanasia‟, by 
breaking itself up and delisting from the LSE.  
 
Acquired for only £300,000 in 1982 by Sir Nigel Rudd and his business 
partner Brian McGowan, Williams grew from being a small Caerphilly foundry 
into a conglomerate with diverse manufacturing and engineering activities 
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through a series of often small acquisitions of poorly managed 
underperforming businesses many with well-known brand names including 
Hammerite, Cuprinol, Rawlplug and Aquilisa (Davidson, 1994). In an interview 
held as part of this research project, Brian McGowan, a director of Williams 
until 1993, stated that the success of the group‟s acquisition-led growth was 
predicated on identifying underperforming companies with widely respected 
brand-names that had the potential for rapid turnaround under specialist 
business improvement teams. The company was renowned for starting the 
process immediately an acquisition was complete and for implementing their 
carefully prepared post-acquisition plans. 
 
Larger acquisitions were also made. In 1989 the group acquired security 
company Yale and fire protection company Kidde. These companies would 
later comprise the bulk of Williams‟ activities. However not all of Williams‟ bids 
were successful; in 1991 it failed to acquire Racal in a bid worth £753m 
although the bid did precipitate Racal‟s subsequent demerger of its Chubb 
security business. By 1993 Williams was an FTSE100 conglomerate with a 
core activity of building products. Turnover had grown to £1,164m, operating 
profits to £189m and the P/E ratio to 19.6. The company‟s Herfindahl index 
was 0.43 and its ROCE was 30.7%. 
 
During 1993 Williams revised its corporate strategy replacing its previous 
opportunistic acquisition-driven strategy with one which aimed to achieve 
focus in three areas; fire protection, security products and building products. 
In 1996 the group significantly increased its focus by selling 15 of its home 
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products business including showers, heaters, conservatories and beds to an 
MBO team for £360m (Tieman, 1996) and in 1998 a further £500m was 
received from the sale of European filler and coating and US home 
improvement businesses. The disposals allowed £300m to be returned to 
shareholders. The focus strategy was re-enforced in early 1997 when the 
group acquired the security company Chubb, demerged from Racal in 1992, 
for £1.3bn. The Chubb acquisition was held up by Williams as offering 
potential fit, synergies and complementarities with existing Williams 
businesses (Davidson, 1997) offering further evidence that acquisitions 
needed to be strategically justified rather than purely opportunistic. By 1998 
Williams had become a related diversified company with activities in security 
products, security systems and home improvement products although the 
group‟s Herfindahl index remained broadly constant at 0.43. The group‟s 
ROCE reached 65.9% in 1998 and its P/E was 18.4.   
 
After 1998 Williams continued to perform adequately although operating 
profits fell 4.5% between 1998 and 1999 on turnover 14.6% higher and ROCE 
fell to 35.0%. The flat performance, lack of obvious growth opportunities and 
failed discussions with US conglomerate Tyco over a potential $6bn bid for 
the group (Maremont, 1999) led Williams to decide that splitting the group 
would enhance shareholder value. In 2000 Williams demerged its activities 
into two separately quoted focussed companies – Chubb (security) and Kidde 
(fire protection) – and de-listed from the LSE. Neither business has remained 
independent; United Technologies Corp. of the US acquired Chubb in 2003 
and Kidde in 2005.  
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Williams provides an example of a company that, in less than 20 years, 
travelled through all of the stages of the conglomerate life cycle. The company 
epitomises the serial acquirers of the 1980s that fed on the ready supply of 
poorly managed underperforming and undervalued companies but were 
effectively forced to focus when that supply dried up in the 1990s. Williams 
also illustrates the need to maintain growth as a focused company if the 
support of investors is to be maintained.      
 
7.3.3 Advances to Conglomeration 
Two companies Whitbread and Hays - became conglomerates between 1998 
and 2003.   
 
7.3.3.1 Hays  
After having been owned by the Kuwait Investment Office since 1980, Hays 
was refloated on the LSE in October 1989. The company floated was 
substantially different from the diverse company the KIO had acquired. The 
property and manufacturing activities had been sold and recruitment added, 
notably through the 1986 acquisition of Career Care which included the 
market-leading Accountancy Personnel business, to supplement the 
distribution and office support services activities. Hays‟ chief executive likened 
the company‟s three divisions to the legs of a stool in the stability they 
provided (Gabb, 1991).       
  
By 1993 Hays, classified as a business services company, was a related 
diversifier with a Herfindahl index of 0.47. At the core of the company‟s 
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activities was distribution which generated 63.8% of total turnover of £477m. 
Hays‟ other activities were personnel (recruitment) and commercial which was 
primarily a mail service business related to its distribution activity. Distribution 
and commercial together generated 79.3% of total turnover. Hay‟s ROCE of 
38.5% reflected its profitability and relatively small capital base, typical of 
service companies, and its P/E ratio of 25.1 its strong growth potential. 
     
By 1998 Hays had entered the FTSE100 but the company still operated the 
same three divisions as it had in 1993; distribution remained the core activity 
generating 51.1% of the total turnover of £1,519m but the growing 
commercial/mail services activity accounted for 31.7% of total turnover up 
from 15.5% in 1993. Distribution and commercial now generated 82.8% of 
total turnover. The dominance of distribution would have been greater had the 
company‟s 1996 bid of £1.16bn for Christian Salvesen been successful. The 
bid was seen as a watershed for Hays as the company ruled out further bids 
for large distribution businesses preferring higher margin specialist over 
volume distributors (Dyer, 1996) and international expansion where it 
acquired FDS in France and van der Heijden in the Benelux countries from 
Australian transport group Mayne Nickless in 1997 for a total of £72m 
(Gresser & Robinson, 1997). The changes in relative turnovers reduced the 
Herfindahl index from 0.47 to 0.39 and Hays remained a related diversifier. 
The financial performance continued to improve with ROCE reaching 49.8% in 
1998 and its shares traded on a P/E of 31.9.  
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Following a strategic review undertaken by the new chief executive, Bob 
Lawson, on taking office in 2001, the company changed its strategy with the 
aim of transforming “Hays into a pure specialist recruitment and HR services 
business” (Annual Report & Accounts 2003, p2). While the 2003 annual report 
shows the company to have the same three activities as in 1993 and 1998, no 
activity generated more than 50% of turnover. Personnel had become the 
largest division accounting for 48.3% of the total turnover of £2,294m with 
distribution, which was earmarked for sale, generating 46.2% and commercial 
only 5.6% reflecting the disposal of several of the division‟s businesses. This 
change in relative turnovers moved the company into the conglomerate 
category although the Herfindahl index actually rose to 0.45 suggesting 
greater focus. As a result of incurring substantial restructuring costs, the group 
made a loss in 2003 and ROCE fell to (161.9)%. Investor confidence, 
although still high, began to wane with the P/E ratio falling to 22.9. 
Interestingly, ROCE has since recovered sharply exceeding 100% in 2005 
suggesting the change in direction was successful.      
 
Although it moved from related diversification to conglomeration, Hays did not 
change its activities through the 10 years between 1993 and 2003. However, 
the company did change its strategy from seeking to maintain stability through 
operating in three divisions to trying, unsuccessfully, to grow the distribution 
division to deciding that distribution should be divested in the pursuit of 
greater focus. These changes in strategy highlight two aspects of 
diversification strategy; choice of the breadth of activities and of the activities 
themselves. Hays has reduced the breadth of its activities, although 
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divestment of distribution did not happen until after 2003, and changed its 
core activity.           
 
7.3.3.2 Whitbread 
The research period saw Whitbread transform itself from a related diversified 
company centred on brewing and public house retail activities into a 
conglomerate with hotel, restaurant and leisure club activities.  
 
Whitbread, traditionally a brewer which can trace its heritage back to 1742, 
had, by 1993, become a related diversifier having added the related activities 
of public house retailing, including some pub restaurant chains such as Berni 
Inns and Beefeater, and public house tenancies of which it had 2,300. The 
1993 accounts show that the managed public house estate was the 
company‟s core activity generating 67.3% of external turnover with brewing 
and leisure, including hotels, contributing 24.1% and 8.6% respectively. The 
Herfindahl index was 0.52. In 1993 Whitbread achieved a ROCE of 8.9% and 
its shares traded on a P/E of 13.9.  
 
The pursuit of related diversification may, in part, have been a reaction to the 
Competition Commission investigation into the supply of beer (Competition 
Commission, 1989) and the „tied house‟ concept where brewers were able to 
restrict tenants of their public houses to buying beer and other drinks from 
them. On grounds of increasing competition, the Commission recommended 
that no brewer should have a tied estate exceeding 2,000 public houses and 
that the product restrictions on tenants should be eased although not removed 
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entirely. The Commission saw its recommendations, the Beer Orders, as 
having an impact on the 6 national brewers one of which was Whitbread.  
 
By 1998 Whitbread‟s portfolio of activities had changed significantly. In 1995 
the company acquired the 16 Marriott hotels in the UK for £180m from Scott‟s 
Hospitality of Canada and also the sports and leisure centre business David 
Lloyd Leisure for £190m. The hotel acquisition confirmed Whitbread‟s 
commitment to the activity adding to the 66 Travel Inns and 30 „full service‟ 
hotels it had operated for several years while the leisure centre purchase 
signalled a move away from brewing and related activities (Buckley, 1995). 
This re-positioning would have been greater had the agreed £1.05bn 
purchase of Forte‟s roadside restaurants, including 430 Little Chef and Happy 
Eater sites and 26 Welcome Break service stations, and budget hotels - 55 
branded Coty in France and 127 Travelodge in the UK - been completed 
(Blackwell, 1995). Granada‟s acquisition of Forte stopped the transaction. 
Whitbread further expanded its restaurants by acquiring Pelican, the operator 
of Café Rouge and Dome restaurants, for £133.1m in 1996. While remaining 
in the related diversified category, Whitbread‟s Herfindahl index had fallen to 
0.29 reflecting the wider spread of its activities. Brewing and soft drinks had 
become the largest activity accounting for 42.6% of total turnover. The change 
in portfolio had improved performance with ROCE reaching 12.8% in 1998 
although the P/E remained little changed from 1993 at 13.5.    
 
The 5 years from 1998 to 2003 saw Whitbread continue to build the strategy 
initiated before 1998. The company added to its hotel and leisure activities 
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acquiring the Swallow chain of hotels in 2000 and Cannon‟s Dutch Health and 
Fitness activities in 2003. In 2000 the company also tried to acquire the UK 
retailing interests – off-licences and 3,600 public houses – of Allied Domecq. 
Had the acquisition been completed, Whitbread‟s public house estate would 
have risen to 7,000 and would only have been approved by the Competition 
Commission on condition that Whitbread‟s brewing activities were divested 
(Willman, 1999). Eventually the Allied Domecq estate was acquired by Punch 
Taverns.  
 
The failure to add to its public house estate was followed by the disposal in 
May 2000 of the company‟s brewing activities to Belgium‟s Interbrew who also 
acquired the brewing activities of Bass (Beck & Carreyrou, 2000). This was 
followed by the sale of the public house estate to Morgan Grenfell Private 
Equity for £1.63bn and the return of £1.1bn to shareholders (Saigol, 2001).         
 
By 2003 Whitbread had become a conglomerate its largest activities being 
restaurants and hotels which generated 54.7% and 31.9% of total revenues. 
The Herfindahl index had increased to 0.41. Interestingly, despite the clear 
differences in operating hotels, restaurants and health clubs, the company 
saw itself as a „focussed leisure business‟ (Whitbread Annual Report & 
Accounts 2002/03, p2). Neither the company‟s ROCE, 8.1%, nor P/E ratio, 
12.0, was significantly different from those of 1993 but the level of major 
shareholdings had risen from 4.8% in 1993 to 20.4% in 2003.                                  
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Whitbread adhered closely to the corporate governance Code of Practice. 
Both Sir Michael Angus, chairman in 1993 and 1998, and his successor, Sir 
John Banham, were non-executive and there was always a separate chief 
executive officer. The percentage of non-executives on the board increased 
from 50% in 1993 to 64.3% in 1998 before falling to 54.5% in 2003.  
 
From the end of the 1980s Whitbread, like its fellow brewer Bass, found itself 
operating in an industry under significant Competition Commission 
restrictions, via the Beer Orders, on market shares. From 1993 both 
Whitbread and Bass took steps to move away from their traditional brewing 
activities with Whitbread finally exiting brewing in 2000 and growing its hotels, 
restaurants and leisure activities to become a conglomerate by 2003.      
 
7.3.4 Temporary Conglomerates 
Guinness/Diageo and North West Water/United Utilities were identified as 
conglomerates in 1998 only having been a related diversifier and a dominant 
business company respectively in 1993. By 2003 both companies had 
refocused their activities with North West Water/United Utilities becoming a 
related diversifier and Guinness/Diageo a single business company.   
 
7.3.4.1 Guinness/Diageo  
Diageo was formed in 1997 by the acquisition of Grand Metropolitan by 
Guinness. In 1993 Guinness and Grand Metropolitan were both related 
diversified companies the former having grown through acquisitions, notably 
that of Distillers in 1986, to become a substantial brewing and spirits 
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company, the latter had grown, also through acquisitions including US food 
group Pillsbury for $5.8bn in 1989, to have similar interests in wines and 
spirits together with another activity, food, including fast food, with brands 
such as Burger King. Although both were related diversifiers, only Guinness 
had a core activity, that of its traditional brewing business which included the 
eponymous stout. Reflecting the greater focus of Guinness, it had a 
Herfindahl index of 0.52 compared to the 0.38 of the more diversified Grand 
Metropolitan. The financial performance of the companies showed Grand 
Metropolitan to be generating higher returns with a ROCE of 22.0% compared 
to 16.0% at Guinness.   
 
The creation of Diageo was justified on the synergies it would create - £195m 
by the 3rd year (Willman, 1998b) – by rationalising operations including 
distribution and administration and „managing for value‟ with a view to 
returning cash to shareholders (Willman, 1988a). The 1998 accounts show 
that Diageo had no core activity although wine and spirits (43.6%) and 
brewing (30.8%) generated the bulk of its turnover with food (18.3%) a distant 
third. The new company‟s ROCE was 22.9% and its Herfindahl index 0.32.  
 
After 1998 Diageo, through a series of major divestments, underwent 
significant change retreating from conglomeration to become a single 
business company focused on premium drinks. The first divestment, the sale 
of two of its leading brands – Bombay Gin and Dewar‟s Scotch – to Bacardi-
Martini for £1.15bn, was unavoidable as it was mandated by the Competition 
Commission when they agreed to Guinness‟ acquisition of Grand Metropolitan 
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(Willman, 1998b). The subsequent divestments were made with the aim of 
refocusing by divesting the low margin food businesses which faced severe 
competition as exemplified by Burger King‟s battle with McDonalds (Jones, 
2002). Pillsbury was sold to General Mills for £4.3bn in 2001 and Berger King, 
after several failed attempts, to a consortium backed by private equity 
company Texas Pacific for £0.6bn in 2002. Diageo used some of the 
proceeds from the Pillsbury sale to return £1.7bn to shareholders. In addition 
to divestments, Diageo also made acquisitions to increase the size and 
international spread of its spirits activities acquiring Seagram‟s spirits 
business for £3.7bn in December 2000 as part of a joint (with Pernod Ricard) 
break-up acquisition from Vivendi Universal SA of Seagram for £5.62bn 
(Blackwell & Edgecliffe, 2000).        
 
By 2003 Diageo had divested all but its brewing and spirits businesses which 
had effectively become, and were reported as, a single activity called 
Premium Drinks. Diageo was now a single business company with a strategy 
to expand globally. The group‟s Herfindahl index was 1.00. According to the 
annual report (p9), in 2003 Diageo had „….completed the strategic transition 
to a focused premium drinks company‟, a process started in 2000. Given the 
different manufacturing processes for brewing and wines/spirits the 
amalgamation of the activities into one reported division could understate 
Diageo‟s degree of diversification. However, a review of the company‟s 
brands shows brewing to be a relatively small part of total activity and 
therefore separation of the brewing and spirits business would be unlikely to 
alter categorisation as a single business company. 
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The ROCE improved each year until 2002 when it reached 31.5% before 
falling to 10.6% in 2003, a year adversely affected by a £1.5bn loss on 
disposal of the Berger King business. ROCE recovered to 35.6% in 2004.   
 
Corporate governance at Grand Metropolitan, Guinness and Diageo broadly 
met Best Practice with a majority of non-executive directors and split roles of 
chairman and chief executive although only by 2003 was the chairman, Lord 
Blyth, a non-executive. In 1998 the board was in transition following the 
creation of Diageo and, unusually, had joint executive chairmen – George Bull 
from Grand Metropolitan and Anthony Greener from Guinness – and a 
majority of executive directors. Major shareholdings fell from 23.9% and 3.5% 
at Guinness and Grand Metropolitan respectively in 1993 to 14.8% in 1998 
and zero in 2003 although the unwinding of a cross-shareholding agreement 
with LMVH (Louis Vuitton Moet Hennessey) which was the only major 
Guinness shareholder in 1993 and held 10.8% of Diageo in 1998 was a major 
factor in the reduction.  
 
The refocusing had little effect on investors‟ view of the company‟s future 
prospects. In 1993 the P/E ratios of Guinness and Grand Metropolitan were 
very similar at 17.8 and 18.2 respectively. A modest improvement was seen in 
1998 with an increase to 20.7 following the creation of Diageo but by 2003 it 
had fallen back to 17.0.                 
 
Guinness/Diageo is, notwithstanding the company‟s amalgamation of its 
brewing and spirits activities, an example of industry consolidation and the 
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creation of a global business that divested activities to concentrate its 
resources in an area offering the greatest potential for growth.  
 
7.3.4.2 North West Water/United Utilities 
North West Water was floated on the LSE when the UK government privatised 
the regional water companies in 1989. In 1993 the company had a small 
number of related activities, including consultancy and the management of 
overseas water treatment facilities, but the provision of water and sewerage 
services to the north west of England remained its dominant activity. One of 
the drivers for diversification was the perceived need to generate income from 
businesses that, unlike the core water business which was under the 
jurisdiction of the Office of Water Regulation (Offwat), were not regulated by 
the government and therefore did not have price controls or efficiency targets 
to meet. In 1993 North West Water was a dominant business company with a 
Herfindahl index of 0.64. Investors saw the group, which achieved a ROCE of 
12.0% in 1993, as a low risk/low growth regulated utility and its shares traded 
on a P/E of only 9.7.     
 
Between 1993 and 1998, the company expanded both its regulated and 
unregulated activities. In 1995 it acquired Norweb, the regional electricity 
company covering the north west of England, for £1.8bn to become a multi-
utility company and changed its name to United Utilities. However, in order to 
mitigate the restrictive influence of UK regulators, both Offwat and, for the 
newly acquired UK electricity business, Offgen, the company continued to 
build its infrastructure management business and also developed a number of 
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other non-regulated businesses (Martinson, 1996). These additional activities 
included a business to compete in the broader UK energy market which was 
deregulated in 1998, a specialist (business and government) 
telecommunications company and Vertex, a business process outsourcing 
company. These changes turned the United Utilities into a conglomerate with 
a core activity of electricity generation and distribution that accounted for 
53.6% of turnover.  
 
The changes pushed ROCE up to 13.6% and the increased potential for 
future growth in the unregulated activities explains the increase in the P/E 
ratio to 11.5. Reflecting its broader range of activities, United Utilities‟ 
Herfindahl index had fallen to 0.47. However, despite the improvements, 
investors were unimpressed by the financial performance which had failed to 
meet the ambitious targets set by the board and forced changes in the chief 
executive and chairman. In late 1997, the new leadership announced that the 
company would seek greater focus to restore performance (Holberton, 1997).            
  
The breadth of United Utilities‟ activities had narrowed by 2003 following the 
sale of its US electricity business and, in 2000, of its Norweb retail power 
supply business for £500m to TXU, a subsidiary of Texas Utilities of the US 
which had also acquired Eastern Electricity in 1998 shortly after its demerger 
from Hanson. The period saw substantial consolidation through the UK 
electricity industry with several regional electricity companies being acquired, 
some by US and European companies. The range potential bidders for 
Norweb had included UK companies Scottish Power, Scottish & Southern, 
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National Power and British Energy, European companies Electricite de 
France, RWE and Viag/Veba and US company AES (Taylor, 2000). In 1999 
United Utilities itself was targeted by National Power, which had already 
acquired Midlands Electricity, but no formal bid was tabled (Taylor, 1999). The 
substantial reduction of electricity activities was complemented by further 
growth, largely organic, through the winning of new outsourcing and 
management contracts, in the company‟s non-regulated activities.  
 
By 2003 the company had moved back to related diversification although it 
reported its utility – water and energy – activities together. Had those 
businesses been separated it is unlikely that the company would have been 
re-categorised as a conglomerate as, having divested the largest parts of its 
energy activities with the sale of the US business and largest parts of the UK 
business, water represented a significant percentage of the Licenced Multi-
utility Operations turnover. The refocusing did little to improve performance; 
ROCE fell to 8.3% and P/E to 9.2 which were close to the pre-diversification 
1993 levels.       
 
The company‟s corporate governance, with the exception of 1993 when 
Desmond Pitcher was executive chairman, met Best Practice with a majority 
of non-executive directors, separate chairmen and chief executives and in 
Clive Harding, between 1998 and 2001, and Roy Evans thereafter, non-
executive chairmen. The aggregate holdings of major shareholders have not 
been significant being 3.5%, 11.3% and 6.4% in 1993, 1998 and 2003.         
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North West Water/United Utilities is the only utility company amongst the 54 
survivors from the 1993 FTSE100 to have been categorised as a 
conglomerate at the end of 1993, 1998 or 2003. The company sought to 
diversify its operations to supply not only the water services that it was 
originally established to provide as a local and then state owned utility 
company but also electricity, telephone services and business outsourcing. 
Diversification was seen as a way of reducing reliance on regulated activities 
with their attendant operational and profit restrictions. However, while the non-
regulated diversifications were successful, the utility diversifications were not. 
The company retreated back towards its original core activity, which it sees as 
offering growth through greater efficiency over and above that demanded by 
the regulator, with non-regulated activities providing further growth through 
increases in volumes.  
 
7.3.5 Conglomerate Exits 
Between 1993 and 1998 4 conglomerates left the FTSE100 index. Forte, the 
hotels group led for many years by Lord Forte and his son, Rocco, was, after 
an acrimonious hostile takeover battle, acquired by the significantly larger 
Granada, another FTSE100 conglomerate. Other exits during the 5 year 
period - Blue Circle, Caradon/Novar and TI Group - were due to losses in 
market value relative to other listed companies.  
 
The period between 1998 and 2003 saw fewer exits with only 2 
conglomerates leaving the index. P&O suffered a loss of market value 
following the demerger of its substantial cruise line, P&O Princess, which 
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subsequently entered into a Dual Listing Agreement with Carnival of the US. 
BTR left the index as a result of its acquisition by Siebe in 1999 by which time 
it had become a related diversifier. 
 
7.3.5.1 Blue Circle 
Blue Circle was, until the 1980s, a company focused on heavy construction 
materials, especially cement which it had been manufacturing for over 100 
years. However, faced with increased competition Blue Circle sought growth 
through diversification acquiring businesses that manufactured heating and 
bathroom equipment, including brands like Potterton and Myson in boilers and 
Armitage Shanks and Ceramica Dolomite in bathrooms. By 1993 Blue Circle 
was a conglomerate with two principal activities - heavy building materials and 
home products - which generated 49.2% and 48.9% of total external turnover; 
the group‟s Herfindahl index was 0.48. The 1993 annual report noted the 
company considered both activities core and worthy of further investment 
creating the potential for conflicting demands for the available funds.     
  
Between 1993 and 1998 Blue Circle‟s activities changed little although, in line 
with peers including Cemex of Mexico and Holderbank of Switzerland, it 
expanded internationally especially in Asia spending more than £700m in 
1998 acquiring cement businesses in Malaysia, Singapore and the Philippines 
(John, 1999). By 1998 heavy building materials was the core activity 
generating 63.4% of the group‟s turnover compared to only 35.4% from home 
products and the Herfindahl index rose to 0.53 primarily reflecting changes in 
relative turnovers. Profits remained broadly constant through the period. 
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Investors appeared unconvinced of the company‟s strategy and its shares 
traded on a P/E of only 10.9 at the end of 1998 despite ROCE increasing from 
10.7% to 14.7%. The fall in share price and market capitalisation caused Blue 
Circle to fall from the FTSE100.   
 
Shortly after the 1998 year end, despite its reiterated commitment to both 
activities, Blue Circle signalled its intention to move back to greater focus with 
the sale of its bathrooms business to American Standard for £253m (Smy, 
1999). This change in strategy was re-enforced by the sale of the heating 
businesses to Baxi Partnerships, a Lancashire co-operative group, for £480m 
in late 1999 and comment from the new chief executive, Rick 
Haythornthwaite, that the company intended to focus on its heavy building 
materials activities (Batchelor, 2000). The new strategy was given little 
opportunity to bear fruit as, after rejecting an initially hostile bid and returning 
£800m to shareholders in 2000, the Blue Circle board recommended a 
second friendly takeover bid in 2001 of £3.1bn from the French company 
Lafarge, which had acquired fellow FTSE100 building materials company 
Redland in 1997, thereby creating the world‟s largest cement manufacturer 
(Skapinker, 2001).   
 
Blue Circle was another UK company that chose diversification as a means of 
reducing its reliance on a competitive industry. Having effectively diversified to 
the point where it had two broadly equal business activities, Blue Circle found 
itself unable to fund growth in both and therefore had to refocus. As with 
Forte, investors had, despite the diversification, endured several years of 
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stagnant growth and were happy to accept Lafarge‟s offer which even the 
board believed represented good value.  
 
7.3.5.2 BTR 
The rise to prominence of BTR (originally floated in 1934 as British Tyre and 
Rubber) was similar to that of Hanson in that it was led by a strong 
personality, Sir Owen Green. Through a series of, often hostile, acquisitions, 
of underperforming and undervalued businesses including Thomas Tilling 
(1983), Dunlop (1985) and Hawker Siddeley (1990) BTR grew into a global 
group with activities as diverse as branded sports goods, including Dunlop 
and Slazenger, and heavy engineering. However, BTR‟s takeover bids were 
not always successful; hostile bids of £1.2bn for UK based glass-maker 
Pilkington and $1.6bn for US-based engineer Norton were defeated in 1986 
and 1990 respectively. The early 1990s saw a major change in BTR‟s strategy 
following the appointment of Alan Jackson as chief executive in 1991. After 
years of serial acquisition with few divestments the group began to sell 
businesses it felt could not become world leaders; in 1991 the Pretty Polly 
hosiery business was sold to US company Sara Lee for £117.5m. BTR was 
now seeking greater focus in those businesses that offered profitable and 
sustainable growth and market leadership (Economist, 1991).          
  
In 1993 BTR was the 9th largest company, by market capitalisation, in the 
FTSE100 with a value of £12,976m. It had a turnover of £8,422m, operating 
profits of £1,292m and, reflecting its diversity, a very low Herfindahl index of 
0.21. BTR did not have a core activity and its 3 largest divisions each 
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contributed around 24% of total external turnover. The company achieved a 
ROCE of 24.0% and its shares traded on a P/E ratio of 20.9 suggesting 
investors continued to hold it in high regard and thought it had a strong future. 
In 1993 BTR‟s executive chairman Sir Owen Green retired with Norman 
Ireland, a director for 24 years, replacing him.  
 
Norman Ireland‟s first year at the helm proved challenging as BTR began to 
lose the confidence of investors. The problems started when, after years of 
substantial growth, in September 1994 BTR announced pre-tax profits for the 
first half of the year were only 12% higher than the previous year suggesting 
that the bubble had burst. Furthermore, it was implied that the company‟s 
historically high sales margins were under severe pressure and could fall. 
From late 1994 onward, except for a few brief rallies, the BTR share price lost 
ground relative to the FTSE100 index and the announcement of the 
impending retirements of Ireland and chief executive officer Alan Jackson 
highlighted the lack of natural successors to the top executive positions. The 
team that had built BTR had all retired and the company would be run by 
„outsiders‟. In 1996 BTR reported half year profits, excluding £622m 
restructuring costs, down 14% on the previous year and announced it would 
be divesting low-growth businesses that were generating 26%, approx. 
£2.3bn, of total turnover (Parker-Pope, 1996). Analysts remained sceptical of 
BTR‟s ability to restore profitability through its new strategy, which would 
leave its conglomerate status unchanged, of focusing on 4 global businesses; 
automotive, process controls, power drivers and packaging (Tieman, 1996). 
Despite achieving some success in realising the divestment programme, 
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BTR‟s problems did not recede in 1997 and in September a further round of 
divestments representing another 36% or £2.8bn of total turnover were 
announced. This second tranche of divestments included the packaging 
business seen only 12 months earlier as being a core activity (Tieman, 1997). 
The deterioration in the company‟s fortunes led to a 5th profit warning in 3 
years (Edgecliffe-Johnson, 1997). The 1997 accounts, the last BTR were to 
publish as an independent company, show its disposal programme to have 
increased focus, raising the Herfindahl index to 0.52, and that engineering 
activities accounted for 68.4% of total turnover of £7,435m. At the end of 1998 
BTR was in 72nd place in the FTSE100 with a value of £4,004m, a third of its 
1993 value.    
 
Early in 1999 BTR was acquired by Siebe, a fellow FTSE100 company, to 
create Invensys. The rationale behind the deal, which was presented as a 
merger, was the creation of a global group with a core competency and 
leadership in controls and automation. Invensys believed it would achieve 
significant synergies through the rationalisation of operations and activities 
restoring shareholder value that had fallen at both Siebe and BTR. Almost 
since its creation, Invensys has experienced serious financial problems, many 
legacies from BTR and Siebe, which were exacerbated by its failure to 
complete disposal programmes or to achieve the expected sale proceeds for 
some businesses.  Invensys fell out of the FTSE100 although it remains in the 
FTSE250 and, after further financial restructurings and rights issues, has 
begun to recover.          
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BTR in its heyday was, like Hanson and Williams, described as a „deal-making 
machine‟ growing by acquiring underperforming and undervalued companies; 
the „classic‟ route to conglomeration. However, when the pool of suitable 
acquisitions began to dry up in the early 1990s and BTR‟s long-standing 
management team began to retire, the company found it difficult to manage 
the widely diverse conglomerate that had been created. The strategy was 
changed but not soon enough and, after significant deteriorations in 
performance and investor confidence that saw massive reductions in market 
value, BTR lost its independence. 
 
7.3.5.3 Caradon/Novar 
Caradon, which later changed its name to Novar, was a conglomerate in 1993 
when it was 65th in the FTSE100. Its core activity – building products – 
accounted for 65.5% of total turnover with two other activities – automotive 
and security printing – generating 13.6% and 21.0% respectively. The 
company‟s Herfindahl index was 0.49 and, with a P/E of 33.5, investors 
appeared confident that it would enjoy significant future growth and maintain 
its high level of return – 1993 ROCE was 35.3%. The 1993 annual report and 
accounts notes that the year saw significant changes at the group with the 
disposal of an investment in CarnaudMetalbox and the acquisition of a 
substantial part of RTZ‟s Pillar building products division.         
 
While Caradon continued to perform well in 1995, from 1996 it began to 
struggle in the face of increased competition, especially price competition in 
window, doors and bathroom products. Caradon was also marked down by 
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analysts who believed it had overpaid for acquisitions including that of Pillar 
(Pretzlik, 1999). The company responded by embarking on a reversal of its 
diversification strategy; non-core activities would be divested to increase focus 
on the core building products activities (London, 1996). Between 1994 and 
early 1999 divestments reduced the number of operating businesses from 60 
to 24 and allowed the return of capital to its shareholders. The falling share 
price together with share repurchases caused Caradon to fall out of the 
FTSE100. By the end of 1998 the company had retreated back from 
conglomeration to become a dominant business company with building 
products generating 83.4% of external turnover and security printing 16.6%. 
The company‟s Herfindahl index had risen to 0.72 reflecting its narrower 
spread of activities. The 1998 financial performance was substantially worse 
than 1993 with ROCE of (21.8)% and poor investor expectations were 
reflected in a P/E ratio of only 8.3.      
 
Caradon continued to divest non-core activities in 1999 with the sale of its 
doors and windows businesses in Germany and the US and of its 
bathroom/heating businesses, including Mira showers and Ideal boilers, in 
2000. The sale of the bathroom business (Rivlin, 2000) came only a year after 
the company had failed in a bid to acquire Blue Circle‟s heating businesses. 
Caradon reinvested some of the disposal proceeds in acquiring building 
materials businesses. Despite the extent of the strategic changes at Caradon, 
some shareholders thought it could and should have gone further and the UK 
Active Value Fund tried, though a special meeting in 2000, to force the 
company to return a further £130m to shareholders and dispose of two 
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divisions to become a single business company (Felstead, 2000); the 
resolutions were defeated in what was effectively a vote of confidence in the 
board. At the end of 2003, Caradon, renamed Novar, remained a dominant 
business company although its Herfindahl index had fallen to 0.63 suggesting 
greater diversification than in 1998. The increased focus achieved through the 
divestment programme saw some recovery in ROCE to (8.5)% and a P/E ratio 
of 13.8 suggesting either the recovery was underway or a takeover was likely. 
 
In 2005, the company was, after an initial approach from private equity 
company Melrose, acquired by Honeywell who intended to break-up the 
business retaining only some of the building products businesses (Orr, 2004).  
 
Caradon, with its 60 operating business in 1994, epitomised the diverse 
conglomerate. From 1994 onwards several of the company‟s key businesses 
faced severe competition forcing it to refocus to restore shareholder value and 
returns. Caradon did not have regulatory issues in any of its activities but that 
also suggests it did not have sufficient size or critical mass in any business 
hampering its ability to compete effectively on price which was a major 
problem for its businesses. 
 
7.3.5.4 Forte 
Starting in 1936 with a small milk bar in London‟s Regent Street financed with 
£2,000, Charles (later Lord) Forte and then his son, Sir Rocco Forte, built a 
hotels and restaurants group with interests ranging from Little Chef and 
Happy Eater roadside cafes through budget hotel chains like Posthouse and 
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Travelodge to exclusive hotels such as London‟s Claridges and Hyde Park. 
The company, although best known for its hotels activities, included 
substantial restaurant and contract catering activities that led to its 
categorisation as a conglomerate. At the end of 1993, Forte had a Herfindahl 
index of 0.34 reporting 4 divisions and 2 unrelated activities; hotels and 
restaurants/contract catering. 
 
The mid 1990s saw Forte embark on a restructuring and rationalisation 
programme to improve the quality of its services and achieve greater focus. 
The company sold its Gardner Merchant contract catering business, Alpha 
airport food business and a number of hotels deemed „non-core‟. At the same 
time it expanded internationally acquiring additional overseas hotels; in 1995 it 
acquired the 54 hotel Meriden chain in France for £215m. In an interview in 
1995, Sir Rocco Forte outlined a strategy of developing an international 5 star 
hotel business (Davidson, 1995) and acquisitions such as that of Meriden 
were consistent with that strategy.   
 
In 1996 Forte was acquired for £3.9bn by Granada Group, another FTSE100 
conglomerate, after a hostile and very acrimonious takeover battle. Granada 
had little interest in Forte‟s luxury hotels including the Meriden and Exclusive 
chains, which it pledged to sell in its offer documents, but wanted the high 
volume budget hotels and roadside restaurants. In making its bid, Granada 
was taking advantage of Forte‟s poor performance and the low level of 
shareholder confidence in the conglomerate. A P/E ratio of 20.5 suggests 
investors had a positive view of the company at the end of 1993 when it was 
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72nd in the FTSE100. However, the company stagnated in the following years 
with ROCE decreasing marginally from 7.3% to 6.6% by 1995. Forte 
addressed the shareholder concerns in its defence documents effectively 
renouncing its conglomerate strategy in favour of focus on hotels which was 
to be achieved through the sale of the roadside restaurants and Travelodge 
hotels to Whitbread for £1.05bn. Forte also pledged to return £800m to 
shareholders and annual dividend growth of 20% to January 1999 (Cozens, 
1996).  
 
The Granada bid was successful although the Competition Commission 
expressed concern regarding the number of motorway service areas 
controlled by the enlarged group and required the sale of all 21 of Forte‟s 
Welcome Break service areas and 4 motorway sites acquired for future 
development. The CC also imposed price limits on the services offered at 
Forte sites through the period until their sale (Daneshkhu, 1996). However, 
given that no more could be added, service areas were seen as offering only 
moderate growth as compared to the turnaround opportunities offered by the 
Happy Eater and Little Chef restaurant chains and therefore the CC‟s 
conditions were not considered a problem. After completing the acquisition 
Granada wasted no time in absorbing Forte‟s operations and making 
considerable cost savings while reinvigorating the roadside restaurants 
(Cassell, 1996).  
 
Forte provides an example of a conglomerate that, realising its performance 
had deteriorated, embarked on a strategy to return to greater focus. 
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Unfortunately, the strategy fell short of what was expected by shareholders 
providing a predator, Granada, an opportunity to acquire the company. The 
Forte bid defence offered its shareholders even greater focus with the 
planned divestment of high volume activities to Whitbread but with no 
guarantee of success. The Granada bid effectively offered Forte shareholders 
a choice as to whether to support the incumbent Forte management in an 
example of Porter‟s Market for Corporate Control.          
 
7.3.5.5 P&O 
P&O (the Peninsular and Oriental Steam Navigation Company), formed in 
1837 to fulfil a contract to transport mail to Portugal and Spain, was one of the 
oldest companies quoted on the LSE. Until the 1970s when „shipbuilding 
prices boomed, the empire collapsed, air travel took off, and tanker rates 
plummeted‟ (Jowit, 2000) shipping, both cargo and passenger, was its core 
activity. However, the decline of traditional markets necessitated significant 
changes including the introduction of containerised shipping, the replacement 
of passenger liners with cruise liners and diversification. A series of 
acquisitions added construction and property development, warehousing, 
tools, catering, security and exhibition centres transforming P&O into a 
conglomerate. In 1993 P&O‟s Herfindahl index was 0.24. The company, which 
was 43rd in the FTSE100, enjoyed a high investor rating with a P/E ratio of 
35.1 reflecting strong future expectations and achieved a ROCE of 14.5%.  
 
After 1993, P&O‟s performance, and its rating amongst investors, deteriorated 
as concerns grew over the effect the newly opened Channel Tunnel was 
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having on ferry operations and problems in construction and container 
shipping. In response to these issues, P&O embarked on a £1bn disposal 
programme, with proceeds to be reinvested in cruise ships, to refocus around 
the core shipping operations (Tieman, 1996). Earmarked for disposal were the 
Bovis construction businesses, investment properties, including Manchester‟s 
Arndale Centre, and several small ports businesses. In addition, the group 
also restructured several of its businesses transferring some to joint ventures 
although there were some competition issues. In 1996 its English Channel 
ferry operations were merged with those of competitor Stena Line in a 60:40 
joint venture. As the enlarged ferry operator had a significant cross-channel 
market share, the transaction was investigated by the CC but, as it meant 
ferry services would be maintained and continue to provide consumer choice 
and competition for the loss-making Eurotunnel, allowed to proceed. In 1997 
P&O put its container operations in a 50:50 joint venture with Koninklijke 
Nedlloyd Groep of the Netherlands creating the world‟s leading container 
shipping line and the potential for significant cost savings. The benefits of the 
restructuring had yet to be fully realised in 1998 - the P/E had fallen to only 
15.3 in line with an ROCE that had deteriorated to only 10.2% with some 
analysts remaining unconvinced by the restructuring (Gresser, 1997).   
 
The company‟s failure to restore investor confidence drove it to announce a 
further rationalisation programme in 1999 (Bernholt & Kibazo, 1999). The 
construction company, Bovis, was sold to Lend Lease, an Australian property 
group, for £285m in 1999 and several investment properties were sold 
generating a further £650m. The company also prepared to float its container 
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joint venture, P&O Nedlloyd, although that divestment was not fully completed 
until early 2004. Over the same period the group invested £800m in its 
international ports activities and, primarily to release shareholder value, 
floated its substantial cruise line business as P&O Princess in 2000. As a 
result of the demerger, the group became a related diversified company and, 
because of the fall in its market capitalisation – down to £1.74bn from a 1998 
peak of £4.6bn - fell out of the FTSE100. The return to greater focus failed to 
improve the group‟s performance and by 2003 ROCE had fallen to only 4.7%.  
 
P&O was acquired by Dubai Ports World for £3.9bn in 2006 (Tait, 2006) while 
the single business company P&O Princess, after a brief period as an 
FTSE100 company, merged in 2003 with Carnival Cruises of the US with the 
enlarged company taking a DLC structure retaining membership of the 
FTSE100 and S&P500 indices.  
 
P&O is an example of a company that, faced with structural and technological 
change in its core businesses, saw diversification as essential. However, 
conglomeration failed to stabilise profitability and investor sentiment pushed 
the company back towards greater focus and the re-development of one of its 
original core activities, the cruise line, which was eventually floated partly to 
create two more focused companies and partly to release shareholder value. 
 
7.3.5.6 TI Group 
TI Group, formerly Tube Investments, was created in 1919 by a merger 
between Midlands-based tube manufacturers and distributors. By the 1980s, 
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TI‟s business portfolio was dominated not by the original tube businesses, 
which were still owned, but by a range of branded consumer products 
businesses including cookers, kettles, heaters and bicycles. The intense 
competition in these markets, exemplified by that in the cycle market where 
low cost foreign imports were gaining market share, impacted negatively on 
TI‟s profitability and necessitated significant portfolio change (Lorenz, 1996).  
 
By 1993, through a series of acquisitions and divestments, the business 
portfolio of TI changed; consumer products businesses were divested and 
aerospace, seals and automotive components businesses acquired. The 
transforming deals were the sale of the Creda appliances business to GEC in 
1987 and the acquisitions of US mechanical seals company John Crane 
Houdaille and small bore tube manufacturer Bundy Corporation in 1987 and 
1988 respectively. In addition to repositioning the group as a tube and seals 
manufacturer, the transactions increased geographic spread reducing reliance 
on UK and Commonwealth markets. The final stage in the transformation was 
the acquisition of Dowty for £509m in 1992 which, after unwanted activities 
were divested to Cray Electronics, added aerospace activities to the group 
and moved it into the FTSE100.      
 
The 1993 accounts show TI to be a conglomerate with a relatively balanced 
portfolio of engineering, polymers/seals and aerospace activities that was 88th 
in the FTSE100 and had a Herfindahl index of 0.35. The group‟s financial 
performance was good with a ROCE of 21.4% and a P/E ratio of 27.4 
reflecting strong investor confidence in the group.    
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Between 1993 and 1998 TI‟s portfolio remained unchanged although the 
group did make three acquisitions; Swedish seals manufacturer Forsheda for 
£189m in 1996, US automotive engineering components company S&H 
Fabricating & Engineering for £212m in 1998 and UK engineering and 
aerospace company EIS for £267m also in 1998. There were also disposals 
of small non-core businesses. By 1998 the polymers/seals and engineering 
businesses had grown to generate 40.1% and 38.2% of turnover respectively 
and were each almost twice as large as the aerospace division which 
produced 21.7% of turnover. The Herfindahl index at 0.35 remained virtually 
unchanged. The company remained profitable with ROCE at 33.6% although 
lack of support amongst investors for engineering stocks meant the P/E had 
fallen to only 10.3 and the reduction in the group‟s market capitalisation had 
caused it to fall out of the FTSE100 in December 1997.    
 
After 1998, TI continued to make targeted acquisitions buying US automotive 
components company Walbro Corporation for £393m and German polymer 
company Busak + Shamban for £275m in 1999 (Larsen, 1999). However, the 
financial performance of the company began to falter with ROCE down to 
24.4% and analysts expressing concern that TI had no interest in aircraft 
electronics which offered substantial future growth (March & Larsen, 1999). In 
order restore its fortunes and boost shareholder value, TI looked for a partner 
entering talks with UK engineering company BBA but the discussions proved 
unsuccessful as insufficient synergies could be identified and BBA were 
unhappy at TI‟s level of exposure to the increasingly competitive automotive 
industry (Malkani, 1999). In 2000, in the aftermath of the failed talks with BBA, 
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TI was acquired by Smiths Industries, an FTSE100 conglomerate with 
significant aerospace activities, for £1.8bn and a pledge to return to 
shareholders up to £1.2bn of the proceeds from the planned disposal of TI‟s 
automotive businesses. Smiths wanted TI‟s aerospace activities and has, 
albeit slowly, since undertaken a disposal programme to divest it‟s other 
activities.       
 
The changes at TI were achieved in a corporate governance environment that 
improved through the 1990s. The roles of chairman and chief executive were 
split in 1998 although there remained a majority of executive directors.   
 
TI is an example of a company that, in response to market forces, made 
significant changes to its portfolio of activities but retained its conglomerate 
strategy with no activity generating more than 50% of total turnover.    
 
7.3.6 Conglomerate Entries 
Only 2 companies entered the FTSE100 as conglomerates; Smiths Industries 
between 1993 and 1998 and Old Mutual between 1998 and 2003.   
 
7.3.6.1 Old Mutual 
Old Mutual was the only conglomerate to enter the FTSE100 between 1998 
and 2003. Although the majority of its business activities, which include 
insurance, banking and asset management, were located in South Africa, the 
company saw the LSE as offering better access to international capital 
markets and chose it for its primary listing on demutualisation, which had been 
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driven by the need to grow internationally, in 1999 (Ashurst, 1997). In deciding 
to list in London, Old Mutual was following fellow South African companies; 
miners Billiton and Anglo American and brewer South African Breweries 
(Wright, 1999). Because of its size, Old Mutual immediately became a 
constituent of the FTSE100. 
 
Within a year of listing, Old mutual made a series of acquisitions that built on 
existing operations and reduced its reliance on its traditional South African 
businesses; the group aimed to derive 20% to 30% of income from outside 
South Africa within 3 to 5 years of floatation. This internationalisation of the 
group was necessary given South Africa‟s high, compared to developed 
countries, risk of civil unrest and weak currency. The first major acquisition 
was that of financial services company Gerrard for £525m followed by that of 
US fund manager, United Asset Management (UAM), for £1.5bn plus a further 
$420m to gain control of a UAM associate company (Croft, 2000). The 
acquisitions, which did not broaden the company‟s activities, reduced the 
percentage of income derived in South Africa from 90% to 75% (Targett, 
2000). In 2001 the company added to its US operations, acquiring Fidelity and 
Guaranty Life Insurance for £441m and a number of smaller businesses 
(Bolger, 2001). In 2003 Old Mutual was a conglomerate with a Herfindahl 
index of 0.45 and its corporate governance was in line with Best Practice.  
 
Old Mutual is unique amongst FTSE100 companies; a „foreign‟ conglomerate 
that joined on demutualisation. The company has changed since floatation but 
rather than using acquisitions and divestments to achieve greater focus it has 
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used them to internationalise its activities and reduce reliance on its traditional 
South African businesses.    
 
7.3.6.2 Smiths Industries 
Smiths Industries has moved a long way from its origins as a watchmaker 
founded in 1851 by Samuel Smith. The company‟s diversification started in 
1904 when motor accessories were added followed by altimeters which 
marked its entry into aerospace (Kay, 1992) which was its core activity in 
1993 generating 54.1% of turnover alongside medical systems, 24.9%, and 
various industrial activities, 20.9%. The automotive activities that in 1982 
generated 70% of turnover had been divested in the late 1980s. Smiths‟ 
development had been achieved through a mix of acquisitive and organic 
growth from successfully tendering for contracts with customers such as 
aircraft maker Boeing and British Aerospace. In 1993 the company, not an 
FTSE100 constituent, was a conglomerate with a Herfindahl of 0.40 achieving 
a healthy ROCE of 27.2%. The P/E ratio of 18.4 suggested investors were 
cautiously optimistic regarding its future prospects.             
     
Between 1993 and 1998 on the back of strong financial performance - 
turnover increased from £726m in 1993 to £1,199m, operating profit rose from 
£106m to £240m and ROCE from 27.2% to 56.2% - Smiths gained entry to 
the FTSE100. Investors remained cautiously optimistic of future prospects 
with the P/E ratio broadly static at 17.8. The period also saw improvement in 
corporate governance with the splitting of the roles of chairman and chief 
executive in 1996 although the chairman, Sir Roger Hurn, retained his 
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executive status. While no major acquisitions were made, Smiths sought to 
reduce its reliance on the UK and US markets through expansion in Asia. The 
company remained a conglomerate and its Herfindahl fell to 0.34 reflecting a 
more even spread of activity across its three businesses – aerospace 
(38.6%), medical systems (28.7%) and industrial (32.6%).              
 
Acquisitions, with the aim of expanding existing aerospace activities, were the 
driver of growth between 1998 and 2003. In 1999 the company acquired the 
aerospace business of Invensys, which was seeking to refocus its activities 
around controls, for £109m (Malkani, 1999) and in 2000 it acquired TI Group 
for £1.8bn with a further payment of up to £1.2bn dependent on the 
divestment of TI‟s automotive businesses. Undoubtedly, TI‟s aerospace 
business attracted Smiths but the acquisition, in addition to automotive 
components, brought seals and engineering businesses that increased 
diversity in the short term. Investors and analysts were not convinced of the 
benefits of the acquisition especially as the potential for synergies was talked 
down by Smiths (Wachman, 2000). In 2001 Smiths finally divested the 
automotive components businesses but only after a protracted and 
complicated  process including debt-for-equity swaps, outside financing and 
MBOs that gave Smiths and TI‟s old shareholders 19.9% and 55% 
respectively of a new company, TI Automotive (Eaglesham, 2001). There 
have since been further divestments of TI businesses, notably the sale of the 
seals business to Swedish company Trelleborg AB for £495m in late 2003.                
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Notwithstanding the disposal of the automotive activities, the TI acquisition 
increased Smiths diversity and its Herfindahl index fell to 0.30 in 2003. 
However, the enlarged company‟s 2003 performance improved over that of 
1998 with ROCE up to 31.8%. The P/E ratio of 13.2 suggested investors were 
uncertain of future performance.                 
 
Smiths maintained its conglomerate strategy throughout the research period 
and, in contrast to its peers, became steadily more diversified in terms of its 
Herfindahl index which was 0.40 in 1993 and 0.30 in 2003. Furthermore, while 
in 1993 Smiths had a core activity – aerospace generating 54.1% of total 
external turnover – there was no core business in 1998 and 2003 despite the 
acquisition of TI‟s aerospace business doubling its aerospace activities.  
 
7.4 Analysis 
The brief company histories of FTSE100 companies that were conglomerates 
at the end of 1993, 1998 and/or 2003 has provided some insight into the 
drivers behind their adoption, maintenance and/or abandonment of 
conglomeration. The histories clearly show that, despite the inherent 
uniqueness and complexity of the companies involved, there were similarities 
in the external factors they faced, their strategic responses to those catalysts 
for change and the effects implementation of those responses had on their 
levels of diversification. The following table summarises key points from each 
company‟s history to show changes in external factors (drivers), changes in 
corporate strategy (strategic response/restructuring) and changes in 
size/scope/diversity (outcomes). 
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Table 82: Drivers for Strategic Change in Conglomerates 
 
Fin/ Regu Dis- De- Return MoCD 
93 98 03 Quote 2 Strat 3 None Mkts lation posal merger Capital E/N Int'l A/R/S Focus Divers 93 03 Same 
Bass/Intercontinental Hotels C C C Y Y Y Y Y Y E Y S + Y 
BAT/British American Tobacco C S S Y Y Y Y Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
E Y R + Y Y 
Blue Circle 7 C C* Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y Y 
E Y S + Y 
BTR 7 C C S + Y 
Caradon/Novar C D* D* Y  R + Y Y Y 
Forte 8 C 
Granada C C S Y Y Y Y Y E R + Y 
Guinness/Diageo R C S Y Y Y Y E Y R + Y Y Y 
Hanson C D* D* Y Y Y Y N R + Y 
Hays R* R C Y Y E Y A - Y 
Ladbroke/Hilton C D D Y Y Y E Y R + Y Y Y 
NW Water/United Utilities D C R Y Y Y Y N Y A - Y Y Y 
Old Mutual 8 C 
P&O C C R* Y Y Y Y Y E Y R + 
Pearson C C R Y Y Y E Y R - Y Y 
Siebe/Invensys C R R* Y Y Y Y E R - Y 
Smiths Industries C* C C Y Y Y Y Y E Y S - Y 
TI 7 C C* Y Y Y E Y S 
Tomkins C C C Y Y Y Y Y Y E S + Y 
Unilever C C C Y Y Y Y Y S + Y Y Y 
Whitbread R R C Y Y Y Y E Y A - Y Y 
Williams 7 C R Y Y Y Y E R Y Y 
FTSE100 Conglomerates 16 10 7 
Non FTSE100 Conglomerates 1 2 0 
Notes: 
    E xisting or  N ew activities. 
  Changes of less than 0.025 in the herfindahl index are assumed immaterial, i.e. focus remains unchanged. 
Key Acq'ns 
External Drivers 4 Stability/ Strategic Responses/Restructuring 5 Outcomes 6 
Core/Dominant Acty 
1 Categories are;  S - Single business,  D - Dominant business,  R - Related Diversified,  C - Conglomerate. Asterisks indicate non-membership of FTSE100 at the year end. 
2 Companies that have retained their independence are those that continued to be separately quoted on the LSE throughout the research period. 
3 Companies that have a stable strategy are those that have remained in the same diversification category at each period end. 
No Change 
No Change 
Herfindahl Category 1 
Company Consistency 
8 Forte was acquired by Granada in 1996 and Old Mutual listed in 1999. Neither company was quoted for two consecutive periods and changes cannot be identified. 
Only four companies -  Bass/Intercontinental Hotels, Smiths Industries, Tomkins and Unilever  - retained their independence and remained conglomerates. 
7   Changes for companies that did not remain independent - Blue Circle, BTR, TI and Williams - are for the period 1993 to 1998 (1997 for BTR as 1998 accounts not published). 
4 External drivers are categorised as being financial/market or regulatory. Regulatory includes Competition Commission and utility regulators, e.g. Offwat, Offgen. 
5 Strategic Response/Restructuring indicate actions taken. Return of Capital includes special dividends and share repurchase programmes. Key acquisitions are either of 
6 Outcomes show the effect of the strategic responses/restructuring. Category changes ( A dvance,  R etreat , S table) relate to the Model of Corporate Development (MoCD).  
     Increases in herfindahl mean greater focus, decreases more diversification. Changes in core activity, including establishing a dominant activity, reflect portfolio restructuring. 
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The remainder of this section considers links between drivers, strategic 
responses and outcomes. 
 
Stability/Consistency  
There were 22 companies that were conglomerates at one or more of the 
period ends. Of those companies, 16 retained their independence, 7 
maintained their conglomerate strategy and four companies – 
Bass/Intercontinental Hotels, Smiths Industries, Tomkins and Unilever 
retained their independence and maintained their conglomerate strategy at 
each period end. Of the 4 independent conglomerates only Smiths was not a 
constituent of the FTSE100 in 1993, 1998 and 2003 having only entered after 
1993. 
 
Environmental Stability 
Only 4 companies were faced with a business environment in which there 
appeared to be no appreciable changes; their financial performance was 
good, markets were not pressing for strategic change and there were no 
regulatory influences. Two of those companies, Smiths Industries and 
Unilever, retained their conglomerate strategy while one, Hays, moved from 
related diversification to conglomeration and one, Pearson, retreated back 
from conglomeration to related diversification. There were no similarities 
between the companies in terms of their primary, but not necessarily core 
activities, which were; Hays - distribution, Pearson - publishing, Unilever – 
FMCG and Smiths - aerospace 
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Financial/Market Pressures 
Over half, 12 companies, faced financial/market pressures. These pressures 
came either as a consequence of poor financial performance – or the 
expectation of poor future financial performance – or a loss of support for 
conglomeration. Companies, including BTR and P&O, suffered deteriorations 
in their financial performance in the mid-1990s, some of which may have been 
due to industry rather than diversification effects, which led to their decisions 
to refocus through a series of divestments to restore profitability and 
shareholder value. Other companies, including Hanson, Tomkins and 
Williams, appear to have been affected more by sentiment than reality as, 
despite stable financial performance, all three came under investor pressure 
to refocus. Hanson and Williams broke themselves up, primarily through 
demergers, while Tomkins sold several activities, including its largest, the 
RHM bakery business, to increase its focus although it remained a 
conglomerate. 
 
Regulation 
The table shows the extent of regulatory influence, primarily from the 
Competition Commission (Monopolies and Mergers Commission until the 
Competition Act 1988). Notwithstanding the change from public interest to 
competition issues in the CC‟s remit introduced by the Enterprise Act 2002, 
decisions of the CC regarding specific proposed acquisitions or levels of 
competition in specific markets, such as the UK brewing industry, had 
significant effects on FTSE100 companies throughout the research period. 
Some companies were effectively forced to grow through international 
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expansion while others chose to divest activities where further domestic 
acquisitive growth was no longer possible without counterbalancing 
divestments. A prime example is the CC‟s 1989 report into the brewing 
industry which had effects not only on its publication, when significant 
divestments were required of the largest brewers to restore acceptable levels 
of competition, but also when subsequent proposed acquisitions were 
reviewed and reported on by the CC which acted in a manner consistent with 
its earlier actions. Bass/Intercontinental Hotels and Whitbread both eventually 
divested their traditional and historic brewing activities after having been 
thwarted by the CC in attempts to grow them through acquisitions. 
Bass/Intercontinental Hotels remained a conglomerate, albeit with hotels at its 
core rather than brewing, while Whitbread diversified away from brewing 
becoming a hotels and leisure-based conglomerate.    
 
It should also be noted that the CC has resisted attempts by companies to 
force its hand by completing acquisitions likely to have an adverse effect on 
competition before receiving its assent. The CC forced Ladbroke/Hilton to sell 
the 833 shop chain of Corals betting offices it acquired from 
Bass/Intercontinental Hotels for £383m in 1997 because the acquisition 
reduced competition in the off-course betting market.               
 
A second, more recent, regulatory influence was that of utility regulators, e.g. 
Offwat for water companies and Offgen for electricity companies, which were 
established to ensure privatised utility companies that often enjoyed domestic 
geographic monopolies were giving their customers value for money. North 
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West Water/United Utilities‟ diversification into unregulated activities was 
driven by a need to generate a higher percentage of its revenues from 
businesses where pricing and ultimately profits were not dependent on the 
decisions of a regulator.  
 
The third regulatory influence, which affected only Granada, was that of the 
Independent Television Commission (ITC) which implements the government 
legislation relating to non-BBC UK broadcasting. The ITC‟s relaxation of 
restrictions on ownership of multiple UK commercial television franchises 
allowed Granada to grow and focus on its television activities.      
 
With the exception of the ITC, the influence of regulatory authorities is 
consistent; the CC‟s vigilance in pursuing competition discourages or even 
stops concentration and therefore encourages diversification and, similarly, 
utility regulators‟ price-setting activities also encourage regulated utility 
companies to diversify into non-regulated activities. Conversely, the ITC, 
through its removal of restrictions on multiple franchise ownership, 
encouraged focus. An alternative consequence of regulatory limitation of 
domestic growth could be an increase in non-UK acquisitions of focusing 
companies as they sought growth through international expansion. Statistics 
from the ONS (see table 19) support the contention that non-UK acquisitions 
have increased as a percentage of total acquisitions by UK companies 
through the 1990s but conversely so have disposals suggesting that either 
international expansion has not been successful or that the drive to greater 
focus has impacted on both international and domestic activities. 
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Strategic Responses/Restructuring 
The strategic responses show all but 2 companies – Hays and TI – to have 
made significant divestments. TI, which was acquired by Smiths Industries in 
2000, did face financial and market pressures but responded by making 
acquisitions and growing internationally. Hays, took the same approach 
although by 2003 it had announced that it was going to divest its distribution 
business. While both companies remained conglomerates, the portfolio of 
businesses changed at Hays increasing its diversification while changes in the 
relative sizes of TI‟s stable portfolio increased its focus. All other companies 
made significant divestments.  
 
The almost universal incidence of divestment is consistent with the increase in 
focus/reduction in diversification shown in the outcomes section of the table. 
Although almost as many companies made significant acquisitions as made 
significant divestments, the broad move to greater focus suggests 
divestments were of unwanted activities while acquisitions were of activities 
already in the acquirers‟ portfolio producing a net reduction in diversification. 
Only two companies acquired new business activities; Hanson acquired 
Eastern Electricity and North West Water/United Utilities acquired Norweb. 
Hanson made its acquisition in the hope of re-invigorating an ex-public utility 
while North West Water/United Utilities‟ rationale was a desire to consolidate 
its activities in the North West of England and to achieve administrative 
synergies despite the clear differences between water and electricity 
businesses.    
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Table 82 also shows that divesters were also downsizers suggesting that 
while some companies chose to reinvest disposal proceeds in acquisitions 
that would add size and/or international scope to existing activities others 
chose to return capital to shareholders instead of or as well as making 
acquisitions. Tomkins exemplifies a company that made substantial 
divestments, including that of its largest activity RHM, and returned capital to 
shareholders. Downsizers also include two conglomerates – Hanson and 
Williams – that broke themselves up; Hanson divested/demerged all activities 
except for building materials while Williams demerged its two activities and 
delisted itself.      
 
Internationalisation has been pursued by approximately half of the companies. 
This reflects not only the broader move towards globalisation, especially in 
industries such as aerospace and drinks, but also the domestic growth 
limitations placed on some companies by CC decisions in acquisition referral 
cases.  Guinness/Diageo was required to sell some major spirits brands after 
its acquisition of Grand Metropolitan and, faced with these effective UK limits 
on some spirits activities, expanded internationally.             
 
Outcomes 
The charts at the start of this chapter and the tables in the previous chapter 
summarising movements between categories clearly show the principal 
outcome of the strategic responses to external drivers for change to have 
been a broad move towards focus; effectively a retreat back through the 
Model of Corporate Development. This is in contrast to predominantly forward 
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movement to greater diversity shown in previous research (Channon, 1973; 
Whittington & Mayer, 2000).   
 
The majority of conglomerates - 14 compared to 6 - have increased their 
focus as reflected in movements - increases - in their Herfindahl indices 
between 1993 and 2003 or the date they lost their independence. 
Furthermore, only 3 companies – Hays, North West Water/United Utilities and 
Whitbread – moved forward through the Model of Corporate Development 
with 7 companies remaining in the same diversification category and 10 
retreating back to greater focus.  
 
In addition to the trend to focus, the companies that have either adopted or 
maintained conglomeration have narrowed the breadth of their activities. The 
average Herfindahl index of conglomerates increased from 0.36 to 0.44 
between 1993 and 2003 while the average percentage of turnover generated 
by the largest activity rose from 46.0% to 55.5% and that of the largest related 
group from 52.5% to 58.1%. As the result of the narrowing of conglomerate 
activities and the shift of companies to more focused diversification 
categories, the overall FTSE100 Herfindahl index increased steadily from 0.63 
in 1993 to 0.77 in 2003.         
 
In addition to changes in diversification, strategic responses have changed 
the mix of activities at companies. At one company - BAT/British American 
Tobacco – there was a return to what had, until diversification in the 1970s 
and 1980s, been the company‟s core and only activity, tobacco. Almost all 
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other companies made significant changes to their business portfolios the 
exceptions being Guinness/Diageo which started and ended a drinks 
company, Ladbroke/Hilton which retained its mix of betting/gaming and hotels, 
TI which, until its acquisition, maintained a stable portfolio and Unilever which 
disposed of only a minor speciality chemicals activity.               
 
7.5 Summary 
The quantitative analyses that were undertaken in chapter 6 (Analysing the 
Accounting Record) clearly show that there has been a trend towards greater 
focus amongst FTSE100 companies since 1993. Furthermore, the analyses 
showed that conglomerates comprise a significantly smaller percentage of the 
FTSE100 and that the diversification, as measured by Herfindahl indices, 
number of activities and percentage of turnover attributable to the largest 
activity/group of related activities, of those companies that constitute the 
conglomerate category has also fallen. However, the quantitative analyses did 
not shed light on the drivers behind the move to greater focus; analyses of the 
average financial performance (post-hoc) of companies within different 
diversification categories showed no clear differences between them or over 
time. Therefore, company histories were compiled for all 22 companies that 
were, at one or more period end, conglomerates creating a new record of the 
activities of those companies with a view to identifying drivers for change.      
 
The histories show that only 4 of the 22 conglomerates faced a stable external 
environment without either significant financial/market or regulatory pressures. 
Given the high profile of the conglomerates, the presence of investor pressure 
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was expected. However, the extent of regulatory pressure, especially from the 
Competition Commission, was surprising as was the far reaching effects on 
strategic decisions. The withdrawals of both Bass/Intercontinental Hotels and 
Whitbread from their traditional brewing activities are prime examples of the 
effect of regulation on strategic decisions. 
 
The strategic responses illustrate the extent of refocusing activities with all but 
two companies making significant disposals. Furthermore, 7 companies, 
notably Bass/Intercontinental Hotels, Hanson, P&O and Williams, made 
disposals of such a size that the divestment was achieved through demerger 
with the demerged businesses becoming FTSE100 companies. Demergers 
effectively resulted in downsizing as existing shareholders were given shares 
in the newly independent company while other disposals yielded cash which 
could be reinvested and/or returned to shareholders. Several of the 
companies facing regulatory restrictions chose to return some/all proceeds to 
shareholders as their scope for growth was limited. Others turned to 
international expansion to avoid domestic competition issues. Despite the 
regulatory issues, where companies did make acquisitions, they were 
overwhelmingly of activities in which they already had an interest. 
 
The outcomes clearly support the findings of chapter 6; the trend is towards 
focus reflecting a reversal of the normal direction of progression through the 
Model of Corporate Development. In addition, there was an increase in the 
number of companies with a core activity that generated more than 50% of 
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total turnover although at only 5 companies was the core activity the same in 
2003 or at the time independence was lost as it had been in 1993.      
 
The company histories do provide a picture of the key external factors that we 
normally take to be drivers of strategic decisions and strategic change among 
conglomerates. However, the histories do not and, without access to and 
information from the individuals who ran the companies at the time key 
strategic decisions were taken, cannot throw light on the existence and 
influence of internal factors including management attitudes. Almost all 
companies undertake periodic strategic reviews, typically after changes in the 
market/competitive environment or in the chairman/chief executive, but the 
detail of these reviews is, for obvious reasons, seldom made public. 
Therefore, the full range of drivers behind corporate strategy decisions will 
include not only the external factors highlighted here - financial/market and 
regulatory – but also a number of internal factors. 
 
Overall, this qualitative analysis of some of the UK‟s largest companies has 
shown that while there has been a systematic move back to greater focus, the 
forces driving change have been inconsistent in their effects; different forces 
have affected different companies – there was no single universal driving 
force.   
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8. CONCLUSIONS 
The aims of this research were to create a comprehensive database of 
financial and non-financial information on the companies that comprised the 
FTSE100 index – including both industrial/manufacturing and service 
companies – between 1993 and 2003 and to interrogate the database to test 
a number of hypotheses. In addition to assessing whether the incidence of 
conglomeration had declined, hypotheses were also established to compare 
conglomerates with other diversification categories – single business, 
dominant business and related diversified. These hypotheses covered the 
breadth of corporate activities, performance and corporate governance.   
 
Initially, the research used quantitative methods to assess changes in 
conglomeration, the breadth of activities, performance and corporate 
governance across all diversification categories. However, having identified a 
reduction in conglomeration and a broad trend to greater focus and having 
failed to find any drivers of these strategic changes in performance (post-hoc) 
or corporate governance, there was a need to go beyond the comprehensive 
FTSE100 database created as part of this research. In what effectively 
became a second qualitative research phase, company histories of each of 
the 22 FTSE100 companies that were conglomerates at one or more of the 
period ends – 1993, 1998 and 2003 – were compiled and analysed to identify 
the drivers that had influenced strategy formulation and strategy change 
decisions. The histories led to what is effectively a New Model of Corporate 
Development (Chart 15) which reflects the dynamics and tensions involved in 
diversification decisions.          
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Incidence 
In broad terms this research has shown that the incidence of conglomeration 
amongst constituents of the FTSE100 index has reduced between 1993 and 
2003 and that there has been a broad trend toward greater focus. 
Conglomerates comprised 16% of the FTSE100 in 1993, 10% in 1998 and 
only 7% in 2003 with the reduction being more profound amongst 
industrial/manufacturing companies. The constant population provided by the 
54 FTSE100 Survivors showed a similar pattern. There were also reductions 
in related diversification primarily amongst FTSE100 companies. The 
dominant category remained broadly stable with the single business category 
increasing significantly from 21% in 1993 to 34% in 1998 and 44% in 2003 for 
FTSE100 companies and from 18.5% to 25.9% to 31.5% for FTSE100 
Survivors. The patterns for industrial/manufacturing and service companies 
were similar although there were differences in the dominant category, where 
industrial/manufacturing increased and services decreased, and the related 
category, where industrial/manufacturing fell and services were stable.      
 
In addition, when conglomerates and related diversifiers are taken together as 
a multiple business category, the data clearly shows fewer companies to be in 
that group, especially in the industrial/manufacturing sector. When the 
findings of this research are added to those of prior research, it appears that 
there is clear evidence to support the anecdotally derived belief that 
conglomeration peaked in the early 1990s for both industrial/manufacturing 
and service companies as the following tables show.   
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Table 83: UK Manufacturing Company Diversification, 1950-2003 
 
All Figs % 
Channon1 
Whittington 
& Mayer2 
This Research3 
Category 1950 1960 1970 1983 1993 1993 1998 2003 
Single  34 19 6 6 5 7 13 30 
Dominant 41 36 34 16 10 16 23 38 
Related  23 41 54 67 61 53 44 24 
Conglomerate  2 4 6 11 24 24 20 8 
Totals 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Companies 92 96 100 75 67 42 30 37 
 
Source: 
1
Channon (1973, p67) 100 largest UK manufacturing companies as in 1969-70, 
2
Whittington & Mayer (2000, p139) UK based companies amongst largest 100 manufacturers 
as in 1983 and as in 1993, 
3
This research - FTSE100 industrial/manufacturing companies as 
in 1993, 1998 and 2003.    
 
Table 84: UK Service Company Diversification, 1950-2003 
 
All Figs % Channon1 This Research2 
Category 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1974 1993 1998 2003 
Single 36 31 23 17 16 16 31 43 53 
Dominant 41 42 46 45 26 16 43 31 27 
Related 17 19 20 26 45 49 16 20 14 
Conglomerate 6 8 11 12 13 19 10 6 6 
Totals 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Companies 69 74 81 91 100 99 58 70 63 
 
Source: 
1
Channon (1978, p31) 100 largest UK service companies as in 1973-74, 
2
This 
research – FTSE100 service companies as in 1993, 1998 and 2003. 
 
As well as showing the decline in the incidence of conglomeration, the data 
also suggests that the breadth of activities of companies adopting or 
maintaining conglomeration narrowed. This contention is supported by 
increases in the average Herfindahl indices of conglomerates and in the 
average percentage of total turnover attributable to the largest activity or 
group of related activities of conglomerates. The average Herfindahl index of 
conglomerates increased from 0.36 to 0.44 between 1993 and 2003 while the 
turnover generated by the largest activity increased from 46.0% to 55.5% and 
that by the largest group of related activities from 52.5% to 58.1% over the 
same period. These increases together with the shift towards focus strategies 
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across the FTSE100 resulted in the overall Herfindahl and turnover 
distribution statistics increasing. The increases amongst the FTSE100 
Survivors were similar to those of the whole index as were those for the 
industrial/manufacturing and service company sectors. The overall trend to 
greater focus was also evidenced by the reduction in the number of activities 
reported by FTSE100 companies, especially conglomerates, and of the 
number of related groups.   Finally, the percentage of conglomerates having a 
core activity accounting for more than 50% of total turnover also rose between 
1993 and 2003, from 43.8% to 71.4% for the FTSE100 and from 57.1% to 
100.0% for FTSE100 Survivors.   
      
These trends are illustrated by the 3 companies that retained membership of 
the FTSE100 throughout the research period and maintained their 
conglomerate status – Bass/Intercontinental Hotels, Tomkins and Unilever. All 
3 companies showed increases in their Herfindahl indices from 1993 to 1998 
and from 1998 to 2003 suggesting that even though they continued to hold a 
portfolio of unrelated business activities the breadth of their activities was 
narrowing. Furthermore, both Bass/Intercontinental Hotels – hotels - and 
Tomkins – industrial and automotive engineering - developed new core 
activities over the 10 year period while Unilever retained and marginally 
increased the relative size of its core of food activity.  
 
A comparison of the old – 1993 – and new – 2003 – conglomerate shows 
them to have different key characteristics as the following table shows:  
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Table 85: Old and New FTSE100 Conglomerates 
 
All figs Category Averages 1993  2003 
Market Capitalisation (£m) 5,582  3,088 
Turnover (£m)  5,287  7,433 
ROCE (2-year average %) 17.8 Note 22.3 
No. of Activities 4.6  3.3 
No. of Related Groups 3.4  2.4 
Largest Activity (% of T/O) 41.2  57.5 
Largest Related Group (% T/O) 57.9  59.2 
Core Activity (% of Conglomerates) 43.8  71.4 
Herfindahl Index 0.36  0.44 
No. of Companies 16  7 
Non-executive Chairmen (%) 43.8  85.7 
Non-Executive Directors (%) 42.6  59.7 
Number without CEO 5  1 
Aggregate Major Shareholders (%) 8.0  16.7 
No. of Service Conglomerates 6  4 
 
Note: All figures except ROCE are averages for all conglomerates. DataStream 
ROCE figures were only available for 14 conglomerates in 1993 and 5 in 2003.  
 
The table clearly shows that companies categorised as conglomerate in 2003 
differ significantly from their 1993 counterparts. Whilst more profitable, in 
terms of ROCE, the average 2003 conglomerate has a lower market 
capitalisation than its 1993 equivalent. The breadth of activity of the 2003 
conglomerate is narrower as evidenced by a higher average Herfindahl index, 
the increased incidence of a core activity, a larger percentage of turnover 
generated by the largest activity and group of related activities and the lower 
number of activities. Corporate governance, in common with other categories 
of company, has also improved amongst conglomerates as enhanced Best 
Practice has been adopted. Finally, the increase in the average major 
shareholding from 8.0% in 1993 to 16.7% in 2003 suggests that institutional 
shareholders may be looking more favourably on the more focused 
conglomerates of 2003.    
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Corporate Governance 
This research has failed to find any strong link between corporate governance 
and diversification that may explain the decline in the incidence of 
conglomeration and the more general trend towards greater focus. However, 
at several companies the renunciation of conglomeration came after the 
retirements of long-serving chairmen and/or chief executives, most notably 
Lords Hanson and White at Hanson and Sir Owen Green at BTR, who had 
been the driving force behind building a small company into a conglomerate. 
In response to changes in the corporate governance Code of Best Practice, 
there has been a trend towards a majority of non-executive directors on 
company boards, a splitting of the roles of chairman and chief executive and 
chairmen being non-executive. However, the trends appear to be similar 
across all diversification categories. Differences in the aggregate levels of 
substantial shareholdings, which have increased over time, are also similar 
across diversification categories although there has been a substantial 
increase in the conglomerate category. This suggests that institutional 
shareholders may still have confidence in conglomeration especially as 
conglomerates have narrowed the breadth of their activities. These similarities 
suggest no link between corporate governance and shareholder influence and 
diversification category. Again, these findings held true for the populations – 
FTSE100 and FTSE100 Survivors – and also for the industrial/manufacturing 
and service company sub-groups.  
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External Drivers 
In common with extant literature and recognising the inherent difficulties of 
inter-company performance comparisons, this research has found no clear 
link between performance and diversification. However, as was conjectured in 
the hypotheses chapter, companies do not operate in a vacuum and there 
must be generic, industry specific and company specific factors that have an 
impact on them and which, in turn, drive their strategic responses which 
determine structure. By compiling company histories for the 22 companies 
that were conglomerates at the end of one or more of the three years 1993, 
1998 and 2003, it has been possible to identify the company specific factors - 
financial/market and regulatory - that lay behind portfolio management 
decisions. These drivers elicited corporate strategic responses - disposals, 
demergers, returning capital to shareholders, acquisitions of existing or new 
activities and internationalisation – which determined the diversification of the 
company and whether it chose to establish a core activity. In making their 
strategic decision, management considered the pressures in light of the 
competing attributes of the different levels of diversification; the lower risks 
attaching to conglomeration, the greater scope, especially for synergies, of 
related diversification and the scale benefits of dominant and single business 
company forms.     
 
At the majority of companies, the external drivers for change elicited strategic 
responses that led to refocusing but at the three companies that retained their 
conglomerate strategies different drivers were present and different outcomes 
resulted from similar strategic responses. Bass/Intercontinental Hotels was a 
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brewing, drinks, pubs and betting/gaming conglomerate in 1993 but by 2003 it 
had demerged its public house activities as Mitchells & Butlers and become a 
hotel company with a much reduced brewing activity. Tomkins categorised 
itself as a conglomerate in 1993 with activities as diverse as baking and 
garden products but by 2003 it had divested baking and several other 
peripheral activities to become an industrial and automotive engineering 
conglomerate. Unilever remained relatively unchanged except for the 
divestment of its speciality chemicals business which marginally increased its 
focus. Bass/Intercontinental Hotels was driven by regulatory influences in the 
brewing/public house industry, Tomkins was driven primarily by a need to 
achieve growth but also by some regulatory influences and Unilever by a 
recognition that speciality chemicals was a peripheral activity. All three 
companies used divestments and/or demergers to achieve their strategic 
changes and Bass/Intercontinental Hotels returned capital to shareholders as 
part of a downsizing exercise.    
 
From the drivers for strategic change identified through the conglomerate 
company histories in chapter 7 it is possible to show how company specific 
factors - financial/market pressures and regulation – influenced diversification 
strategies and their implications for the third company specific factor – 
leadership or the competence to manage the complexity inherent in diverse 
companies. Chart 14 shows these relationships and places the conglomerates 
investigated in chapter 7 and that were quoted in 1993 and 2003 in each of 
the broad categories – increase focus, maintain focus, restructure and 
maintain diversity – according to changes in their diversification. Given that, at 
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some point, all the companies were conglomerates, none appears in the 
maintain focus category.   
Chart 14: Influence of Company Specific Factors on Diversification  
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The chart clearly shows that companies facing low financial/market pressures 
are relatively stable retaining their diversity - conglomerate or related 
diversified – which suggests they possess the necessary management 
competence. Some of the companies in this group did not face any regulatory 
influences that would have encouraged diversification but still chose to 
maintain their diversity as they could manage their portfolios effectively. The 
companies that increased their focus were those that did have 
financial/market pressures. As, proportionately, companies in this group faced 
more regulatory issues than any other, they were, notwithstanding 
international expansion, limited in the level of focus they could achieve. A key 
reason they sought greater focus in spite of potential regulatory issues, may 
have been weaknesses in management competence. Finally, three 
companies have been categorised as restructuring as their responses to 
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market pressures were more extreme than others. Despite having good 
management teams, companies in this group chose to radically downsize. 
Only at Tomkins were regulatory issues, which concerned its RHM bakery 
activities, an influence on the change in strategy. 
 
New Model of Corporate Development 
The move towards greater focus identified by this research and illustrated in 
the company histories in chapter 7 suggests the flow through the Model of 
Corporate Development has reversed. This contrasts with earlier periods 
when the direction – evolutionary rather than revolutionary - was 
predominantly forwards to greater diversification. Within the constant 
population of 54 FTSE100 Survivors, the 10 year period from 1993 to 2003 
saw a net reversal of diversification of 9 (17%) companies; 11 (20%) 
advanced to greater diversification and 20 (37%) retreated back towards 
greater focus. Interestingly, notwithstanding movements in the intervening 10 
years, 23 (42%) companies were in the same diversification category in 2003 
as 1993.  This net reversal contrasts with a net positive movement in the 10 
year period between 1983 and 1993 when the ratio of movements was 9:4 in 
favour of advances. This research has found the Model of Corporate 
Development to continue to be a true reflection of the diversification options 
available to companies and the sequential path - forwards and backwards - 
followed by the majority of companies; few companies attempt to move by 
more than one category at a time even over a 5 year period. However, the 
Model has become multi-directional.         
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The increasing number of companies retreating back to focus strongly 
suggests that the flow through the Model of Corporate Development should 
be two-way rather than just forward to greater degrees of diversification. In 
addition, the known external and unknown internal influences that drive 
changes in corporate diversification should also be added to the Model.  
 
The „New‟ Model of Corporate Development - Drivers Impacting Corporate 
Development - on the following page clearly shows that, in addition to a range 
of generic, industry and company specific factors driving diversification 
decisions, the level of diversification pursued by a company effects its 
potential for growth, level of risk, opportunities for economies of scale and 
ability to achieve scope benefits.  
 
As chart 15 shows, conglomerates, by virtue of having a portfolio of unrelated 
activities, enjoy reduced levels of risk and, by adding further activities, 
increased levels of growth which are unconstrained by the limitations, that 
may be exacerbated by restrictions imposed by competition authorities, 
inherent in participation in a single industry. However, conglomerates, by 
virtue of holding a portfolio of unrelated activities, have limited opportunities to 
operate at levels that enable them to achieve economies of scale or to 
leverage their core capabilities and competences to gain scope benefits. 
Furthermore, conglomerates also face greater internal organisation and 
management problems by virtue of the complexity inherent in their business 
model.           
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At the other end of the spectrum of diversification, single business companies, 
with „all their eggs in one basket‟ are higher risk and have limited growth 
opportunities while they have greater potential to achieve significant 
economies of scale. Single business companies may also be able to obtain 
limited scope benefits, e.g. through international expansion, by leveraging 
their core capabilities and competences and, notwithstanding their increasing 
globalisation, they are relatively simple in terms of their organisation and 
management.  
 
Therefore, in choosing a level of diversification from single business to 
conglomeration managers must acknowledge the inherent trade-off in the  
potential level of risk, growth, scale and scope benefits. Understanding how 
companies achieve an acceptable balance across these benefits could be the 
focus of future research.  
 
Other areas for future research include making greater use of existing 
database detail to further investigate links between diversification and 
performance, looking beyond FTSE100 constituents and investigating the role 
of management in diversification decisions especially how their perceptions of 
the relatedness of business activities impacts on those decisions.         
 
Summary 
In summary, this research has proven that the incidence of conglomeration 
amongst the FTSE100 has fallen markedly in the 10 years between 1993 and 
2003, that there has been a trend towards greater focus and that the breadth 
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of activities in conglomerate portfolios has narrowed. The research failed to 
find evidence of a clear link between performance and diversification or 
between corporate governance and diversification although standards have 
increased across all companies in line with enhancements to Best Practice. 
These findings from the Analysis of the Accounting Record (Chapter 6) 
together with the outcomes from the Analysis of the Historical Record 
(Chapter 7) that included reviews of the 22 companies that were 
conglomerates at the end of one or more of the years 1993, 1998 and 2003, 
have led to a revision of the Model of Corporate Development. The „New‟ 
Model shows movement to be two-way and dependent on generic, industry 
specific and company specific drivers the existence and influence of which 
was a conjecture made in the absence of a clear performance-based driver.    
   
The reduced incidence of conglomeration amongst the FTSE100 does not 
necessarily mean that the strategy is no longer valid. The 10 years covered by 
this research has seen unprecedented activity by private equity companies 
that have, by virtue of their diverse portfolios, become the conglomerates of 
the 21st century. Whittington (1999) suggests conglomeration is „evergreen‟ 
and that as old conglomerates die new conglomerates take their place and 
the demise of the public company conglomerate and rise of the private 
company conglomerate supports this view. However, the structure and 
management of the new conglomerates, which seek to exploit tax breaks and 
adopt a „Porteresque‟ (acquire-turnaround-sell) approach treating companies 
as „stock-in-trade‟, differs greatly from that of the old. 
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Ultimately, this research has extended our understanding of UK 
conglomerates and the factors – generic, industry and company specific - that 
influence corporate diversification decisions. It has also identified an ongoing 
corporate dilemma; the search for an acceptable level of trade-off between 
risk, growth, scale and scope which balances the benefits of higher growth 
and lower risk against the costs of operating on a smaller scale and with 
limited scope. The move towards greater focus amongst FTSE100 companies 
suggests prevailing management attitudes favour the achievement of scale 
and scope over lower risk and higher growth. Finally, given the complexities of 
the companies and the environments in which they operate, there will also be 
other drivers, including management attitudes, influencing their strategic 
decisions. 
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APPENDICES 
 
Appendix A – Definitions of Performance Measures 
 
The following definitions have been used to determine the key performance 
measures used to assess the FTSE100 companies.  
 
Market Capitalisation 
This is the aggregate market value of a company‟s issued share capital. 
Market capitalisations are taken from the Financial Times.   
 
Share Price Volatility 
This indicator provides a measure of the stability of a company‟s share price 
during a calendar year.  
 
The share prices are taken from the Financial Times and have been adjusted 
for any events, e.g. capital reorganisations, share splits, acquisitions, etc. that 
would have distorted share prices. Volatility is defined as the difference 
between the highest and lowest share price expressed as a percentage of the 
lowest price. 
 
Highest Price – Lowest Price X 100 
                Lowest Price     
 
Volatility is a function of market, industry and company specific factors.  
 
Market Value/Book Value Excluding Intangibles Ratio 
This ratio provides an indication of how the investment community believes a 
company is managing its asset base; a value above 1 means the company 
has a value in excess of the book value of its assets. 
 
The ratio is computed by DataStream using the value of total assets less 
intangible assets as per the most recent balance sheet and the market value 
of the issued share capital at the balance sheet date.    
 
__________Market Value___________            
Book Value Excluding Intangible Assets 
 
It should be noted that the frequency of asset revaluations and their 
incorporation into financial statements and depreciation policies may distort 
this indicator. 
 
Return on Capital Employed (ROCE) 
ROCE provides a measure of how well a company is using the capital is has 
at its disposal.  
 
The return is computed by DataStream using profit after tax but before interest 
and capital employed including short-term borrowing but excluding intangible 
assets.    
 
   II 
_________Pre-Tax Profit + Interest X100___________ 
Capital Employed + Short-Term Borrowing - Intangibles 
 
As the return uses profit after tax it will be affected by depreciation and 
amortisation charges.   
 
Gearing 
Gearing provides a measure of a company‟s indebtedness as a percentage of 
its overall funding, i.e. debt and equity including reserves and minority 
interests.  
 
The indicator is calculated by DataStream as follows:  
 
                                    Total Debt X 100                                                                               
Total Debt + Share Capital and Reserves + Minority Interest 
  
 
 
 
   III 
ASSOCIATED BRITISH FOODS DS Code 900825 Check OK
General Data @ 31/12
Company Name Associated British Foods Associated British Foods Associated British Foods
Changes - M&A, FTSE Entry/Exit
Listed Yes Yes Yes
FTSE100 Yes Yes Yes
FT Classification
Market Capitalisation (Plc only) 2,527.0 5,116.0 4,661.0
Share Price (p) - Year End 563.00 568.50 584.00
                       - Year Low 456.00 455.00 459.00
                       - Year High 569.50 670.00 599.00
P/E 11.5 18.9 13.5
Yield (%) 3.4 2.1 2.5
Primary Activities
Position in Largest 100 62 58 49
Service Company No No No
Services (%) OK 28.3 OK 7.0 OK 14.8
Financial Services No No No
Financial Year Ended 18/09/1993 12/09/1998 13/09/2003
Length (Months) 12 12 12
Auditor
Audit Report
Significant Shareholdings (%) 63.00 53.99 54.50
DataStream - Download / Seg. Reconcil. Yes OK Yes OK Yes OK
Diversification Indicators
Herfindahl (PDI = 1-Herf) Sales 0.594 Sales 0.869 Sales 0.748
Herfindahl (Related Basis) Sales 1.000 Sales 0.869 Sales 0.748
No. of Divisions Reported 2 2 2
No. of Unrelated Activities 1 2 2
External Sales of Largest Div. (%) 71.7 93.0 85.2
Ext Sales of Largest Related Grp (%) 100.0 93.0 85.2
Op Profit of Largest Div (%) 87.5 92.7 78.8
Op. Profit of Largest Rel Grp (%) 100.0 92.7 78.8
Assets of Largest Div (%) N/A N/A N/A
Assets of Largest Rel Grp (%) N/A N/A N/A
Channon/Whittington & Mayer
Core (Related & Conglomerate only)
Focus Business/Multiple Business Focus Focus Focus
Hill & Pickering
Executive Directors (%) 83.3 62.5 37.5
Ave Length of Service - EDs (Years) 15 20 6
Ave Length of Service - NEDs (Years) 29 14 11
Chairman Weston, G.H. Weston, G.H. Adamson, M.G.
Non-Executive Chairman No No Yes
Years as a Director 44 49 4
Years as Chairman/Year Appointed 26 1967 31 1967 1 2002
Group Chief Executive/COO/MD N/A N/A Jackson, P.J.
Years as a Director 0 0 11
Years as CEO/COO/MD/Year Appointed 0 0 0 0 4 1999
Alternative CEO    Chair    Chair N/A
CATEGORISATION RATIOS WHITTINGTON & MAYER*
1983 Related
Category Ratios Category Non-Core % 1993 Related
Single SR ≥ 0.95 Low < 5.00
Dominant Product SR ≥ 0.70 Medium ≥ 5.00 *Categorisations as per 
Related Diversified RR ≥ 0.70 High > 25.00  extant W&M research
Unrelated Diversified RR< 0.70
Core Activity Level 0.50
Channon/Whittington & Mayer Hill & Pickering
1993 1998 2003
Low Medium Medium
Dominant
N/A
Dominant
N/A
Dominant
N/A
KPMG
Clean
KPMG
Clean
Food Producers
Food processing and food & 
non-food retailing
Food Prods & Processors
Food processing and food & 
non-food retailing
Food Manufacturing
Food processing and 
retailing
KPMG Peat Marwick
Clean
 
A
p
p
e
n
d
ix
 B
 –
 E
x
a
m
p
le
 o
f D
a
ta
b
a
s
e
 S
p
re
a
d
s
h
e
e
t  
   IV 
 
DATASTREAM DOWNLOAD - ACCOUNTS DATA
ABF ASSOCIATED BRIT.FOODS   
TYPE DESCRIPTION 12/09/1992 18/09/1993 17/09/1994 16/09/1995 14/09/1996 13/09/1997 12/09/1998 18/09/1999 16/09/2000 15/09/2001 14/09/2002 13/09/2003 18/09/2004 17/09/2005 16/09/2006 15/09/2007
104 TOTAL SALES                   3,954,000 4,386,000 4,513,000 4,894,000 5,707,000 4,437,000 4,195,000 4,299,000 4,406,000 4,418,000 4,545,000 4,909,000 5,165,000 5,622,000 5,996,000 6,800,000
136 DEPRECIATION                  122,000 138,000 148,000 154,000 172,000 156,000 151,000 147,000 212,000 160,000 167,000 184,000 185,000 239,000 218,000 293,000
696 DEPN AND OPERATING PROVISIONS #NA #NA #NA #NA #NA #NA #NA #NA #NA #NA #NA #NA #NA #NA #NA #NA
993 OPERATING PROFIT              271,000 273,000 308,000 335,000 395,000 342,000 317,000 317,000 327,000 333,000 370,000 401,000 421,000 477,000 512,000 519,000
2408 NET INTEREST CHARGES          (22,000) 34,000 30,000 29,000 25,000 21,000 22,000 25,000 26,000 (35,000) 22,000 (23,000) (36,000) (15,000) 14,000 35,000
D011 EXTRAORD./SPECIAL ITEMS       #NA #NA #NA #NA #NA #NA #NA #NA #NA #NA #NA #NA #NA #NA #NA #NA
154 PRE-TAX PROFIT                297,000 338,000 382,000 375,000 430,000 401,000 392,000 300,000 240,000 350,000 413,000 450,000 483,000 469,000 409,000 498,000
623 PUBLISHED AFTER TAX PROFIT    201,000 234,000 314,000 256,000 286,000 282,000 270,000 186,000 131,000 246,000 320,000 324,000 339,000 333,000 298,000 390,000
176 MINORITY INTERESTS            5,000 6,000 6,000 6,000 8,000 8,000 2,000 1,000 (2,000) 8,000 3,000 (3,000) 6,000 7,000 7,000 31,000
625 EARNED FOR ORDINARY           195,960 227,960 308,000 250,000 278,000 274,000 265,000 184,000 138,000 243,000 322,000 332,000 342,000 333,000 301,000 369,000
193 EXTRAORD. ITEMS AFTER TAX     (30,000) 0 0 0 0 407,000 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
D012 ORDINARY DIVIDENDS            #NA #NA #NA #NA #NA #NA #NA #NA #NA #NA #NA #NA #NA #NA #NA #NA
1300 EBIT                          338,000 372,000 412,000 404,000 455,000 422,000 414,000 325,000 266,000 374,000 435,000 480,000 506,000 503,000 455,000 553,000
1502 EBITDA                        460,000 510,000 560,000 558,000 627,000 578,000 565,000 472,000 478,000 534,000 602,000 664,000 691,000 742,000 673,000 846,000
2260 PUBLISHED CASH EARNINGS       #NA #NA #NA #NA #NA #NA #NA #NA #NA #NA #NA #NA #NA #NA #NA #NA
305 EQUITY CAP. AND RESERVES      1,707,000 1,878,000 2,088,000 2,256,000 2,451,000 2,909,000 2,981,000 2,660,000 2,751,000 2,869,000 2,979,000 3,261,000 3,467,000 3,694,000 3,956,000 4,242,000
306 PREFERENCE CAPITAL            1,000 1,000 2,000 2,000 2,000 2,000 2,000 2,000 2,000 2,000 2,000 2,000 2,000 2,000 2,000 2,000
307 TOT. SHARE CAPITAL & RESERVES 1,708,000 1,879,000 2,090,000 2,258,000 2,453,000 2,911,000 2,983,000 2,662,000 2,753,000 2,871,000 2,981,000 3,263,000 3,469,000 3,696,000 3,958,000 4,244,000
315 MINORITY INTERESTS            35,000 43,000 53,000 65,000 73,000 71,000 66,000 79,000 78,000 75,000 75,000 24,000 27,000 29,000 224,000 220,000
D036 LONG TERM DEBT                #NA #NA #NA #NA #NA #NA #NA #NA #NA #NA #NA #NA #NA #NA #NA #NA
322 TOTAL CAPITAL EMPLOYED        1,902,000 2,086,000 2,301,000 2,482,000 2,689,000 3,139,000 3,206,000 2,898,000 2,991,000 3,103,000 3,443,000 3,669,000 3,853,000 4,252,000 4,358,000 5,062,000
339 TOT FIXED ASSETS-NET          1,319,000 1,375,000 1,444,000 1,585,000 1,650,000 1,396,000 1,439,000 1,528,000 1,459,000 1,397,000 1,421,000 1,406,000 1,459,000 2,252,000 2,525,000 2,690,000
344 TOTAL INTANGIBLES             0 0 0 0 0 0 0 108,000 151,000 179,000 383,000 510,000 593,000 1,035,000 1,542,000 1,570,000
364 TOTAL STOCK AND W.I.P.        372,000 412,000 466,000 480,000 482,000 416,000 428,000 464,000 496,000 469,000 498,000 516,000 496,000 558,000 732,000 818,000
287 TRADE DEBTORS                 306,000 317,000 360,000 432,000 471,000 461,000 448,000 459,000 485,000 488,000 479,000 480,000 533,000 618,000 712,000 726,000
375 TOTAL CASH & EQUIVALENT       712,000 801,000 903,000 829,000 993,000 1,668,000 1,640,000 1,081,000 1,198,000 1,290,000 1,501,000 1,712,000 1,683,000 1,198,000 402,000 428,000
376 TOTAL CURRENT ASSETS          1,430,000 1,564,000 1,757,000 1,790,000 1,989,000 2,573,000 2,549,000 2,036,000 2,220,000 2,302,000 2,545,000 2,769,000 2,778,000 2,473,000 2,100,000 2,261,000
392 ASSETS (TOTAL)                2,754,000 2,946,000 3,206,000 3,380,000 3,647,000 3,981,000 4,000,000 3,691,000 3,857,000 3,905,000 4,377,000 4,710,000 4,913,000 5,813,000 6,410,000 6,910,000
276 TRADE CREDITORS               261,000 270,000 290,000 330,000 374,000 233,000 227,000 234,000 217,000 255,000 271,000 319,000 349,000 365,000 445,000 503,000
309 BORROWINGS REPAYABLE < 1 YEAR 144,000 136,000 90,000 69,000 33,000 51,000 44,000 53,000 57,000 82,000 64,000 92,000 68,000 447,000 531,000 125,000
389 TOTAL CURRENT LIABLITIES      826,000 841,000 897,000 849,000 908,000 773,000 726,000 733,000 792,000 753,000 800,000 891,000 897,000 1,405,000 1,673,000 1,443,000
390 NET CURRENT ASSETS            604,000 723,000 860,000 941,000 1,081,000 1,800,000 1,823,000 1,303,000 1,428,000 1,549,000 1,745,000 1,878,000 1,881,000 1,068,000 427,000 818,000
1301 TOTAL DEBT                    303,000 300,000 248,000 228,000 196,000 208,000 201,000 210,000 217,000 239,000 451,000 474,000 425,000 974,000 707,000 723,000
1501 NET DEBT                      (409,000) (501,000) (655,000) (601,000) (797,000) (1,460,000) (1,439,000) (871,000) (981,000) (1,051,000) (1,050,000) (1,238,000) (1,258,000) (224,000) 305,000 295,000
1504 ENTERPRISE VALUE (EV)         1,375,681 1,789,383 1,927,414 2,658,997 2,974,698 3,254,109 3,189,160 2,536,154 1,751,107 2,602,386 3,697,875 3,023,453 3,976,253 6,377,890 7,141,476 6,794,972
MV   MV                            1,748,681 2,246,383 2,527,414 3,192,997 3,696,698 4,641,109 4,560,160 3,326,154 2,652,107 3,576,386 4,670,875 4,235,453 5,205,253 6,570,890 6,610,476 6,277,972
219 TOTAL NO. OF EMPL. (UNITS)    51,724 49,968 50,241 43,665 45,173 40,371 32,712 34,186 34,372 33,989 34,957 35,416 35,584 42,375 46,703 84,636
190 DIVIDENDS PER SHARE           7.122 7.631 8.139 6.613 9.665 10.174 10.683 10.750 11.250 11.800 13.250 14.600 16.400 18.000 18.750 19.500
254 NET EPS                       22.230 25.791 34.947 28.283 31.538 30.827 30.114 21.399 17.499 30.799 40.800 42.100 43.300 42.200 38.100 46.700
794 PUBLISHED CASH EPS            40.106 29.117 41.600 42.390 56.295 48.833 47.183 47.672 47.653 48.794 59.823 63.625 65.906 77.693 68.481 76.709
1308 BOOK VALUE PER SHARE          197.346 217.116 236.128 255.127 277.178 328.973 337.114 335.985 347.480 362.384 376.290 411.910 437.931 466.604 499.951 536.077
D037 MARKET TO BOOK VALUE EX. INTAN 1.020 1.200 1.210 1.420 1.510 1.600 1.530 1.300 1.020 1.330 1.800 1.540 1.810 2.470 2.740 2.350
1505 SALES PER SHARE               447.961 496.903 510.155 553.224 645.127 501.564 475.794 499.866 558.408 559.929 576.044 622.178 654.624 712.545 758.984 860.756
1015 CASH IN -OPERATING ACTIVITIES #NA #NA 353,000 402,000 508,000 395,000 414,000 369,000 367,000 346,000 468,000 541,000 541,000 544,000 412,000 661,000
1024 PAYMENTS: FIXED ASSETS        202,000 191,000 188,000 198,000 225,000 254,000 226,000 259,000 182,000 212,000 186,000 180,000 223,000 403,000 432,000 420,000
1040 CASH OUT-INVESTING ACTIVITIES #NA #NA 80,000 510,000 289,000 (364,000) 274,000 390,000 164,000 146,000 376,000 231,000 398,000 1,453,000 760,000 489,000
1045 CASH INFLOW FROM FINANCING    #NA #NA (304,000) (144,000) (118,000) (85,000) (134,000) (540,000) (88,000) (92,000) 119,000 (111,000) (148,000) 412,000 (221,000) (119,000)
1048 NET CASH FLOW                 #NA #NA (31,000) (252,000) 101,000 674,000 6,000 (561,000) 115,000 108,000 211,000 199,000 (5,000) (497,000) (569,000) 53,000  
   V 
DATASTREAM DOWNLOAD - RATIOS
ABF ASSOCIATED BRIT.FOODS   
TYPE DESCRIPTION 12/09/1992 18/09/1993 17/09/1994 16/09/1995 14/09/1996 13/09/1997 12/09/1998 18/09/1999 16/09/2000 15/09/2001 14/09/2002 13/09/2003 18/09/2004 17/09/2005 16/09/2006 15/09/2007
D013 DIVIDEND COVER - PUBLISHED    3.12 3.38 4.29 4.28 3.26 3.03 2.82 1.99 1.56 2.61 3.08 2.88 2.64 2.34 2.03 2.39
D040 PAYOUT RATIO - PUB'D          0.32 0.30 0.23 0.23 0.31 0.33 0.35 0.50 0.64 0.38 0.32 0.35 0.38 0.43 0.49 0.42
1506 RETURN ON EQUITY              9.93 12.72 15.53 11.51 11.81 25.41 9.00 6.52 5.10 8.65 11.01 10.64 10.17 9.30 7.72 9.00
D014 ROCE % - PUBLISHED            16.52 16.74 17.23 15.84 16.72 13.23 12.74 11.43 9.18 12.44 13.92 14.76 15.20 13.73 13.59 15.29
D015 OPTG PROF.MARGIN % - PUBLSHD  6.85 6.22 6.82 6.85 6.92 7.71 7.56 7.37 7.42 7.54 8.14 8.17 8.15 8.48 8.54 7.63
D016 PRETAX PROF.MARGIN % - PUB'D  7.51 7.71 8.46 7.66 7.53 9.04 9.34 6.98 5.45 7.92 9.09 9.17 9.35 8.34 6.82 7.32
D017 EARNINGS MARGIN % - PUBLISHED 4.96 5.20 6.82 5.11 4.87 6.18 6.32 4.28 3.13 5.50 7.08 6.76 6.62 5.92 5.02 5.43
722 TURNOVER/FIXED ASSETS         #NA #NA #NA #NA #NA #NA #NA #NA #NA #NA #NA #NA #NA #NA #NA #NA
723 TURNOVER/N. CURRENT ASSETS    #NA #NA #NA #NA #NA #NA #NA #NA #NA #NA #NA #NA #NA #NA #NA #NA
724 STOCK TURNOVER                #NA #NA #NA #NA #NA #NA #NA #NA #NA #NA #NA #NA #NA #NA #NA #NA
725 STOCK RATIO (DAYS)            47.00 45.00 50.00 48.00 42.00 51.00 51.00 53.00 58.00 57.00 54.00 53.00 50.00 50.00 57.00 59.00
731 CAPITAL GEARING %             14.81 13.50 10.37 8.94 7.20 6.52 6.18 7.12 7.12 7.50 12.86 12.60 10.84 20.73 14.46 13.94
733 BORROWING RATIO               17.75 15.97 11.88 10.11 8.00 7.15 6.74 7.89 7.89 8.33 15.14 14.54 12.26 26.37 17.87 17.04
741 WORKING CAPITAL RATIO         1.73 1.86 1.96 2.11 2.19 3.33 3.51 2.78 2.80 3.06 3.18 3.11 3.10 1.76 1.26 1.57
742 QUICK ASSETS RATIO            1.23 1.33 1.41 1.49 1.61 2.75 2.88 2.10 2.13 2.36 2.47 2.46 2.47 1.29 0.67 0.80
762 SALES PER EMPLOYEE            #NA #NA #NA #NA #NA #NA #NA #NA #NA #NA #NA #NA #NA #NA #NA #NA
D018 OPTG PROFIT PER EMPLOYEE      5.24 5.46 6.13 7.67 8.74 8.47 9.69 9.27 9.51 9.80 10.58 11.32 11.83 11.26 10.96 6.13
764 CAPITAL EMPLOYED /EMPLOYEE    #NA #NA #NA #NA #NA #NA #NA #NA #NA #NA #NA #NA #NA #NA #NA #NA
765 STOCK AND W.I.P. PER EMPLOYEE #NA #NA #NA #NA #NA #NA #NA #NA #NA #NA #NA #NA #NA #NA #NA #NA
1503 RICBT                         8.24 10.94 13.73 13.93 18.20 20.10 18.82 13.00 10.23 15.58 19.77 16.00 22.00 14.79 9.89 10.05
D038 MARKET VALUE TO SALES         0.44 0.51 0.56 0.65 0.65 1.05 1.09 0.77 0.60 0.81 1.03 0.86 1.01 1.17 1.10 0.92
D039 MARKET VALUE TO EBITDA        3.80 4.40 4.51 5.72 5.90 8.03 8.07 7.05 5.55 6.70 7.76 6.38 7.53 8.86 9.82 7.42  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   VI 
SEGMENTAL DATA EXTRACTED FROM ANNUAL REPORTS
ASSOCIATED BRITISH FOODS
Services 1993 Services 1998 Services 2003
Sales By Division
Manufacturing N 3,143.0 N 3,900.0 N 4,324.0
Retail Y 1,243.0 Y 295.0 Y 752.0
Grocery
Primary Food & Agriculture
Ingredients
  Spare
  Spare
  Spare
  Spare
  Spare
Sub-Total 1,243.0 4,386.0 295.0 4,195.0 752.0 5,076.0
Duty (e.g. Excise) 0.0 0.0 0.0
Intra-Group 0.0 0.0 (185.0)
Unidentified/Rounding 0.0 0.0 0.0
External Sales 4,386.0 4,195.0 4,891.0
Discontinued 0.0 0.0 18.0
JV/Assoc. Co. 0.0 0.0 0.0
Differences 0.0 0.0 0.0
Total External Sales Per Datastream 4,386.0 4,195.0 4,909.0
Op. Profit By Division
Manufacturing 239.0 293.0 324.0
Retail 34.0 23.0 87.0
Grocery
Primary Food & Agriculture
Ingredients
  Spare
  Spare
  Spare
  Spare
  Spare
Sub-Total 273.0 316.0 411.0
Unallocated 0.0 0.0 0.0
(Profit)/Loss on Asset Disposals 0.0 0.0 0.0
Other (Income)/Costs 0.0 0.0 0.0
Discontinued 0.0 0.0 36.0
Corporate Costs 0.0 0.0 3.0
JV/Assoc. Co. 0.0 1.0 (7.0)
Exceptionals 0.0 0.0 0.0
Goodwill 0.0 0.0 (42.0)
Miscellaneous 0.0 0.0 0.0
Differences 0.0 0.0 0.0
Total Operating Profit Per Datastream 273.0 317.0 401.0
Assets (Banks Only)
Manufacturing
Retail
Grocery
Primary Food & Agriculture
Ingredients
  Spare
  Spare
  Spare
  Spare
  Spare
Total Continuing 0.0 0.0 0.0
Corporate 0.0 0.0 0.0
Discontinued 0.0 0.0 0.0
Miscellaneous 2,946.0 4,000.0 4,710.0
Differences 0.0 0.0 0.0
Assets Per Datastream 2,946.0 4,000.0 4,710.0
Reconciliation Datasteam to Pub Accs
Profit After Tax & Min Ints Pub Accounts 228.0 265.0 332.0
Non-Equity Dividends 0.0 0.0 0.0
Miscellaneous 0.0 0.0 0.0
Differences 0.0 0.0 0.0
Earned For Ordinary Per Datastream 228.0 265.0 332.0
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Appendix C – Database Definitions and Assumptions 
 
This appendix provides details of the key principles, definitions and 
assumptions used in compiling the database.  
 
ACCOUNTS 
 
 Windfall Taxes 
The windfall tax levied by the UK government on the privatised utility 
companies – Gas, Electricity, Telephones & Water – in July 1997 have 
been excluded from tax and profit after tax figures in the database as they 
are exceptional charges. This treatment is consistent with DataStream.   
 
 Extraordinary Profits/Losses 
Extraordinary items are excluded from the database as they are in 
DataStream figures. However, extraordinary items are very rare; FRS3 – 
Reporting Financial Performance replaced SSAP6 Extraordinary Items and 
Prior Year Adjustments and effectively stopped them by revising and 
tightening the definitions). The only significant extraordinary item in the 
Database is the £100m „profit‟ recorded by Argyll/Safeway which 
represented compensation received from Guinness/Diageo following the 
legal case it brought relating to irregularities, principally a Guinness‟s 
illegal share support scheme, that occurred during its unsuccessful battle 
with Guinness to acquire Distillers. 
 
 Excise Duties 
Excise duties are deducted from tobacco and brewing/spirit turnovers 
where possible. The accounts of Scottish & Newcastle, Allied Lyons/Allied 
Domeq and Guinness/Diageo show segmental turnover inclusive of excise 
duty which has been deducted as a single adjustment in the database to 
reduce total turnover to its net value. Bass/Intercontinental Hotels shows 
gross turnover in 1993 but net thereafter; given its withdrawal from 
brewing, this inconsistency is not significant. Whitbread‟s turnover 
excludes excise duty in all years.  
 
 Other Activities 
Where no explanation/description provided, it is assumed that the activities 
relate to the major business activity. There is a reasonable assumption as, 
where details are given, other activities are frequently property, insurance, 
logistics, etc. related to the core/primary activity. 
 
 Mergers & Acquisitions 
Business combinations are achieved in two ways: acquisitions where one 
company acquires a controlling interest, usually 100% of another and 
mergers where neither company is seen as acquiring the other and 
consideration is almost wholly in the form of shares in the enlarged 
company.  
 
A key advantage of mergers is that through the use of shares to achieve 
the combination of two or more companies the creation of goodwill, which 
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would result in amortisation charges in subsequent years, is avoided. This 
creates an incentive to have business combinations classified as mergers 
when in reality they are acquisitions. DataStream reviews mergers to 
establish if the underlying transaction is, in reality, an acquisition in which 
case it maintains the DataStream record of the company it deems to be 
the acquirer.           
 
This research has categorised transactions as being acquisitions or 
mergers according to DataStream‟s interpretation of the underlying 
substance of each deal.  
   
 ‘Abnormal’ Structures 
Companies within the FTSE100 with „abnormal‟ structures were treated as 
follows:     
o Dual Listing Companies (DLC) 
These companies remain separate legal entities quoted on 
separate exchanges but act, under a DLC agreement, as one entity 
with identical/balanced dividend policies and, usually, a common set 
of executive and non-executive directors often with the chairman of 
one company acting as deputy chairman of the other. DLC 
companies in the FTSE100 are: 
 
RTZ (UK and Australia) – Mining 
BHP Billiton (UK and Australia) – Mining (Billiton before DLC) 
Carnival (UK and US) – Cruises (P&O Princess before DLC) 
Shell – Oils (UK and Netherlands) 
Unilever – Food Manufacturing (UK and Netherlands) 
 
The consolidated accounts of DLCs are used in the database. 
 
o Joint Holding Companies 
These companies have no operations of their own but have a 
significant, usually 50%, shareholding in operating companies 
together with a partner. The only joint holding company in the 
FTSE100 is: 
 
Reed Elsevier (UK and Netherlands) – Publishing (Joint with 
Elsevier of Netherlands, UK company formerly called Reed 
International) 
 
The segmental report in the consolidated accounts of this company 
is used in the database with an adjustment to reduce the total 
turnover to zero as reported in the accounts of the LSE quoted UK 
holding company which records only dividend income from the 
operating company. 
 
 Service/Non-Service Split 
Service activities are those that do not produce a tangible product. There 
are a few „grey‟ areas which have necessitated some fine distinctions, e.g. 
software development (Sage Group) is non-service as it produces a 
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product, typically a software package, whereas computer system operation 
(Misys) is a service activity.   
 
 Categorisation Bias 
There is an „in-built‟ bias toward single business, dominant business and 
related diversified business categories as it is easy to aggregate reported 
segments that may reasonably be considered identical in terms of 
processes and products but it is not possible to disaggregate reported 
segments that, from descriptions included in the reports of chairmen and 
CEOs and lists of principal subsidiaries, are different. 
     
DIRECTORS   
 
 Presidents 
The position of president is deemed to be honorary without either 
executive or non-executive director responsibilities unless either the 
annual report and accounts, the remuneration report or associated notes 
specifically say otherwise, e.g. as at Schroders where the president is an 
executive director and sits on the company‟s board which is headed by a 
chairman. Examples of honorary presidents include Lord King at BA, Lord 
Forte at Forte and John Camden at RMC.   
   
 Chairmen 
Where neither the annual report and accounts, the remuneration report nor 
associated notes specify the status – executive or non-executive – of the 
chairman, the receipt of bonus/incentive payments and/or share options is 
deemed to reflect executive status.     
   
 Length of Service 
Where a director has left and returned to a company, an absence of less 
than 1 year is ignored and service is deemed continuous from the first 
appointment to the Board. Otherwise, the date of appointment will be that 
of the current period of directorship. Length of service is calculated by 
reference to the year of appointment rather than the exact date.   
   
 Mergers & Acquisitions 
Where companies have merged, directors will be deemed to have been 
appointed to the Board of the combined company on the date they were 
appointed to the Board of either of the combining companies. However, 
where one company acquires another and appoints directors of the 
acquired company to its board the date of their appointment will be that on 
which they joined the acquiring company‟s board.  
 
 Additional Data Sources 
FAME, FT Intelligence, Yearbooks and websites used to provide additional 
information regarding directors and their appointment dates. In a very 
small number of cases FAME shows default appointment dates for some 
directors. This only occurred in the early 1990s, the number of directors 
was not material and other sources were used to obtain correct dates 
wherever possible.    
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MAJOR SHAREHOLDERS 
 
 Cross shareholdings, between Dual Listed Companies (DLCs) are ignored, 
e.g. BHP Billiton Pty‟s holding in BHP Billiton Plc and RTZ Corporation‟s 
holding in Rio Tinto plc. 
   
 Where a substantial shareholding is noted as having more than one 
beneficial holder, e.g. where institutions have joint holdings, it is only 
included once in the list of major shareholders to avoid double counting of 
the holding.  
 
 Where a trust is noted as a major shareholder, that holding will be 
excluded from the shareholding of any trustee should they also be noted 
as a major shareholder, e.g. several trusts are major shareholders in food 
retailer Morrisons and some of the company‟s directors are trustees.  
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APPENDIX D – Rationalisation of Reported Segments 
 
In compiling the database some adjustments have been made to the 
segments reported by companies in their annual reports and accounts. 
Adjustments have been made to enhance consistency in reporting across 
companies in the same FTSE100 classifications, e.g. banks, insurance, 
pharmaceuticals, etc. and to eliminate geographic segmentation where the 
same activities are reported in separate segments according to location. 
These adjustments, which have been made following careful review of the 
descriptions of divisional activities included in reports, typically those of the 
chairman, chief executive and finance director, included in annual reports, 
seek to minimise distortion of product/service diversity by geographic 
diversification or by clearly identifiable differences in segmentation across 
companies in the same FTSE classifications. Examples of adjustments 
include the elimination of Wolseley‟s geographic – UK/US – segmentation of 
its Builders Merchants operations and the inconsistencies in segmental 
reporting by banks.          
 
The following sections outline adjustments made to the segmental reports of 
companies operating in similar FTSE classifications  
 
 Insurance Companies 
Insurance companies have become more complex since Channon‟s 
(1978) research into service companies; almost all insurance companies 
now have asset management businesses as well as insurance/assurance 
businesses. Published accounts (the Companies Acts make provisions for 
Banks and Insurance companies to submit accounts in a different format to 
those of other trading companies) do not provide sufficient information to 
identify revenues from asset management activities as they are absorbed 
into revenues from investments which include those on the investment of 
long-term and, to a lesser extent, short-term insurance premiums. 
Insurance companies are therefore operating in two-sided markets; one 
external generating premium income and, through the investment of those 
premiums, investment income and one internal generating revenue 
through investments both on behalf of customers and the company itself. 
As separation of customer and company investment returns is not possible 
from analysis of published accounts, this research effectively ignores 
investment revenues treating them as unallocated turnover. 
   
The effective under-recognition of asset management activities is accepted 
but it could fairly be described as an activity related to those of long-
term/life and general insurance and therefore doesn‟t effect categorisation 
of insurance companies. In summary, insurance companies are treated as 
follows:  
 
o Long-term/Life Assurance Premiums – continuing and „single‟ 
premiums less reinsurance (where insurance risk is effectively 
passed to third parties). 
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o General Premiums – all non long-term/life assurance premiums 
(policies include motor, household, fire, marine, etc.) less 
reinsurance and adjusted for unearned premiums, i.e. premiums 
paid in respect of periods after the financial year end.   
 
o Differences between accounts premium incomes and DataStream 
revenues reflect investment returns that DataStream include in 
revenue. The differences are noted as „unidentified/rounding 
differences‟   
 
All insurance company activities are treated as services. 
 
 Banks 
The nature and breadth of activities of banks has changed significantly 
since Channon‟s (1978) work on service companies. In addition to their 
traditional operations providing retail and business/commercial banking, 
they have added mortgage finance, insurance and stock broking activities 
and have become more international. Some of the changes followed 
deregulation of the City in 1986 (commonly referred to as „Big Bang‟) 
others the demutualisation of some building societies including Northern 
Rock, Abbey National and Alliance & Leicester.  
 
The increase in complexity since Channon‟s (1978) research into service 
companies is exacerbated by the lack of analysis of revenues in published 
accounts (the Companies Acts make provisions for Banks and Insurance 
companies to submit accounts in a different format to those of other 
trading companies) which do not provide sufficient information to identify 
revenues from different activities. Channon (1978) used interest income 
but the increased complexity of bank activities mean that this is no longer 
a valid proxy for turnover in the assessment of diversity. However, 
segmental reports do provide details of assets used by each activity. 
Therefore, assets have been used to determine diversification category. 
 
Other changes in banks‟ operations centre on the way they manage their 
business; several banks now show their processing or „manufacturing‟ 
activities as a separate activity in their segmental reports. Similarly, 
wholesale and treasury operations, which comprise raising finance to 
support other operations, are also often reported separately. Despite clear 
similarities between them and their operations, the banks show little 
consistency in their segmental reporting either across time or across the 
industry; HSBC, the largest UK bank, reports only two segments – 
commercial banking and investment banking – despite offering a full range 
of financial services whilst the far smaller ex-building society Abbey reports 
between 5 and 7 segments. Therefore, the segmental reports of banks 
have been rationalised into a maximum 4 „standard‟ activities; banking 
(personal and commercial), insurance (life and general), capital 
markets/investment banking and other which is not specified at most 
banks but which includes estate agency at Bradford & Bingley and private 
equity at Schroders. All bank activities are treated as services.       
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 Property Companies 
Primary activity is the establishment and active management of a portfolio 
of properties to yield income through rentals. The companies, e.g. British 
Land, Land Securities, MEPC, etc. do trade in properties and record 
profits/losses on that activity but that is considered a secondary activity 
ancillary to the core rental business. All property company activities are 
treated as services.  
 
 Media 
In determining segmentation of media company activities, television 
broadcast and content has been amalgamated reflecting the inseparability 
of the two constituents of a television service. The similarities in publishing 
have been recognised by the amalgamation of different categories of book 
although, given the increased complexity of education publications which 
at Pearson include on-line services and CD/DVD support, they are kept 
separate. For similar reasons, consumer and scientific magazines are 
reported separately as are newspapers produced by Daily Mail and United 
Trust, Pearson and United News & Media. Finally, newswire services are 
deemed sufficiently different from the provision of financial information and 
transaction services at Reuters. Categorisation as industrial/manufacturing 
or service is dependent on whether physical products, e.g. books, are 
produced.             
   
 Mining 
The activities of the three mining companies in the FTSE100 – BHP Billiton 
(formerly Billiton), RTZ and Xstrata – have been separated into high 
volume mining and metals activities, which, in addition to iron, bauxite and 
cooper extraction, include coal and some ore processing/smelting 
operations, and low volume/high value industrial minerals activities which 
include diamond mining. All mining activities are categorised as 
industrial/manufacturing.       
    
 Utilities  
Companies providing energy and water services are classified as utilities. 
Reflecting the segmentation adopted by the majority of utilities companies, 
some of which have broadened their product range to encompass more 
than one type of energy, e.g. Scottish Power added water to its electricity 
activities, the generation and distribution of energy – gas and electricity – 
is treated as a single integrated activity. All utilities activities are treated as 
services. 
   
 Stores 
Recognising the growing importance of store credit cards, where sufficient 
segmental information is available finance operations are treated as a 
separate activity. While several stores companies have both store and 
home/on-line shopping operations, each effectively amalgamates the two 
revenue streams into either a retail or home/catalogue shopping segment 
and makes no distinction between type of product, e.g. electrical, clothing, 
etc. sold. The only store to offer a pharmacy – Boots – shows this activity 
as a separate segment reflecting the need for specialist 
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professional/trained staff and legal control of stock. With the exception of 
Boots pharmaceutical manufacturing operations, all stores activities are 
services.   
  
 Supermarkets & Food Processing 
A similar approach has been taken to that outlined in the above section 
covering stores. All food retailing activities are treated as services while 
food processing, primarily at Associated British Foods, is 
manufacturing/industrial.  
    
 Transport 
Segmentation has been maintained where there are different modes of 
transport, e.g. bus, coach, rail and air, and substantially different 
operations, e.g. ferries & cruises and container & bulk shipping. All 
transport activities are deemed services.     
    
 Building Materials 
Segmentation is maintained to reflect primary, e.g. quarrying, and 
processing, e.g. ready mixed concrete, activities. All distribution activities, 
e.g. builder‟s merchants, are deemed services while, consistent with the 
treatment of mining, quarrying is an industrial/manufacturing activity.    
   
 Brewers & Distillers/Hotels & Leisure 
In classifications that cover a wide range of activities from brewing to 
hotels, restaurants and sports, health and fitness centres, segmentation 
has been maintained to reflect the differences inherent in the provision of 
these products/services, e.g. brewing differs from the production soft 
drinks. The differences inherent in the provision of hotel services 
compared to the operation of restaurants are reflected in those activities 
being kept separate. Depending on whether a physical product is 
produced, activities undertaken by companies within these classifications 
may be either industrial/manufacturing, e.g. brewing, or services, e.g. 
restaurants. 
 
 Engineering/Invensys 
Review of the activities of companies within this classification, which 
includes Siebe, TI Group, British Aerospace, Rolls Royce and Smiths 
Industries, shows their segmentation to reflect different activities, e.g. 
polymer engineering, tubes and aerospace at TI Group. Except for some 
immaterial property development (British Aerospace) and engine leasing 
(Rolls Royce) activities, all operations within this classification are 
industrial/manufacturing.        
   
 Telephone Networks 
Segmentation is maintained differentiating between fixed line and mobile 
telecommunications reflecting the significant differences in technology 
used. All operations are services.   
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 Electronics 
Information technology and computer services companies Misys and 
Sema are deemed to offer services while Sage, which provides software, 
and GEC which produces equipment which utilises a core competence in 
electronics, are categorised as industrial /manufacturing companies.     
   
 Other Classifications 
Segmentation across companies in the oil & gas, packaging & printing, 
business services, chemicals and pharmaceuticals classifications has 
remained broadly unchanged with industrial/manufacturing categorisation 
dependent on the fabrication of a physical product.   
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APPENDIX E – FTSE100 Constituents 1993, 1998 & 2003 
 
FTSE100 As At 31st December 1993 
 
Company Service Rank Mkt Cap Herfindahl W&M Core
British Telecom Yes 1 29,328 0.54 Related Yes
HSBC Yes 2 24,912 0.88 Dominant N/A
Shell Transport & Trading No 3 24,100 0.77 Dominant N/A
Glaxo No 4 22,061 1.00 Single N/A
BP No 5 19,650 0.56 Dominant N/A
BAT Industries Yes 6 17,036 0.50 Conglomerate Yes
British Gas Yes 7 14,776 0.66 Dominant N/A
Hanson No 8 13,540 0.21 Conglomerate No
BTR No 9 12,976 0.21 Conglomerate No
Marks & Spencer Yes 10 12,566 0.96 Single N/A
Cable & Wireless Yes 11 11,390 0.79 Dominant N/A
SmithKline Beecham No 12 10,316 0.41 Related Yes
Barclays Bank Yes 13 10,315 0.52 Related Yes
National Westminster Bank Yes 14 10,304 0.51 Related Yes
Grand Metropolitan No 15 9,852 0.38 Related No
Unilever No 16 9,756 0.35 Conglomerate Yes
Guinness No 17 9,588 0.52 Related Yes
GEC No 18 9,340 0.22 Related No
RTZ No 19 8,639 0.60 Dominant N/A
Lloyds Bank Yes 20 8,461 0.89 Dominant N/A
Zeneca Group No 21 7,942 0.34 Related No
Sainsbury Yes 22 7,925 0.95 Single N/A
Reuters Yes 23 7,433 0.57 Dominant N/A
Prudential Yes 24 6,826 0.86 Dominant N/A
Abbey National Yes 25 6,712 0.87 Dominant N/A
GUS Yes 26 6,528 0.65 Dominant N/A
Boots Yes 27 6,213 0.51 Related Yes
National Power Yes 28 6,185 0.98 Single N/A
Allied Lyons No 29 6,018 0.27 Related No
Vodafone Group Yes 30 5,975 1.00 Single N/A
ICI No 31 5,776 0.27 Related No
Wellcome No 32 5,704 1.00 Single N/A
BAA Yes 33 5,395 0.85 Dominant N/A
Kingfisher Yes 34 5,147 0.95 Single N/A
Reed International No 35 5,026 0.34 Related No
Bass Yes 36 4,652 0.21 Conglomerate No
British Airways Yes 37 4,279 0.84 Dominant N/A
PowerGen Yes 38 4,272 1.00 Single N/A
Cadbury Schweppes No 39 4,219 0.51 Related Yes
Thorn EMI No 40 4,207 0.25 Related No
Tesco Yes 41 4,191 1.00 Single N/A
Land Securities Yes 42 4,002 1.00 Single N/A
P&O Yes 43 3,856 0.24 Conglomerate No
Scottish Power Yes 44 3,716 0.75 Dominant N/A
TSB Yes 45 3,673 0.61 Dominant N/A
Royal Bank of Scotland Yes 46 3,620 0.97 Single N/A
Commercial Union Yes 47 3,597 0.57 Related Yes
Pearson No 48 3,344 0.48 Conglomerate Yes
General Accident Yes 49 3,229 0.69 Dominant N/A
Rank Organisation Yes 50 3,222 0.26 Related No  
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FTSE100 As At 31st December 1993 (Cont.) 
 
Company Service Rank Mkt Cap Herfindahl W&M Core
BOC Group No 51 3,136 0.53 Related Yes
Sun Alliance Yes 52 3,123 0.63 Dominant N/A
Argyll Group Yes 53 3,096 1.00 Single N/A
Redland No 54 3,018 0.42 Related Yes
Whitbread Yes 55 3,016 0.52 Related Yes
Standard Chartered Yes 56 2,957 0.81 Dominant N/A
Inchcape Yes 57 2,897 0.51 Related Yes
Scottish & Newcastle No 58 2,835 0.43 Related Yes
Reckitt & Colman No 59 2,707 0.51 Related Yes
Tomkins No 60 2,616 0.23 Conglomerate No
Bank of Scotland Yes 61 2,612 1.00 Single N/A
Associated British Foods No 62 2,527 0.59 Dominant N/A
British Steel No 63 2,520 0.60 Dominant N/A
Legal & General Yes 64 2,459 0.88 Dominant N/A
Caradon No 65 2,455 0.49 Conglomerate Yes
Siebe No 66 2,439 0.50 Conglomerate Yes
Granada Yes 67 2,433 0.24 Conglomerate No
Rentokil Yes 68 2,349 0.65 Dominant N/A
Blue Circle No 69 2,332 0.48 Conglomerate No
Bowater No 70 2,265 0.37 Related Yes
Thames Water Yes 71 2,261 0.62 Dominant N/A
Forte Yes 72 2,249 0.34 Conglomerate No
Wolseley Yes 73 2,247 0.80 Dominant N/A
MEPC Yes 74 2,222 1.00 Single N/A
Royal Insurance Yes 75 2,206 0.84 Dominant N/A
Enterprise Oil No 76 2,204 1.00 Single N/A
Severn Trent Yes 77 2,193 0.69 Dominant N/A
North West Water Yes 78 2,185 0.64 Dominant N/A
Warburg SG Yes 79 2,020 1.00 Single N/A
Guardian Royal Exchange Yes 80 2,005 0.65 Dominant N/A
Rolls-Royce No 81 1,985 0.52 Related Yes
Courtaulds No 82 1,961 0.26 Related No
Arjo Wiggins Appleton No 83 1,937 0.52 Related Yes
Sears Holdings Yes 84 1,925 1.00 Single N/A
Southern Electricity Yes 85 1,918 0.89 Dominant N/A
United Biscuits No 86 1,895 0.73 Dominant N/A
Carlton Communications Yes 87 1,886 0.28 Related No
TI Group No 88 1,864 0.35 Conglomerate No
Ladbroke Yes 89 1,854 0.43 Conglomerate Yes
RMC Group No 90 1,836 0.45 Related Yes
Williams Holdings No 91 1,832 0.43 Conglomerate Yes
Eastern Electricity Yes 92 1,822 0.92 Single N/A
Anglian Water Yes 93 1,752 0.91 Single N/A
Schroders Yes 94 1,735 1.00 Single N/A
Coats Viyella No 95 1,727 0.29 Related No
Scottish Hydro Electricity Yes 96 1,714 0.90 Dominant N/A
Burmah Castrol No 97 1,628 0.43 Related Yes
ASDA Yes 98 1,608 0.91 Single N/A
British Aerospace No 99 1,561 0.50 Related Yes
Smith & Nephew No 100 1,535 0.73 Dominant N/A
Totals 100 553,349 0.63 Average  
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FTSE100 As At 31st December 1998 
 
Company Service Rank Mkt Cap Herfindahl W&M Core
Glaxo Wellcome No 1 74,903 1.00 Single N/A
British Telecommunications Yes 2 58,504 0.42 Related Yes
BP Amoco No 3 52,808 0.52 Related Yes
SmithKline Beecham No 4 46,863 0.43 Related Yes
Lloyds TSB Yes 5 46,460 0.96 Single N/A
HSBC Yes 6 41,995 0.91 Single N/A
Shell Transport & Trading No 7 36,718 0.63 Dominant N/A
Vodafone Group Yes 8 30,197 1.00 Single N/A
Zeneca Group No 9 24,861 0.41 Related Yes
Diageo No 10 24,494 0.32 Conglomerate No
Unilever No 11 21,979 0.38 Conglomerate Yes
Halifax Yes 12 20,796 1.00 Single N/A
Nat West Yes 13 19,668 0.64 Dominant N/A
Barclays Bank Yes 14 19,569 0.62 Dominant N/A
Abbey National Yes 15 18,198 0.81 Dominant N/A
Cable & Wireless Yes 16 17,773 0.85 Dominant N/A
Prudential Yes 17 17,678 0.95 Single N/A
BG Yes 18 15,010 0.59 Dominant N/A
GEC No 19 14,506 0.30 Related No
Allied Zurich Yes 20 14,084 0.57 Related Yes
Rentokil Initial Yes 21 12,973 0.21 Related No
CGU Yes 22 12,317 0.51 Related Yes
Marks & Spencer Yes 23 11,802 0.94 Single N/A
Tesco Yes 24 11,398 1.00 Single N/A
Cadbury Schweppes No 25 10,424 0.50 Related Yes
Legal & General Yes 26 9,967 0.87 Dominant N/A
Granada Yes 27 9,636 0.30 Conglomerate No
Boots Yes 28 9,354 0.56 Dominant N/A
Sainsbury Yes 29 9,215 0.85 Dominant N/A
British Aerospace No 30 8,982 0.59 Dominant N/A
Reuters Yes 31 8,966 0.50 Related Yes
Bank of Scotland Yes 32 8,869 1.00 Single N/A
Kingfisher Yes 33 8,846 0.98 Single N/A
Royal Bank of Scotland Yes 34 8,400 0.97 Single N/A
Norwich Union Yes 35 8,398 0.56 Related Yes
Orange Yes 36 8,368 1.00 Single N/A
British American Tobacco No 37 8,302 1.00 Single N/A
Railtrack Yes 38 7,965 0.75 Dominant N/A
BSkyB Yes 39 7,874 1.00 Single N/A
Royal & Sun Alliance Yes 40 7,665 0.58 Dominant N/A
BAA Yes 41 7,428 0.63 Dominant N/A
Rio Tinto No 42 7,416 0.55 Related Yes
Scottish Power Yes 43 7,397 0.57 Dominant N/A
Pearson No 44 7,265 0.27 Conglomerate No
National Grid Yes 45 7,071 0.86 Dominant N/A
Bass Yes 46 6,965 0.29 Conglomerate No
Standard Chartered Yes 47 6,965 1.00 Single N/A
National Power Yes 48 6,418 0.93 Single N/A
GUS Yes 49 6,373 0.60 Dominant N/A
Allied Domeq No 50 5,800 0.55 Related Yes  
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FTSE100 As At 31st December 1998 (Cont.) 
 
Company Service Rank Mkt Cap Herfindahl W&M Core
Woolwich Yes 51 5,694 1.00 Single N/A
GKN No 52 5,670 0.57 Related Yes
Reed International No 53 5,376 0.51 Related Yes
Centrica Yes 54 5,370 0.83 Dominant N/A
Colt Telecom Yes 55 5,307 1.00 Single N/A
Alliance & Leicester Yes 56 5,162 1.00 Single N/A
PowerGen Yes 57 5,127 0.75 Dominant N/A
Associated British Foods No 58 5,116 0.87 Dominant N/A
Siebe No 59 4,991 0.39 Related No
British Energy Yes 60 4,950 0.99 Single N/A
ASDA Yes 61 4,919 1.00 Single N/A
Compass Group Yes 62 4,661 1.00 Single N/A
United Utilities Yes 63 4,573 0.47 Conglomerate Yes
P&O Yes 64 4,568 0.35 Conglomerate No
Hays Yes 65 4,525 0.39 Related Yes
Scottish & Newcastle Yes 66 4,327 0.48 Related Yes
Sun Life & Provincial Yes 67 4,286 0.77 Dominant N/A
British Airways Yes 68 4,267 0.84 Dominant N/A
Land Securities Yes 69 4,257 1.00 Single N/A
BOC Group No 70 4,203 0.67 Dominant N/A
Thames Water Yes 71 4,013 0.77 Dominant N/A
BTR No 72 4,004 0.52 Conglomerate Yes
Whitbread Yes 73 3,793 0.29 Related No
ICI No 74 3,787 0.27 Related No
Rolls-Royce No 75 3,745 0.69 Dominant N/A
Telewest Yes 76 3,711 1.00 Single N/A
Severn Trent Yes 77 3,478 0.51 Related Yes
3i Group Yes 78 3,451 1.00 Single N/A
Carlton Communications Yes 79 3,373 0.32 Related No
Safeway Yes 80 3,343 1.00 Single N/A
Tomkins No 81 3,334 0.28 Conglomerate No
Southern Electric Yes 82 3,275 0.79 Dominant N/A
Reckitt & Colman No 83 3,239 0.64 Dominant N/A
EMI No 84 3,159 1.00 Single N/A
Stagecoach Yes 85 3,146 0.42 Related Yes
Schroders Yes 86 3,123 1.00 Single N/A
Amvescap Yes 87 3,095 1.00 Single N/A
Securicor Yes 88 3,029 0.47 Related No
GRE Yes 89 2,974 0.67 Dominant N/A
Ladbroke Group Yes 90 2,895 0.68 Dominant N/A
LucasVarity No 91 2,823 0.73 Dominant N/A
WPP Yes 92 2,801 1.00 Single N/A
Sema Group Yes 93 2,724 1.00 Single N/A
Smiths Industries No 94 2,649 0.34 Conglomerate No
United News & Media Yes 95 2,635 0.35 Related No
Nycomed Amersham No 96 2,612 0.36 Related No
Billiton No 97 2,549 1.00 Single N/A
Williams No 98 2,487 0.43 Related Yes
Misys Yes 99 2,460 1.00 Single N/A
British Land Yes 100 2,315 1.00 Single N/A
Totals 100 1,067,254 0.70 Average  
 
 
 
 
 
 
   XX 
FTSE100 As At 31st December 2003 
 
Company Service Rank Mkt Cap Herfindahl W&M Core
BP No 1 100,589 0.47 Related Yes
HSBC Yes 2 97,309 0.51 Related Yes
Vodafone Group Yes 3 95,109 0.83 Dominant N/A
Glaxo SmithKline No 4 77,306 0.74 Dominant N/A
Royal Bank of Scotland Yes 5 48,675 0.96 Single N/A
AstraZeneca No 6 45,870 1.00 Single N/A
Shell Transport & Trading No 7 40,241 0.76 Dominant N/A
Barclays Bank Yes 8 32,931 0.73 Dominant N/A
HBOS Yes 9 27,820 0.78 Dominant N/A
Lloyds TSB Yes 10 25,434 0.91 Single N/A
Diageo No 11 22,895 1.00 Single N/A
Tesco Yes 12 18,810 1.00 Single N/A
Anglo American No 13 17,947 0.32 Related No
Rio Tinto No 14 16,597 0.71 Dominant N/A
BT Group Yes 15 16,395 0.44 Related Yes
British American Tobacco No 16 16,019 1.00 Single N/A
Unilever No 17 15,154 0.41 Conglomerate Yes
BSkyB Yes 18 13,729 1.00 Single N/A
National Grid Transco Yes 19 12,548 0.80 Dominant N/A
BHP Billiton No 20 12,180 0.57 Dominant N/A
Aviva Yes 21 11,240 0.56 Related Yes
Standard Chartered Yes 22 10,929 1.00 Single N/A
BG Yes 23 10,096 0.36 Related No
Prudential Yes 24 9,684 1.00 Single N/A
Centrica Yes 25 9,021 0.80 Dominant N/A
Reckitt Benckiser No 26 8,952 0.90 Dominant N/A
Cadbury Schweppes No 27 8,599 0.52 Related Yes
Compass Group (New) Yes 28 8,237 1.00 Single N/A
Imperial Tobacco No 29 8,094 1.00 Single N/A
GUS Yes 30 7,924 0.72 Dominant N/A
Abbey National Yes 31 7,845 0.93 Single N/A
Kingfisher Yes 32 7,355 0.99 Single N/A
Scottish Power Yes 33 6,946 1.00 Single N/A
mmO2 Yes 34 6,892 1.00 Single N/A
WPP Yes 35 6,631 1.00 Single N/A
Legal & General Yes 36 6,616 0.88 Dominant N/A
Marks & Spencer Yes 37 6,540 0.92 Single N/A
Sainsbury Yes 38 6,103 0.96 Single N/A
Reed Elsevier No 39 5,936 0.41 Related Yes
SABMiller No 40 5,832 0.82 Dominant N/A
Scottish & Southern Elec Yes 41 5,814 0.85 Dominant N/A
Boots Yes 42 5,491 0.72 Dominant N/A
Amersham No 43 5,407 0.42 Related Yes
BAA Yes 44 5,283 0.60 Dominant N/A
BAE Systems No 45 5,186 0.62 Dominant N/A
Pearson No 46 5,039 0.45 Related Yes
Allied Domeq No 47 4,838 0.86 Dominant N/A
Carnival Yes 48 4,718 0.93 Single N/A
Associated British Foods No 49 4,661 0.75 Dominant N/A
Land Securities Yes 50 4,636 0.50 Related Yes  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   XXI 
FTSE100 As At 31st December 2003 (Cont.) 
 
Company Service Rank Mkt Cap Herfindahl W&M Core
Wolseley Yes 51 4,573 1.00 Single N/A
Man Yes 52 4,537 0.57 Related Yes
Smith & Nephew No 53 4,345 1.00 Single N/A
BOC Group No 54 4,251 0.74 Dominant N/A
Alliance & Leicester Yes 55 4,158 1.00 Single N/A
Xstrata No 56 3,987 0.99 Single N/A
Intercontinental Hotels Yes 57 3,940 0.58 Conglomerate Yes
Gallaher No 58 3,926 1.00 Single N/A
3i Group Yes 59 3,799 1.00 Single N/A
Smiths No 60 3,705 0.30 Conglomerate No
United Utilities Yes 61 3,697 0.48 Related Yes
Hilton Yes 62 3,622 0.70 Dominant N/A
Old Mutual Yes 63 3,577 0.45 Conglomerate Yes
Morrison Yes 64 3,537 0.99 Single N/A
Rentokil Initial Yes 65 3,489 0.23 Related No
Reuters Yes 66 3,456 0.58 Dominant N/A
Granada Yes 67 3,398 0.99 Single N/A
Amvescap Yes 68 3,305 1.00 Single N/A
Scottish & Newcastle No 69 3,282 1.00 Single N/A
Cable & Wireless Yes 70 3,201 1.00 Single N/A
Next Yes 71 3,043 0.89 Dominant N/A
Northern Rock Yes 72 3,043 1.00 Single N/A
Hanson No 73 3,006 0.60 Dominant N/A
Safeway Yes 74 2,987 1.00 Single N/A
Rolls-Royce No 75 2,903 0.60 Dominant N/A
British Land Yes 76 2,889 1.00 Single N/A
Dixons Group Yes 77 2,698 0.98 Single N/A
Severn Trent Yes 78 2,631 0.34 Related No
Shire Pharmaceuticals No 79 2,570 1.00 Single N/A
Royal & Sun Alliance Yes 80 2,520 0.72 Dominant N/A
Daily Mail No 81 2,513 0.48 Related Yes
British Airways Yes 82 2,485 0.85 Dominant N/A
ICI No 83 2,358 0.27 Related No
Rexam No 84 2,334 1.00 Single N/A
Friends Provident Yes 85 2,320 1.00 Single N/A
Sage Group No 86 2,264 1.00 Single N/A
Exel Yes 87 2,212 0.96 Single N/A
EMAP No 88 2,201 0.73 Dominant N/A
Yell Yes 89 2,156 1.00 Single N/A
Whitbread Yes 90 2,137 0.41 Conglomerate Yes
Liberty International Yes 91 2,136 0.94 Single N/A
Hays Yes 92 2,134 0.45 Conglomerate No
Johnson Matthey No 93 2,133 0.50 Related Yes
Tomkins No 94 2,079 0.48 Conglomerate Yes
GKN No 95 1,956 0.72 Dominant N/A
Bradford & Bingley Yes 96 1,952 1.00 Single N/A
Bunzl Yes 97 1,905 0.72 Dominant N/A
Schroders Yes 98 1,842 0.67 Dominant N/A
Alliance Unichem Yes 99 1,806 1.00 Single N/A
Foreign & Colonial Yes 100 1,788 1.00 Single N/A
Totals 100 1,110,889 0.77 Average  
   XXII 
Appendix F – Data Summaries of FTSE100 Conglomerates 
 
1993 1998 2003
Company Name Bass Bass Intercontinental Hotels
Investor (31st Dec)
FT Classification Brewers & Distillers Breweries, Pubs & Rests Leisure & Hotels
Service Yes Yes Yes
FTSE100 Yes Yes Yes
Market Cap. (£m) 4,652.0 6,965.0 3,940.0
Position 36 46 57
P/E Ratio 14.5 17.3 43.4
MV/Book (Excluding Intangibles) #NA #NA 1.6
Diversification
Channon/W&M Conglomerate Conglomerate Conglomerate
Core No No Yes
Focus/Multiple Business Multiple Multiple Multiple
Hill & Pickering High High High
Herfindahl 0.21 0.29 0.58
No. of Divisions 6 5 2
No. of Unrelated Activities 3 3 2
Largest Activity Turnover (%) 27.8 35.5 69.5
Largest Related Group Turnover (%) 63.9 47.5 69.5
Performance
External Turnover (£m) 3,747 4,231 2,152
Operating Profit (£m) 583 674 274
ROCE (%) 12.9 18.9 4.2
Gearing (%) 29.8 47.3 26.9
Corporate Governance
Chairman Prosser, I. Prosser, I. Webster, D.
Non-Executive No No Yes
Tenure (Years) 6 11 0
CEO/COO/MD N/A N/A North, R.
Tenure (Years) 0 0 1
Alt CEO/COO/MD    Chair    Chair N/A
Major Shareholdings (%) 3.6 3.8 10.6
BASS/INTERCONTINENTAL HOTELS
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1993 1998 2003
Company Name BAT Industries British American Tobacco British American Tobacco
Investor (31st Dec)
FT Classification Miscellaneous Tobacco Tobacco
Service Yes No No
FTSE100 Yes Yes Yes
Market Cap. (£m) 17,036.0 8,302.0 16,019.0
Position 6 37 16
P/E Ratio 16.6 11.0 13.4
MV/Book (Excluding Intangibles) 3.4 553.4 (3.5)
Diversification
Channon/W&M Conglomerate Single Single
Core Yes N/A N/A
Focus/Multiple Business Multiple Focus Focus
Hill & Pickering High Low Low
Herfindahl 0.50 1.00 1.00
No. of Divisions 2 1 1
No. of Unrelated Activities 2 1 1
Largest Activity Turnover (%) 53.7 100.0 100.0
Largest Related Group Turnover (%) 53.7 100.0 100.0
Performance
External Turnover (£m) 11,368 7,120 10,570
Operating Profit (£m) 1,513 1,043 2,109
ROCE (%) 21.9 19.2 44.5
Gearing (%) 37.1 91.7 62.7
Corporate Governance
Chairman Sheehy, P. (Sir) Broughton, M. Broughton, M.
Non-Executive Yes No No
Tenure (Years) 11 0 5
CEO/COO/MD Broughton, M. Herter, U. Adams, P.
Tenure (Years) 5 6 0
Alt CEO/COO/MD N/A N/A N/A
Major Shareholdings (%) 0.0 0.0 35.0
BAT/BRITISH AMERICAN TOBACCO
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1993 1998 2003
Company Name Blue Circle Blue Circle
Investor (31st Dec)
FT Classification Building Materials Building Matls & Merch
Service No No
FTSE100 Yes No
Market Cap. (£m) 2,332.0 2,411.0
Position 69 0
P/E Ratio 0.0 10.9
MV/Book (Excluding Intangibles) 2.7 2.0
Diversification
Channon/W&M Conglomerate Conglomerate
Core No Yes
Focus/Multiple Business Multiple Multiple
Hill & Pickering High High
Herfindahl 0.48 0.53
No. of Divisions 4 4
No. of Unrelated Activities 2 2
Largest Activity Turnover (%) 49.2 63.4
Largest Related Group Turnover (%) 50.6 64.5
Performance
External Turnover (£m) 1,679 1,845
Operating Profit (£m) 150 260
ROCE (%) 10.7 14.7
Gearing (%) 42.1 35.2
Corporate Governance
Chairman Walters, P. (Sir) Tugendhat, C
Non-Executive Yes Yes
Tenure (Years) 3 2
CEO/COO/MD Orrell-Jones, K. Orrell-Jones, K.
Tenure (Years) 1 6
Alt CEO/COO/MD N/A N/A
Major Shareholdings (%) 10.9 7.0
BLUE CIRCLE
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1993 1998 2003
Company Name BTR BTR
Investor (31st Dec)
FT Classification Other Industrials Engineering
Service No No
FTSE100 Yes Yes
Market Cap. (£m) 12,976.0 4,004.0
Position 9 72
P/E Ratio 20.9 16.4
MV/Book (Excluding Intangibles) 6.2 0.0
Diversification
Channon/W&M Conglomerate Conglomerate
Core No Yes
Focus/Multiple Business Multiple Multiple
Hill & Pickering High High
Herfindahl 0.21 0.52
No. of Divisions 5 4
No. of Unrelated Activities 5 4
Largest Activity Turnover (%) 24.6 68.4
Largest Related Group Turnover (%) 24.6 68.4
Performance
External Turnover (£m) 8,422 7,435
Operating Profit (£m) 1,292 1,126
ROCE (%) 24.0 27.5
Gearing (%) 46.7 57.0
Corporate Governance
Chairman Ireland, N. Bauman, R.
Non-Executive Yes Yes
Tenure (Years) 0 0
CEO/COO/MD Jackson, A. Strachan, I.
Tenure (Years) 2 2
Alt CEO/COO/MD N/A N/A
Major Shareholdings (%) 6.7 0.0
BTR
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1993 1998 2003
Company Name Caradon Caradon Novar
Investor (31st Dec)
FT Classification Building Materials Building Matls & Merch Construction & Bldg Matls
Service No No No
FTSE100 Yes No No
Market Cap. (£m) 2,455.0 475.8 607.6
Position 65 0 0
P/E Ratio 33.5 8.3 13.8
MV/Book (Excluding Intangibles) 5.4 2.5 (5.1)
Diversification
Channon/W&M Conglomerate Dominant Dominant
Core Yes N/A N/A
Focus/Multiple Business Multiple Focus Focus
Hill & Pickering High Medium Medium
Herfindahl 0.49 0.72 0.63
No. of Divisions 3 2 2
No. of Unrelated Activities 3 2 2
Largest Activity Turnover (%) 65.5 83.4 75.7
Largest Related Group Turnover (%) 65.5 83.4 75.7
Performance
External Turnover (£m) 952 1,292 1,431
Operating Profit (£m) 115 124 75
ROCE (%) 35.3 (21.8) (8.5)
Gearing (%) 20.7 39.2 50.4
Corporate Governance
Chairman Hichens, A. Parker, E. (Sir) Hearne, G. (Sir)
Non-Executive Yes Yes Yes
Tenure (Years) 3 0 4
CEO/COO/MD Jansen, P. Hintz, J. Hintz, J.
Tenure (Years) 4 1 6
Alt CEO/COO/MD N/A N/A N/A
Major Shareholdings (%) 6.9 34.0 31.9
CARADON/NOVAR
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1993 1998 2003
Company Name Forte
Investor (31st Dec)
FT Classification Hotels & Leisure
Service Yes
FTSE100 Yes
Market Cap. (£m) 2,249.0
Position 72
P/E Ratio 20.5
MV/Book 0.6
MV/EBITDA 3.9
Diversification
Channon/W&M Conglomerate
Core No
Focus/Multiple Business Multiple
Hill & Pickering High
Herfindahl 0.34
No. of Divisions 4
No. of Unrelated Activities 2
Largest Activity Turnover (%) 43.5
Largest Related Group Turnover (%) 53.4
Performance
External Turnover (£m) 1,936
Operating Profit (£m) 169
ROCE (%) 7.3
Gearing (%) 32.5
Corporate Governance
Chairman Forte, R.
Non-Executive No
Tenure (Years) 1
CEO/COO/MD N/A
Tenure (Years) 0
Alt CEO/COO/MD Multiple
Major Shareholdings (%) 7.9
FORTE
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1993 1998 2003
Company Name Granada Granada Granada
Investor (31st Dec)
FT Classification Hotels & Leisure Leisure & Hotels Media & Entertainment
Service Yes Yes Yes
FTSE100 Yes Yes Yes
Market Cap. (£m) 2,433.0 9,636.0 3,398.0
Position 67 27 67
P/E Ratio 21.3 18.9 26.0
MV/Book (Excluding Intangibles) 0.0 0.0 0.0
Diversification
Channon/W&M Conglomerate Conglomerate Single
Core No No N/A
Focus/Multiple Business Multiple Multiple Focus
Hill & Pickering High High Low
Herfindahl 0.24 0.30 0.99
No. of Divisions 6 5 2
No. of Unrelated Activities 4 4 1
Largest Activity Turnover (%) 33.3 40.5 99.7
Largest Related Group Turnover (%) 49.2 40.5 100.0
Performance
External Turnover (£m) 1,615 3,978 1,402
Operating Profit (£m) 205 967 129
ROCE (%) 0.0 0.0 0.0
Gearing (%) 0.0 0.0 0.0
Corporate Governance
Chairman Bernstein, A. Robinson, G. Allen, C.
Non-Executive Yes No No
Tenure (Years) 14 2 0
CEO/COO/MD Robinson, G. Allen, C. N/A
Tenure (Years) 2 2 0
Alt CEO/COO/MD N/A N/A Vacant
Major Shareholdings (%) 19.8 0.0 100.0
GRANADA
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1993 1998 2003
Company Name Guinness Diageo Diageo
Investor (31st Dec)
FT Classification Brewers & Distillers Alcoholic Beverages Beverages
Service No No No
FTSE100 Yes Yes Yes
Market Cap. (£m) 9,588.0 24,494.0 22,895.0
Position 17 10 11
P/E Ratio 17.8 20.7 17.0
MV/Book (Excluding Intangibles) 4.8 (120.8) 49.3
Diversification
Channon/W&M Related Conglomerate Single
Core Yes No N/A
Focus/Multiple Business Multiple Multiple Focus
Hill & Pickering Low High Low
Herfindahl 0.52 0.32 1.00
No. of Divisions 2 4 1
No. of Unrelated Activities 1 3 1
Largest Activity Turnover (%) 59.5 43.6 100.0
Largest Related Group Turnover (%) 100.0 61.9 100.0
Performance
External Turnover (£m) 3,439 9,874 6,795
Operating Profit (£m) 894 1,786 1,951
ROCE (%) 16.0 22.9 10.6
Gearing (%) 37.2 59.8 55.6
Corporate Governance
Chairman
Greener, A. (Sir)
Greener, A. (Sir ) & Bull, G. 
(Sir) Blyth (Lord)
Non-Executive No No Yes
Tenure (Years) 0 5 3
CEO/COO/MD Baldock, B. McGrath, J. Walsh, P.
Tenure (Years) 4 1 3
Alt CEO/COO/MD N/A N/A N/A
Major Shareholdings (%) 23.9 14.8 0.0
GUINNESS/DIAGEO
 
 
References 
 
Annual Reports & Accounts: 1993 Guinness, 1998 Diageo, 2003 Diageo. 
 
Blackwell, D. & Edgecliffe, A. (2000), „Happy Guys‟ Sleep Off $8bn Seagram Spirits Binge, 
Financial Times, December 21
st
, p24. 
 
Jones, A. (2002), Diageo Considers a Fire Sale in its Craving for Focus, Financial Times, 
November 23
rd
, p14. 
 
Willman, J. (1998a), „Robber Baron‟ Promises Reform at Diageo, Financial Times, March 
18
th
, p44. 
 
Willman, J. (1988b), Markets Go on a Bender and Diageo is Nursing a Headache, Financial 
Times, September 24
th
, p25. 
 
 
 
 
   XXX 
1993 1998 2003
Company Name Hanson Hanson Hanson
Investor (31st Dec)
FT Classification Conglomerates Building Matls & Merch Construction & Bldg Matls
Service No No No
FTSE100 Yes No Yes
Market Cap. (£m) 13,540.0 3,109.0 3,006.0
Position 8 0 73
P/E Ratio 19.9 15.0 12.0
MV/Book (Excluding Intangibles) 3.2 2.1 1.6
Diversification
Channon/W&M Conglomerate Dominant Dominant
Core No N/A N/A
Focus/Multiple Business Multiple Focus Focus
Hill & Pickering High Low Low
Herfindahl 0.21 0.75 0.60
No. of Divisions 8 3 2
No. of Unrelated Activities 5 2 1
Largest Activity Turnover (%) 31.8 85.7 72.1
Largest Related Group Turnover (%) 31.8 98.4 100.0
Performance
External Turnover (£m) 9,668 1,590 3,498
Operating Profit (£m) 923 245 356
ROCE (%) 10.4 9.7 4.6
Gearing (%) 74.3 51.3 47.5
Corporate Governance
Chairman Hanson (Lord) Collins, C. Collins, C.
Non-Executive No Yes Yes
Tenure (Years) 28 0 5
CEO/COO/MD Bonham, D. Dougal, A. Murray, A
Tenure (Years) 1 2 1
Alt CEO/COO/MD N/A N/A N/A
Major Shareholdings (%) 0.0 22.6 23.7
HANSON
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1993 1998 2003
Company Name Hays Hays Hays
Investor (31st Dec)
FT Classification Business Services Support Services Support Services
Service Yes Yes Yes
FTSE100 No Yes Yes
Market Cap. (£m) 1,162.0 4,525.0 2,134.0
Position 0 65 92
P/E Ratio 25.1 31.9 22.9
MV/Book (Excluding Intangibles) 7.3 23.8 (14.3)
Diversification
Channon/W&M Related Related Conglomerate
Core Yes Yes No
Focus/Multiple Business Multiple Multiple Multiple
Hill & Pickering Medium Medium High
Herfindahl 0.47 0.39 0.45
No. of Divisions 3 3 3
No. of Unrelated Activities 2 2 2
Largest Activity Turnover (%) 63.8 51.1 48.3
Largest Related Group Turnover (%) 79.3 82.8 51.8
Performance
External Turnover (£m) 477 1,519 2,294
Operating Profit (£m) 68 208 152
ROCE (%) 38.5 49.8 (161.9)
Gearing (%) 24.9 57.2 100.7
Corporate Governance
Chairman Frost, R. Frost, R. Lawson, R.
Non-Executive No No Yes
Tenure (Years) 4 9 2
CEO/COO/MD Napier, J. Cole, J. Matthews, C.
Tenure (Years) 2 0 1
Alt CEO/COO/MD N/A N/A N/A
Major Shareholdings (%) 25.3 7.8 12.4
HAYS
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1993 1998 2003
Company Name Ladbroke Ladbroke Hilton
Investor (31st Dec)
FT Classification Hotels & Leisure Leisure & Hotels Leisure & Hotels
Service Yes Yes Yes
FTSE100 Yes Yes Yes
Market Cap. (£m) 1,854.0 2,895.0 3,622.0
Position 89 90 62
P/E Ratio 13.9 15.9 18.1
MV/Book (Excluding Intangibles) 1.4 3.6 4.6
Diversification
Channon/W&M Conglomerate Dominant Dominant
Core Yes N/A N/A
Focus/Multiple Business Multiple Focus Focus
Hill & Pickering High Medium Medium
Herfindahl 0.43 0.68 0.70
No. of Divisions 4 2 2
No. of Unrelated Activities 3 2 2
Largest Activity Turnover (%) 59.5 79.6 81.4
Largest Related Group Turnover (%) 59.5 79.6 81.4
Performance
External Turnover (£m) 4,269 4,681 8,931
Operating Profit (£m) 162 325 256
ROCE (%) 7.4 19.0 10.3
Gearing (%) 38.9 41.8 41.7
Corporate Governance
Chairman Jackson, J. Jackson, J. Robinson, I. (Sir)
Non-Executive Yes Yes Yes
Tenure (Years) 0 4 2
CEO/COO/MD George, P. George, P. Michels, D.
Tenure (Years) 0 4 3
Alt CEO/COO/MD N/A N/A N/A
Major Shareholdings (%) 0.0 0.0 23.1
LADBROKE/HILTON
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   XXXIII 
1993 1998 2003
Company Name North West Water United Utilities United Utilities
Investor (31st Dec)
FT Classification Water Utilities Utilities (Ex Electricity)
Service Yes Yes Yes
FTSE100 Yes Yes Yes
Market Cap. (£m) 2,185.0 4,573.0 3,697.0
Position 78 63 61
P/E Ratio 9.7 11.5 9.2
MV/Book (Excluding Intangibles) 1.0 2.4 1.3
Diversification
Channon/W&M Dominant Conglomerate Related
Core N/A Yes Yes
Focus/Multiple Business Focus Multiple Multiple
Hill & Pickering Low High Medium
Herfindahl 0.64 0.47 0.48
No. of Divisions 3 5 4
No. of Unrelated Activities 1 3 2
Largest Activity Turnover (%) 77.5 53.6 65.5
Largest Related Group Turnover (%) 100.0 53.6 91.4
Performance
External Turnover (£m) 878 2,150 1,879
Operating Profit (£m) 320 597 524
ROCE (%) 12.0 13.6 8.3
Gearing (%) 28.1 52.3 58.9
Corporate Governance
Chairman Pitcher, D. (Sir) Harding, C. (Sir) Evans, R. (Sir)
Non-Executive No Yes Yes
Tenure (Years) 0 0 2
CEO/COO/MD Thian, R. Green, D. Roberts, J.
Tenure (Years) 1 1 4
Alt CEO/COO/MD N/A N/A N/A
Major Shareholdings (%) 3.5 11.3 6.4
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   XXXIV 
1993 1998 2003
Company Name Old Mutual
Investor (31st Dec)
FT Classification Life Assurance
Service Yes
FTSE100 Yes
Market Cap. (£m) 3,577.0
Position 63
P/E Ratio 8.6
MV/Book (Excluding Intangibles) 2.4
Diversification
Channon/W&M Conglomerate
Core Yes
Focus/Multiple Business Multiple
Hill & Pickering High
Herfindahl 0.45
No. of Divisions 3
No. of Unrelated Activities 2
Largest Activity Turnover (%) 57.40
Largest Related Group Turnover (%) 57.40
Performance
External Turnover (£m) 10,085
Operating Profit (£m) 2,446
ROCE (%) 48.4
Gearing (%) 31.6
Corporate Governance
Chairman Levett, M.
Non-Executive Yes
Tenure (Years) 4
CEO/COO/MD Sutcliffe, J.
Tenure (Years) 2
Alt CEO/COO/MD N/A
Major Shareholdings (%) 22.8
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   XXXV 
1993 1998 2003
Company Name P&O P&O P&O
Investor (31st Dec)
FT Classification Transport Transport Transport
Service Yes Yes Yes
FTSE100 Yes Yes No
Market Cap. (£m) 3,856.0 4,568.0 1,740.0
Position 43 64 0
P/E Ratio 35.1 15.3 0.0
MV/Book (Excluding Intangibles) 1.5 1.6 1.7
Diversification
Channon/W&M Conglomerate Conglomerate Related
Core No No No
Focus/Multiple Business Multiple Multiple Multiple
Hill & Pickering High High Medium
Herfindahl 0.24 0.35 0.36
No. of Divisions 5 4 4
No. of Unrelated Activities 3 2 2
Largest Activity Turnover (%) 29.4 46.1 47.2
Largest Related Group Turnover (%) 67.5 53.9 91.0
Performance
External Turnover (£m) 5,587 5,912 2,291
Operating Profit (£m) 343 481 124
ROCE (%) 14.5 10.2 4.7
Gearing (%) 42.7 33.7 53.8
Corporate Governance
Chairman Sterling (Lord) Sterling (Lord) Sterling (Lord)
Non-Executive No No No
Tenure (Years) 10 15 20
CEO/COO/MD MacPhail, B. (Sir) MacPhail, B. (Sir) Woods, R.
Tenure (Years) 8 13 0
Alt CEO/COO/MD N/A N/A N/A
Major Shareholdings (%) 4.9 35.6 21.9
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   XXXVI 
1993 1998 2003
Company Name Pearson Pearson Pearson
Investor (31st Dec)
FT Classification Media Media Media & Entertainment
Service No No No
FTSE100 Yes Yes Yes
Market Cap. (£m) 3,344.0 7,265.0 5,039.0
Position 48 44 46
P/E Ratio 33.0 30.5 17.9
MV/Book (Excluding Intangibles) 3.4 (5.7) (14.4)
Diversification
Channon/W&M Conglomerate Conglomerate Related
Core Yes No Yes
Focus/Multiple Business Multiple Multiple Multiple
Hill & Pickering High High Medium
Herfindahl 0.48 0.27 0.45
No. of Divisions 4 4 3
No. of Unrelated Activities 4 3 2
Largest Activity Turnover (%) 62.0 31.2 60.5
Largest Related Group Turnover (%) 62.0 54.4 81.3
Performance
External Turnover (£m) 1,320 2,251 4,048
Operating Profit (£m) 111 224 175
ROCE (%) 15.8 47.0 13.8
Gearing (%) 30.1 70.9 38.3
Corporate Governance
Chairman Blakenham, M. Stevenson, D. Stevenson, D.
Non-Executive No No Yes
Tenure (Years) 10 1 6
CEO/COO/MD Barlow, F. Scardino, M. Scardino, M.
Tenure (Years) 3 1 6
Alt CEO/COO/MD N/A N/A N/A
Major Shareholdings (%) 8.9 10.6 26.9
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   XXXVII 
1993 1998 2003
Company Name Siebe Siebe Invensys
Investor (31st Dec)
FT Classification Engineering - General Engineering Electronic & Elec Equip
Service No No No
FTSE100 Yes Yes No
Market Cap. (£m) 2,439.0 4,991.0 647.5
Position 66 59 0
P/E Ratio 20.0 14.7 0.0
MV/Book (Excluding Intangibles) 3.1 19.5 (0.4)
Diversification
Channon/W&M Conglomerate Related Related
Core Yes No No
Focus/Multiple Business Multiple Multiple Multiple
Hill & Pickering High Medium Low
Herfindahl 0.50 0.39 0.38
No. of Divisions 5 3 3
No. of Unrelated Activities 5 2 1
Largest Activity Turnover (%) 67.9 45.9 48.2
Largest Related Group Turnover (%) 67.9 85.8 99.9
Performance
External Turnover (£m) 1,619 3,670 5,018
Operating Profit (£m) 217 576 208
ROCE (%) 18.5 38.3 (100.3)
Gearing (%) 46.1 49.7 95.9
Corporate Governance
Chairman Stephens, B. Marshall, C. (Sir/Lord) Marshall, C. (Sir/Lord)
Non-Executive No Yes Yes
Tenure (Years) 3 0 5
CEO/COO/MD N/A Yurko, A. Haythornthwaite, R.
Tenure (Years) 0 6 2
Alt CEO/COO/MD    Chair N/A N/A
Major Shareholdings (%) 14.0 12.0 28.9
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   XXXVIII 
1993 1998 2003
Company Name Smiths Industries Smiths Industries Smiths
Investor (31st Dec)
FT Classification Engineering - Aerospace Engineering Aerospace & Defence
Service No No No
FTSE100 No Yes Yes
Market Cap. (£m) 1,369.0 2,649.0 3,705.0
Position 0 94 60
P/E Ratio 18.4 17.8 13.2
MV/Book (Excluding Intangibles) 4.2 9.9 151.6
Diversification
Channon/W&M Conglomerate Conglomerate Conglomerate
Core Yes No No
Focus/Multiple Business Multiple Multiple Multiple
Hill & Pickering High High High
Herfindahl 0.40 0.34 0.30
No. of Divisions 3 3 4
No. of Unrelated Activities 3 3 3
Largest Activity Turnover (%) 54.1 38.6 38.0
Largest Related Group Turnover (%) 54.1 38.6 48.4
Performance
External Turnover (£m) 726 1,199 3,056
Operating Profit (£m) 106 240 380
ROCE (%) 27.2 56.2 31.8
Gearing (%) 34.7 44.3 47.8
Corporate Governance
Chairman Hurn, R. (Sir) Hurn, R. (Sir) Orrell-Jones, K.
Non-Executive No No Yes
Tenure (Years) 2 7 5
CEO/COO/MD N/A Butler-Wheelhouse, K. Butler-Wheelhouse, K.
Tenure (Years) 0 2 7
Alt CEO/COO/MD    Chair N/A N/A
Major Shareholdings (%) 12.3 10.8 24.7
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   XXXIX 
1993 1998 2003
Company Name TI Group TI Group
Investor (31st Dec)
FT Classification Engineering - General Engineering
Service No No
FTSE100 Yes No
Market Cap. (£m) 1,864.0 1,556.0
Position 88 0
P/E Ratio 27.4 10.3
MV/Book (Excluding Intangibles) 6.6 21.3
Diversification
Channon/W&M Conglomerate Conglomerate
Core No No
Focus/Multiple Business Multiple Multiple
Hill & Pickering High High
Herfindahl 0.35 0.35
No. of Divisions 3 3
No. of Unrelated Activities 3 3
Largest Activity Turnover (%) 43.2 40.1
Largest Related Group Turnover (%) 43.2 40.1
Performance
External Turnover (£m) 1,323 2,079
Operating Profit (£m) 134 239
ROCE (%) 21.4 33.6
Gearing (%) 59.6 53.2
Corporate Governance
Chairman Lewinton, C. (Sir) Lewinton, C. (Sir)
Non-Executive No No
Tenure (Years) 4 9
CEO/COO/MD N/A Laule, W.
Tenure (Years) 0 0
Alt CEO/COO/MD    Chair N/A
Major Shareholdings (%) 14.6 16.4
TI GROUP
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   XL 
1993 1998 2003
Company Name Tomkins Tomkins Tomkins
Investor (31st Dec)
FT Classification Conglomerates Engineering Engineering & Machinery
Service No No No
FTSE100 Yes Yes Yes
Market Cap. (£m) 2,616.0 3,334.0 2,079.0
Position 60 81 94
P/E Ratio 17.2 11.8 13.5
MV/Book (Excluding Intangibles) 3.4 13.8 10.9
Diversification
Channon/W&M Conglomerate Conglomerate Conglomerate
Core No No Yes
Focus/Multiple Business Multiple Multiple Multiple
Hill & Pickering High High High
Herfindahl 0.23 0.28 0.48
No. of Divisions 5 4 3
No. of Unrelated Activities 5 4 3
Largest Activity Turnover (%) 32.2 35.6 64.3
Largest Related Group Turnover (%) 32.2 35.6 64.3
Performance
External Turnover (£m) 2,060 5,048 3,150
Operating Profit (£m) 145 473 259
ROCE (%) 18.6 39.4 15.0
Gearing (%) 16.4 27.9 36.4
Corporate Governance
Chairman Moore, M. Hutchins, G. Newlands, D.
Non-Executive Yes No Yes
Tenure (Years) 9 3 3
CEO/COO/MD Hutchins, G. Snowdon, D. Nicol, J.
Tenure (Years) 9 2 1
Alt CEO/COO/MD N/A N/A N/A
Major Shareholdings (%) 16.7 15.8 12.2
TOMKINS
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   XLI 
1993 1998 2003
Company Name Unilever Unilever Unilever
Investor (31st Dec)
FT Classification Food Manufacturing Food Processors Food Prods & Processors
Service No No No
FTSE100 Yes Yes Yes
Market Cap. (£m) 9,756.0 21,979.0 15,154.0
Position 16 11 17
P/E Ratio 16.4 27.7 21.6
MV/Book (Excluding Intangibles) 2.1 7.2 (1.6)
Diversification
Channon/W&M Conglomerate Conglomerate Conglomerate
Core Yes Yes Yes
Focus/Multiple Business Multiple Multiple Multiple
Hill & Pickering High High High
Herfindahl 0.35 0.38 0.41
No. of Divisions 5 4 4
No. of Unrelated Activities 2 2 2
Largest Activity Turnover (%) 51.5 52.1 56.1
Largest Related Group Turnover (%) 54.0 53.6 56.9
Performance
External Turnover (£m) 27,863 27,094 29,501
Operating Profit (£m) 2,427 2,871 3,865
ROCE (%) 28.9 49.6 121.1
Gearing (%) 32.6 47.2 71.4
Corporate Governance
Chairman Perry, M. (Sir) FitzGerald, N. FitzGerald, N.
Non-Executive No No No
Tenure (Years) 1 2 7
CEO/COO/MD N/A N/A N/A
Tenure (Years) 0 0 0
Alt CEO/COO/MD Multiple Multiple Multiple
Major Shareholdings (%) 5.0 5.0 14.0
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   XLII 
1993 1998 2003
Company Name Whitbread Whitbread Whitbread
Investor (31st Dec)
FT Classification Brewers & Distillers Breweries, Pubs & Rests Leisure & Hotels
Service Yes Yes Yes
FTSE100 Yes Yes Yes
Market Cap. (£m) 3,016.0 3,793.0 2,137.0
Position 55 73 90
P/E Ratio 13.9 13.5 12.0
MV/Book (Excluding Intangibles) 1.0 2.0 0.8
Diversification
Channon/W&M Related Related Conglomerate
Core Yes No Yes
Focus/Multiple Business Multiple Multiple Multiple
Hill & Pickering Low Medium High
Herfindahl 0.52 0.29 0.41
No. of Divisions 3 6 4
No. of Unrelated Activities 1 3 3
Largest Activity Turnover (%) 67.3 42.6 54.7
Largest Related Group Turnover (%) 100.0 91.9 58.2
Performance
External Turnover (£m) 2,319 3,198 1,794
Operating Profit (£m) 183 384 242
ROCE (%) 8.9 12.8 8.1
Gearing (%) 20.0 26.1 33.9
Corporate Governance
Chairman Angus, M. (Sir) Angus, M. (Sir) Banham, J. (Sir)
Non-Executive Yes Yes Yes
Tenure (Years) 1 6 3
CEO/COO/MD Jarvis, P. Thomas, D. Thomas, D.
Tenure (Years) 8 1 6
Alt CEO/COO/MD N/A N/A N/A
Major Shareholdings (%) 4.8 0.0 20.4
WHITBREAD
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   XLIII 
1993 1998 2003
Company Name Williams Holdings Williams
Investor (31st Dec)
FT Classification Other Industrials Support Services
Service No No
FTSE100 Yes Yes
Market Cap. (£m) 1,832.0 2,487.0
Position 91 98
P/E Ratio 19.6 18.4
MV/Book (Excluding Intangibles) 7.0 (6.3)
Diversification
Channon/W&M Conglomerate Related
Core Yes Yes
Focus/Multiple Business Multiple Multiple
Hill & Pickering High Medium
Herfindahl 0.43 0.43
No. of Divisions 4 3
No. of Unrelated Activities 4 2
Largest Activity Turnover (%) 60.2 55.0
Largest Related Group Turnover (%) 60.2 89.1
Performance
External Turnover (£m) 1,164 2,320
Operating Profit (£m) 189 313
ROCE (%) 30.7 65.9
Gearing (%) 45.7 96.8
Corporate Governance
Chairman Rudd, N. (Sir) Rudd, N. (Sir)
Non-Executive No No
Tenure (Years) 11 16
CEO/COO/MD Carr, R. Carr, R.
Tenure (Years) 5 10
Alt CEO/COO/MD N/A N/A
Major Shareholdings (%) 8.3 12.5
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